

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION**

ABBY MARTIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

No. 1:20-cv-00596-MHC

STEVE WRIGLEY, Chancellor for
the Board of Regents of the
University System of Georgia, in his
official capacity, et al.,

Defendants.

**BRIEF OF T'RUAH AND J STREET AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF**

INSTITUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION
Jonathan L. Backer*
Mary B. McCord*
Georgetown University Law Center
600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
Telephone: (202) 662-9042
jb2845@georgetown.edu
mbm7@georgetown.edu

CAPLAN COBB LLP
Michael A. Caplan
Georgia Bar No. 601039
Jarred A. Klorfein
Georgia Bar No. 562965
75 Fourteenth Street, NE, Suite 2750
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
Tel: (404) 596-5600
Fax: (404) 596-5604
mcaplan@caplancobb.com
jklorfein@caplancobb.com

** Not admitted to practice
in Georgia*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE.....	1
INTRODUCTION	3
ARGUMENT.....	8
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IS A CRUCIAL SAFEGUARD FOR MINORITY GROUPS AND VIEWPOINTS.	8
II. SB 327 AND ITS ANALOGUES VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT.....	13
A. Consumer Boycotts Are Protected by the First Amendment.	14
B. Boycotts Are a Protected Form of Collective Action.....	21
CONCLUSION.....	25
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES	Page(s)
<i>Amawi v. Pflugerville Indep. Sch. Dist.</i> , 373 F. Supp. 3d 717 (W.D. Tex. 2019)	passim
<i>Arkansas Times LP v. Waldrip</i> , 362 F. Supp. 3d. 617 (E.D. Ark. 2019).....	8
<i>Bonner v. City of Prichard</i> , 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)	17
<i>Buckley v. Valeo</i> , 424 U.S. 1 (1976).....	22
<i>California v. Whitney</i> , 274 U.S. 357 (1927).....	24
<i>Cenac v. Murry</i> , 609 So. 2d. 1257 (Miss. 1992).....	16
<i>Citizens Against Rent Control / Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley</i> , 454 U.S. 290 (1981).....	22
<i>Ealy v. Littlejohn</i> , 569 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1978)	17
<i>Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB</i> , 796 F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1986)	16–17
<i>Gayle v. Browder</i> 352 U.S. 903 (1956).....	4
<i>Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos.</i> , 515 U.S. 557 (1995).....	21
<i>Jordahl v. Brnovich</i> , 336 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (D. Ariz. 2018)	8, 23
<i>Koontz v. Watson</i> , 283 F. Supp. 3d 1007 (D. Kan. 2018).....	8, 23
<i>Lamont v. Postmaster Gen.</i> , 381 U.S. 301 (1965).....	12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

	Page(s)
<i>NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.</i> , 458 U.S. 886 (1982).....	passim
<i>N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan</i> , 376 U.S. 254 (1964).....	8
<i>Par Indus., Inc. v. Target Container Co.</i> , 708 So. 2d 44 (Miss. 1998).....	16
<i>Ray v. Edwards</i> , 725 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1984)	17
<i>Robinson v. Anderson</i> , No. 74-3117 (5th Cir. Sept. 9, 1974)	17
<i>Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., (FAIR)</i> , 547 U.S. 47 (2006),.....	19–20
<i>Spence v. Washington</i> , 418 U.S. 405 (1974).....	14
<i>Texas v. Johnson</i> , 491 U.S. 397 (1989).....	14
<i>Watkins v. United States</i> , 354 U.S. 178 (1957).....	12
CONSTITUTION	
U.S. Const., amend. I	passim
STATUTES	
Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, tit. XII, 40 Stat. 217, 230–31	9
Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. § 983.....	19–20
O.C.G.A. § 50-5-85.....	passim
O.C.G.A. § 50-5-85(a)(1)(A)	14
O.C.G.A. § 50-5-85(a)(1)(B)	14, 20
O.C.G.A. § 50-5-85(b)	14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

