{"id":2671,"date":"2026-04-28T16:36:20","date_gmt":"2026-04-28T20:36:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/american-criminal-law-review\/?page_id=2671"},"modified":"2026-04-28T16:38:12","modified_gmt":"2026-04-28T20:38:12","slug":"the-constitutional-demand-for-evidentiary-asymmetry-to-protect-the-accused","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/american-criminal-law-review\/in-print\/volume-63-number-2-spring-2026\/the-constitutional-demand-for-evidentiary-asymmetry-to-protect-the-accused\/","title":{"rendered":"The Constitutional Demand for Evidentiary Asymmetry to Protect the Accused"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Evidence law\u2019s ultimate purpose is to maximize accurate fact-finding.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_1' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_1'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>1<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_1' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #1<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_1' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_1' tabindex='-1'>1<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #1 content: <\/span>FED. R. EVID. 102 (\u201cThese rules should be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.\u201d).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t To encourage accuracy, evidence rules are typically applied symmetrically to both parties, allocating the risk of error equally.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_2' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_2'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>2<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_2' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #2<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_2' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_2' tabindex='-1'>2<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #2 content: <\/span><em>See<\/em> Dale A. Nance, <em>Allocating the Risk of Error: Its Role in the Theory of Evidence Law<\/em>, 13 LEGAL THEORY 129, 130\u201331 (2007) (book review) (explaining conventional framework in Anglo-American evidence law is to serve the goals of \u201c(1) enhancement of accuracy in fact-finding, or, in other words, minimization of the risk of error; (2) minimization of the expenses that fact-finding procedures and decisions incur; and (3) apportionment of the risk of error with the consequent risk of misdecision between the parties to litigation.\u201d); <em>see also<\/em> Michael S. Pardo, <em>The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory<\/em>, 66 VAND. L. REV. 547, 561 (2013) (explaining that evidence rules are applied symmetrically in civil cases but less symmetrically in criminal cases).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t To prevent errors, the rules exclude relevant evidence when deemed \u201cunreliable.\u201d\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_3' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_3'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>3<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_3' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #3<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_3' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_3' tabindex='-1'>3<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #3 content: <\/span><em>See, e.g.<\/em>, FED. R. EVID. 801, 702; <em>see also<\/em> Madeline Smedley, Note, <em>Hearsay in the Modern Age:<\/em>\n<em>Balancing Practicality and Reliability by Amending Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A)<\/em>, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 207, 209 (2019) (\u201cThe hearsay rule is a prime example of a limitation that enhances the reliability of evidence, as the rule\u2019s main function is to keep out statements if their trustworthiness cannot be adequately assessed.\u201d); <em>see generally<\/em> Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that Rule 702 requires trial judges to ensure expert testimony is reliable).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t Trial judges are granted significant discretion to decide whether certain evidence is \u201creliable\u201d or not.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_4' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_4'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>4<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_4' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #4<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_4' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_4' tabindex='-1'>4<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #4 content: <\/span><em>See generally<\/em> Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (holding that Rule 702 grants trial judges significant discretion in determining whether to admit expert testimony).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t Admitting only relevant and reliable evidence is thought to aid factfinders in uncovering the ultimate truth.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_5' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_5'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>5<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_5' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #5<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_5' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_5' tabindex='-1'>5<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #5 content: <\/span><em>See<\/em> FED. R. EVID. 102; Katherine Goldwasser, <em>Vindicating the Right to Trial by Jury and the Requirement of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom about Excluding Defense Evidence<\/em>, 86 GEO. L. J. 621, 632 (1998).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t<\/p>\n<p>But, in criminal trials, \u201ctruthfinding is not the only value at stake.\u201d\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_6' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_6'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>6<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_6' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #6<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_6' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_6' tabindex='-1'>6<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #6 content: <\/span>Goldwasser, <em>supra<\/em> note 5, at 632.\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t Other values like the presumption of innocence, the moral force of criminal law, and the accused\u2019s liberty interest cut against maximizing accuracy. These principles are rooted in the Constitution, which grants the accused procedural rights in criminal trials that the prosecution does not enjoy.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_7' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_7'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>7<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_7' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #7<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_7' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_7' tabindex='-1'>7<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #7 content: <\/span><em>See<\/em> U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI.\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t<\/p>\n<p>Criminal defendants\u2019 constitutional rights often conflict with established evidence rules, frustrating the truth-seeking goals of evidence law.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_8' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_8'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>8<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_8' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #8<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_8' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_8' tabindex='-1'>8<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #8 content: <\/span><em>See infra<\/em> Part II.B.