I. INTRODUCTION

In October 2017, dozens of women made public decades of alleged sexual harassment by Harvey Weinstein, a major Hollywood producer.1 Within two weeks, Weinstein was fired from his studio and resigned from the board.2 Partly as a reaction to these events, women (and some men) across the United States began using the hashtag “#MeToo” to share their own experiences with sexual harassment and abuse.3 The #MeToo Movement garnered enough attention that powerful and famous men like Matt Lauer, Charlie Rose, Russell Simmons, Al Franken, Louis C.K., Kevin Spacey, and many others have been fired or forced to resign in response to allegations of “sexual misconduct that ranged from inappropriate comments to rape.”4

While these allegations are receiving unprecedented attention, they are not new. Sexual harassment in the workplace often comes in the form of sexual assault, sexualized attention, demeaning comments, and authentic or mock sexual advances from co-workers or supervisors.5 And though women continue to file the vast majority of sexual harassment complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),6 women are not the only individuals that

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5. Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 3 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004). This introduction expands on the history of oppression of women and inequality at work, from slavery to the modern Information Age. The authors argue that women have experienced unequal power dynamics at work for centuries, which has led to modern harassment ranging from sexual assault to derogatory comments about the female anatomy.
6. Enforcement & Litigation Statistics, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment_new.cfm (last visited Jan. 7, 2019). In 2018, 15.9% of 7,609 charges alleging sexual harassment were filed by males. The EEOC website defines sexual harassment as “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
experience sexual harassment. While sexual orientation and gender identity are not explicitly protected classes under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, some courts have held that sexual harassment can occur between people of the same sex or against transgender persons. As of this publication, the circuits are split on the application of Title VII to sexual orientation discrimination. Thus, although many judges or statutes once relied on gender-specific language, it is important to note that judges will often apply the same standards regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity.

To combat harassment at work, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which implemented the first legal recognition of, and protection from, sexual harassment outside of tort law. Section 703(a) of Title VII states that:

> It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Thus, Title VII created both a legal cause of action for sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as an anti-harassment policy meant “to encourage informal conciliation and to foster voluntary compliance.” Congress continues to work to ensure that workplaces are free from discrimination by updating

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8. See infra Part V.
10. See infra Section IV(A).
12. Id. at § 2000e-2(a).
13. See id.
employment discrimination law.\textsuperscript{15} For example, the Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Act of 2018 would require parties contracting with the United States government to report any Title VII violations by that party from the preceding three years.\textsuperscript{16} Congress is also considering the EMPOWER Act, Part 2 of which would disallow tax deductions for expenses and judgments incurred in sex harassment litigation,\textsuperscript{17} and Part 1 of which would prohibit nondisclosure clauses regarding sex harassment, establish a confidential tip line for workplace harassment, require disclosure of claims to the SEC, and establish federally-recommended materials for use in workplace anti-harassment trainings.\textsuperscript{18}

The Supreme Court has also attempted to legally define sexual harassment, generally holding that sexual harassment can include tangible employment changes in exchange for sexual favors or conduct that is so pervasive or severe that it creates an abusive working environment for the victim.\textsuperscript{19} Such conduct cannot be mere utterances or offhand comments;\textsuperscript{20} typically, both a reasonable person as well as the actual victim must find the conduct hostile or abusive given the circumstances.\textsuperscript{21} This article will explore how other courts apply and expand upon this legal definition.\textsuperscript{22}

To supplement federal law, forty-seven states and Washington, DC have implemented anti-discrimination statutes that either expressly\textsuperscript{23} or impliedly prohibit sexual harassment in the private workplace.\textsuperscript{24} Others rely on common law

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[16.] S. 3077, 115th Cong. § 4 (2017-2018).
\item[17.] S. 2988, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017-2018).
\item[18.] S. 2994, 115th Cong. §§ 4-7 (2017-2018).
\item[19.] See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (holding that sexual harassment actions cover pervasive or severe conduct, which does not have to include economic or tangible discrimination, that creates an objectively hostile or abusive work environment); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 67 (1986) (holding that actionable sexual harassment claims can be, but are not limited to, tangible economic actions against victims and can also include severe or pervasive conduct that creates an abusive or hostile workplace).
\item[20.] See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998); \textit{Meritor}, 477 U.S. at 67.
\item[21.] See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787 (citing \textit{Harris}, 501 U.S. at 21-22).
\item[22.] See infra Parts II-V.
torts.\textsuperscript{25} States also define sexual harassment in regulations governing public employees.\textsuperscript{26}

This article will analyze the varying approaches of states and circuits in implementing, expanding, and interpreting elements of their own sexual harassment laws.\textsuperscript{27} Part II will present the basic elements of most sexual harassment claims. Part III will explain the basics of Title VII, the EEOC, and FEPA, as well as

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\textsuperscript{25} See, e.g., Machen v. Childersburg Bancorporation, Inc., 761 So. 2d 981, 983 (Ala. 1999).


\textsuperscript{27} See infra Parts I-V.
policy updates since the election of President Trump. Part IV will examine state implementation of sexual harassment laws, including alternative common law remedies. This section will also explore the ways many states have expanded their protection of employees and implemented administrative requirements as part of a broader regulatory scheme to protect workers. Part V will examine different key elements of sexual harassment claims and how states have interpreted them. Part VI will explore the extent to which employers may be held liable for sexual harassment claims and the different defenses available to an employer in defending against a sexual harassment claim. Part VII will examine the standards courts have more recently developed for applying Title VII protections to same-sex sexual harassment and sexual harassment of transgender employees. Finally, Part VIII will give a brief overview of recent cases of sexual harassment in the media that received national coverage, concluding with a summary of the response to #MeToo within the legal community.

II. BASIC ELEMENTS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAWS

Under Title VII, federal courts recognize two forms of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work environment. While these terms do not appear in the text of Title VII, the Supreme Court has interpreted Section 703(a) to protect employees from both tangible (quid pro quo) and intangible (hostile work environment) sexual harassment. Many state courts look to federal guidelines as persuasive authority to shape their own statutory interpretation. The following section will briefly cover the general legal elements of quid pro quo and hostile work environment, as these elements are the foundation of workplace sexual harassment claims.

A. QUID PRO QUO

Quid pro quo harassment occurs when the “submission to or rejection of” requests for sexual favors “is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting” an individual. Thus, quid pro quo harassment falls within Title VII’s “because of . . . sex” requirement because a sexual favor would not have been solicited but for the sex of the person harassed. To prove quid pro quo sexual

28. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1998) (explaining that the terms “quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment” can be used to demarcate different types of sexual harassment claims); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777, 781 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiffs may proceed under either a quid pro quo or hostile work environment theory); Soto v. John Morrell & Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1169 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (explaining that Title VII recognizes both quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims).

29. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (“[T]he language of Title VII is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination. [Congress intended] to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment.”) (citations omitted). Title VII extends to hostile work environment cases where the harassment does not always lead to economic damages for the victim. Id. at 66.

30. See, e.g., Labra v. Mid-Plains Const., Inc., 90 P.3d 954, 957 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (“Although federal cases construing Title VII . . . are not controlling, they are persuasive authority in the interpretation and application of the KAAD.”).

31. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1972).

32. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
harassment under most state laws, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the plaintiff
belongs to a protected class under antidiscrimination law; (2) the harassment allegedly
experienced was based on sex; (3) the harassment was unwelcome; (4) the plaintiff
was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances or requests for sexual favors; and (5) the plaintiff’s submission to the unwelcome advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits, or the plaintiff’s refusal to submit resulted in a tangible job detriment such as reduction in pay, failure to obtain a raise or to receive benefits, or termination of employment. The Ninth Circuit has held that an employer can be vicariously liable for a quid pro quo action when a supervisor recommends, with the authority to recommend, a “tangible employment action” against a plaintiff.

B. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT

A hostile work environment claim usually involves “severe or pervasive” harassment and hostility that interferes with an individual’s work performance. While a plaintiff must show that gender is a substantial factor in the discrimination – and that “but for” the sex of the plaintiff, the plaintiff would not have been treated in that manner – no showing of economic harm or actual psychological injury is necessary. To make a prima facie showing of a hostile work environment, the victim must show that: (1) he or she belongs to a protected class under the antidiscrimination law; (2) the harassment allegedly experienced was based on sex; (3) the harassment was unwelcome; and (4) the harasser’s conduct was so severe and/or pervasive that it altered the victim-employee’s work environment by detracting from the employee’s job performance.


35. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. As discussed in Section V(A), infra, states differ as to whether the harassing conduct must be “of a sexual nature.”


37. See Veco, Inc. v. Rosebrook, 970 P.2d 906, 910 (Alaska 1999); Elezovic v. Ford Motor Co., 697 N.W.2d 851, 868-69 (Mich. 2005); Goins v. W. Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 725 (Minn. 2001); Nava v. City of Santa Fe, 103 P.3d 571, 574 (N.M. 2004); Lively, 830 A.2d at 888; Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Young, 731 N.E.2d 631, 639-40 (Ohio 2000).
Recent decisions have extended hostile work environment claims to employees who are not the intended recipients of unwelcome sexual advances.\(^{38}\) For example, in *Miller v. Department of Corrections*, a male prison warden had affairs with numerous female employees and then provided these employees with promotions and privileges.\(^{39}\) When other female employees complained about the practice of favoritism, the warden retaliated against them.\(^{40}\) These women brought a hostile work environment claim.\(^{41}\) The California Supreme Court held that these women could bring a hostile work environment action against their employer under the state equivalent of Title VII.\(^{42}\) According to the court, management’s view of the female employees as “sexual playthings” was demeaning to all female employees and implied that the only way to advance professionally was to engage in sexual conduct with superiors.\(^{43}\) The court noted the deleterious effect that such widespread sexual favoritism could have on the work environment.\(^{44}\) This approach is mirrored by EEOC enforcement guidance stating that if sexual favoritism is sufficiently widespread, male or female colleagues not subject to that favoritism can establish a hostile work environment claim.\(^{45}\)

III. EEOC & Other Federal Law Updates

A. Title VII

Spurred by nationwide civil unrest protesting blatant racial discrimination and segregation, President Johnson, Congress, civil rights advocates, and labor organizations created and eventually passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.\(^{46}\) The Act forbids discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin within voter registration requirements, public schools and accommodations, and employment contexts.\(^{47}\) Title VII of the Act specifically forbids discrimination on the basis of sex and race in employment practices including hiring, promotion,
and firing.\textsuperscript{48} This section of the Act applies to most employers with at least fifteen employees, labor unions, and employment agencies.\textsuperscript{49} Perhaps most importantly, Title VII created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), discussed in Part B below.\textsuperscript{50}

Title VII is a consistent source of both great debate and expansion of substantive rights for victims of discrimination.\textsuperscript{51} Since its implementation, Title VII has consistently paved the way for the EEOC and the judicial system at large to protect the rights of marginalized individuals, expanding to include age discrimination in 1967 and creating the model for the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, among numerous other protections.\textsuperscript{52} The EEOC is principally responsible for implementing Title VII’s protections. Additionally, executive orders and Congressional legislation often use Title VII as a basis for new actions, referencing definitions and Title VII’s legislative history when further expanding anti-discrimination guidelines. Over the last five decades, Title VII has been broadly interpreted as an instrument by which the EEOC, the legislature, and the judiciary may ensure discrimination-free workplaces and employment opportunities. The EEOC constitutes the most progressive and far-reaching vehicle for Title VII’s assurances.

