{"id":765,"date":"2021-01-06T17:05:04","date_gmt":"2021-01-06T22:05:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/american-criminal-law-review\/aclr-online\/the-heart-of-the-business-an-analysis-of-the-antitrust-divisions-new-policy-of-crediting-corporate-compliance-at-the-charging-stage\/"},"modified":"2025-05-12T11:09:33","modified_gmt":"2025-05-12T15:09:33","slug":"the-heart-of-the-business-an-analysis-of-the-antitrust-divisions-new-policy-of-crediting-corporate-compliance-at-the-charging-stage","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/american-criminal-law-review\/aclr-online\/volume-58\/the-heart-of-the-business-an-analysis-of-the-antitrust-divisions-new-policy-of-crediting-corporate-compliance-at-the-charging-stage\/","title":{"rendered":"&#8220;The Heart of the Business&#8221;: An Analysis of the Antitrust Division&#8217;s New Policy of Crediting Corporate Compliance at the Charging Stage"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span>Throughout its history, when prosecuting corporations for criminal antitrust violations, the U.S. Department of Justice\u2019s Antitrust Division did not credit a corporation\u2019s demonstrated commitment to compliance at the charging stage. The Division also disfavored the use of deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements. In July 2019, however, Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim announced a change to this approach under which the Division would begin taking a wider range of \u201cSpecial Factors\u201d into account before prosecuting a corporation. If these\u00a0factors, including the corporation\u2019s effective compliance department, weigh against bringing a full prosecution, then the Division can negotiate a deferred prosecution agreement with the corporation instead.<\/p>\n<p>This Comment argues that the Antitrust Division\u2019s new policy pursues a worthy end of incentivizing antitrust compliance, but its specific approach of crediting compliance at charging, could benefit from fuller explication and limited usage. Part I outlines the Division\u2019s old approach, which functionally constituted a per se rule that compliance departments that permitted antitrust violations, with few exceptions, were ineffective. Part II reviews the Division\u2019s new policy and possible application in cases to date. Part III raises remaining questions regarding the new policy\u2019s rationales and practical effect, concluding that it may result in little change and could lead to the Division\u2019s underenforcement of criminal antitrust laws.<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/american-criminal-law-review\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/15\/2021\/01\/58-0-Salem-Mackall-The-Heart-of-the-Business.pdf\">Read More<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>\u00a0Throughout its history, when prosecuting corporations for criminal antitrust violations, the U.S. Department of Justice\u2019s Antitrust Division did not credit a corporation\u2019s demonstrated commitment to compliance at the charging stage. 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