ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH

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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2017 ruling in Buck v. Davis highlights the disturbing consequences of deficient representation in capital cases.1 Duane Edward Buck was sentenced to death in 1997 after the defense’s own witness testified that “[t]here is an overrepresentation of Blacks among the violent offenders” and the defendant’s race made him more likely to be dangerous in the future.2 During closing argument, defense counsel failed to object to the State’s reference to this testimony. This improper evidence of race was the only evidence presented on which the jury could base a finding of “future dangerousness”—a necessary finding to sentence a defendant to death, as opposed to life in prison. The jury sentenced Buck to death based on this improper evidence. Thus, in Buck, the Supreme Court found ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that Buck’s trial counsel performed deficiently and that Buck was prejudiced by that deficiency.3

Buck v. Davis, one of today’s clearest violations of a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial, went un-reviewed on the merits through countless appeals over the course of twenty-one years and had yet to be rectified when it reached the Supreme Court. Even after the State of Texas recognized a deficiency in Buck’s case, procedural roadblocks continued to deny Buck relief.4 Perhaps most concern-

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2. Id. at 768–69.
3. See id. at 775–80. To demonstrate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland, a defendant “must show both that counsel performed deficiently and that counsel’s deficient performance caused him prejudice.” Id. at 775 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). The first prong cannot be satisfied so long as counsel’s decisions are considered within the “wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Lawyer error must fall so outside the bounds of professional competence that it cannot be considered to constitute the “counsel” that is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687. Second, a defendant must show prejudice, i.e., “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
4. Brief for Petitioner at 3–4, Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (No. 15-8049), 2016 WL 4073689 [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief]. Texas conceded error in the case and said it would not oppose rehearing petition by Buck. Id. at 3. However, the State did not ultimately grant Buck’s application for a Certificate of Appealability. In 2006, a federal district court found Buck’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim unreviewable on the merits because his counsel failed to raise the issue in his first post-conviction proceeding. Id. at 3–4; see Amy Howe,
ing, though, is the fact that the ineffectiveness of Buck’s counsel was foreseeable and, thus, preventable.

The attorney who failed to adequately represent Buck in his initial proceedings carried a track record of deficient representation that today totals twenty former clients sentenced to death.\(^5\) Unfortunately, this pattern of deficient representation by a capital-defense attorney is not unique. Nor is this just a problem in Texas. “Repeat offenders”—attorneys whom courts continue to appoint as defense counsel in capital cases despite demonstrably defective representation in past cases—present a problem across the country.\(^6\) While no single shortcoming renders an attorney’s representation deficient, the most common deficiency of repeat-offender attorneys is their failure to zealously advocate on behalf of their client at the sentencing phase of trial. For instance, the representation is considered “ineffective” for purposes of deeming the attorney a “repeat offender” when the defense’s case for a life sentence, as opposed to death, is unusually short. Evidence of an inappropriately short case at the sentencing phase may include presenting little-to-no mitigation evidence; calling few, if any, defense witnesses; and failing to interview potential witnesses (either a key witness or a sufficient number of witnesses generally). Failing to zealously advocate at the sentencing phase is often what leads to a death sentence, as opposed to life in prison.\(^7\)

The “repeat” aspect of “repeat offender” points to an issue uniquely problematic in the capital context. Courts continue to appoint repeat offenders because, having tried capital cases previously, repeat offenders project an image of experience. Further, these attorneys shortcomings are often insufficient to satisfy the high threshold for an ineffective-assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment.\(^8\) These attorneys gain credibility through experience, while the quality of that experience is not often challenged successfully.

Current measures and remedies designed to prevent deficient capital representation are insufficient to guard against the repeat-offender problem. Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims,\(^9\) for example, are only remedial and do not prevent the appointment of inadequate attorneys in the first place. Buck’s plight—spending decades on death row before the Supreme Court finally ruled on

\(^5\) Adam Liptak, \textit{A Lawyer Known Best for Losing Capital Cases}, N.Y. Times (May 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/us/18bar.html. This attorney has since stopped his capital defense work. \textit{Id.}

\(^6\) In this Note, the phrase “repeat offender” denotes ineffective counsel whom courts appoint to defend capital cases in a recurring national trend. Additionally, “ineffectiveness” does not necessarily refer to a finding of a Sixth Amendment violation (ineffective assistance of counsel), though such a finding may indicate that an attorney is a repeat offender. Additional factors may make an attorney sufficiently ineffective to qualify as a repeat offender.

\(^7\) See \textit{infra} note 25 and accompanying text.

\(^8\) See, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{infra} Section II.B (repeat offenders in Arizona, Florida, Illinois, and Louisiana).

\(^9\) See \textit{supra} note 3.
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim—demonstrates the problem with relying on after-the-fact remedial measures to address ineffective counsel. Rather than rely on remedial measures, states should improve procedures for the appointment of counsel to prevent foreseeably deficient attorneys, like the one who represented Buck in his initial trial, from defending capital defendants in the future. Given that so much of a defendant’s fate rests in the hands of his or her attorney at the sentencing phase of trial, a defendant may live or die depending on the quality of his or her counsel. This gamble is unacceptable.

Section I will discuss in more detail the deficient representation in the trial that led to the Court’s decision in Buck v. Davis. Section II will explain why the appointing court should have known that Buck’s trial counsel was incompetent and illustrate why it is necessary to institute procedures to guide judges in their appointment of capital defense counsel. It will further reveal that Buck’s plight is not unique; the system for appointing capital defense counsel permits conspicuously deficient attorneys to continue to represent capital defendants across the country. This faulty system is due, in part, to the fact that courts often consider only one metric to evaluate a capital defense attorney’s qualifications: the number of capital trials in which the attorney has been involved. This standard is an imperfect measure of the quality of a capital defense attorney. Section III will suggest a two-prong approach for eliminating the appointment—and existence—of repeat offenders. States should (1) redefine “experience” for purposes of appointment decisions in capital cases, and (2) institute minimum requirements for offering mitigation evidence at the sentencing phase of trial.

I. DEFICIENT REPRESENTATION IN BUCK V. DAVIS

This Section will demonstrate that the representation of Duane Edward Buck at the trial stage of Buck v. Davis was deficient. Deficient representation is the first prong necessary to establish that an attorney is a repeat offender. The second prong is established when that same attorney is repeatedly appointed to capital cases. The attorney who represented Buck at trial was deficient because he (1) introduced problematic evidence that race contributed to future dangerousness, and (2) failed to object appropriately on cross-examination when the prosecution referenced the same problematic evidence.

