{"id":35,"date":"2018-02-09T15:59:25","date_gmt":"2018-02-09T20:59:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/environmental-law-review\/?page_id=35"},"modified":"2025-05-12T11:10:00","modified_gmt":"2025-05-12T15:10:00","slug":"political-costs-and-the-challenge-of-tradable-environmental-allowance-markets","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/environmental-law-review\/in-print\/volume-29-issue-4-summer-2017\/political-costs-and-the-challenge-of-tradable-environmental-allowance-markets\/","title":{"rendered":"Political Costs and the Challenge of Tradable Environmental Allowance Markets"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Traditional accounts of tradable environmental allowance markets focus on\u00a0the economics of their operation and the instrumental costs of their design, such\u00a0as the definition, monitoring, and enforcement of rights. Less attention has been\u00a0given to the role of political costs in influencing whether these market-based\u00a0mechanisms get enacted at all, and their form and fate if they do. These costs help\u00a0to explain the divergence between strong theoretical arguments in favor of\u00a0tradable environmental allowance markets and their more limited real world\u00a0success. This Article analyzes how costs arising from the political process\u2014that\u00a0is, costs to political actors of pursuing particular policies\u2014affect the decision to\u00a0advance tradable market-based environmental policies, and whether these policies\u00a0are sustained. This Article does so through an examination of two tradable\u00a0environmental allowance markets established in New Zealand: one governing\u00a0fisheries and another regulating greenhouse gas emissions. The political acceptability\u00a0of these environmental markets was affected by internal and external\u00a0influences, including wider economic reforms, policy entrepreneurs, and failure\u00a0of other policy options. Moreover, both policies have faced post-enactment\u00a0political challenges that have threatened to undermine their design. New Zealand\u2019s\u00a0experience suggests that tradable environmental allowance markets have\u00a0limited political range, making them vulnerable to policy failure or manipulation\u00a0and, though they can be successful in certain political environments, they are\u00a0unlikely to form the basis of wide ranging environmental policy reform.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Traditional accounts of tradable environmental allowance markets focus on\u00a0the economics of their operation and the instrumental costs of their design, such\u00a0as the definition, monitoring, and enforcement of rights. Less attention [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":28,"featured_media":0,"parent":62,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"abstract.php","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_price":"","_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_header":"","_tribe_default_ticket_provider":"","_tribe_ticket_capacity":"0","_ticket_start_date":"","_ticket_end_date":"","_tribe_ticket_show_description":"","_tribe_ticket_show_not_going":false,"_tribe_ticket_use_global_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_global_stock_level":"","_global_stock_mode":"","_global_stock_cap":"","_tribe_rsvp_for_event":"","_tribe_ticket_going_count":"","_tribe_ticket_not_going_count":"","_tribe_tickets_list":"[]","_tribe_ticket_has_attendee_info_fields":false,"footnotes":"","_tec_slr_enabled":"","_tec_slr_layout":""},"class_list":["post-35","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"ticketed":false,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/environmental-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/35","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/environmental-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/environmental-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/environmental-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/28"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/environmental-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=35"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/environmental-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/35\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1767,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/environmental-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/35\/revisions\/1767"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/environmental-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/62"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/environmental-law-review\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=35"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}