	Page(s)
RULES	
5th Cir. Loc. R. 47.5.3.....	17
BILLS	
Combating BDS Act of 2019, S. 1, 116th Cong. §§ 401–08 (as passed by Senate, Feb. 5, 2019)	6
OTHER AUTHORITIES	
7 ADL Bulletin, Dec. 1950	12
8 ADL Bulletin, Jan. 1951	12
Albert Vorspan & David Saperstein, <i>Tough Choices: Jewish Perspectives on Social Justice</i> (1992).....	13
<i>Anti-Semitism: State Anti-BDS Legislation</i> , Jewish Virtual Library, https://perma.cc/CVB5-JH5J (last visited Nov. 21, 2019)	6
Aryeh Neier, <i>Defending My Enemy</i> (1979).....	13
Aviva Weingarten, <i>Jewish Organisations’ Response to Communism and to Senator McCarthy</i> (2008)	11
Cecile Counts, <i>Divestment Was Just One Weapon in the Battle Against Apartheid</i> , N.Y. Times (Jan. 27, 2013), https://perma.cc/PWK3-BE6Q	4–5
<i>From George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode Island, 18 August 1790</i> , Nat’l Archives: Founders Online, https://perma.cc/XM7V-SLTX (last visited Dec. 2, 2019)	9
Hillary Greene, <i>Antitrust Censorship of Economic Protest</i> , 59 Duke L.J. 1037 (2010)	18
Irving Howe, <i>World of Our Fathers</i> 539–40 (NYU Press 2005) (1976).....	10
Letter from Louis Marshall to Postmaster General A. S. Burleson (Jan. 5, 1918), reprinted in 2 <i>Louis Marshall: Champion of Liberty</i> 975 (Charles Reznikoff ed., 1957)	10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

	Page(s)
Mike Wallace, <i>Greater Gotham: A History of New York City from 1898 to 1919</i> (2017).....	10
Moses Rischin, <i>The Early Attitude of the American Jewish Committee to Zionism (1906–1922)</i> , 49 <i>Publications of the Am. Jewish Hist. Soc’y</i> 188 (1960).....	10
<i>Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS</i> , BDSMovement.net (July 9, 2005), https://perma.cc/ZV73-82HZ	3–4
<i>Rabbi Wise Breaks Silence on Boycott; Calls It Duty of All Self-Respecting Jews</i> , Jewish Telegraphic Agency (Aug. 15, 1933), https://perma.cc/MD4D-33Y4	5
Randall Kennedy, <i>Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott</i> , 98 <i>Yale L.J.</i> 999 (1989)	4
Seth F. Kreimer, <i>Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link</i> , 155 <i>U. Pa. L. Rev.</i> 11 (2006)	11
Stuart Svonkin, <i>Jews Against Prejudice</i> (1997).....	12
<i>Virginia Nonimportation Resolutions, 22 June 1770</i> , Nat’l Archives: Founders Online, https://perma.cc/ES2G-XANY (last visited Dec. 2, 2019)	5
2 Zosa Szajkowski, <i>Jews, Wars, and Communism: The Impact of the 1919-20 Red Scare on American Jewish Life</i> (1974).....	10

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Jewish tradition reflects a strong commitment to freedom of thought and expression. T’ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights brings together rabbis and cantors from all streams of Judaism, together with members of the Jewish community, to act on the Jewish imperative to respect and advance the human rights of all people. T’ruah represents more than 2,000 Jewish clergy across North America, along with thousands of Jewish lay people and activists. Grounded in Torah and Jewish historical experience and guided by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, T’ruah calls upon Jews to assert Jewish values by raising their voices and taking concrete steps to protect and expand human rights in North America, Israel, and the occupied Palestinian territories. T’ruah believes that a just and secure future for Israelis and Palestinians will best be achieved by a negotiated resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that results in both peoples living peacefully side by side, each within their own sovereign states. While T’ruah does not reject out of hand the strategic, targeted use of boycott and divestment in justice campaigns, T’ruah does not affiliate with the Global Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (“Global BDS”) movement out of concern that its lack of distinction between Israel proper and the occupied Palestinian territories points to a potential rejection of Israel’s right to exist, a right recognized by the United Nations and other international bodies, and

because of concern about anti-Semitism among some BDS activists. At the same time, T'ruah opposes efforts to stifle or penalize participation in the Global BDS movement, as such censorship is contrary to Jewish values and the First Amendment. T'ruah believes that the Jewish community is strengthened by vigorous debate on issues that are vital to the well-being of Israel and the worldwide Jewish community. Free speech—including the right to boycott and the right to speech with which we vehemently disagree—constitutes an essential component of democracy, a basic human right, and a fundamental value of Judaism. Jewish tradition teaches this in Talmud, where the rabbis frequently use colorful language to repudiate each other's opinions, while leaving even rejected opinions in the text for later study. T'ruah also believes that boycotts and other forms of economic pressure are a protected and legitimate form of protest, and one in which the Jewish community has participated—for example, in support of the rights of farmworkers, against German-made goods during and following the Nazi era, and against Pepsi when it abided by Arab States' boycott of Israel.