Duane Edward Buck was not a sympathetic petitioner when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Buck v. Davis. Buck had been romantically involved with victim Debra Gardner, who Buck believed had since become involved with Kenneth Butler. On July 30, 1995, he forced entry into Gardner’s home, fought with her, and struck her.10 Later, he returned and shot and killed Butler. In the process, he also shot at two other individuals in Gardner’s home—one of whom

was his own step-sister, Phyllis Taylor. Buck chased Gardner onto the street and shot her while her children looked on. After police arrived at the scene, he told them, “[t]he bitch deserved what she got.”

The central issue at Buck’s trial was not his guilt but his “future dangerousness.” Before a defendant may receive the death penalty, a Texas jury must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, several “special issues,” including “future dangerousness.” Therefore, if even one juror found a lack of future dangerousness, the death penalty cannot be imposed. To assess whether Buck was likely to commit criminal acts of violence in the future, his defense counsel hired psychologist Dr. Walter Quijano. According to Dr. Quijano, “being ‘Black’ was a ‘statistical factor’ that [i]ncreased [the] probability” that Buck would “commit future acts of criminal violence.” Not only was evidence of Buck’s race impermissibly admitted at trial, but Buck’s own attorney was the one who introduced it. This warrants repeating: Buck’s own counsel introduced evidence that Buck’s race made him more likely to commit future acts of violence.

Moreover, Buck’s counsel failed to object when the prosecution cross-examined Dr. Quijano on this “evidence.” The prosecution asked Dr. Quijano, “You have determined that . . . a male is more violent than a female because that’s just the way it is, and that the race factor, black, increases the future dangerousness for various complicated reasons; is that correct?” Dr. Quijano responded in the affirmative. Next, Dr. Quijano’s report was submitted to the jury without objection from Buck’s counsel. In fact, the report was submitted to the jury at defense counsel’s request, and over the prosecution’s objection. This report was available to the jury during their deliberations. Finally, Buck’s attorney referenced this “expert” testimony during his own closing argument and failed to object to the prosecution doing the same.

As Buck’s petition to the Supreme Court noted, the jury clearly relied on Dr. Quijano’s “expert” testimony in deciding Buck was likely to commit future acts of violence.

11. Id. Taylor survived. The other individual, Harold Ebnezer, was unharmed. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id. (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 37.071, § 2 (West 2013)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 7. Evidence of a defendant’s race should not be introduced as evidence to prove a defendant’s future dangerousness. See Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community: Evidence from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 Hosp. & Comm. Psychiatry 761, 764 (1990) (finding that when controlling for socioeconomic status, correlations between race and violence disappear); see also John Monahan et. al., Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence 56–57 (2001) (“[l]ocal, individual-level associations between racial status and violent behavior may be systematically confounded with levels of disadvantage in the neighborhood contexts of African-Americans.”).
18. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 4, at 7.
19. Id. at 8.
20. Id.
violence. There was no evidence Buck was violent outside of the context of romantic relationships, nor were any of his prior convictions for crimes of violence. In fact, individuals who knew Buck for “most, if not all, of his life testified that they had never known . . . Buck to be violent.” Lastly, another psychologist, Dr. Patrick Lawrence, testified that Buck was not, in fact, likely to be dangerous in the future. Given the evidence of non-dangerousness and the absence of any compelling evidence of dangerousness, the jury must have relied heavily on the problematic testimony introduced by Buck’s deficient counsel.

Buck’s counsel was ineffective because he introduced “evidence” that Buck’s race made him more likely to be violent in the future, which the jury relied upon in finding future dangerousness—a necessary finding for the imposition of the death penalty. The fact that the defense counsel introduced such evidence, as opposed to failing to object to the prosecution’s offering of such evidence, strengthened the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The “expert” testimony presented by the defense was so contrary to Buck’s interests that no competent attorney would put it forward. The incompetence of Buck’s counsel was so great that it effectively allowed Buck to be sentenced to death because of “expert” testimony asserting Buck was more likely to be dangerous in the future because he is black. The decision in *Buck v. Davis* serves as a reminder that, while our justice system may eventually address shocking instances of ineffective counsel, that same system continually permits the appointment of foreseeably inadequate representatives.

21. *Id.* at 5–6 (conceding that Buck did physically abuse Gardner towards the end of their romantic relationship).

22. *Id.* at 6 (citing Tr. 5–28) (noting prior convictions for delivery of cocaine and unlawfully carrying a weapon).

23. *Id.* (testifying on Buck’s behalf were his father, James Buck; stepmother, Sharon Buck; sister, Monique Winn; and friend, Reverend J. C. Neal).

24. *Id.* at 6–7. Dr. Lawrence reasoned that Buck was unlikely to develop a romantic relationship with a woman while in prison, had been held thus far in minimum security custody, and had an IQ of 75 (which is only fourth percentile for intellect when compared with the general population). *Id.* at 7 (citing Tr. 189, 196). At the time he testified for the defense in Buck’s case, Dr. Lawrence had twenty-five years of experience working on both the defense and prosecution sides of litigation, and had evaluated approximately 900 prisoners convicted of homicide. *Id.* at 6 (citing Tr. 177, 182–86, 188–204, 205–06).


27. *Id.* at 775 (“No competent defense attorney would introduce such evidence about his own client.”); Oral Argument Transcript, *supra* note 25, at 27 (“What competent counsel would put that evidence before a jury[?]”) (statement by Ginsburg, J.); see also *Buck v. Thaler*, 565 U.S. 1022, 1025–27 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting in denial of certiorari) (asserting that Buck’s “death sentence [is] marred by racial overtones” stemming from the introduction of this testimony).
II. REPEAT OFFENDERS

One would like to think that the inadequacy of Buck’s attorney was a unique and rare occurrence, but that is unfortunately not the case. Around the time Texas conceded error in Buck’s case, two-thirds of all death penalty convictions in the United States had been overturned, many due to “serious errors by incompetent court-appointed defense attorneys with little experience in trying capital cases.”28 Many of these overturned cases share more than just their outcomes: they often involve the same defense lawyers. Right now, the criminal justice system allows the same attorneys to make the same “mistakes” in capital cases, and courts continue to appoint them to cases where the quality of representation influences whether the defendant lives or dies.

This Section describes the records of defense attorneys whose pattern for defective representation in capital cases, and repeated appointment to such cases, make them “repeat offenders.”29 When examined carefully, these attorneys’ track records should dissuade courts from appointing them again. These attorneys often fail to offer the jury much (if any) mitigation evidence to consider in determining whether the defendant should be sentenced to life in prison, as opposed to death. Most commonly, the repeat offenders fail to interview key witnesses who would testify favorably for mitigating the defendant’s sentence.