B. EEOC

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 created the EEOC, a five-member bipartisan commission with the power to receive, investigate, and conciliate complaints of discrimination based on Title VII factors.\textsuperscript{53} Per the Act, the Commission must include no more than three members from the same political party and provides guidance to federal agencies on equal employment opportunity regulations.\textsuperscript{54} Since its creation, the EEOC’s purview of potential discriminatory practices has expanded to include race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability, or genetic information.\textsuperscript{55} The EEOC enforces Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as well as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Americans with


\textsuperscript{51} See \textit{NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION}, \textit{supra} note 48.


\textsuperscript{53} See \textit{Pre 1965: Events Leading to the Creation of the EEOC}, \textit{supra} note 46.


\textsuperscript{55} See \textit{Overview}, \textit{supra} note 54.
Disabilities Act, and the Genetic Nondiscrimination Information Act, all of which strive to ensure equal opportunities in the workplace. Though it is the lead enforcement agency in workplace discrimination, advocating on behalf of those discriminated against based on race, color, religion, national origin, age, disability, and sex, the EEOC’s powers are somewhat limited. As a federal agency, the EEOC is permitted to pursue conciliation through its administrative enforcement process. If the EEOC finds discriminatory practices do exist, it refers the matter to the Department of Justice for litigation. If it is unable to resolve charges of employment discrimination against private sector employers, agencies, or labor unions with informal conciliation methods, the EEOC may pursue litigation in the Article III court system. In the event that the EEOC does pursue litigation to obtain relief for victims of employment discrimination on behalf of the government, the Office of General Counsel works with district office legal units to manage and direct any enforcement litigation operations.

The EEOC is on occasion a divisive body, pushing interpretations of the Civil Rights Act to include affirmative action and investigatory authority, though neither power is explicitly enumerated in the Act. Political conservatives are often in opposition to many EEOC guidelines, arguing they saturate the legal system with government regulations and federal policies, while political liberals support EEOC policies expanding the rights of women and minorities. In recent years, the EEOC continues to address record numbers of discrimination charges while operating in a dramatically shifting workplace structure—there are more women and minorities in the workforce now, and part-time and temporary work is increasingly popular. The changing workplace structure may partially account for a marked increase in individuals alleging sex-based harassment from 2010 to 2018: up from 12,695 to 13,055, the highest in that timeframe. It is difficult, however, to extrapolate generally from recorded charging statistics what, if any, effect an evolving workforce has on overall trends in types of charges filed with the EEOC. The EEOC’s charging statistics show a percentage of cases that include any of ten types of discrimination—for example, one individual may
allege both sex and national origin discrimination.\textsuperscript{67} Thus, while the percentage of charges that include discrimination on the basis of sex generally as a distinct charge has remained roughly 30\% from 1997 to 2017, the EEOC does not provide statistics on whether there has been a change in cases that allege only discrimination on the basis of sex generally in a lawsuit.\textsuperscript{68} The EEOC reports charges related to retaliation under Title VII only: 32,023 charges filed in 2017 alone, as opposed to 16,394 in 1997.\textsuperscript{69} More poignantly, these Title VII Retaliation charges are not only increasing in absolute terms, but also as a percentage of total charges filed—up from 20.3\% of total charges in 1997 to 38\% in 2017.\textsuperscript{70}

C. FEPA

State and local agencies called Fair Employment Practices Agencies ("FEPAs") are responsible for enforcing geographic-specific anti-discrimination laws.\textsuperscript{71} FEPA filing practices vary greatly, as FEPAs can enforce local law that goes beyond those promulgated by the EEOC. Because of the great variation between various states, cities, and towns, some FEPAs may enforce laws that provide far greater protection to employees based on local marriage or custody laws, for example.\textsuperscript{72} Complaints may be filed either with a FEPA or directly with the EEOC, though if the complaint is originally lodged with a FEPA and the matter is one covered by the EEOC, the FEPA will file a copy with the EEOC, with the reverse also being true.\textsuperscript{73}

As part of the Performance and Accountability Report for Fiscal Year 2017, Acting Chair Victoria A. Lipnic, a Trump Administration appointee, noted a goal to combat employment discrimination through strategic law enforcement by increasing FEPA-reported resolutions to between 15 and 17\% from a baseline percentage of 14\% in 2014.\textsuperscript{74} The result was an increase in the proportion of FEPA resolutions reported by local or state FEPA offices from 14\% to a range from 15-17\% as of September 30, 2017.\textsuperscript{75} The EEOC achieved this objective by integrating EEOC responsibilities into private and state and local government sectors so as to track the progress of state and local partners in adhering to agency-wide efforts to attack instances of systemic discrimination.\textsuperscript{76}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{67} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{68} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{69} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{70} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{71} See Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs) and Dual Filing, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/fepa.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
  \item \textsuperscript{72} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{73} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{74} U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2017 at 24 (2018).
  \item \textsuperscript{75} See id. at 24.
  \item \textsuperscript{76} See id. at 19.
\end{itemize}
D. RELATED FEDERAL LAWS

As outlined above, the EEOC is tasked with enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Sections 102 and 103 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008. These Acts comprise the vast majority of federal legislation and regulation addressing sexual harassment in the workplace or public spaces. However, there are a number of other federal acts and orders worth noting.

Title IX, a 1972 amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex under any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. This prohibition applies to “admissions to institutions of vocational education, professional education, and graduate higher education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher education.” Title IX also governs procedure in any instance of alleged sexual assault or harassment on a college campus, as sexual violence or harassment is a form of discrimination on the basis of sex. The Department of Labor enforces the requirements of Title IX and the Education Amendments of 1972.

Presidents may choose to address issues of sexual discrimination and harassment in the workplace through the implementation of executive orders. On May 28, 1998, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13087 in furtherance of Executive Order 11478, Equal Employment Opportunity in the Federal Government. While the EEOC operates under the holding that discrimination against an individual because of that person’s sexual orientation is discrimination because of sex and is therefore prohibited under Title VII, this Executive Order made clear that the federal government is held by a uniform policy prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.

President Barack Obama amended Executive Order 11246 (now entitled Executive Order 11326), originally signed by President Johnson in 1965, on July 21, 2014, substantially expanding its reach. Now, Executive Order 11326 prohibits federal contractors and federally-assisted construction contractors and subcontractors who complete more than $10,000 in government business in one year

79. See id. at (a)(1).
80. See id. at (a)(1).
from discrimination in employment decisions based on race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or national origin. The Trump Administration has not repealed this executive order.

E. TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND CURRENT POLICIES

The Trump Administration has made and continues to make sweeping changes to previous federal government stances on discrimination. On March 27, 2017, President Trump signed an executive order revoking President Obama’s 2014 Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces executive order. The Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces order required paycheck transparency and a ban on forced arbitration clauses for sexual harassment, sexual assault, or discrimination claims for companies with Federal contracts. President Trump’s revocation of the Fair Pay order directly impacts individuals seeking to sue employers of harassment in the workplace, as allegations of harassment may now be kept from the public and thus lead to few lasting impacts on large contractors while affording victims little by way of remedy.

In July 2017, the Trump Administration took the highly unusual step of filing a friend-of-the-court brief in a federal case in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Zarda v. Altitude Expressions. In its brief, the Department of Justice (DOJ) argues that federal civil rights law, namely Title VII, does not protect employees from discrimination based on sexual orientation. The DOJ argues that Title VII amendments are the purview of Congress, not the courts, and “sex” has always been separate from “sexual orientation.” Directly opposing the EEOC and a Seventh Circuit opinion holding the opposite, the DOJ stated that “an employer who discriminations against an employee in a same-sex relationship is not engaged in sex-based treatment of women as inferior to similarly situated men […], but rather is engaged in sex-neutral treatment of homosexual men and women alike” and is thus not in violation of Title VII. This brief laid bare the sharp divide between the DOJ and the EEOC—both enforce the requirements of Title VII, but neither is entitled to Chevron deference when interpreting the Act.

84. See id.
87. See Brief for the Untied States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2017).
88. See id. at 22.
On October 4, 2017, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions released a memorandum on the Revised Treatment of Transgender Employment Discrimination Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In this memo, Attorney General Sessions states “Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination encompasses discrimination between men and women but does not encompass discrimination based on gender identity per se, including transgender status.” Attorney General Sessions notes that the memorandum does not remove protections provided for transgender individuals provided by Congress, but the memorandum effectively removed transgender individuals’ ability to pursue litigation with the power of Title VII.

In a September 2017 speech Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos proposed a rewrite and reinterpretation of rules implementing Title IX. Secretary DeVos’s proposed regulations are subject to public notice and comment and, once formalized, will carry the force of law, in stark contrast to less-formal Obama-era guidance. Proponents argue the proposal is a restoration of balance in a system too favorable to accusers, while victims’ rights advocacy groups contend the changes will decrease women’s safety on college campuses and go too far in incorporating legal concepts into a collegiate disciplinary setting. The proposed regulations apply Supreme Court standards to define sexual harassment, such that whether discrimination has the effect of denying access to the federal aid recipient’s educational programs or activities is set by the narrow standard in *Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education*. In addition, the proposed regulations include rape shield protections like those utilized in formal criminal investigations, and educational institutions are given a choice between evidentiary standards (“preponderance of the evidence” or “clear and convincing evidence”) in deciding which evidentiary standard to employ in sexual assault or harassment cases. At the time of publishing, these rules had been recently released and had not yet been implemented.

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92. Id. at 2.
93. See id. at 2.
94. See id. at 2.
97. See *Betsy DeVos Releases Sexual Assault Rules She Hails as Balancing Rights of Victims, Accused*, supra note 95.
IV. State Implementation and Expansion of Sexual Harassment Laws

While most state statutes at least partially mirror Title VII, many go further to effectively expand Title VII anti-discrimination protections to cover LGBT workers and workers in settings with fewer than fifteen employees. These expanded protections recognize the fact that those classes are equally as vulnerable to discrimination as are the named Title VII classes. In some jurisdictions, they represent a direct response to their circuit federal courts’ holdings that sexual orientation and gender identity are not protected classes under Title VII.99 Many states also impose additional regulatory requirements on employers and have established their own Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs) to oversee compliance.100 In FEPA states,101 employees can either bring a cause of action for sexual harassment through the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII, or through the state FEPA, under the state’s Title VII equivalent.102 Despite this apparent overlap in protection, dual protection is necessary as FEPAs often enforce statutes that offer greater protections than Title VII; they also often have different deadlines, standards, and relief available to the employee.103 Part A will discuss the ways that protected classes have been expanded beyond the formal Title VII class members. First, it will explore state statutes that protect employees who work in settings of fewer than fifteen workers. It will then discuss protections that some states have implemented for marginalized groups not named in Title VII. Part B will explain the administrative requirements that Title VII imposes on employers to educate its workers and to facilitate prevention of workplace harassment.