\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t The Constitution requires some level of evidentiary asymmetry in criminal trials, in part to correct for the asymmetrical interests of the accused and the prosecution.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_9' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_9'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>9<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_9' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #9<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_9' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_9' tabindex='-1'>9<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #9 content: <\/span><em>See<\/em> U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI (identifying rights specific to the accused, including the evidentiary right \u201cto be confronted with the witnesses against him\u201d); Nuno Garoupa, <em>Explaining the Standard of Proof in Criminal Law: A New Insight<\/em>, 25 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 111, 112\u201313 (2017) (discussing how the constitutional requirement of a \u201cbeyond a reasonable doubt\u201d burden of proof for criminal defendants has justified based on the assumption that a \u201cfalse positive,\u201d or a wrongful conviction, is more costly than a \u201cfalse negative,\u201d or a wrongful acquittal).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t Constitutional rights, therefore, ought to limit the scope of evidence rules when applied to criminal defendants.<\/p>\n<p>However, the Federal Rules of Evidence were not drafted with modern constitutional concerns in mind.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_10' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_10'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>10<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_10' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #10<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_10' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_10' tabindex='-1'>10<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #10 content: <\/span>The Federal Rules of Evidence were first drafted in 1970 and codified in 1975. <em>See<\/em> G. Alexander Nunn, <em>The Living Rules of Evidence<\/em>, 170 U. PA. L. REV. 937, 957 (2022). However, some amendments to the Federal Rules have since focused on emerging constitutional problems. <em>See<\/em> Daniel J. Capra &amp; Liesa L. Richter, <em>Long Live the Federal Rules of Evidence!<\/em>, 31 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 31\u201338 (2024). An example is Federal Rule of Evidence 803, which was partially drafted with the Confrontation Clause in mind. <em>See<\/em> FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee\u2019s note. It states:\nWhile these rules do not in general purport to resolve constitutional issues, they have in general been drafted with a view to avoiding collision with constitutional principles. Consequently the exception [803(22)] does not include evidence of the conviction of a third person, offered against the accused in a criminal prosecution to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment of conviction. A contrary position would seem clearly to violate the right of confrontation.\n<em>Id<\/em>. Caselaw interpreting that Rule 803(6) may not be used to circumvent 803(8) has also generally been based on confrontation considerations. <em>See<\/em> FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee\u2019s note. The Advisory Committee\u2019s notes state:\n[T]he rule with respect to evaluate [sic] reports under item (c) is very specific; they are admissible only in civil cases and against the government in criminal cases in view of the almost certain collision with confrontation rights which would result from their use against the accused in a criminal case.\n<em>Id<\/em>. As discussed in Part II.B, the confrontation right has been enforced more forcefully against the Federal Rules of Evidence since <em>Crawford v. Washington<\/em>, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t Rule 402 simply provides that \u201c[r]elevant evidence is admissible\u201d\u2014unless the Constitution \u201cprovides otherwise.\u201d\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_11' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_11'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>11<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_11' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #11<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_11' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_11' tabindex='-1'>11<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #11 content: <\/span>FED. R. EVID. 402.\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t And the Advisory Committee\u2019s Note to Rule 402 states that the \u201crule recognizes but makes no attempt to spell out the constitutional considerations which impose basic limitations upon the admissibility of relevant evidence.\u201d\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_12' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_12'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>12<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_12' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #12<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_12' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_12' tabindex='-1'>12<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #12 content: <\/span>FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee\u2019s note.\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t With the exception of Rules 803(8) and 412,\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_13' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_13'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>13<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_13' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #13<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_13' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_13' tabindex='-1'>13<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #13 content: <\/span><em>See<\/em> sources cited <em>supra<\/em> note 10; FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C) (\u201cThe court may admit . . . evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant\u2019s constitutional rights.\u201d).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t the rules that frequently conflict with defense rights generally do not acknowledge that constitutional concerns might be at play\u2014leaving constitutional enforcement to the accused and their counsel.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_14' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_14'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>14<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_14' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #14<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_14' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_14' tabindex='-1'>14<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #14 content: <\/span><em>See, e.g<\/em>., FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing a framework for excluding expert testimony without advising that such exclusion might violate a defendant\u2019s right to present a defense).