Mitigation evidence—evidence presented by the defense to persuade the jury that the defendant should not receive a death sentence—is central to a capital defendant’s case for life. Introducing of mitigating evidence is important because “death sentences are never automatic or inevitable.”30 Mitigating evidence offers the defense an opportunity to make a case for life as opposed to death. The definition of what constitutes “mitigating evidence” is also incredibly broad. It includes evidence of “mental problems, remorse, youth, childhood abuse or neglect, a minor role in the homicide, . . . the absence of a prior criminal record,” etc.31 Thus, it is not a stretch to assume that some form of mitigation evidence is generally available, in a capital case. Given the importance of mitigation evidence and the broad range of potential mitigating evidence available, capital defense attorneys should always present some mitigation evidence. The consequence of not doing so—the death penalty—mandates some effort by defense attorneys at the mitigation stage. Failing to present mitigation evidence, presenting very little of

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29. While these attorneys are by no means the only repeat-offender attorneys, their records illustrate the issue posed by the “repeat-offender” problem outlined in Section I.
such evidence, or failing to adequately prepare for the mitigation phase of trial (e.g., not interviewing key witnesses) satisfies the first prong of the repeat-offender definition: deficient representation.

A. Jerry Guerinot: The Buck v. Davis Attorney

Buck’s trial was not the first capital case Jerry Guerinot had botched. One of Guerinot’s more public cases is that of Linda Carty. The state charged Carty, a citizen of Britain, with kidnap and murder.32 According to the prosecution, Carty murdered her victim in order to claim the victim’s newborn son as her own.33 Putting aside the merits of the prosecution’s case, Guerinot’s representation of Carty affected both the verdict and sentencing in key ways. Guerinot visited Carty in jail for the first time just one month before her trial,34 three months after being appointed to represent her.35 After the trial, Carty reported in an interview that she had only met Guerinot once, and that the meeting lasted a mere fifteen minutes.36 Guerinot also failed to inform the British Consulate of the proceeding; once the British government found out about it, it was too late in the proceedings for it to get involved.37

At the mitigation stage of the trial, Guerinot’s mistakes were the kiss of death. Guerinot failed to interview key witnesses, including Carty’s husband and a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) officer for whom Carty was an informant. The DEA officer said after the trial that he would have testified on Carty’s behalf.38 The jury would likely have found the testimony of a DEA agent, as a law enforcement official, highly credible, particularly with respect to Carty’s future dangerousness. Likewise, Carty’s husband said that the defense never asked him to testify on Carty’s behalf either.39 The husband ultimately testified for the prosecution, telling the jury that his wife desperately wanted a baby and thereby bolstering the prosecution’s theory of Carty’s motive.40 The husband said he had no idea that he could refuse to testify for the prosecution based on marital privilege.41

33. Liptak, supra note 5.
35. Liptak, supra note 5.
36. Id. (citing Carty’s interview with documentary filmmaker Steve Humphries “I met this guy for less than 15 minutes. Once”).
37. Graczyk, supra note 34. Carty “was a citizen of Britain, where the death penalty is outlawed.” Id.; Liptak, supra note 5.
38. Liptak, supra note 5.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
The appellate court denied Carty’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. According to the appellate judge, Guerinot made “an imperfect attempt” to avoid the death penalty for his client, but trials need not be perfect.42 Although the appellate court could not definitively find that the case would have come out differently but for Guerinot’s deficient representation, his representation was nonetheless ineffective in a broader sense of the word. If not for Guerinot’s failure to interview key witnesses—and meaningfully interview his client herself—it is at least possible that the jury would not have sentenced Carty to death, as there would have been some mitigation evidence presented that cut against the prosecution’s assertion that Carty was likely to be dangerous in the future (e.g., the DEA officer’s testimony).43 It is even possible, had Guerinot informed his client or her husband of the availability of marital privilege, that the jury would have found Carty guilty of a lesser crime than first-degree murder. In order to prove murder in the first degree, the government must prove premeditation; Carty’s husband’s testimony was the only evidence offered to show that Carty had a motive. These possibilities alone, despite being insufficient to establish a Sixth Amendment violation, should put a court on notice that Guerinot is unlikely to be an effective advocate for capital defendants. At the very least, weak advocacy at the mitigation phase of trial makes similarly weak advocacy in future cases foreseeable.

In isolation, Carty’s case is not necessarily indicative of Guerinot’s general ineffectiveness. However, as one supporting brief in Carty’s appeal states, “[i]t is no exaggeration to suggest that Mr. Guerinot has perhaps the worst record of any capital lawyer in the United States.”44 At least twenty of Guerinot’s clients in Harris County, Texas were sentenced to death over the course of his career.45 As of 2016, ten had been executed.46 It is extremely unusual for a capital defense attorney to have a client sentenced to death.47 In fact, it is rare for a capital case to proceed to the trial phase at all.48 In light of these facts, Guerinot’s record seems all the more obviously deficient. However, as his record grew, so did his number of

42. Id. (“[T]he Constitution does not require perfection in trial representation.”) (quoting Judge Vanessa D. Gilmore, the federal trial judge in Houston who presided over Ms. Carty’s case).
45. See Graczyk, supra note 34 (twenty-one former clients); Liptak, supra note 5 (twenty former clients).
46. Graczyk, supra note 34 (as of April 13, 2016). Guerinot has since retired, but execution remains a possibility for those clients still on death row at the time of his retirement.
47. For example, in 2014, only seventy-two death sentences were imposed in the United States. Death Penalty Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN, https://www.statisticbrain.com/death-penalty-statistics/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2018). In both 2012 and 2013, eighty-three persons were admitted to death row. Id. Of those capital-eligible cases that were actually pursued and then actually proceeded to trial, only 32% resulted in a death sentence between 1988 and 2006. Federal Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-penalty (citing N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 2, 2006)) (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
48. Since 1988, only 420 prosecutions have been authorized out of over 2500 potentially eligible defendants. Federal Death Penalty, supra note 47 (citing PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 28, 2007), and Marcia Coyle,
appointments to capital cases. Deficient representation at the mitigation phase coupled with repeated appointment to capital cases in the face of such deficiencies makes Guerinot a classic repeat offender.

B. Other Repeat Offenders

Guerinot is not the only repeat offender. Across the country, courts continually appoint attorneys as capital defense counsel despite records demonstrating a history of lackluster advocacy on behalf of their clients’ lives. These features—foreseeable deficiencies and continued appointment as capital defense counsel in cases where those foreseeable deficiencies manifest yet again—make these attorneys repeat offenders.