98. See infra Part V.
99. See e.g. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that “transsexuals” are not a protected class for purposes of Title VII’s “because of sex” discrimination). The following year, Colorado incorporated protections for sexual identity and transgender status. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402, § 24-34-301. See also, e.g., Pagan v. Gonzalez, 430 Fed. Appx. 170 (3rd Cir. 2011) (holding that sexual orientation is not a cognizable claim under Title VII). Two years later, Delaware amended its state statute to include sexual orientation; the following year it was amended to include gender identity. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711. See also, http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/federal-court-decisions.
101. Id. (“To determine if there is a FEPA in your area, please see the information for your nearest EEOC field office, which lists the FEPAs in its jurisdictional area”).
102. Id.
103. Id.
A. EXPANDED CLASS PROTECTIONS

Title VII only provides sexual harassment protection to those employees working in an environment with a minimum of fifteen employees. As a result, many individuals working for small businesses do not fall under the federal umbrella of protection. State sexual harassment statutes in thirty-eight states, however, cover employers with fewer than fifteen employees; seventeen of these states cover all employers with one or more employees. Many small businesses that

104. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-327) ("The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.").


106. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-327) (establishing that the statute applies to those employees with fifteen or more employees), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102 (West 2017) (establishing that employers with nine or more employees can be held liable); see CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926 (West 2018) (establishing that employers with five or more employees may be held liable); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-51, 46a-60 (West 2017) (establishing that employers with three or more employees may be held liable); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 710, 711 (West 2016) (establishing that employers with four or more employees may be held liable); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 67-5902, 67-5909 (West 2018) (establishing that employers with five or more employees may be held liable); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-3 (West 2018) (establishing that employer with six or more employees may be liable); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 216.2, 216.6 (West 2018) (establishing that anyone employing employees in the state may be held liable); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1002, 44-1009 (West 2018) (establishing that employer with four or more employees may be held liable); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.030, 344.040 (West 2017, 2010) (establishing that employer with eight or more employees may be held liable); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, §§ 1, 4 (West 2014, 2018) (establishing that employers with six or more employees may be held liable); MO. STAT. ANN. §§ 213.010, 213.055 (West 2017) (establishing that employers with six or more employees may be held liable); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:2, 354-A:7 (West 2018) (establishing that employer with six or more employees may be liable and protecting sexual orientation); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-2, 28-1-7 (West 2018) (establishing that employers with four or more employees may be held liable); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01 (West 2016) (establishing that employers with four or more employees may be held liable); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 954 (West 2018) (establishing that employer with four or more employees may be liable); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-6, 28-5-7 (West 2018) (establishing that employers with four or more employees may be liable); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102 (West 2012) (establishing that employers with eight or more employees may be liable); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3903 (West 2018) (establishing the employers with more than five employees may be liable). WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (West 2019) (establishing that employers with eight or more employees may be liable); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3 (West 2018) (establishing that employers with twelve or more employees may be liable); WYOMING CODE ANN. § 27-9-102 (West 2018) (establishing that employers with two or more employees may be liable).

107. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.300(5), 18.80.220 (West 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-34-401, 24-34-402 (West 2016); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1401.02, 2-1402.11 (West 2018, 2017) (stating that there is no minimum number of employees an employer must have in order to be held liable); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378-1, 378-2 (West 2018) (stating that employers with one or more employee may be held liable); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-101 (West 2017) (stating that there is no employee minimum when a complainant asserts a civil rights violation due to discrimination based on sex); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4553, 4572 (West 2018) (stating that there is no minimum number
were once exempt from sexual harassment laws under Title VII are now required to comply with analogous state laws. They provide a “Small Business Resource Center” offering assistance and training in order to help newly covered companies implement changes to ensure compliance. Individual state FEPAs and equivalent government agencies also provide resources designed to assist small local companies to comply with expanded state laws.

Title VII offers protection from discrimination because of one’s sex. There is significant disagreement among the EEOC, the Trump Administration, federal courts, and states as to their respective interpretations of whether and how discrimination “because of sex” applies to sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination. While the Title VII wording does not formally recognize different classes of sexual minorities, many state statutes specify that protections extend to various additional classes of sexual minorities. This includes either actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, bisexuality,
homosexuality, heterosexuality, and transgender status. The EEOC interprets Title VII to encompass discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation, and asserts that it will enforce this interpretation of the law regardless of conflicting state law; that is, a state law that does not prohibit discrimination on these bases is not a defense under Title VII. In contrast, the Trump Administration has taken a stance against protecting workers because of their sexual orientation or identity under Title VII. In October 2017, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a memo on behalf of the Department of Justice asserting that Title VII does not protect transgender workers from discrimination, reversing the Obama Administration’s position. The Trump Administration’s Health and Human Services Agency has most recently been preparing draft guidelines to legally define sex as “a person’s status as male or female based on immutable biological traits identifiable by or before birth,” effectively “eradicating” transgender recognition for the purpose of Title IX federal education funding. As of November 14, 2018, there has not been formal implementation of these reported plans.

Circuits are split in their interpretation of the federal law; just six states are covered by federal appeals courts holding that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, while twenty-three states are under circuits holding that Title VII protects against gender identity discrimination. In a notable case last year, the Second Circuit held in Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc. that sexual orientation discrimination falls under Title VII’s purview. Then-Attorney General Sessions filed an amicus brief taking the opposite position, highlighting

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114. See supra note 46.

115. See supra note 89.

116. See supra note 89.


the Administration’s conflicting position with certain federal circuits. The Seventh Circuit has also recently held that sexual orientation discrimination is considered a subset of sex discrimination under Title VII.\textsuperscript{120}

Other appellate courts have recently reached the opposite conclusion and found that they were bound by circuit precedent disallowing sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title VII. Notably, there have been extensive separate opinions written in each case reasoning that the older precedent should be overturned, demonstrating the significant conflicts that abound interpreting to what extent Title VII protections extend to unnamed groups.\textsuperscript{121} These varying interpretations across federal, state, executive, and administrative lines reflect the contentious and indeterminate nature of Title VII’s application to the LGBT community. In states without explicit protections, and where federal courts have not interpreted Title VII to include persons with different sexual orientations or gender identities, employees are not able to bring a cognizable suit under Title VII for discrimination along those lines. While there are grassroots organizing groups and efforts to expand protections in other ways, twenty-five percent of LGBT employees report facing discrimination at work, while fifty percent choose to remain closeted because of pervasive discrimination.\textsuperscript{122}

Because of the ambiguity around Title VII’s protection of particular sex-related conditions, some state statutes explicitly include protections for gender- or stereotype-related classifications such as: pregnancy; childbirth (and related medical conditions such as childbearing capacity, sterilization, and fertility); marital status (including a change thereof and domestic partnership); relationship with a person of another race; breastfeeding; parenthood; personal appearance; family status; and family responsibilities (actual or perceived).\textsuperscript{123} Codifying these

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120.} See Hivley v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
\item \textsuperscript{121.} See Anonymous v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 2017 WL 1130183 (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2017) (concurring, two judges extensively critiqued the circuit precedent disallowing Title VII sexual orientation discrimination claims and endorsed all three rationales set forth by the EEOC in Baldwin); Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 2017 WL 943925 (11th Cir.) (ruling that the sexual orientation discrimination is not actionable but the claim could proceed because the facts supported a permissible Title VII claim of sex discrimination based on gender nonconformity; dissenting, one judge reasoned that plaintiff’s sexual orientation discrimination claim should also have been permitted to proceed, because when a woman alleges “she has been discriminated against because she is a lesbian, she necessarily alleges that she has been discriminated against because she failed to conform to the employer’s image of what women should be - specifically, that women should be sexually attracted to men only”).
\item \textsuperscript{122.} See supra at note 116.
\item \textsuperscript{123.} See e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.220 (West 2018) (including, marital status, and changes thereto, pregnancy, and parenthood); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12920 to 12996 (West 2018) (including marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity, pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402 (West 2017) (including sexual orientation); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60 (West 2017) (including marital status); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (West 2018) (including marital status and sexual orientation); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11 (West 2018) (including marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, and family responsibilities); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 760.01-760.11 (West 2018) (including marital status); GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 45-19-20-45-19-45 (West 2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (West 2018) (including sexual orientation); IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6 (West 2018) (including sexual orientation and gender identity);
\end{itemize}
classes of sexual minorities not only ensures that they have a legal cause of action, but also proactively communicates a strong message to employers that the state will protect all classes of citizens, regardless of their sexual minority status.

B. ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS

In addition to the expanded class of protected employees, many states now require employers to take affirmative action to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace.124 These regulations may involve (1) formal training, (2) distribution of a formal written sexual harassment policy, (3) posting of signs declaring employees’ rights, and (4) taking all reasonable measures to prevent sexual harassment from occurring within the organization.125 Part One will discuss the formal training standard, and the ways in which some states have gone beyond the Court’s interpretation of minimum requirements, whether to enhance their protocols and work towards prevention, or in anticipation of litigation defenses. Part Two will discuss posting and policy requirements, and the emerging research on how to address systemic problems that underlie Title VII claims. Part Three will discuss proactive employer “best practices” and states at the forefront of transparency in harassment cases. Part Four will discuss the overlaps with common law torts in states that do not have protective statutes separate and apart from federal legislation.

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124. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(k) (West 2019) (“It is an unlawful employment practice ... for an employer, labor organization, employment agency, apprenticeship training program, or any training program leading to employment, to fail to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring”).

125. See infra Parts II-IV.
1. Training

Title VII does not require employers to conduct training on sexual harassment prevention. Nonetheless, many states have taken a variety of measures to implement such training. Since the Supreme Court’s decisions in *Ellerth* and *Faragher*, employers can demonstrate an affirmative defense to a Title VII claim by showing that “(1) the employer had communicated and established an effective procedure for employees to seek redress from sexual harassment and (2) the harassed employee failed to take advantage of this procedure.” Some states’ mandatory programs are so comprehensive that they seem designed to raise awareness and prevent sexual harassment, despite the minimal *Ellerth/Faragher* standard. Other states do not legally require, but rather “encourage” employers to provide various training and prevention programs, in anticipation of positing an *Ellerth/Faragher* affirmative defense in potential litigation. The “encouragement” terminology comes directly from the EEOC, which cites commonly accepted practices designed to educate workers about discrimination/harassment and work towards preventing it, without delineating specific measures that employers must take.