J Street organizes and mobilizes pro-Israel, pro-peace Americans who want Israel to be secure, democratic, and the national home of the Jewish people. Working in American politics and the Jewish community, J Street advocates for policies that advance shared U.S. and Israeli interests as well as Jewish and democratic values,

leading to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Strong and vibrant debate has characterized the Jewish tradition for millennia, and the same openness should govern discourse about Israel today. Those who believe that there is one acceptable view on Israel—theirs—should not be allowed to impose constraints on what constitutes acceptable speech in the Jewish community or in the broader marketplace of ideas. J Street believes that censorship of those who question American or Israeli policy puts the intellectual integrity and future of the Jewish community at risk and threatens to further calcify opinions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, making more remote the realization of a just and secure future for both Israelis and Palestinians.¹

INTRODUCTION

In 2005, a coalition of Palestinian civil-society organizations called on “people of conscience all over the world to impose broad boycotts and implement divestment initiatives against Israel . . . until Israel meets its obligation to recognize the Palestinian people’s inalienable right to self-determination,” thus sparking the Global BDS movement. *Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS*, BDSMovement.net

¹ Counsel for amici certifies that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person or entity, other than amici and their counsel, made any monetary contribution intended to fund this brief’s preparation or submission.

(July 9, 2005), <https://perma.cc/ZV73-82HZ>. The Global BDS movement blurs the distinction between “Israel proper”—the territory that Israel possessed prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War—and Israeli settlements on the land that it conquered in that war and has since occupied by targeting the movement’s boycotts at the entirety of the economy and people of Israel and its settlements rather than at companies that specifically help to perpetuate Israel’s presence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Some leaders of the Global BDS movement have trafficked in anti-Semitic ideas and rhetoric and have questioned the right of the Jewish people to self-determination. Because of those and other troubling aspects of the Global BDS movement, amici do not support or participate in its initiatives.

Despite amici’s concerns about aspects of the Global BDS movement, amici recognize that consumer boycotts—even those with which amici disagree—are forms of collective action that powerfully communicate political messages. Indeed, consumer boycotts played a critical role in the founding of the United States, the dismantling of Jim Crow, and the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. *See* Randall Kennedy, *Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott*, 98 Yale L.J. 999, 1000 (1989) (noting that the Montgomery Bus Boycott led to *Gayle v. Browder*, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), which “effectively overruled *Plessy v. Ferguson*”); Cecile Counts, *Divestment Was Just*

One Weapon in the Battle Against Apartheid, N.Y. Times (Jan. 27, 2013), <https://perma.cc/PWK3-BE6Q>; *Virginia Nonimportation Resolutions, 22 June 1770*, Nat'l Archives: Founders Online, <https://perma.cc/ES2G-XANY> (last visited Dec. 2, 2019) (calling for colonial boycott of British and European goods). Consumer boycotts also have been used by the American Jewish community as a tool of self-defense. In the wake of Adolph Hitler's rise to power, Jewish groups organized a boycott of German goods. *Rabbi Wise Breaks Silence on Boycott; Calls It Duty of All Self-Respecting Jews*, Jewish Telegraphic Agency (Aug. 15, 1933), <https://perma.cc/MD4D-33Y4> (quoting Rabbi Stephen S. Wise as saying, "As long as Germany declares the Jews to be an inferior race, poisoning and persecuting them, decent, self-respecting Jews cannot deal with Germany in any way, buy or sell or maintain any manner of commerce with Germany or travel on German Boats"). By referencing the aforementioned examples of consumer boycotts, amici in no way mean to equate those boycotts' motivations or targets to those of the Global BDS movement. The point is, rather, that those who oppose the Global BDS movement cannot censor its activities without exposing other activism with which they agree to similar suppression.

Given this history and amici's strong commitment to freedom of thought and expression, amici reject the choice of many lawmakers to express their disagreement

with the Global BDS movement's positions and tactics by enacting laws that penalize companies and individuals for participating in boycotts against Israel. To date, 32 states have adopted laws designed to discourage and penalize boycotts against Israel. *Anti-Semitism: State Anti-BDS Legislation*, Jewish Virtual Library, <https://perma.cc/FM7Y-3LZL> (last visited September 17, 2020). And the U.S. Senate has passed a bill that, if signed into law, would encourage other states to adopt similar anti-BDS legislation. *Combatting BDS Act of 2019*, S. 1, 116th Cong. §§ 401–08 (as passed by Senate, Feb. 5, 2019).

Amici oppose anti-BDS laws because they penalize individuals for expressing their views about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Instead of encouraging or even simply permitting constructive dialogue about this important issue, anti-BDS laws drive people into ideological corners, making the possibility of political progress on the conflict more remote. Congress and state legislatures are free to express their institutional opposition to the Global BDS movement through resolutions or hearings on the subject, but the First Amendment does not permit governments to use fiscal policy to pick winners and losers among those expressing their views on policy debates.

This case concerns Georgia's anti-BDS law, known as Senate Bill 327 (SB 327), which is codified at Official Code of Georgia Annotated Section 50-5-85.