One Maricopa County attorney, like Guerinot, has failed to zealously advocate for his clients to the point of being foreseeably deficient, but courts continue to appoint him to capital cases. In 2009, this attorney represented five pretrial capital defendants at once. According to American Bar Association (“ABA”) Guidelines, several thousand hours are typically required to provide appropriate defense representation in capital cases. This attorney’s caseload materially affected the quality of his representation of those five defendants. For example, in the month before the trial of Fabio Gomez, defense counsel did not file “a single substantive motion . . .” Gomez’s counsel also had not visited him in over a year.

Like other repeat offenders, Gomez’s counsel has a reputation for short mitigation proceedings. In capital cases in particular, the sentencing phase of the trial often lasts weeks or months, as the defense attorney has the opportunity to introduce various types of evidence about the defendant—much of which is sympathetic—in an attempt to mitigate the defendant’s sentence. In one case, this attorney’s case for mitigation took less than one day. In another the mitigation

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49. Maricopa County, Arizona.
50. See Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, A.B.A. (2003), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/2003_guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA Guidelines]. ABA Principle 5 on workload further states: “The workload demands of capital cases are unique: the duty to investigate, prepare, and try both the guilt/innocence and mitigation phases today requires an average of almost 1,900 hours, and over 1,200 hours even where a case is resolved by guilty plea.”
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
phase was fewer than two days. And, in the case of Brian Womble, this same attorney presented no mitigation evidence.

After Womble’s conviction, his new representative discovered mitigating evidence, any piece of which had the potential to elicit a life sentence rather than a death sentence from the jury. Womble was born addicted to heroin because his mother abused the drug while pregnant; his mother also had thrown him down a flight of stairs as a child, beaten him, and emotionally abused him. Womble struggled in school, and even attempted suicide. He “stuttered and suffered from head injuries, neuropsychological impairment, and symptoms of fetal alcohol syndrome.” Potentially most relevant for mitigation purposes, however, was the fact that Womble had paranoid delusions and hallucinations about demons. Just “hours before [committing] the crime that landed him on death row, Womble voluntarily entered a mental health treatment facility, saying that he wanted to kill himself and possibly others, and yet was permitted to leave.” Still, Womble’s counsel presented zero mitigation evidence. After learning this information later, one juror stated: “Knowing all of that, I would have voted for life, no doubt about it.” It is not surprising to learn that six of this attorney’s former clients are currently on death row. Given this track record, it is foreseeable that this attorney, if appointed again, will be similarly deficient. Unfortunately, further appointments to capital cases are also likely, given that this attorney is clearly experienced in trying capital cases.

Another attorney, this time from Florida, also fits the repeat-offender bill. This attorney has been found ineffective under Strickland, which certainly would make him foreseeably deficient, but courts have continued to appoint him to capital cases. From 2008–2015, this Duval County attorney represented eight capital defendants who were sentenced to death. One of those convictions was overturned in November 2015, after the judge found that counsel “failed to conduct a basic factual investigation of the circumstances of the crime, failed to secure the

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. State v. Womble, 235 P.3d 244, 257 (Ariz. 2010) (en banc) (stating that the record showed Womble contemplated suicide); Smith, supra note 51 (stating that Womble tried to kill himself and “had a difficult time in school”).
59. Smith, supra note 51.
60. Id.
61. Smith, supra note 51; see also Womble, 235 P.3d at 257.
62. Womble, 235 P.3d at 257 (“The record does establish that Womble sought counseling the day before the murder and even mentioned his plan to kill someone before killing himself. However, Womble chose not to introduce any additional mental health evidence. Although Womble’s attempt to get help before the murder deserves some consideration, the record does not support mental impairment such that it would call for leniency.”).
63. Smith, supra note 51.
64. Id.
65. Id. (highlighting that eight is more than any other lawyer in Florida).
testimony of alibi witnesses, and also failed to investigate evidence of [the defendant’s] “organic brain damage and intellectual disability.” The attorney’s representation was found ineffective under Strickland—a violation of the Sixth Amendment—in that case. In fact, courts found that this same attorney’s representation of capital defendants constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in three separate cases. Finding that an attorney violated the Sixth Amendment is necessarily deficient representation under the first prong of the repeat offender definition. And, despite the attorney’s repeated failure to adequately represent capital defendants, courts continued to appoint him to capital cases—satisfying the second prong.

The attorneys described above are examples of the “repeat offenders” of inadequate representation in capital cases: their representation is deficient—they have a track record of death sentences for their clients and are often found ineffective after-the-fact—yet they continue to be appointed as defense counsel in capital cases.

C. Alternative Explanations

It is possible, of course, that results of these cases and the attorneys’ corresponding track records are attributable to explanations other than the deficiencies of counsel. Seemingly deficient representation may appear obvious in hindsight while evading identification in real time. Further, these attorneys’ actions may have come to light solely because they are in the business of representing capital defendants specifically; capital cases garner more attention, given the high stakes and intrigue. However, the alternative explanations are not sufficient to justify the inadequacy of these attorneys’ representation.

As mentioned in Section II.A, supra, Guerinot’s representation of Linda Carty was not ultimately found to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. It is possible that Guerinot’s repeated appointment to capital cases, rather than his ineffective representation, is to blame for the fact that a large number of his clients are on death row.

An attorney’s experience representing capital defendants makes them appear more qualified to represent capital defendants in the future. In fact, federal law requires that appointees have such experience. At least one attorney appointed to represent a “person indicted in federal court for any death-eligible offense” must be “learned in the law applicable to capital cases.” To be considered “learned,”

66. Id.
an attorney must have experience “in the trial, appeal, or post-conviction review” of federal or state death penalty cases.\textsuperscript{70} As discussed in Section II.A, trying a death penalty case is not only uncommon, it is also generally undesirable. Attorneys who have extensive capital trial experience may, therefore, not be the best representatives available. At the same time, the appointment of at least one of these “experienced” attorneys is required by federal law. Thus, a dismal track record in capital cases may actually work to keep an attorney at the top of the list for capital counsel appointments.

Another potential explanation often offered to excuse the poor records of some capital attorneys is the fact that they are assigned a high number of “losing” cases.\textsuperscript{71} While capital cases generally do have extreme sets of facts, the fact that an attorney is assigned to a capital case does not explain a high number of clients on death row.\textsuperscript{72} Similarly, whether a case has horrendous or jarring facts has no bearing on the availability of mitigation evidence. Therefore, failure to present mitigating evidence, or a failure to adequately prepare for the sentencing phase of trial (e.g., by failing to interview key witnesses and/or an attorney’s own client), cannot be excused simply because the case is a “losing” one. While the “losing” nature of a capital case may have some effect on an attorney’s record for life or death sentences, it does not explain the behavior generally attributable to repeat-offender attorneys.