A handful of state regulations provide useful models for comprehensive prevention measures. California, Connecticut, and Maine are at the forefront of requiring businesses to implement a comprehensive training program designed to raise awareness and prevent workplace sexual harassment. While Connecticut requires all employers with at least fifty employees to provide sexual harassment training to all new supervisors within six months of taking such position,

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129. See supra at footnotes 112, 113.

130. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 3A(e) (West 2018) (“[e]mployers are encouraged to conduct additional training for new supervisory and managerial employees”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495H(f)(3) (West 2018) (“Employers are encouraged to conduct additional training for new supervisory and managerial employees and members within one year after commencement of employment or membership, which should include at a minimum the information outlined in this section, the specific responsibilities of supervisory and managerial employees, and the actions that these employees must take to ensure immediate and appropriate corrective action in addressing sexual harassment complaints.”). See, e.g., Terry v. Laurel Oaks Behavioral Health Ctr., Inc., 1 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1271-72 (M.D. Ala. 2014); Aguas v. State, 107 A.3d 1250 (N.J. 2015); Johnson v. N. Idaho Coll., 278 P.3d 928, 934-37 (Idaho 2012).

California’s state legislature recently passed a bill expanding such requirements to include companies with at least five workers by January 2020.132

Maine requires sexual harassment training for all employers with more than fifteen employees, mandating special training for supervisors and managers.133 All three states have specific requirements regarding the content of sexual harassment training, record keeping, refreshment courses, and question and answer sessions.134

In 2018, New York and Delaware adopted similarly strong provisions.135 New York’s new law, for example, requires employers of all sizes to conduct training beyond “parking employees in front of a video” and includes soliciting feedback from workers regarding the training.136 Notably, though, the New York law does not include mandatory state monitoring for compliance, but does allow the state to audit or investigate when a company fails to comply.137 Rather than impose significant consequences, the state instead relies on the expectation that in a more visible system, employees will be more likely to report.

In addition to the specific California statute, the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing insists that all employers take reasonable steps to prevent harassment, which includes providing training to their respective employees.138 Such statutory provisions become especially important when determining liability or mitigating damages.139

Hawaii, on the other hand, is representative of states whose legislation encourages companies to take a proactive approach to sexual harassment prevention but does not mandate training protocols by law. The Hawaii Administrative Rules provide that:

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139. See generally State Dep’t of Health Servs. v. Superior Ct., 79 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2003).
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. Employers should affirmatively raise the subject, express strong disapproval, develop appropriate sanctions, inform employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of sexual harassment, and take any other steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring.140

Other states use similar wording in order to stress the importance of “prevention,” and recommend approaches that may achieve that goal, without legally requiring the employer to take affirmative steps to eliminate sexual harassment.141 Regardless of the state, courts will always consider proactive steps taken by employers to prevent sexual harassment as one of the factors to determine employer liability.142 As one scholar puts it, “Courts have been strict with employers who do not meet this basic requirement of having a policy specifically dealing with sexual harassment, but have been flexible in approving different types of policies.”143 The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, mandated sexual harassment training for all supervisory and managerial positions through a decision which held that a material question of fact existed as to vicarious liability for supervisor misconduct in the absence of such training.144

In light of the varying approaches and motivations of state practices, there is little conclusive evidence that standalone training is an effective prevention tool. In 2016, the EEOC released a study evaluating sexual harassment training, but reported that it was unable to determine whether or not standalone training “is or is not an effective tool in preventing harassment.”145 The EEOC, National Women’s Law Center (“NWLC”), and other scholars have called for strategies beyond standalone training, since systemic organizational cultures are typically at the root of Title VII claims

141. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (2018), WL 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (“Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under title VII, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.”); COLO. CODE REGS. § 708-1:20.6 (2018), WL 3 CCR 708-1:20.6 (“Covered entities are encouraged to take all steps necessary to prevent discrimination, including harassment, from occurring, such as: affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, promulgating and distributing an anti-discrimination policy, training, developing appropriate sanctions, informing affected individuals of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of discrimination, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.”); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05(J)(6) (2018), WL OAC 4112-5-05 (“Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment”).
142. See discussion infra Part IV.
and violations.\(^\text{146}\) On the heels of the study, the EEOC published a webpage devoted to “Promising Practices” that reflect more comprehensive tactics that seek to address the root of discriminatory and harassing behavior.\(^\text{147}\)

2. Posting

The *Faragher* Court “noted that the central goal of Title VII is prophylactic—‘to avoid harm’—and that employers must ‘inform[] employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment.’”\(^\text{148}\) The EEOC affirms that “Employers are required to post notices describing the Federal laws prohibiting job discrimination based on. . . sex.”\(^\text{149}\) Many states enforce this requirement by either (1) posting a sign in a prominent and accessible location to ensure notice to all employees or (2) distributing a brochure with a formal written sexual harassment policy to all employees.\(^\text{150}\) These statutes often require specific content to be included, such as definitions, rights, and the state employment commission’s contact information; failure to comply is generally punishable by minor fines.\(^\text{151}\)

As with standalone training, there is little conclusive data that reflects the effectiveness of posting procedures. In fact, there has been a lack of scientific research into the effectiveness of employers’ varying posting and policy approaches to sexual harassment prevention.\(^\text{152}\) As the National Women’s Law Center asserts, “a policy is only the first step in prevention.”\(^\text{153}\)


\(^{148}\) Id.


\(^{150}\) See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 7 (West, Westlaw through chapter 322 of 2018 2d Ann. Sess.) (mandating that employers post, in a conspicuous place, notices of its sexual harassment policies; failure to do so shall result in a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than one hundred dollars); Me. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 807(1), (6) (West, Westlaw through 2017 2d Reg. Sess. and 2d. Spec. Sess. of the 128th Leg.) (“(1) An employer shall post in a prominent and accessible location in the workplace a poster providing, at a minimum, the following information: the illegality of sexual harassment; a description of sexual harassment, utilizing examples; the complaint process available through the commission; and directions on how to contact the commission. . . (6) An employer who violates this section may be assessed a fine” ranging from $25-$2,500, depending on the violation.).

\(^{151}\) Id.


echoes several of the EEOC recommendations which include: anonymous climate surveys to identify problematic behavior and address it early, training that includes testimonials from victims, clear instructions for reporting, and strong and appropriately enforced policies against retaliation. As discussed in the preceding section, California has recently implemented a comprehensive training program that includes noteworthy accountability measures. Supervisors are required to acknowledge that they received the written policy and completed requisite training, and upon doing so, if they then receive a complaint about harassment and fail to act, they cannot plead ignorance and may be held liable if illegal conduct is found. Such accountability measures, while moderate, are an important first step towards systematizing accountability, and thus harassment prevention.

### B. Employer Best Practices and Proactive Prevention

Despite the minimal data reflecting the ineffectiveness of standalone training policies, two recent studies have taken a more nuanced approach to evaluating organizational attitudes that may contribute to the perpetuation or prevention of Title VII complaints. These studies focus was on the extent to which employees viewed their employer and work setting as ethical, and their management as open to organizational reform and taking harassment prevention seriously. The studies found that when individuals viewed management with skepticism regarding their asserted interest in preventing workplace harassment, “training outcomes particularly suffer.” In short, when employees trust their supervisors’ ethical standards and believe that they genuinely view harassment as a problem to be remedied, workers are more likely to benefit and learn from training procedures.

One example of a proactive state approach is Maryland’s Disclosing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Act of 2018. The first part of the two-part Act, which went into effect on October 1, 2018, declares null and void against public policy any employment contract provision that waives an employee’s rights or remedies to a sexual harassment claim, or retaliation for reporting one. This

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154. Id.
158. See id.
159. Ho Kwan Cheung et. al., Are They True to the Cause? Beliefs About Organizational and Unit Commitment to Sexual Harassment Awareness Training, 43 GROUP & ORG. MGMT., September 2017, at 1, RESEARCHGATE http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1059601117726677.
part of the Act applies to all employers of any side, notwithstanding conflicting federal arbitration laws.  

In recent months, major companies such as Google and Facebook have taken a similar approach, in light of internal employee protests against employers’ confidential settlements, signaling the potential that more states and private companies will follow Maryland’s lead.

The second part of the Act only applies to employers with fifty or more workers, a minimum significantly higher than the Title VII employer coverage. It enacts regimented training requirements as well as transparency by requiring employers to: provide two hours of in-person or virtual training (with specified components) to every employee within six months of beginning employment and subsequently at least every two years, designate an employee as a training representative, and provide annual reports regarding sexual harassment settlements to the state’s Civil Rights commission. If an employer fails to comply, the EEOC has authority to conduct an audit of the office or organization.

The varying state approaches to proactive prevention reflect the necessity of further extensive research into the intersection between workplace environments, organizational culture, and transparency.

C. COMMON LAW TORT PROTECTION

Some states, like Alabama and Mississippi, do not have statutory provisions to protect public and private workers from sexual harassment, relying instead on established common law tort actions to offer protection. Alabama sexual harassment claims can be based on the torts of outrage, assault and battery, negligence, or invasion of privacy. Mississippi has a statute that specifically protects state employees from sexual harassment, but makes no mention of the remedies available to private sector employees. The one exception to this requirement is a statutory provision that prohibits any employer from discriminating against women who use their break time to breastfeed. Mississippi tort

164. Id. at (f)(2).
165. See, e.g., Stabler v. City of Mobile, 844 So. 2d 555, 558 (Ala. 2000).
166. See, e.g., Ex parte Birmingham News, Inc., 778 So. 2d 814, 818 (Ala. 2000) (stating that the invasion of privacy tort consists of four distinct wrongs: “(1) intruding into the plaintiff’s physical solitude or seclusion; (2) giving publicity to private information about the plaintiff that violates ordinary decency; (3) putting the plaintiff in a false, but not necessarily defamatory, position in the public eye; or (4) appropriating some element of the plaintiff’s personality for a commercial use.” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Fuller, 706 So.2d 700, 701 (Ala. 1997))).
theories include recovery for breach of contract, emotional distress, and reputational harm caused by sexual harassment. 169

Many states do not recognize sexual harassment as a separate tort, and instead allow plaintiffs to seek remedy under other tort claims in addition to formal statutory protections. 170 This common law alternative is especially relevant when the plaintiff seeks to avoid federal and state statutory restrictions, such as the statute of limitations or the EEOC and state FEPAs’ filing requirements. 171 Common tort claims used include assault and battery, 172 invasion of privacy, 173 negligent training or supervision, 174 breach of contract, 175 and negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. 176 Common law tort claims have certain benefits such as

169. See, e.g., Univ. of S. Miss. v. Williams, 891 So. 2d 160, 172-73 (Miss. 2004) (explaining that a contract contains implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in performance and enforcement; thus, plaintiff could recover for mental anguish and emotional distress, but only for the breach of contract after plaintiff was denied the opportunity to receive her doctoral degree due to sexual harassment by a professor). Additionally, the court held that plaintiffs may recover damages for mental anguish and emotional distress in breach of contracts actions without proof of physical manifestation. Id.