Plaintiff Abby Martin is a documentarian and journalist whose work is critical of the Israeli government and the United States' support of it. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 9, ECF No. 26. She supports and participates in in the Global BDS movement. *Id.* ¶ 4. Georgia Southern University disinvited Martin from delivering a keynote speech at an academic conference and deprived her of an honorarium when she refused to sign a contract that contained a provision required by SB 327 certifying that she would not engage in boycotts against Israel during the contract's term. *Id.* ¶¶ 5–6. In response, Martin sued the Chancellor of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, Steven Wrigley, President of Georgia Southern University, Kyle Marrero, and the conference planners who organized the event to which Martin had been invited, challenging the legality of SB 327.

Defendants argue that SB 327 is constitutional because boycotts are not protected speech or expression under the First Amendment. Br. Supp. Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 3, ECF No. 37-1 ("Mot."). This argument rests on a strained view of longstanding Supreme Court precedent establishing exactly the opposite: consumer boycotts *are* entitled to First Amendment protection. *NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware*, 458 U.S. 886, 907 (1982). Relying on *Claiborne Hardware*, all but one court that has considered challenges to anti-BDS laws have concluded that such laws are unconstitutional. *Amawi v. Pflugerville Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 373 F. Supp. 3d 717,

745 (W.D. Tex. 2019), *vacated as moot* 956 F.3d 816 (5th Cir. 2020); *Jordahl v. Brnovich*, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1040 (D. Ariz. 2018), *vacated as moot* 789 F. App'x 589 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 2020) (mem.); *Koontz v. Watson*, 283 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1024 (D. Kan. 2018). *But see Arkansas Times LP v. Waldrip*, 362 F. Supp. 3d 617, 623 (E.D. Ark. 2019), *appeal docketed* No. 19-1378 (8th Cir. Feb. 25, 2019). This Court should reach the same conclusion and deny Defendants' motion to dismiss.

ARGUMENT

I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IS A CRUCIAL SAFEGUARD FOR MINORITY GROUPS AND VIEWPOINTS.

As the Supreme Court famously stated in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” *Id.* at 270. That bedrock First Amendment principle applies with full force to debate over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has been a source of disagreement and friction in U.S. foreign policy since even before Israel achieved independence in 1948. SB 327 is a brazen attempt to penalize those who engage in collective action to express their opposition to Israel’s government and its policies and is, in turn, a violation of the First Amendment’s protection of free expression. Even though amici do not support the Global BDS movement, historical experience and tradition teach that Jews must speak out against government censorship like SB 327.

In a 1790 letter to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode Island, President George Washington wrote that “the Government of the United States . . . gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance.” *From George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode Island, 18 August 1790*, Nat’l Archives: Founders Online, <https://perma.cc/XM7V-SLTX> (last visited Dec. 2, 2019). That promise of freedom of religion drew many Jewish immigrants to the shores of the United States. But, for American Jews and other minorities, America has not always lived up to that promise. During two dark chapters of American history—the First Red Scare (1917–20) and the McCarthy Era (late 1940s through 50s)—fears of Communism fueled government censorship and repression. And, as two examples show, Jews were among the victims of those epochs’ injustices.

As the First Red Scare took hold, Congress enacted the Espionage Act of 1917, which, among other things, gave the Postmaster General the power to crack down on supposedly subversive publications. Pub. L. No. 65-24, tit. XII, 40 Stat. 217, 230–31. Using that authority, Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson threatened to revoke the *Jewish Daily Forward*’s second-class postage rates in response to the outlet’s publication of articles expressing opposition America’s involvement in World War I. Mike Wallace, *Greater Gotham: A History of New York City from 1898 to 1919*, at 991 (2017); 2 Zosa Szajkowski, *Jews, Wars, and*

Communism: The Impact of the 1919-20 Red Scare on American Jewish Life 30 (1974). Louis Marshall, a prominent lawyer and one of the founders of the American Jewish Committee—a group founded in 1906 to secure civil and religious rights for Jews—successfully interceded on behalf of the *Forward* to preserve the newspaper’s mail privileges, but at a heavy price. Irving Howe, *World of Our Fathers* 539–40 (NYU Press 2005) (1976); Moses Rischin, *The Early Attitude of the American Jewish Committee to Zionism (1906–1922)*, 49 *Publications of the Am. Jewish Hist. Soc’y* 188, 196 (1960). Abraham Cahan, the newspaper’s editor, pledged to cease publication of pacifist articles, and Marshall promised Burleson that he would act as a “private censor” and identify any *Forward* articles that “could be considered as contrary to the public interests.” Letter from Louis Marshall to Postmaster General A. S. Burleson (Jan. 5, 1918), *reprinted in 2 Louis Marshall: Champion of Liberty* 975 (Charles Reznikoff ed., 1957). The *Forward* kept its doors open, but only by succumbing to censorship.