It is important to acknowledge that some of the deficiency may actually have to do with some counties’ prosecutors seeking death more often than others.\textsuperscript{73} The first attorney discussed in Section I.I.B above practices in Maricopa County, Arizona: the second-deadliest county in America.\textsuperscript{74} Similarly, Caddo Parish, Louisiana employed what one public defender described as a bloodthirsty prosecutor, who sought the death penalty regularly.\textsuperscript{75} As argued above, though, a high volume of death penalty cases does not fully explain the inadequacy of representation by these attorneys, especially at the mitigation phase of trial. Failure to present a case for a life sentence—or presenting a weak case because of a failure to interview enough and/or key witnesses—is inexcusable.


\textsuperscript{71} See Liptak, supra note 5 (quoting a capital attorney as claiming that he never got assigned the easy cases).

\textsuperscript{72} See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (discussing death-sentence statistics).

\textsuperscript{73} Caddo Parish, Louisiana, for example. See Robert J. Smith, America’s Deadliest Prosecutors, SLATE (May 14, 2015, 3:54 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/05/america_s_deadliest Prosecutors_death_penalty_sentences_in_louisiana_florida.html.

\textsuperscript{74} Smith, supra note 51. The first is Los Angeles County, California, which has twice the population of Maricopa County. Id.

\textsuperscript{75} Smith, supra note 73. Prosecutor Dale Cox is “personally secured half of the death sentences in Louisiana” from 2010 to 2015. Id. These numbers are not coincidence either: Cox has been very outspoken in favor of the death penalty, and has even been quoted as saying “I think we need to kill more people.” Id. (referencing an interview with Cox).
Further, taking on a disproportionately high number of cases does not excuse poor representation in any case. The facts of cases like those of Carty and Buck suggest that Guerinot had failed to seek out available mitigation evidence. Being assigned a large number of unfavorable capital cases in a county where a prosecutor often seeks the death penalty does not change the fact that mitigation evidence was available, but defense counsel failed to bring it forward. Guerinot said himself, “Somebody’s got to defend—‘defend’ is the wrong word—represent these people.”76 The repeated appointment of these deficient attorneys makes them repeat offenders—regardless of the possible alternate explanations discussed above.

D. Importance of Eliminating Repeat Offenders from the Pool of Potential Representatives

Because of the life-or-death nature of capital cases, fairness and consistency in the capital system are of the utmost importance. Yet, capital punishment is not “administered with fairness and justice,” as was originally intended.77 Today, too many low-quality attorneys represent defendants in capital cases throughout the United States.78 Perhaps more importantly, even attorneys experienced in trying capital cases may be ineffective, given that getting to the trial stage is not necessarily the mark of a good defense attorney. To the contrary, capital defense attorneys should, at times, seek to avoid trial, given the prejudicial facts that generally distinguish murder trials. In order for capital defendants to receive fair trials (particularly in cases involving an unnerving set of facts like that in Buck’s), they must have diligent, vigorous representation—not just free counsel, and not even just experienced counsel.

Attorneys who fail to provide quality representation in capital cases, like the repeat offenders discussed above, should be barred from defending capital cases in the first place. As Section III will discuss, this restriction should not be limited to just those attorneys whose representation has been found ineffective under the

76. Graczyk, supra note 34.
78. Andrea Neal, Death Row Inmates Point to Poor Quality of Lawyers Who Defend Them, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 29, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-10-29/news/nn-7739_1_death-row-inmates; see, e.g., Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Part 2: Inept Defenses Cloud Verdict, Chi. Trib. (Nov. 15, 1999), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-991115deathillinois2-story.html. From the time Illinois reinstated the death penalty in 1977 to 1999, 12% of the “defendants sentenced to death were represented at trial by an attorney who had been, or was later, disbarred or suspended—disciplinary sanctions reserved for conduct so incompetent, unethical or even criminal that the state believes an attorney’s license should be taken away.” Id. During the same time period, 9.5% of those defendants sentenced to death were granted “a new trial or sentencing because their attorneys’ incompetence rendered the verdict or sentence unfair.” Id.
Sixth Amendment after-the-fact. Instead, it should extend to all repeat offenders. An attorney who fails to interview key witnesses or to introduce mitigating evidence is unfit to represent capital defendants, regardless of whether his or her representation was in fact found to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under the *Strickland* test for Sixth Amendment violations. A broad prohibition based on an attorney’s lack of care and attention at the mitigation phase of trial would reach attorneys like Guerinot—whose representation of Linda Carty was not found ineffective under *Strickland*. Given that so much of a defendant’s fate rests in the hands of his or her attorney at the sentencing phase of trial, a defendant may live or die depending on the quality of his or her counsel. This gamble is unacceptable.

III. THE NEED TO TARGET THE APPOINTMENT OF REPEAT OFFENDERS AND POSSIBLE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL

Society must protect capital defendants from foreseeably deficient attorneys. This Section argues that the assertion of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is an insufficient and unreliable safety net for capital defendants. Ineffectiveness claims do not prevent low-quality representation from occurring in the first place. To directly influence and improve the quality of counsel in capital cases, some states recently have passed laws governing the assignment and conduct of capital defense counsel. These attempts are often flawed, even when motivated by a genuine desire to provide quality representation to all capital defendants. Still, despite these shortcomings, states should continue their efforts to heighten standards for capital defense representation. Section III.C will argue that, at a minimum, states with capital punishment must protect capital defendants from attorneys who *already* have a track record of poor representation in capital proceedings. States should take prophylactic measures to identify and deem unfit such repeat-offender attorneys *before* they are appointed—not years after a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim by a former client already on death row. Further, states should set requirements for the mitigation phase of trial to ensure that attorneys make a case for life.

79. In 1994, Yale Law School Professor Stephen B. Bright wrote that death sentences were given “[n]ot for the [w]orst [c]rime but for the [w]orst [l]awyer.” Stephen B. Bright, *Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer*, 103 *Yale L.J.* 1835, 1835 (1994); see also Neal, supra note 78 (“‘No one who has any money faces the death penalty,’ says South Carolina trial lawyer David Bruck. ‘While there are hundreds of thousands of lawyers in the United States, there is very little competent defense available for the people who need it most, people on trial for their lives.’”). Now, in 2018—with declining death penalty and execution rates, a recognition that the death penalty does not deter future violent crime, and mounting evidence that death sentences are arbitrary and often based on unlawful prejudices—this sentiment still holds true. The effect of counsel on a capital proceeding is great. The representation of Buck in *Buck v. Davis*, as well as the discussion of deficient attorneys as repeat offenders, illustrate this point. To match this great potential for influence, our criminal justice system has a duty to provide capital defendants with competent representation.