170. See, e.g., Smith v. Am. Online, Inc., 499 F.Supp.2d 1251, 1267 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (finding Florida law does not recognize a common law claim of sexual assault as an independent tort, but nevertheless allowing the plaintiff to advance her claim for battery resulting from the alleged sexual assault); Surpin v. United Am. Ins. Co., 154 F.Supp.2d 906, 908 (W.D. Va. 2000) (finding that sexual harassment, in and of itself, is not a separate cause of action under Virginia tort law); Machen v. Childersburg Bancorporation, Inc., 761 So. 2d, 981, 987-88 (Ala. 1999) (finding that while Alabama does not recognize sexual harassment as an individual cause of action, claims of sexual harassment are maintained under common law tort claims such as assault and battery, invasion of privacy, negligent training and supervision, and outrage); Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 501, 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“[t]here is no common law cause of action for sexual harassment, but conduct constituting sexual harassment may be alleged in common law claims such as battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.”).

171. See EEOC Dual Filing Procedures, supra note 69.

172. See, e.g., Minckler v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 132 A.D.3d 1186, 1190 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (finding that there was a material issue of fact as to the plaintiff’s assault and battery claim).

173. See, e.g., Garces v. R & K Spero Co., No. CV09502589SS, 2009 WL 1814510, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 29, 2009) (finding a material issue of fact as to whether requiring the plaintiff to “beg” to use the bathroom and given subsequent reasons as to why constituted a breach of privacy). Additionally, the court expressed that the law of privacy encompasses four distinct kinds of invasion: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life; or (4) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public. Id.


175. See, e.g., Moret v. Gale, No. 47768-8-II, 2016 WL 6216257, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2016) (finding that the plaintiff would be able to recover if he could prove that the employer’s handbook outlined specific treatment regarding sexual harassment allegations or termination, thereby contractually modifying his at-will status and creating the right to sue if the employer failed to adhere to those promises).

176. See, e.g., Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that plaintiff is able to bring a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against her employer, explaining that “[t]he four elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional distress, and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress”) (quoting Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., 762 P.2d 46, 61 (Cal. 1986),
sometimes providing larger recoveries than claims filed through the EEOC or state FEPA processes.\textsuperscript{177}

\section*{V. VARYING STATE AND FEDERAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ELEMENTS OF A SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIM}

Although the elements of a sexual harassment claim purport to be objective standards, there are inherent subjective questions regarding whether a person may perceive conduct as discriminatory or harassing. Federal and state courts’ interpretations of the elements thus demonstrate some notable discrepancies. Part A explores the varying interpretations of “conduct of a sexual nature,” particularly the nuanced understanding of a “reasonable person” standard in determining whether a hostile work environment exists. Part B discusses the relevance of gender stereotyping in determining whether conduct is “based on sex,” including claims against a harasser of the same sex. Part C examines how to quantify the requisite severity and pervasiveness under federal and state statutes.

\subsection*{A. CONDUCT OF A SEXUAL NATURE}

The EEOC asserts that, “[h]arassment does not have to be of a sexual nature... and can include offensive remarks about a person’s sex. For example, it is illegal to harass a woman by making offensive comments about women in general.”\textsuperscript{178} Some states follow the EEOC’s direction in their assessment of a claim.\textsuperscript{179} But others take a contrasting position, requiring unwelcome conduct of a “sexual nature” in determining whether a hostile work environment exists.\textsuperscript{180} Because most

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\textsuperscript{177} Catania, \textit{supra} note 46, at 783.
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\textsuperscript{180} See, \textit{e.g.}, Arquero v. Hilton Haw. Vill., LLC, 91 P.3d 505, 510 (Haw. 2004) (requiring that in order to establish a claim for hostile work environment due to sexual harassment, a plaintiff must first show that “he or she was subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct or visual forms of harassment of a sexual nature’ai); Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129, 135 (Mich. 2003) (finding that only conduct or communication of a sexual nature, such as unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors, may constitute a sexual harassment claim).
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gender discrimination statutes are not fault-based, the offender’s intent is sometimes not relevant.181

Many courts use a “reasonable person” standard to establish whether the conduct of a sexual nature created a hostile work environment for a victim, per EEOC guidelines.182 This standard is applied by considering whether a person in the plaintiff’s position and circumstances (an analysis which often includes the plaintiff’s gender) would feel that a hostile work environment was created by the conduct.183

Despite the inherent subjectivity of the “reasonable person” standard, the EEOC guidelines set some benchmarks. The court must “consider the victim’s perspective and not stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior,” and take into account the context of the situation in order to “adopt the perspective of a reasonable person’s reactions in a similar environment under similar circumstances.”184 On the other end of the spectrum, a claim that serves as a “vehicle for vindicating the petty slights suffered by the hypersensitive” is not a cognizable claim.185 In recent years, certain courts and scholars have wrestled with the reality that a “reasonable person” standard “fails to account for the wide divergence between most women’s views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men.”186 Some courts have also been keen to point out that evaluating such conduct by an objective reasonableness standard could in fact reinforce prevailing social norms that perpetuate gender discrimination.187 As the Ninth Circuit posited in Ellison v. Brady, in environments where sexual harassment is commonplace, asking whether a “reasonable person” would find particular conduct

181. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that Title VII is not fault-based, and thus courts should not look at the motivations of employers); Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 454 (N.J. 1993) (explaining that the state statute does not require the plaintiff to demonstrate intentional discrimination).


185. Id.


offensive would simply look at existing practices rather than aspiring to an ideal in which discrimination is not tolerated.\textsuperscript{188}

The Court attempted to delineate some contours of the reasonable person standard further in \textit{Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.}, explaining that Title VII “comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown . . . [it] takes a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause tangible psychological injury.”\textsuperscript{189} But the Court’s explanation that psychological harm is “relevant . . . but no single factor is required,” may have resulted in more confusion than cohesion among state courts on the question of how to factor psychological injury into the totality of the circumstances.

While federal circuits and the EEOC follow the \textit{Harris} Court’s standard that psychological harm is but one factor in the totality calculus, state courts vary in their understanding of this element in interpreting state Title VII analogs. As a result, some states require victims to be personally exposed to harassment that affects their “psychological well-being,”\textsuperscript{190} while others do not.\textsuperscript{191}

\textbf{B. Conduct Based on Sex}

To show that conduct is based on sex, plaintiffs often must show that a defendant’s conduct or damaging evaluation of the plaintiff was motivated by gender stereotypes.\textsuperscript{192} A 2017 case in the Second Circuit, \textit{Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, Inc.}, reflects a claim on these grounds. The plaintiff, an openly-gay creative director at an advertising agency, alleged that over the course of four years his supervisor repeatedly harassed him by highlighting his effeminacy via crude and graphic drawings, taunting social media posts, and mocking him by “depicting him in tights and a low-cut shirt prancing around” the office.\textsuperscript{193} The lower court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, but the Second Circuit reversed, finding there was a cause of action under Title VII because Christiansen was discriminated against based on gender non-conforming behavior or gender stereotyping.\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{188. Id.}

\textsuperscript{189. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).}


\textsuperscript{191. See, e.g., Herman v. W. Fin. Corp., 869 P.2d 696, 875-76 (Kan. 1994) (finding that there is no psychological well-being requirement for a discrimination claim).}

\textsuperscript{192. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (holding that in a Title VII claim, a plaintiff may use evidence of gender stereotypes to show that the employer relied on gender in decision-making), rev’d on other grounds, Burrett v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 881, 889 n.4 (2014). The conduct based on “gender stereotypes” standard used in \textit{Price Waterhouse} is still cited as a prevailing authority. See, e.g., Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2017).}

\textsuperscript{193. Christiansen v. Omnicom Grp., Inc., 852 F.3d 195, 198 (2d. Cir. 2017).}

\textsuperscript{194. Id.}
Indeed, the “conduct based on sex” test often allows courts to negate the alternative requirement that the harassment was sexual in nature. For example, in Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., the female plaintiff, a mother of six-year-old triplets, brought a claim of discrimination under Title VII. She alleged that she was denied a promotion because of gender stereotypes that, as a working mother, she would not be able to devote adequate effort to the company. In notifying Chadwick that she did not get the promotion, her boss said, “It was nothing you did or didn’t do. It was just that you’re going to school, you have the kids and you just have a lot on your plate right now.” The First Circuit held that despite the lack of sexual innuendo, the discrimination was based on the gender stereotype “that mothers, particularly those with young children, neglect their work duties in favor of their presumed childcare obligations.”

C. Conduct of a Severe and Pervasive Nature

Since the Court’s decision in Meritor, harassing conduct must be “severe or pervasive” so as to constitute a hostile work environment under Title VII. In assessing the severity and pervasiveness of conduct, courts consider: (1) the frequency of the harassment; (2) the severity of the harassment; (3) whether the harassment is physically threatening or humiliating; and (4) whether the harassment unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. Because of the inherently subjective nature of these terms, the EEOC guidelines recommend a context-based totality of the circumstances assessment to determine whether there was severity and/or pervasiveness based on the facts of each case. The standard of review is normally both objective and subjective, meaning that courts must consider how the harasser’s behavior would be viewed by a reasonable person, as well as how the harasser’s behavior was subjectively viewed by the plaintiff.

Circuits continue to split in terms of how to delineate clear lines and standards for hostile work environments under this element. The Tenth Circuit held in Morris v. City of Colorado Springs, that a surgeon’s inappropriate comments towards the plaintiff female nurse were insufficiently severe or pervasive enough to constitute a Title VII hostile work environment. Although she subjectively felt uncomfortable, the court reasoned that in light of the totality of the facts at hand,
the workplace was not an objectively hostile environment. On the other hand, the Second Circuit held in *Howley v. Town of Stratford* that a single instance of a supervisor’s particularly offensive and extended remarks was sufficient to create a hostile work environment, when considered in the specific professional context at hand. For further contrast to each of those cases, the Ninth Circuit has held that in light of particular circumstances, even a one-time breast fondling did not meet its “extremely severe” standard for one-time physical incidents.

**VI. Employer Liability**

Employees who have faced workplace harassment and seek relief must overcome the additional burden in proving that their employer is liable for the harm. Whether the victim is reacting to negative employment action like hiring, firing, shift assignments, promotions, pay raises, or is simply taking proactive action against a hostile work environment, they are required to navigate the legal liabilities at play. This section outlines the primary issues analyzed in the evaluation of employer liability. One must consider whether the employer is imputable, if the employer can raise affirmative defenses, and the role the harasser plays in relation to the victim in the employment scheme.

**A. Imputability of the Employer**

Because most state anti-discrimination laws are modeled after Title VII, courts hold employers liable not only for the direct actions taken by the employer, but also for the acts of supervisors and other employees. However, the standard to determine an employer’s liability changes depending on whether the harasser was a co-worker or the employer himself or herself. If the harasser is a co-worker, then employers are held to a negligence standard. The employer is liable in this instance if the employer reasonably knew or should have known that a co-worker harassed the plaintiff and the employer failed to prevent or stop the harassment.