During the McCarthy Era, congressional committees including the infamous House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and Senator Joseph McCarthy’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations delved into individuals’ private associations in an attempt to uncover supposed Communist affiliations. Fear of those investigations prompted Americans to engage in widespread private

ensorship and even self-censorship to avoid being branded as Communist sympathizers. Seth F. Kreimer, *Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link*, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 11, 42–46 (2006). One target of those largely unchecked investigations was a Jewish woman named Anna Rosenberg, whom Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall nominated in 1950 to be Assistant Secretary of Defense. After receiving a unanimous confirmation vote in the Senate Committee on Armed Forces, rumors began circulating that Rosenberg had associated with or been a member of the Communist Party in the 1930s. Aviva Weingarten, *Jewish Organisations' Response to Communism and to Senator McCarthy* 112 (2008). Openly anti-Semitic supporters of Senator McCarthy—Gerald L.K. Smith, Wesley Swift, and Benjamin Freedman—lobbied Congress in an attempt to defeat Rosenberg's nomination. *Id.* at 113. Freedman obtained files from HUAC showing that someone named Anna Rosenberg belonged to a Communist literary society in the 1930s. *Id.* He also engineered unreliable testimony by a witness who claimed to have known Rosenberg when she had supposedly been active in Communist circles. *Id.* at 113–15.

Rosenberg eventually secured Senate confirmation, in part because Jewish leaders rallied to her defense. Stuart Svonkin, *Jews Against Prejudice* 121 (1997). For Jewish organizations, the attacks on Rosenberg exposed how anti-Semites could

capitalize on anti-Communist hysteria to tarnish Jews' reputations. An Anti-Defamation League (ADL) publication described Rosenberg as “a latter-day Dreyfus,” invoking the name of the Alsatian French military officer of Jewish descent who was convicted on trumped-up espionage charges. *Id.* at 120 (quoting 7 ADL Bulletin, Dec. 1950, at 5). And the ADL's national director, Benjamin Epstein, warned that all Jews were “targets” of the Rosenberg affair because “[t]he goal was to keep Jews out of Washington and out of public office; to label them as unreliable citizens, as second grade citizens, as traitors.” *Id.* (quoting 8 ADL Bulletin, Jan. 1951, at 2).

Since the end of the McCarthy Era, First Amendment case law has matured to offer more robust protections against the types of injustices that the *Forward* and Anna Rosenberg faced. In *Lamont v. Postmaster General*, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), the Supreme Court struck down a law similar to the one wielded against the *Forward* that allowed the Postmaster General to detain mail from abroad deemed “communist political propaganda” and release it only upon request by the intended recipient. *Id.* at 306–07. And in *Watkins v. United States*, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), the Court overturned a criminal contempt conviction of a man who refused to divulge to HUAC the names of people who had once associated with the Communist Party, stating that the First Amendment denies Congress “a general power to expose where

the predominant result can only be an invasion of the private rights of individuals.”
Id. at 200.

As Jewish organizations, amici are mindful that carving out exceptions to the First Amendment’s protections imperils the Jewish community. “If American Jews have attained an unprecedented measure of security and success in America, one major reason is the majestic sweep of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.” Albert Vorspan & David Saperstein, *Tough Choices: Jewish Perspectives on Social Justice* 40 (1992); *see also* Aryeh Neier, *Defending My Enemy* 7 (1979) (“It is dangerous to let the Nazis have their say. But it is more dangerous by far to destroy the laws that deny anyone the power to silence Jews if Jews should need to cry out to each other and to the world for succor. . . . When the time comes for Jews to speak, to publish, and to march in behalf of their own safety, [states] and the United States must not be allowed to interfere.”). Anti-BDS laws like SB 327 are troubling echoes of the past and cannot be squared with the First Amendment and the jurisprudence that has emerged construing its protections.

II. SB 327 AND ITS ANALOGUES VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

Under SB 327, a contract related to “construction or the provision of services, supplies, or information technology” between the State and an “individual or company” in Georgia must contain a written certification that the contractor “is not

currently engaged in, and agrees for the duration of the contract not to engage in, a boycott of Israel.” O.C.G.A. § 50-5-85(b). A “boycott of Israel” is defined as:

engaging in refusals to deal with, terminating business activities with, or other actions that are intended to limit commercial relations with Israel or individuals or companies doing business in Israel or in Israeli-controlled territories when such action are taken:

- (A) In compliance or adherence to calls for a boycott of Israel other than those boycotts to which 50 U.S.C. App. Section 2407(c), as it existed on January 1, 2016, applies; or
- (B) In a manner that discriminates on the basis of nationality, national origin, religion, or other unreasonable basis that is not founded on a valid business reason.