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t And, although amendments to the rules have focused on ensuring that criminal defendants are treated fairly,\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_15' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_15'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>15<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_15' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #15<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_15' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_15' tabindex='-1'>15<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #15 content: <\/span><em>See<\/em> Capra &amp; Richter, <em>supra<\/em> note 10, at 31\u201338 (discussing the Advisory Committee\u2019s efforts to ensure fairness for the criminally accused through a notice amendment to Rule 404(b), an amendment of Rule 804(b)(3) which originally placed a heavier burden on criminal defendants\u2019 introduction of hearsay statements against interest, an amendment that narrowed the breadth convictions that were automatically admitted under Rule 609, an amendment to Rule 106 which had been interpreted by some circuits to prevent criminal defendants from correcting a misimpression created by the prosecution, and the recent amendment to Rule 702 which limits overstatement by testifying experts).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t substantive changes have thus far largely maintained the status quo.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_16' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_16'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>16<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2671_16' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #16<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2671_16' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2671_16' tabindex='-1'>16<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #16 content: <\/span><em>See<\/em> Nunn, <em>supra<\/em> note 10, at 961 (arguing that amendments adopted by the Advisory Committee since the Rules\u2019 inception are \u201cdemonstrative of an affinity for the status quo\u201d and that \u201c[m]issing [from the Federal Rules] is any attempt to expressly consider evidence law\u2019s role in falsely convicting scores of defendants exonerated by the Innocence Movement.\u201d). Professor Nunn also notes that the complicated process for amendment may be in part to blame for the lack of truly significant changes to the Rules: \u201c[E]ven if rulemakers did deem a particular amendment desirable, the current bureaucratic maze establishes a de facto three-year process to actualize it.\u201d <em>Id.<\/em> at 958.\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t<\/p>\n<p>When applied to criminal defendants, this Note argues that certain evidence rules have attained supremacy over criminal defendants\u2019 constitutional rights. A review of the Federal Rules of Evidence that have come into repeated conflict with defendants\u2019 constitutional rights demonstrates how evidence regulation tends to occupy the field, depriving defense rights of any evidentiary bite. These rights include the right to present a defense, the right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to an impartial jury. When these rights conflict with evidentiary values, courts are reluctant to find evidence rules unconstitutional on their face or even in their application. Ironically, although almost all evidence rules apply equally to the parties, in practice, some tend to favor the prosecution.<\/p>\n<p>This Note argues that greater asymmetry in favor of criminal defendants is necessary to avoid evidentiary supremacy over constitutional rights and to enforce constitutional norms. Understood from this perspective, constitutional enforcement need not only occur through major doctrinal development\u2014that is, overturning or abrogating cases that have weakened defense rights. Instead, implementing defense rights can occur through more constitutionally avoidant applications of evidence rules or through amendments to the rules themselves.<\/p>\n<p>Part I begins with background on the constitutional principles that call for asymmetry, such as the values undergirding the right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Part I proceeds with a discussion of the Supreme Court\u2019s recognition of the demand for asymmetry as a means to enforce the supremacy of defense rights over evidence rules. The history of the Court\u2019s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence provides a helpful example of a constitutional right that was rescued from being absorbed into, and subservient to, modern evidence law.<\/p>\n<p>Part II discusses how the application of certain evidence rules has overtaken or displaced other defense rights over time. First, Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which regulates the admission of testimony by expert witnesses, is generally applied asymmetrically\u2014but in favor of the prosecution. This not only frustrates the rule\u2019s purpose of ensuring the reliability of expert witnesses, but also conflicts with the accused\u2019s constitutional right to present a meaningful defense. Second, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), the exclusionary rule which prohibits the use of jurors\u2019 testimonies about their deliberations to impeach a verdict, directly prevents the enforcement of the criminal defendant\u2019s right to an impartial jury.<\/p>\n<p>Finally, Part III ends with an outline of several suggested approaches that may help to implement greater asymmetry in the Federal Rules of Evidence to prevent further constitutional displacement. Part III ultimately recommends amendment as the most effective approach for ensuring the accused\u2019s liberties are protected.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/american-criminal-law-review\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/15\/2026\/04\/GT-ACLR260005.pdf\">Continue reading The Constitutional Demand for Evidentiary Asymmetry to Protect the Accused<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Evidence law\u2019s ultimate purpose is to maximize accurate fact-finding. To encourage accuracy, evidence rules are typically applied symmetrically to both parties, allocating the risk of error equally. To prevent errors, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":28,"featured_media":0,"parent":2657,"menu_order":3,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"abstract.php","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_price":"","_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_header":"","_tribe_default_ticket_provider":"","_tribe_ticket_capacity":"0","_ticket_start_date":"","_ticket_end_date":"","_tribe_ticket_show_description":"","_tribe_ticket_show_not_going":false,"_tribe_ticket_use_global_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_global_stock_level":"","_global_stock_mode":"","_global_stock_cap":"","_tribe_rsvp_for_event":"","_tribe_ticket_going_count":"","_tribe_ticket_not_going_count":"","_tribe_tickets_list":"[]","_tribe_ticket_has_attendee_info_fields":false,"footnotes":"","_tec_slr_enabled":"","_tec_slr_layout":""},"class_list":["post-2671","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"ticketed":false,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/american-criminal-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2671","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/american-criminal-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/american-criminal-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/american-criminal-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/28"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/american-criminal-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2671"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/american-criminal-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2671\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2674,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/american-criminal-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2671\/revisions\/2674"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/american-criminal-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2657"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/american-criminal-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2671"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}