If the harasser is the employer or a supervisor with authority over the employee, then an employer may be liable if harassment culminates in a tangible

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204. *See Brooks v. City of San Mateo*, 214 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
207. *See Vance*, 567 U.S. at 439 (holding that an employer is liable if they were negligent in controlling the harassment); *see also Dunlap v. Spec Pro, Inc.*, 939 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1085 (D. Colo. 2013) (holding that an employer is negligent if they knew or should have known about a “non-supervisory” employee’s harassment and did not stop it).
208. *See Vance*, 567 U.S. at 439; *Burhans v. Lopez*, 24 F. Supp. 3d 375, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that a failure to act and respond to complaints of sexual harassment may make an employer or supervisor liable).
action against the employee. If no tangible action occurred, an employer may be subject to vicarious liability for a hostile work environment created by a supervisor. In this case, the employer may raise the affirmative defense that they took “reasonable care to prevent and correct” discriminatory behavior.

In some instances, common law principles of agency may be applied to impute liability to the employer after a supervisor harasses the plaintiff. For example, New Jersey has developed a four-prong test to determine whether an agency relationship existed between the employer and the harassing supervisor. The fact finder must determine whether: (1) the employer gave the supervisor the authority to control the situation leading to the plaintiff’s complaint, (2) the supervisor exercised that authority, (3) the supervisor discriminated against the plaintiff in violation of a statute, and (4) the authority delegated by the employer aided the supervisor in causing the injury of which the plaintiff complains.

B. EMPLOYER DEFENSES

Courts have carved out a defense for employers when they are vicariously liable for a supervisor’s actions. Most states allow defendants to defend against state law sexual harassment claims with the affirmative defense introduced by the Supreme Court in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth. The Ellerth defense explains that an employer can defend against vicarious liability of a supervisor’s

209. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 744 (stating tangible action is defined as an action that is “a significant change in employment status, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment”).
210. See Helm v. Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1287 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that an employer may be strictly liable if a supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible adverse employment action, and the plaintiff can demonstrate a connection between the harassment and the adverse action); State Dep’t of Health Servs. v. Super. Ct., 79 P.3d 556, 562-63 (Cal. 2003) (explaining that employers are held strictly liable for a supervisor’s harassment and may be liable for non-supervisory harassment if they knew or should have known of the harassment and did not take steps to correct it).
211. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see also Debord v. Mercy Health Sys. of Kansas, Inc., 737 F.3d 642, 650 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding that employers can be directly or vicariously liable for a hostile work environment).
212. Helm, 656 F.3d at 1285 (finding that in the absence of an adverse action, an employer is only liable if they cannot assert the Faragher/Ellerth two-step affirmative defense: that the employer took reasonable care to correct or prevent harassment, and that the plaintiff failed to utilize the preventive or corrective opportunities); Debord, 737 F.3d at 653 (finding that an employer can defeat a harassment claim when no tangible action was taken by showing that the employer took reasonable steps to avoid a hostile workplace (or, the “Faragher defense”)).
213. See Entrott v. BASF Corp., 819 A.2d 447, 453 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (holding that to establish employer liability, a plaintiff must prove that the harassing employer was a “supervisor” and that “the employer contributed to the harm through its negligence, intent, or apparent authorization of the harassing conduct, or [that] the supervisor was aided in the commission of the harassment by the agency relationship.”).
215. Id.; cf. Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., Inc., 835 F.3d 267, 273 (2d Cir. 2016) (using the law of agency to find an employer liable for sexual harassment); Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 418 (2011) (using the law of agency to see if the employer can be held liable for discrimination based on military status).
216. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742; see, e.g., Natson v. Eckerd Corp., Inc., 885 So. 2d 945, 947-48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Zeller Elevator Co. v. Slygh, 796 N.E.2d 1198, 1212 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003);
harassment if the employer can show that they (1) exercised “reasonable care to prevent and correct” harassment, and (2) the plaintiff failed to take advantage of these preventive or corrective measures.\footnote{217} Moreover, the employer may escape liability if he or she took adequate affirmative steps to investigate and remedy the harassment complaint.\footnote{218} Courts will examine the reasonableness of the employer’s response to the plaintiff’s grievance, including the promptness of the response, when determining whether the employer’s affirmative defense articulates a reasonable response to the complaint.\footnote{219} For example, in \textit{Madeja v. MBF}

Farmland Foods, Inc. v. Dubuque Human Rights Comm’n, 672 N.W.2d 733, 744 (Iowa 2003) (“When a supervisor perpetrates the harassment, but no tangible employment action occurred, the employer may assert the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense to avoid liability.”); Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hall, 74 S.W.3d 688, 692 (Ky. 2002) (explaining that the Kentucky Civil Rights Act recognizes the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense); \textit{Entrot}, 819 A.2d at 463 (finding that there is no barrier to applying Title VII affirmative defenses to New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination claims); \textit{cf. Garcez v. Freightliner Corp.}, 72 P.3d 78, 87 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that, although the Faragher/Ellerth defense cannot be used in claims of co-worker harassment, its principles are embedded in the requirement that the plaintiff establish that the employer knew or should have known of the harassing conduct (construing Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2001)). \textit{But see Barra v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist.}, 858 A.2d 206, 216-17 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (holding that an employer cannot raise the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense if the employee raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the supervisor’s act amounted to constructive discharge (citing Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 139 (2004)).

\footnote{217. \textit{Ellerth}, 524 U.S. at 765; \textit{see also Vance v. Ball State Univ.}, 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013) (adopting the two-part test from \textit{Ellerth}); \textit{see also Dudley v. Metro-Dade Cty.}, 989 F. Supp. 1192, 1200 (D. Fla. 1997) (applying federal and Florida law to find that “an employer is insulated from liability for hostile working environment sexual harassment if (1) the employer has an explicit policy against sexual harassment, and (2) it has effective grievance procedures calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come forward”) (citations omitted); \textit{State Dep’t of Health Servs. v. Superior Court}, 79 P.3d 556, 565 (Cal. 2003) (finding employer can affirmatively defend against a sexual harassment suit under the Fair Employment and Housing Act under the avoidable consequences doctrine by proving that (1) the employer took reasonable steps to prevent and correct the harassment, (2) the employee unreasonably failed to use the available preventative and corrective measures that the employer provided, and (3) reasonable use of the employer’s procedures would have prevented at least some of the harm that the employee suffered); \textit{Lee v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.}, 778 So. 2d 1169, 1173 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (placing the burden on plaintiff to prove that employer knew or should have known of the sexual harassment and failed to take proper remedial action). \textit{But see Velez v. City of Jersey City}, 817 A.2d 409, 415 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (finding plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the employer knew of the harassing conduct and failed to take any reasonable steps to remedy it).


\footnote{219. \textit{See Madeja v. MBP Corp.}, 821 A.2d 1034, 1042-43 (N.H. 2003) (explaining that defendant’s remedial action must be “reasonable and adequate”); \textit{see also Payton v. N.J. Turnpike Auth.}, 691 A.2d 321, 327 (N.J. 1997) (finding that when the remedial process is unduly prolonged or unnecessarily and unreasonably leaves the employee exposed to continued hostility in the workplace, it is considered ineffective and does not prevent the employer from being held vicariously liable); \textit{Velez}, 817 A.2d at 415 (explaining that the entire remedial process must be judged to determine its effectiveness or its calculated ability to end the alleged harassment, and that the fact finder must consider the speed, diligence, and good faith with which a sexual harassment investigation is performed).
Corp., the court held that the reasonableness inquiry turned on the remedy’s ability to stop the individual harasser from continuing to engage in the harassment and to discourage other potential harassers from engaging in similar conduct.\(^{220}\)

In California, however, employers are strictly liable for harassment at the hands of their supervisors.\(^{221}\) The *Ellerth* defense is not available to employers under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).\(^{222}\) In *State Department of Health Services v. Superior Court*, the court explains that the *Ellerth* defense was derived from the law of agency.\(^{223}\) In contrast, the language of FEHA suggests that employer liability cannot be constrained by these principles.\(^{224}\) Rather, training could provide employers with an opportunity to mitigate and reduce the level of damages that they ultimately pay.\(^{225}\) Likewise in Illinois, employers are strictly liable for the sexual harassment of employees by supervisory personnel, regardless of whether the employer was aware of the conduct.\(^{226}\)

The employer may also be relieved of liability if the harassing conduct did not occur in a work-related context; factors such as the time, location, and motivation of the actions may be considered when making this determination.\(^{227}\) However, employers may be held liable for retaliatory actions even if not related to the terms or conditions of employment.\(^{228}\) On the other hand, if the employer would have made the same employment decision absent a discriminatory or retaliatory motive, the employer may also escape liability.\(^{229}\)

\(^{220}\). *See Madeja*, 821 A.2d at 1042-43.
\(^{221}\). *State Dep’t of Health Servs.*, 79 P.3d at 558.
\(^{222}\). *Id.* at 563.
\(^{223}\). *Id*.
\(^{224}\). *See id*.
\(^{225}\). *Id.* at 565.
\(^{227}\). *See Doe v. Oberweis Dairy*, 456 F.3d 704, 715-16 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that although sexual intercourse between the supervisor and employee took place outside of work, it still affected conditions of employment); Doe v. Capital Cities, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122, 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding employer can be liable for sexual harassment outside of the workplace under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, if harassment occurs within a work-related context); Lee v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 778 So. 2d 1169, 1174 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (finding employee’s conduct is within the scope of his employment if the conduct (1) is of the kind that he is employed to perform, (2) occurs substantially within the authorized limits of time and space, and (3) is performed in part to serve the employer); Tanner v. Reynolds Metals Co., 739 So. 2d 893, 897 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that an employer is vicariously liable if the tortious conduct of its employee is “so closely connected in time, place, and causation to his employment duties as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly attributed to the employer’s business”); Phelps v. Vassey, 437 S.E.2d 692, 694 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that employer is liable for harassing actions by its employees if the harassment was expressly authorized, within the scope of the employee’s employment, and in furtherance of the employer’s business, or if the harassment was ratified by the employer).
\(^{229}\). *Johnson v. Curtis Dworken Chevrolet*, 242 B.R. 773, 780 (D.D.C. 1999) (“[I]f the plaintiff successfully shows that a discriminatory or retaliatory motive played a motivating part in an adverse employment action, the employer can nevertheless avoid liability by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action absent discriminatory or retaliatory motive ...”).
Lastly, the employer may avoid liability if the employer did not have actual or constructive notice of a non-supervisor’s harassment.\textsuperscript{230} An employee must provide enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer knew or should have known about the harassment, and despite that knowledge, failed to stop it.\textsuperscript{231} To prove actual knowledge, the employee must demonstrate that they took steps to inform management of the harassment.\textsuperscript{232} In the case that actual knowledge does not exist, the Tenth Circuit court in *Tademy v. Union Pacific Corp.* reasons that we must test for constructive knowledge by applying “what amounts to a negligence standard: highly pervasive harassment should, in the exercise of reasonable care, be discovered by management-level employees.”\textsuperscript{233} In this case the employer has constructive knowledge of the harassment.\textsuperscript{234}