Id. § 50-5-85(a)(1).

A. Consumer Boycotts Are Protected by the First Amendment.

The First Amendment prohibits laws “abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. First Amendment safeguards “do[] not end at the spoken or written word,” *Texas v. Johnson*, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989), but also protect conduct “inten[ded] to convey a particularized message” that is likely to “be understood by those who view[] it,” *Spence v. Washington*, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). Defendants argue that SB 327 does not violate the First Amendment because individual purchasing decisions are “neither speech nor inherently expressive conduct.” Mot. 5. This argument cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s

case law establishing that politically motivated boycotts like those discouraged by SB 327 are entitled to First Amendment protection.

Of direct relevance to this case is *Claiborne Hardware*, in which the Supreme Court held that consumer boycotts are political expression protected by the First Amendment. 458 U.S. at 907. *Claiborne Hardware* grew out of a boycott launched in 1966 by black citizens of Port Gibson, Mississippi, against white-owned businesses as a vehicle for demanding racial equality and integration. *Id.* at 889. The boycott had a significant impact, prompting the targeted companies to file suit in state court where they obtained tort damages for lost earnings based on a claim of malicious interference with business. *Id.* at 891–94. Holding that “each . . . element[] of the boycott is a form of speech or conduct that is ordinarily entitled to protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments,” the Supreme Court reversed the judgment against the boycott participants. *Id.* at 907, 934. Those protected elements included the boycott itself, which was “supported by speeches and nonviolent picketing” and calls by participants for others to join the cause. *Id.* at 907.

Through a strained reading of *Claiborne Hardware*, Defendants parse the elements of a boycott, concluding that the meetings, speeches, and non-violent picketing are entitled to First Amendment protection, but not the individual

purchasing decisions that those aspects of a boycott support. Mot. 16–17. But in *Claiborne Hardware*, it was the boycott participants’ refusal to patronize white-owned businesses—not their speeches, meetings, and picketing—that proximately caused the businesses to lose earnings. If, as Defendants argue, only the meetings, speeches, and picketing that supported the boycott had received First Amendment protection from the *Claiborne Hardware* Court, then the boycott participants still could have been held liable for interfering with business relations through their coordinated effort to withhold their patronage from the targeted companies.² *Claiborne Hardware*’s holding would make little sense unless—contrary to Defendants’ rendering—political boycotts themselves are protected by the First Amendment. See *Amawi*, 373 F. Supp. 3d at 744 (“There would be no basis for this damages limitation if the decision to withhold patronage were not . . . protected [by the First Amendment].”). Not surprisingly, therefore, the Eleventh Circuit has described *Claiborne Hardware* as holding “that the First Amendment protects a secondary boycott organized by a civil rights group.” *Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. &*

² A cause of action exists under Mississippi law for malicious injury to business where “[1] one engages in some act [2] with a malicious intent to interfere and injure the business of another, and [3] injury does in fact result.” *Par Indus., Inc. v. Target Container Co.*, 708 So. 2d 44, 48 (Miss. 1998) (quoting *Cenac v. Murry*, 609 So. 2d. 1257, 1271 (Miss. 1992)).

Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1986); *see also Ray v. Edwards*, 725 F.2d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The Supreme Court held [in *Claiborne Hardware*] that the boycott was political activity, protected by the first amendment.”); *Ealy v. Littlejohn*, 569 F.2d 219, 222 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that the Fifth Circuit directed the issuance of an injunction against a state court “from interfering with the rights of . . . parties to engage in peaceful protests and boycotts” in *Robinson v. Anderson*, No. 74-3117 (5th Cir. Sept. 9, 1974)).³

The First Amendment’s applicability to consumer boycotts themselves—and not just the speech and conduct that support them—is confirmed by *FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association (SCTLA)*, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). That case concerned a coordinated effort by trial lawyers to refuse to represent indigent criminal defendants in protest of the District of Columbia’s compensation rates for such representation. *Id.* at 414. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) determined that the lawyers’ boycott amounted to an unfair trade practice and issued a cease-and-desist order. *Id.* at 419–20. That order applied only to the lawyers’ “concerted

³ Unpublished opinions issued by the Fifth Circuit prior to January 1, 1996, are precedent in that circuit. 5th Cir. Loc. R. 47.5.3. Precedential Fifth Circuit decisions handed down prior to September 30, 1981, are binding on the Eleventh Circuit and its district courts. *Bonner v. City of Prichard*, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

refusal . . . to accept any further assignments” and not to their “efforts to publicize the boycott, to explain the merits of [their] cause, and to lobby District officials to enact favorable legislation.” *Id.* at 426. Thus, *SCTLA* presented the Court with an unambiguous question of whether consumer boycotts, isolated from any accompanying expressive activity, are protected by the First Amendment.

The Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative: “Every concerted refusal to do business with a potential customer or supplier has an expressive component.” *Id.* at 431. The Court nevertheless upheld the FTC’s order, not because the boycott was non-expressive, but because it sought only “to economically advantage the participants.” *Id.* at 428. That is, the boycott, expressive as it was, nonetheless constituted an antitrust violation. In turn, because the boycott’s objectives were purely economic, the Court held that it could be subject to antitrust law without offending First Amendment principles. *Id.* at 427; *see also* Hillary Greene, *Antitrust Censorship of Economic Protest*, 59 Duke L.J. 1037, 1066–67 (2010) (“[A]ny speech interests inherent in the conduct at issue [in *SCTLA*] are trumped not only by the government’s substantive interest in antitrust regulation but also by the government’s ‘administrative efficiency interests in antitrust regulation.’” (quoting *SCTLA*, 493 U.S. at 430)). Plainly, companies and individuals who boycott Israel are motivated by political convictions, not economic self-interest.

Accordingly, the government interests that justified the FTC's order in *SCTLA* do not underlie SB 327.

In arguing that Martin's conduct is not expressive, Defendants erroneously rely on *Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR)*, 547 U.S. 47 (2006). Mot. 4–10, 12, 14–18. *FAIR* upheld a federal law known as the Solomon Amendment that withholds contracts and grants to universities that bar ROTC or military recruiters from campus. 547 U.S. at 70. The Solomon Amendment is facially neutral: it denies contracts to universities that close their gates to ROTC or military recruiters for any reason, political or apolitical. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (withholding grants and contracts to universities that have “a policy or practice . . . that either prohibits, or in effect prevents” the establishment of an ROTC unit or campus access to military recruiters). Because of the Solomon Amendment's neutral terms, a university might be denied a federal contract for turning away ROTC based on the apolitical judgment that the school's curriculum better prepares students for civilian rather than military life or for excluding military recruiters from a job fair because other employers signed up first. Accordingly, the Court held that a university's decision to bar the military from campus is expressive only when “accompanied . . . with speech” that explains the decision. *FAIR*, 547 U.S. at 66.

Unlike the Solomon Amendment, however, SB 327 is not facially neutral, contrary to what Defendants assert.⁴ Mot. 22 n.9. SB 327 withholds contracts only from those whose business decisions are “intended to limit commercial relations with Israel or individuals or companies doing business in Israel or in Israeli-controlled territories.” O.C.G.A. § 50-5-85(a)(1). It does not apply to actions taken for “a valid business reason,” i.e., for non-political reasons. *Id.* § 50-5-85(a)(1)(B). Put differently, a breach-of-contract claim based on SB 327 could not proceed without proof that the contractor’s refusal to deal was based on a political viewpoint as opposed to a business reason devoid of any political perspective. A neutral version of SB 327 would simply (if outlandishly) require state contractors to do business in Israel, denying contracts to companies that lack business there for completely apolitical reasons. For example, a small Georgia company that does business only domestically might be unable to obtain a state contract under a neutral version of SB 327. The absurdity of such an alternative policy underscores that SB

⁴ Defendants argue that SB 327 is facially neutral because “decisions not to purchase based on valid business reasons are not properly characterized as a boycott.” Mot. 22 n.9. But there’s the rub. By specifically defining the term “boycott” to exclude refusals to deal for apolitical reasons, SB 327 removes any shred of doubt that the statute exclusively targets viewpoints anathema to the State. The viewpoint-discriminatory nature of SB 237 also is evident from the plain meaning of the term “boycott.” But the statute’s valid-business-reason exception says the quiet part out loud.

327 is no evenhanded measure to promote business with Israel but, rather, a policy intended to penalize expressive activism concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Because of the salient differences between the Solomon Amendment and SB 327, *FAIR* is inapposite.

B. Boycotts Are a Protected Form of Collective Action.

Defendants’ analysis of SB 327 also misses the mark by atomizing boycotts—a type of *collective* action—into *individual* purchasing decisions. Mot. 9–10 (describing the relevant inquiry as whether a reasonable observer would be aware that a political message underlies “a state contractor’s private purchases”). By characterizing boycotts at the molecular level, Defendants attempt to elide their expressive value.

Boycotts are similar to parades in that the communicative power of both can be detected only by viewing them in the aggregate. In *Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston*, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), the Supreme Court held that parades are expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. *Id.* at 568–69. “Parades are . . . a form of expression,” the Court stated, “not just motion,” because they are comprised of “marchers who are making some sort of collective point, not just to each other but to bystanders along the way.” *Id.* at 568. Even if an individual marcher also engages in expressive conduct, a parade’s

“collective point” might not be discernible by focusing on that isolated marcher. Similarly, a boycott’s expressive message is not conveyed fully by a single purchasing decision. By analyzing consumer boycotts through too narrow of a lens, Defendants obscure boycotts’ expressive power at the collective level—a power recognized by the Supreme Court’s boycott jurisprudence.