80. See infra Section III.B.
A. Ineffective Assistance Claims: An Incomplete Solution

Successful ineffective assistance of counsel claims can rectify the harm done by inadequate representation. However, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a remedial measure that defendants may only exercise after the jury has already issued a verdict and made a sentencing decision. The fact that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a remedial, post-hoc action\textsuperscript{81} is problematic, particularly in light of the indigent status of many capital defendants. The Supreme Court has guaranteed a right to counsel for indigent defendants only through the first appeal.\textsuperscript{82} After direct appeal, states differ on whether a defendant has a right to counsel for post-conviction proceedings.\textsuperscript{83} Many defendants, therefore, find themselves unable to bring ineffective assistance of counsel claims at all.\textsuperscript{84} In such cases, the effect of inadequate counsel can be permanent. In a capital case, this means the likelihood that an indigent defendant will successfully overturn a sentence resulting from deficient representation at the mitigation phase of trial is slimmer than that of success for a defendant who can afford the appeals process.

Even if able to raise an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant has an uphill battle ahead. Death sentences are often upheld even when a defendant’s representation was clearly inadequate. For example, Georgia executed Robert Wayne Holsey even after learning that Holsey’s trial attorney “was a drunk,” in and out of hospitals, who drank a quart of liquor every night during the trial.\textsuperscript{85} Holsey’s attorney was later disbarred and sentenced to prison for stealing from a client.\textsuperscript{86} Even in the face of clear lawyer misconduct, it is very difficult to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment.\textsuperscript{87} In order to prove that counsel is ineffective, the defendant must show not only that his or her counsel was deficient, but also that, but for his or her counsel’s deficiency, the trial

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\textsuperscript{83} Id.

\textsuperscript{84} Id.

\textsuperscript{85} Marc Bookman, This Man’s Alcoholic Lawyer Botched His Case. Georgia Executed Him Anyway, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 22, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/alcoholic-lawyer-botched-robert-wayne-holsey-death-penalty-trial.

\textsuperscript{86} Id.

\textsuperscript{87} The Sixth Amendment states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
result would have been different. In appealing a death sentence in a capital case, a defendant must show that his or her counsel’s inadequate representation was the reason for the jury sentencing the defendant to death rather than life in prison. In other words, the defendant must show that without deficient counsel, the jury would not have chosen death. This difficulty is illustrated in the case of Carty, the British woman convicted of kidnap and murder. In that case, the judge ultimately found that, though Carty’s lawyer had made an “imperfect attempt” to spare his client the death penalty, there is no requirement that trials be perfect. Given the difficult nature of meeting the Strickland requirements to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, defendants need much more than just effective counsel to prevail on this type of claim.

Admittedly, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim may right the wrongs of a repeat offender with respect to a specific defendant. However, many defendants face financial barriers to bringing such claims. Even when they may bring ineffective assistance of counsel claims, prevailing is extremely difficult. Thus, the availability of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is an incomplete remedy for the problem of repeat offenders.

B. States’ Varying Success in Guarding Against Repeat Offenders

The Supreme Court has not specified performance standards for capital-defense attorneys. Instead, states have attempted to set minimum standards for such attorneys. States’ Rules of Professional Conduct, for example, govern attorney conduct generally and provide for disciplinary action if the Rules are violated. Like ineffective assistance of counsel claims though, the Rules do not deal directly with the appointment of capital defense counsel. Nor do they impose requirements with respect to the introduction of evidence at the mitigation phase of trial. Many states also have in place some sort of legal framework intended to heighten the quality of counsel for capital defendants. Recent efforts by states with high execution rates have had varying levels of success. Virginia, the state with the most success in improving representation of capital defendants, focused on: (1) requirements for appointment of capital defense counsel in the first place, and (2) enhanced mitigation evidence at the sentencing phase of trial. While the

88. See supra note 3; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”).
89. See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 4, at 33.
90. See Liptak, supra note 5.
92. Representation in Capital Cases, supra note 82.
elimination of representation by repeat-offenders does not require following the Virginia model exactly, any efforts aimed at combating the repeat-offender problem must focus on improvement in these two areas specifically.

1. Piecemeal Approaches by Death Penalty States

In some states, prosecutors seek \(^94\) and juries impose the death penalty frequently compared with the national average. The country as a whole, however, imposes the death penalty less frequently than in the past, \(^95\) and some of these states have begun addressing the problem of inadequate representation in capital cases. Louisiana, Arizona, and Alabama, for example, updated the standards for and criteria considered for appointing of capital defense attorneys. These efforts are incomplete, however, because they fail to account for the repeat-offender problem.

Beginning with a 2007 legislative directive, \(^96\) Louisiana has heightened its standards for capital-defense attorneys. The Louisiana legislature “directed the Louisiana Public Defender Board to create ‘mandatory statewide public defender standards and guidelines . . . [that are] uniformly fair and consistent throughout the state.’” \(^97\) Over the past decade, the Louisiana Public Defender Board’s (“LPDB”) attempts to comply with the legislative directive resulted in the LPDB Guidelines for Capital Defense, which went into effect on May 20, 2010. \(^98\) The Guidelines require a lead trial counsel to, among other things, have tried at least two murder cases to completion. As discussed in Section II, trial experience may not be the most accurate predictor of attorney competence, particularly in the capital context. Generally, capital-defense attorneys should avoid going to trial. \(^99\) That is because,  

\(^94\) See generally Smith, supra note 73. Alabama and Arizona, for example, impose 0.956 and 0.474 death sentences per capita. Death Sentences per Capita by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-capita-state (last visited Feb. 20, 2018) (compiling cumulative death sentences in each state from 1977 to 2013). The national average, however, is just 0.271 amongst all death-penalty states (and is just 0.206 across all states, including both death-penalty and non-death-penalty states). Id. (math done by author). Louisiana is also above the national average, imposing 0.355 death sentences per capita. Id.


\(^97\) Id.

\(^98\) Id.