C. Definition of “Supervisor”

The *Ellerth* defense may turn on the meaning of “supervisor” because the Supreme Court discussed this affirmative defense as applicable when the harasser is a supervisor.\textsuperscript{235} Until recently, courts were split on the meaning of “supervisor” for purposes of the *Ellerth* defense.\textsuperscript{236} The Seventh Circuit held that supervisors are those with the authority to affect a victim’s employment, and thus have the power to hire, fire, promote, demote, discipline, or transfer the employee.\textsuperscript{237} The First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits similarly held that supervisors were employees who could take tangible employment actions including hiring, firing, changing benefits, and promoting and demoting the victim.\textsuperscript{238} However, Minnesota’s statutes and Supreme Court, as well as other states’ courts, have accepted a broader definition of supervisor: a supervisor could be someone who either has the authority to affect tangible employment decisions or, more simply, “has authority to direct the employee’s daily work activities.”\textsuperscript{239}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{230} Debord, 737 F.3d at 651-52.
\bibitem{231} Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758-59.
\bibitem{232} See Debord, 737 F.3d at 651.
\bibitem{233} Tademy v. Union Pacific Corp., 614 F.3d 1135, 1147 (10th Cir. 2008).
\bibitem{234} See id.
\bibitem{235} See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
\bibitem{236} See generally Merritt v. Albemarle Corp., 496 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2007); Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2005); Mikels v. City of Durham, 183 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 1999); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 1998).
\bibitem{237} Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1035.
\bibitem{238} See Merritt, 496 F.3d at 883-84 (holding that a supervisor must have more responsibility than assigning tasks to employees and should have the authority to make tangible employment actions including hiring, firing, or promoting); Noviello, 398 F.3d at 96 (explaining that to prove an employee is a supervisor, a plaintiff must prove that the employee had the power . . . to affect the terms of the plaintiff’s employment, such as terminating or disciplining the plaintiff); Mikels, 183 F.3d at 333 (finding that a supervisor’s position lies in his authority to take tangible employment actions against a victim, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, or changing benefits or responsibilities).
\bibitem{239} Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363A.08 (West, Westlaw through ch. 6 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.); Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558, 572 (Minn. 2008); see also, e.g., Entrot, 819 A.2d at 458 (explaining that while a supervisor could be an employee with the power to fire, demote, and direct job functions, this list is not exhaustive and could also include an employee with more indirect influence).
\end{thebibliography}
However, the Supreme Court arguably ended this debate in *Vance v. Ball State*.240 There, the Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s approach and held that an employee is a supervisor under Title VII “if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim.”241 Thus, it appears that the narrower definition of supervisor prevails when applied to an employer’s affirmative defenses.242

Given the increased attention and notoriety of workplace discrimination and the many distinct groups it affects, it is likely that the law will evolve to encompass an expanded definition of sexual harassment.243 Indeed, the legal evolution of sexual harassment law has led to recognition that sexual harassment may include harassment between people of the same-sex and modern protections for members of the LGBT community.244

**VII. Modern Developments**

**A. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment**

Some states are beginning to encompass same-sex sexual harassment under their anti-discrimination statutes.245 The Supreme Court’s decision in *Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.* introduced protections against same-sex sexual harassment.246 Same-sex sexual harassment claims, like opposite-sex sexual harassment claims, often turn on perceived sexual interest or advances.247 Also like opposite-sex claims, same-sex sexual harassment claims can be based on the quid pro quo theory or the hostile environment theory.248 While different courts

241. *Id.* at 424-25.
242. *See id.*
243. *See infra* Part IV.
244. *See infra* Part V.
245. *See Storey v. Chase Bankcard Servs.*, 970 F. Supp. 722, 731 (D. Ariz. 1997) (denying motion to dismiss when female employee claimed sexual harassment by female supervisor after supervisor made sexual advances toward her). In *Storey*, the court’s ruling centered on the fact that the harasser had treated members of one sex differently from members of the other sex. *Id.; see also* Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment by supervisor of the same sex); Melnychenko v. 84 Lumber Co., 676 N.E.2d 45, 48 (Mass. 1997) (holding that the supervisor’s sexual orientation was irrelevant where he repeatedly touched plaintiffs in a sexual way and made sexual comments). In *Mogilefsky*, the court explained that the proper inquiry is “whether the victim has been subjected to sexual harassment, not what motivated the harasser.” *Mogilefsky*, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121; *see also* Green v. Ford, No. 01-220, 2003 WL 22100835, at *2-3, 2003 Me. Super. LEXIS 182, at *4-7 (Me. Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 2003) (recognizing same-sex sexual harassment using the elements described in *Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.*, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), but finding that the supervisor’s sexual comments about plaintiff’s wife were not based on the plaintiff’s sex; thus, no sexual harassment could be found).
248. *Mogilefsky*, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121 (holding that same gender sexual harassment may be the basis of a sexual harassment claim and may be based on quid pro quo or hostile work environment or both).
use a variety of tests, many continue to rely on three basic standards in evaluating same-sex sexual harassment claims: (1) the “because of” gender test, (2) the conduct-based test, and (3) the hostility towards one sex test. Courts may also use the stereotype test.

1. The “Because of” Gender Test

The standard to prove same-sex sexual harassment may be higher than opposite-sex sexual harassment as plaintiffs must prove that the conduct constituted discrimination “because of” sex. This means that an employer will only be liable if the harassment would not have occurred had the victim been a member of the opposite sex. Therefore, if a male would not have been harassed if he were female, then the treatment of him would constitute sexual harassment because of his gender. In the previously mentioned Zarda case, a gay employee sued his former employer alleging he was fired because he failed to conform to stereotypical male behavior by referring to his sexual orientation. The court held that since sexual orientation is a function of sex, sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination. Therefore, it concluded, the plaintiff was entitled to protection because “but for” the his gender, he would not have been harassed for being sexually attracted to men.

2. The Conduct-Based Test

The conduct-based test examines whether the harassing conduct of a same-sex employee is of a sexual nature and is repeated, pervasive, or interferes with the other employee’s ability to work. This test overlaps with the hostile work environment test, since such repeated conduct creates a hostile environment.

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250. See infra Section V(A)(4).


252. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that harassing behavior directed only at the area of male sexual organs may have constituted prohibited sexual harassment); Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 967 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that when a supervisor harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, the supervisor is discriminating on the basis of sex regardless of the parties’ respective genders).


254. See id. at 116.

255. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (holding that Title VII covers conduct that is severe and pervasive); Smith v. Rock-Tenn Servs., Inc., 813 F.3d 298, 309 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding that same-sex pervasive and severe harassment creates a Title VII claim); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that severe and pervasive unwelcome physical conduct constitutes a cause of action); Sheffield, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498-501 (finding that repeated telephone calls to plaintiff requesting a date and threatening behavior after rejection created hostile work environment).
environment. For a work environment to be considered hostile, it must be objectively offensive based on the reasonable person standard, as well as subjectively offensive to the plaintiff. The court looks to the totality of the circumstances to make this determination, including the “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”

The conduct-based test does not always require that the conduct be overtly sexual. The test also typically does not inquire into the sexual orientation of either party. In *Smith v. Rock-Tenn Services, Inc.*, the court considered the frequency of the behavior the defendant categorized as ‘horseplay,’ the threatening nature of the acts, and the plaintiff’s response to the offenses to determine whether the conduct interfered with the plaintiff’s ability to work.

3. Hostility towards a Single Sex

Regardless of what gender the employer and employee are, harassment may still be found under the test of hostility towards a single sex. A court may look to see if an employer is generally hostile to a certain sex. Such general hostility towards the plaintiff’s sex can be the basis for a sexual harassment claim. The EEOC recently filed a lawsuit in Wisconsin using this reasoning against Walmart Inc. by arguing that the employer was hostile towards women, particularly pregnant women, at one of their warehouses.

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256. Psychiatric Inst. of Washington v. D.C. Comm’n on Human Rights, 871 A.2d 1146, 1151 (D.C. 2005) (finding that repeated phone calls and numerous degrading comments about sexuality and mental health was conduct that also created hostile work environment).
258. Id. at 23.
260. See Rene, 305 F.3d at 1063 (finding sexual orientation irrelevant for Title VII claims). But see Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining that plaintiff’s employer and co-workers were homosexuals, and that Title VII permits claims from homosexual employees against homosexual employers and co-workers).
263. See *Oncale*, 523 U.S. at 80 (surmising that a trier of fact can determine that a female employee experiences harassment from a female employer who is hostile to all women); *Davis*, 275 F.3d at 1119 (holding that a plaintiff can demonstrate harassment with evidence that the harasser treated men as a group differently than women); *Salinas*, 163 F. Supp. 3d at 424 (explaining that general hostility to a particular sex can constitute “because of sex” discrimination).
264. See *Salinas*, 163 F. Supp. 3d at 424.
4. Harassment Based on Stereotypes

Same-sex harassment may also arise when an employer discriminates against an employee for failing to conform to stereotypical gender roles. For example, the Third Circuit held that conduct motivated by beliefs that the plaintiff did not conform to his or her gender stereotypes could be held to be discriminatory. Other courts have similarly held that harassment from one sex to the same sex based on stereotypes creates a Title VII claim. Often with same-sex discrimination, claims fall into both the realms of harassment based on stereotypes as well as “because of” gender. The court in *Christensen v. Omnicorp, Inc.* concluded that plaintiffs could prove that they were discriminated against based on gender stereotypes like “the stereotype that men should be exclusively attracted to women and women should be exclusively attracted to men.”

5. Sexual Harassment of Transgender Persons

Multiple courts have held that Title VII protects transgender persons against sexual harassment. To bring a successful Title VII claim, a transgender person must show that they were discriminated against because they failed to conform to gender stereotypes. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that all persons cannot be discriminated against for gender non-conformity. Lower courts have simply

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267. *See* Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that evidence demonstrating that a harasser harassed an employee because that employee did not conform to gender stereotypes is one way a plaintiff can prove same-sex harassment because of sex).

268. *See* Zalewski v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 131, 135-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (finding that when plaintiff was harassed for being a virgin and effeminate, jury could find that plaintiff was discriminated against because he was a man and did not fit into gender stereotypes).


270. *Id.* at 206.

271. *See* Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that transgender persons, like all people, are protected from sex discrimination under Title VII); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that terminating an employee because they were diagnosed with “Gender Identity Disorder”—a now antiquated diagnostic term—violates Title VII); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that turning down a transgender person for employment violated Title VII).

272. *See* Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1320-21 (holding that firing a transgender woman after coming to work in woman’s clothes constituted discriminatory sex stereotyping); *Smith*, 378 F.3d at 575 (holding that sex stereotyping for not conforming to a gender, including transitioning, is impermissible); *Schroer*, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 305 (holding that firing a transgender woman for not appearing as a man constitutes sex-stereotyping, which is a violation of Title VII).

273. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (holding that an employer violated Title VII through sex stereotyping by making an adverse decision against a female employee because of her unfeminine and aggressive behavior); *see also* Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 527 (D. Conn. 2016) (holding that discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes is discrimination “because of sex”).
enumerated that Title VII protection applies to transgender persons as well.274

Federal courts have held that transgender individuals are not protected as a class under Title VII, and thus discrimination based on being transgender is not itself a violation of Title VII.275 However, in an administrative decision, the EEOC held that discrimination based on being transgender is itself a cognizable claim.276 For example, the EEOC ruled that keeping a transgender woman from using the women’s restroom at work because of her gender identity violated Title VII.277 Here, the EEOC broke from the federal courts’ standard in recognizing harassment against transgender persons.278

Recently however, the Trump administration has proposed redefining gender as binary, immutable, and solely based on genitalia at birth.279 In pursuit of this revision, the Department of Health and Human Services is attempting to establish a legal definition of sex under Title IX.280 Even if this reformation takes place, transgender persons will likely still have the same avenue available for relief in proving that they have been discriminated against because they failed to conform to gender stereotypes.281 Nevertheless, these modifications would certainly hinder attempts to define transgender persons as a protected class.282

VIII. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE NEWS

While much of this review outlines the legal principles set by statutes and courts surrounding sexual harassment in the workplace, the recent outbreak of high-profile sexual harassment cases demonstrates that sexual harassment continues to be an issue in the workplace.283 All of the stories discussed below are a part of ongoing litigation, though some of the cases—including the case involving American Apparel CEO Dov Charney—have been ongoing for many years without result.284

274. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith, 378 F.3d at 575; Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1173 (N.D. Ga. 2014), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 F. App’x 883 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding triable issues of fact exist as to (1) Chavez’s employer’s discriminatory intent and (2) whether gender bias was “a motivating factor” in the employer terminating her); Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293.

275. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007); Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 305.


278. Id.


280. See id.

281. See 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).

282. See 502 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007).

283. See infra Part VI.

284. Id.
In December 2014, Dov Charney was fired by the American Apparel Board of Directors after a series of sexual allegations were presented against him. These allegations included sending unsolicited sexually explicit messages and pornographic videos (or links thereto) to employees, as well as keeping videos of himself engaging in sexual acts with models and American Apparel employees on a company server.

In March 2016, Enrichetta Ravina, an assistant professor of finance at Columbia University, filed suit against the school after alleging she had been subjected to sexual harassment by Geert Bekaert, a tenured professor at Columbia Business School. In her complaint filed in July 2016, Ravina states that she was mocked when she approached senior leaders at Columbia about Bekaert’s conduct. Specifically, Ravina alleged that Dean Hubbard compared her situation to a “soap opera” and accused her of flirting with Bekaert. In the aftermath of her repeated allegations of sexual harassment against Bekaert, Columbia revoked Ravina’s paid leave and informed Ravina that her tenure process would run during the 2015-2016 academic year “on an expedited basis.” Ultimately, Ravina’s request for tenure was denied, and in May 2016, she received a letter from Columbia notifying her that her employment would be terminated in 2017.

Furthermore, in March 2016, University of California at Berkeley School of Law Dean Sujit Choudhry resigned after a sexual harassment lawsuit was filed against him and the law school. Tyann Sorrell, Choudhry’s former executive assistant, alleged that Choudhry had sexually harassed her by giving her “bear hugs,” kissing her on her cheeks, and repeatedly rubbing her shoulders and arms. When Sorrell complained to her superiors, she alleged that they made no
attempt to reprimand Choudhry. A four-month investigation conducted by UC Berkeley in 2015 found that Choudhry had “[b]y a preponderance of the evidence . . . violated the sexual harassment provisions of the UC Policy on Sexual Harassment and Sexual Violence.”

While the aforementioned cases are merely a sampling of the current and ongoing sexual harassment litigations, they demonstrate that, despite Title VII and state statutes, sexual harassment remains prevalent in the workplace. Nevertheless, this high-profile media attention has given a voice to those previously unable to pursue criminal charges or civil action.

On September 25, 2018, Judge Steven T. O’Neill sentenced Bill Cosby to three to ten years in prison for the sexual assault of Andrea Constand. When Constand initially reported the sexual assault to the authorities, the district attorney for Montgomery decided not to pursue charges, citing “insufficient credible and admissible evidence.” During discovery, Cosby admitted to obtaining Quaaludes to give to women for sex. Constand and Cosby settled in civil court for an amount that would later revealed to be $3.8 million; both sign a nondisclosure agreement. After numerous accusations spanning decades against the actor came to light in the media and a judge released Cosby’s deposition to the public, the investigation was reopened and Cosby was subsequently arrested on charges of aggravated indecent assault. While his initial trial resulted in a deadlock, upon retrial a jury found Cosby guilty on three counts of assault.

Likewise, in October 2017, the New York Times released an expose documenting movie mogul Harvey Weinstein’s long history of paying off sexual

294. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Bowley, supra note 213.
harassment accusers.303 Like Cosby, the investigation revealed that Weinstein had long been accused of sexual harassment and assault, reaching at least eight settlements with women. Currently, he is on trial for five separate allegations related to the assault and rape of several women.304 While the Weinstein trial is ongoing, the New York Times investigation gave momentum to the established #MeToo movement founded by Tarana Burke. #MeToo began as a way for social media users to share “their experience with sexual violence and stand in solidarity with other survivors.” Over the next few months, stories flooded the news of well-known victims of Weinstein.305 While celebrities have provided ample support to #MeToo, activists and lawyers have received support beyond Hollywood: Tina Tchen, Chief-of-Staff to Michelle Obama, is leading the Time’s Up Legal Defense Fund; the Legal Network for Gender Equity was created after the 2016 presidential election to connect sexual assault and harassment survivors to lawyers across the nation; and employers are now revising their employee Human Resources and sexual harassment handbooks.306

Legal responses to #MeToo have varied across the profession. While lawyers and organizations immediately sought to analyze #MeToo and address sexual harassment in the industry, courts have been slower to adopt the change.307 In February 2018, the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates unanimously adopted Resolution 302, which established and recommended “policies and procedures prohibiting harassment and retaliation in the workplace based on gender, gender identity and sexual orientation.”308 Claims regarding employment misconduct issues have increased since the onset of the movement for both plaintiffs’ attorneys and defense attorneys for employers.309 In light of #MeToo and public opinion on sexual harassment Plaintiff’s attorneys have revisited and revised pre-litigation strategies for claims.310 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, signed into law by
President Trump, eliminates the deduction from taxable income of any settlement or payment related to sexual harassment or sexual abuse, including attorneys’ fees, but if the settlement is subject to a nondisclosure agreement then these fees are likely no longer nondeductible.\footnote{See Trey Cooper, \textit{Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Limits Business Expense Deduction For Settlement Of Sexual Harassment Claims}, ARK. LAW 32, 32 (Sum. 2018).}

While President Trump has been critical of the #MeToo movement, the judiciary’s response has been more tepid.\footnote{Felicia Sonmez, \textit{Trump Mocks MeToo Movement in Montana Rally} WASH. POST (Jul. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-mocks-metoo-movement-in-montana-rally/2018/07/05/fad40ce2-80b3-11e8-b660-4d0f9f0351f1_story.html.} In December 2017, Chief Justice Roberts announced an initiative to ensure there are proper procedures in place related to sexual harassment in the federal judiciary.\footnote{Robert Barnes, \textit{Chief Justice Roberts Says Courts Will Examine Protections Against Sexual Harassment}, WASH. POST, (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/chief-justice-roberts-says-courts-will-examine-protections-against-sexual-harassment/2017/12/31/94a55d00-ee40-11e7-97bf-bba379b809a9_story.html?utm_term=.346bd1e71548.} Despite this pronouncement, employees filing sexual harassment claims face an uphill battle in federal court. When seeking legal counsel, employees are often told that multiple witnesses are needed to establish credibility. If a plaintiff can find an attorney, he or she often bears the cost rather than the attorney taking the case on a contingent fee basis. Getting past summary judgment also presents a problem. A study found that when an employer files motion for summary judgment in federal court in a sexual harassment claim, the majority of time it is granted in part or in full; in some federal jurisdictions, up to ninety-four percent of claims are dismissed.\footnote{Stephanie Francis Ward, \textit{TIME’S UP: As the Me Too Movement Continues to Shed Light on Sexual Harassment and Assault, Sparking Changes in Various Industries, the Legal and Judicial Systems Have Been Slow to Adapt}, A.B.A. J. 46 (Jun. 2018).} Despite the “factual intensive nature” of these cases, which requires a jury to decide, federal judges, most of whom are male, are “taking the place of juries and deciding what they think is evidence.”\footnote{Id.} Questions about how the federal judiciary will address sexual harassment in the future continue after Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit retired in December 2017 amid sexual harassment allegations and the appointment of now Associate Justice Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court.\footnote{See supra Part II.}

\section*{IX. Conclusion}

Title VII has played a major role in creating legal solutions for those who experience sexual harassment in the workplace. Many states comply with Title VII and proactively create their own state-specific anti-discrimination laws to further protect employees.\footnote{See Ryan J. Foley, \textit{Kavanaugh’s Ties To Disgraced Mentor Loom Over Confirmation}, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 28, 2018), https://apnews.com/e37ba9bc11014b72a5df6f92680eb42.} While some of these state laws are modeled after Title VII, many of them provide greater protection for people who experience sexual
harassment in the workplace, including expanded protections for people in sexual minorities.\textsuperscript{318} States use different tests to determine if any employer, supervisor, or co-worker has engaged in sexual harassment against an employee.\textsuperscript{319} However, most states allow employers to use the \textit{Ellerth} defense, and the Supreme Court has recently advanced a common definition of “supervisor” for states to use.\textsuperscript{320} Additionally, more courts have recognized that Title VII also forbids same-sex sexual harassment and protects transgender persons from sexual harassment.\textsuperscript{321} When filing or defending a sexual harassment claim, practitioners must be aware of the discrepancies between federal law and state law, and the growing acceptance of sexual harassment claims against members of the LGBT community. Understanding the different administrative procedures, remedies, and judicial interpretations can help practitioners determine which law should be used to support or defend a claim, so that a client may receive the most beneficial representation. Sexual harassment in the workplace is a recurring issue, and new cases and issues arise every day.\textsuperscript{322} The advances that occur in interpreting sexual harassment law provides confidence that remedial devices may be available to more victims. Yet, these remedies and interpretations are still jurisdiction-specific in some cases.

\textsuperscript{318} See id.
\textsuperscript{319} See supra Part III.
\textsuperscript{320} See supra Part IV.
\textsuperscript{321} See supra Part V.
\textsuperscript{322} See supra Part VI.