First Amendment limitations on campaign-finance regulations flow from a similar recognition that group association amplifies expression that might be less powerful by itself. Through campaign contributions, “like-minded persons [can] pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals” and “aggregate large sums of money to promote effective advocacy.” *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (per curiam). The “value” of campaign contributions “is that by collective effort individuals can make their views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or lost.” *Citizens Against Rent Control / Coal. for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley*, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981). Boycotts are, in effect, the mirror image of campaign financing. Instead of pooling their resources to support a candidate or political cause, boycott participants coordinate the withholding of resources that would otherwise flow to and support a company’s activities. The communicative power of boycotts is no less impactful because they deny resources to companies that participants oppose rather than giving them to entities that they support.

The impact of anti-BDS laws on collective expression is evident from the stories of the plaintiffs who have come forward to challenge them. Esther Koontz had an individual offer to contract with the Kansas State Department of Education to coach and train public school math and science teachers. *Koontz*, 283 F. Supp. 3d at 1013–14. As a member of the Mennonite Church, which supports the Global BDS movement, she boycotts Israeli products. *Id.* at 1013. Kansas’s anti-BDS law thus forced Koontz to choose between continuing to participate in her Church’s boycott and contracting with the Department of Education. *Id.* at 1014.

Mikkel Jordahl is an attorney who personally boycotts Israeli products in response to the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America’s Peace Not Walls campaign and as a non-Jewish member of Jewish Voice for Peace, which has endorsed the Global BDS movement. *Jordahl*, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1028–29. Jordahl refrained from engaging his law firm, which he alone owns, from participating in boycott activity as well to avoid losing a contract with a county jail on account of Arizona’s anti-BDS law. *Id.*

George Hale is a radio reporter with Texas A&M’s NPR station. *Amawi*, 373 F. Supp. 3d at 734. Prior to joining the station, he reported on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for eight years, living in the Palestinian territories, an experience that led him to feel solidarity with the Palestinian cause and to align himself with the Global

BDS movement. Until the enactment of Texas’s anti-BDS law, Hale boycotted the cosmetic company Ahava because of its operations in the West Bank and the technology company Hewlett Packard, because it provides Israel with technology that Hale believes is used to violate Palestinians’ rights. *Id.* After attempting to sign under protest an employment contract with an anti-boycott provision by notating his objection, Hale was threatened with termination if he would not sign a clean copy of the contract. *Id.* at 734–35. Hale acquiesced and stopped participating in the Global BDS movement in order to meet his contractual obligations. *Id.* at 735.

Koontz, Jordahl, and Hale are but three examples of individuals whom anti-BDS laws inhibit from joining in collective expressive activity. The First Amendment is incompatible with laws that force individuals like Koontz, Jordahl, and Hale to stand on the sidelines while the groups with which they associate engage in collective action. As Justice Louis Brandeis (who was also a Zionist leader) wrote, “the remedy to be applied” to disfavored speech “is more speech, not enforced silence.” *California v. Whitney*, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Georgia is free to express its opposition to boycotts against Israel, but it may not penalize state contractors for participating in them.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully urge this Court to deny Defendants' motion to dismiss.

Dated: September 30, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

Jonathan L. Backer*
Mary B. McCord*
INSTITUTE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION
Georgetown University Law Center
600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
Telephone: (202) 662-9042
jb2845@georgetown.edu
mbm7@georgetown.edu

** Not admitted to practice
in Georgia*

/s/ Jarred A. Klorfein
Michael A. Caplan
Georgia Bar No. 601039
Jarred A. Klorfein
Georgia Bar No. 562965
CAPLAN COBB LLP
75 Fourteenth Street, NE, Suite 2750
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
Tel: (404) 596-5600
Fax: (404) 596-5604
mcaplan@caplancobb.com
jklorfein@caplancobb.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

LOCAL RULE 7.1 CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that the foregoing has been prepared in 14-point Times New Roman font in accordance with Local Rule 5.1(C).

Dated: October 8, 2020.

/s/ Jarred A. Klorfein

Jarred A. Klorfein

Georgia Bar No. 562965

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Jarred A. Klorfein, hereby certify that on October 8, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing Brief of T'ruah and J Street as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court of Northern Georgia, by using the Court's CM/ECF system, which will send notice of such filing to all registered CM/ECF users.

/s/ Jarred A. Klorfein
Jarred A. Klorfein
Georgia Bar No. 562965