\(^99\) Supra Section II.D; Interview with Daniel Goldman, (Jan. 5, 2017) (explaining that the number of capital cases that an attorney has taken to trial is an imperfect indicator of how good that attorney is at representing capital defendants). While taking a case to trial may be the best decision in some capital cases, there are many reasons why a skilled capital defender may want to avoid trial. For instance, the evidence in a capital murder case might be particularly inflammatory and, therefore, more likely to prompt a jury to convict or grant a death sentence. A plea agreement may also be the best way to ensure one’s client avoids the death penalty. See, e.g., Sarah Kershaw, In Plea Deal That Spares His Life, Man Admits Killing 48 Women, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/06/us/in-plea-deal-that-spares-his-life-man-admits-killing-48-women.html?mcubz=3 (discussing the “Green River Killer” plea deal, where Gary L. Ridgway avoided the death penalty by agreeing to plead guilty to the murder of forty-eight women). While trial experience certainly has
particularly in a prolific death-penalty state, taking a capital case to trial is not necessarily in the best interest of a capital defendant.\footnote{100. See id; but see Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976, \textit{Death Penalty Info. Ctr.}, \url{http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976} (last visited Feb. 20, 2018) (since executing a single person in 2010, Louisiana has not executed anyone on death row).}

Thus, Louisiana’s two-trial requirement may not necessarily result in the most competent counsel being appointed to death penalty cases in the state. In fact, the requirement may actually perpetuate the appointment of repeat-offenders—those attorneys who, while appearing experienced in capital cases, are in fact deficient in their representation of capital defendants, particularly vis-à-vis insufficient attention to the mitigation phase of trial.\footnote{101. See supra Section II.B.}

Other states prohibit attorneys from representing a capital defendant if the attorney has been suspended by the state bar within a certain number of years. In Arizona, an attorney must be “a member in good standing of the State Bar of Arizona for at least five years . . . preceding the appointment” to a capital case.\footnote{102. \textit{Ariz. R. Crim. P.} 6.8(a)(1)–(2); see also Paul Rubin, \textit{Death-Penalty Lawyers Are Making a Killing Off Maricopa Taxpayers}, \textit{Phx. New Times} (July 19, 2012, 4:00 AM), \url{http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/death-penalty-lawyers-are-making-a-killing-off-maricopa-taxpayers-6454923}.}

Even in states with laws like Arizona’s, however, the appointment of repeat-offenders remains a possibility. In fact, the lack of discipline by the bar is what differentiates plainly ineffective counsel from the subtler deficiencies of a repeat-offender. If an attorney is suspended from practice, the appointing judge in a capital case has notice that that attorney’s subsequent representation of a capital defendant may be inadequate; in contrast, when a repeat-offender is up for an appointment, his or her potential deficiencies are not so obvious. Despite deficiencies being non-obvious, the repeat-offender attorney is still predictably deficient when their tactics and record—rather than just the volume of their experience with capital cases—is examined. Thus, courts may assign clients potentially deficient counsel in a way that technically complies with the State’s Code of Professional Conduct, yet is predictably deficient.

Many states’ laws—in addition to Arizona and Louisiana, discussed above—are simply incomplete attempts to guard against predictably deficient representation in capital cases. For example, Alabama law requires that at least one attorney appointed to a capital case have five years of criminal experience.\footnote{103. \textit{The Crisis of Counsel in Alabama}, supra note 83.} Alabama law also provides, however, that Alabama’s trial courts may allow exceptions to the
Further, while ABA Guidelines recommend that at least two attorneys represent each capital defendant, Alabama law allows only one defense attorney to represent a defendant in a capital case. Efforts by these states are valid, but they are often incomplete or hindered by loopholes, exceptions, and other problematic laws.

2. Comprehensive Approach in Virginia

Compared to other death penalty states, Virginia has made perhaps the most progress in recent years towards ensuring quality representation in capital cases—despite few (if any) significant changes to the substantive death-penalty law. In fact, “lawmakers have long installed death-penalty-friendly procedures” in the state of Virginia. This progress is, instead, attributable to the State’s creation of regional capital defenders offices.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, Virginia was one of the leading death penalty states. In response to ABA Guidelines regarding the appointment of counsel and representation of defendants in capital cases, Virginia’s General Assembly passed a law that established four regional capital defender offices in the State. These offices cover all jurisdictions in the State, and the lawyers in these offices specialize in capital criminal defense. In every capital case, at least two lawyers must be appointed, one of whom must be from the regional capital defender office.
office. This requirement, combined with the establishment of regional capital defender offices itself, drastically improved the quality of representation of capital defendants in Virginia.

The impact of representation by regional capital defenders (“RCDs”) shows not only in the decrease number of death sentences overall but also in the increased complexity of defendants’ cases. The “complexity” of a defense refers to the number of witnesses called, including expert witnesses, as well as the length of the sentencing hearings. These factors presumably correlate with the amount of mitigating evidence that defense counsel introduces. The complexity particularly reveals the success of the regional public defender offices. The reduced frequency of death sentences could be due to a variety of factors, but the complexity of defendants’ cases-in-chief is directly attributable to individual counsel. More mitigating evidence—found in complex defenses—increases the likelihood of a jury recommending a sentence of life in prison, as opposed to death. Increased complexity thus points to improved representation.

In fact, since the representation by RCDs began, the length of the critical sentencing phase of trial has more than doubled in Virginia. Representation by a RCD means an average of four days of sentencing hearings, as opposed to the average of fewer than two days from 1996 to 2004. The number of defense witnesses called has increased—both relative to the time before RCDs and as compared with representation by non-RCDs.

Virginia also improved the standard used to judge an attorney’s experience level in capital cases. Virginia used to judge a lawyer’s quality by the number of capital cases a given attorney had taken to trial. However, this measure does not necessarily indicate whether an attorney has provided (and will provide) quality representation to capital defendants because going to trial in a capital case is not usually in the client’s best interest. According to Virginia Public Defender Daniel Goldman, the goal in cases where the prosecution is seeking the death penalty should, generally, be to settle with the prosecution for something less than a death penalty.

113. § 19.2-163.7 (West 2017).
114. AM. B. ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE VIRGINIA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 142 (2013), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/death_penalty_moratorium/va_complete_report.authcheckdam.pdf; see Garrett, supra note 107, at 678 (noting that part of the success of these offices is their particular focus on the presentation of mitigation evidence).
116. Including, but not limited to, zealous advocacy by counsel and the shifting of both prosecutorial priorities and societal views on the death penalty.
117. See supra Section II.
118. Garrett, supra note 107, at 667.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 683 (“RCDs also called more defense witnesses on average (averaging nineteen witnesses called for the defense, compared with eleven in non-RCD cases).”).
Now, it is unusual for a capital case to get to trial in Virginia.\footnote{121}{Interview with Daniel Goldman, \textit{supra} note 99.} 

\textbf{C. Targeting Repeat Offenders: Appointment Procedures & Minimum Requirements for Mitigation Evidence}

Protecting defendants from attorneys who have a track record of, or reputation for, failing to adequately represent their clients in capital cases requires a comprehensive approach, similar to the one taken by Virginia. The following recommendations would reduce the risk of predictably deficient attorneys representing capital defendants.

Despite the piecemeal efforts made in some states, state-implemented guidelines for the appointment and conduct of capital-defense attorneys remain the best way to avoid the appointment of repeat offenders. Using the Virginia program as a model, states should establish regional capital defender offices.\footnote{122}{See Garrett, \textit{supra} note 107, at 681.} The creation of such offices would provide a centralized, accountable team of attorneys who are genuinely invested in achieving the best outcome possible for their clients (as opposed to being motivated by the financial incentive associated with representing a capital defendant).\footnote{123}{States may also consider treating the American Bar Association Guidelines as the floor, and self-imposing additional requirements and restrictions on top of that floor. For example, while the ABA Guidelines do not contain a recommended limit on the number of capital cases an attorney defend in a given year, RCD offices in Virginia often average fewer than three cases per attorney in any given year. \textit{See generally} ABA Guidelines, \textit{supra} note 50; Interview with Daniel Goldman, \textit{supra} note 121 (explaining that many pretrial capital-defense cases require extensive travel and research, including interviewing anyone who ever knew their client, and that, as a result, sometimes juggling three pretrial capital cases may not allow an attorney to adequately represent a capital defendant); \textit{see also} Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, AM. B. ASS’N (1989) (previously recommending a caseload of no more than three capital cases in a given year).} 

Studies show that, compared to appointed (i.e., private) counsel, public defenders reduce both the rate of conviction and the length of their clients’ sentences.\footnote{124}{Many repeat offenders are private attorneys, paid hourly by the state. \textit{See, e.g.,} attorneys discussed in Section II.B. For example, “[o]f 41 judicial circuits in Alabama, just six have a public defender, and not all represent capital defendants.” \textit{The Crisis of Counsel in Alabama, supra} note 83. The majority of circuits contract with private attorneys for a monthly fee. The remaining judicial circuits appoint attorneys to represent capital defendants for an hourly fee. \textit{Id.} \textit{See also} Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, AM. B. ASS’N (1989) (previously recommending a caseload of no more than three capital cases in a given year).} 

Capital defendants are thus less likely to be sentenced to death if represented by a public defender. Other states should attempt this program by appointing seasoned, defense-minded attorneys to capital cases.

Building on the Virginia model, states could involve regional defender offices in the appointment process even when the offices do not represent a specific capital defendant. States should allow a regional capital defender office to offer input—

\footnote{125}{One study—the Rand study—analyzed the benefit of retaining public as opposed to private counsel, and is well-known in this area. James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, \textit{How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes}, 122 YALE L.J. 154 (2012). The Rand study found that “[c]ompared to appointed counsel, public defenders in Philadelphia reduce their clients’ murder conviction rate by 19%. They reduce the probability that their clients receive a life sentence by 62%. Public defenders reduce overall expected time served in prison by 24%.” \textit{Id.} at 159.}
and allow courts to solicit that input—on the appointment of attorneys to all capital cases within its jurisdiction. This advice requirement could be as limited as requiring that a court provide the regional offices with an opportunity to file a brief containing its opinion with respect to a specific attorney. Alternatively, the requirement that regional offices advise courts could be as demanding as actually requiring the regional office to file such a brief—and be heard by the court—prior to the appointment of counsel.

It is not unheard of for judges to appoint their friends to capital cases because of the lucrative nature of capital cases. It is also, in fact, common for judges to appoint an attorney to a capital case because of seniority, rather than because that attorney is the best available representative for the defendant. Giving regional capital defender offices a say in who is appointed to capital cases—outside of those cases in which the office is directly involved—would reduce the likelihood of a judge appointing counsel for solely personal or seniority reasons.

Another proposed solution is to require that capital-defense attorneys present some mitigating evidence or else information about the attorney’s unsuccessful attempts to discover mitigating evidence. As discussed in Section II, supra, there are many ways in which counsel can offer mitigation evidence. The definition of “mitigating evidence” is extremely broad, and the defense’s case for a life sentence as opposed to death is subject only to limited restrictions. Thus, defense counsel should be required to present some mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of trial. And, if counsel presents little to no mitigating evidence, the court should investigate. Essentially, there should be some inquiry by the court into whether counsel adequately prepared to present a case at the sentencing phase of trial (i.e., made reasonable effort to gather relevant mitigating evidence).

CONCLUSION

At first glance, the unfortunate circumstances surrounding Duane Edward Buck’s deficient representation seem unique and extreme. But, in fact, Buck’s fate was quite predictable. His counsel was appointed despite a history of deficient representation in capital cases. Such a history is not unique to Buck’s attorney, either: attorneys who repeatedly exhibit ineptitude, particularly in the sentencing phase of a trial, are not precluded from continuing to represent capital defendants. In fact, deficient attorneys are oftentimes ideal candidates for capital appointments, because they appear to have experience, even though such “experience” does not necessarily correlate with competency.

126. Conflicts of interest are, according to the Rand study, a risk associated with judicial involvement in the appointment of defense counsel. Id. at 190–93; see also Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Does the Lawyer Make a Difference? Public Defender v. Appointed Counsel, 27 CRIM. JUST. 46, 47 (2012).
127. Interview with Daniel Goldman, supra note 99.
128. See supra Section II.
As Justice Ginsburg remarked: “I have yet to see a death case, . . . in which the defendant was well represented at trial.” If the death penalty’s inequitable administration is exacerbated by the varying quality of representation—so much so that many sentences turn on whether a capital defendant was adequately represented—perhaps the only real solution to the problem of repeat offenders is to abolish the death penalty. Yet, as long as the death penalty remains in effect in the United States, states and courts must combat the prevalence of repeat offenders in capital proceedings. Attorneys with reputations for failing to introduce mitigation evidence should be barred from representing capital defendants, or else should be forced to put forth some evidence in favor of a life sentence for their client. Neither approach discussed in Section III.C, supra, is sufficient on its own, and the approaches may even be insufficient in combination with one another. That said, reform efforts towards a comprehensive approach should continue. Implementing any type of reform aimed at improving the quality of counsel in capital cases is a step towards eliminating repeat offenders from the capital defense system.

129. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Joseph L. Rauh Lecture at the University District of Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law: In Pursuit of the Public Good: Lawyers Who Care (Apr. 9, 2001); see Liptak, supra note 5.

130. Eliminating the death penalty would likewise eliminate the disproportionate execution of black defendants. The merits of the death penalty itself are discussed at length in much legal and academic scholarship but are not central to this piece.