{"id":814,"date":"2022-06-09T09:08:51","date_gmt":"2022-06-09T13:08:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/gender-journal\/?page_id=814"},"modified":"2025-05-12T11:10:36","modified_gmt":"2025-05-12T15:10:36","slug":"equal-protection","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/gender-journal\/in-print\/volume-xxiii-issue-2-annual-review-2022\/equal-protection\/","title":{"rendered":"Equal Protection"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reads,\u00a0 <\/span>\u201c<\/span>[N]o State shall <\/span>. . . <\/span>deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,<\/span>\u201d<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>is an invaluable tool for groups that experience discrimination.\u00a0 In addition to binding the states, it also applies to the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>To establish an Equal\u00a0 Protection violation, a plaintiff must prove purposeful discrimination directed at an identifiable or suspect class. Classes are defined by an individual\u2019s characteristics<\/span>\u2014<\/span>for example, sex, sexual orientation, or race<\/span>\u2014<\/span>and those classes determine the level of scrutiny received under the Equal Protection Clause.<\/span><\/p>\n

Part II of this article provides an overview of the principles of constitutional equal protection, discusses the three levels of judicial scrutiny and their corresponding triggers, and briefly addresses potential alternatives. Part III considers sex-based classifications under the federal and state constitutions. It first <\/span>describes the federal intermediate scrutiny test and details common and contentious areas of the law. It also addresses the extent to which <\/span>United States v.\u00a0 Virginia, <\/span><\/i>Nguyen v. INS<\/span><\/i>, <\/span>and <\/span>Sessions v. Morales-Santana<\/span><\/i>\u00a0<\/span>altered the framework for analyzing sex-based classifications. Part III next discusses the standards <\/span>of review that states apply in sex-based discrimination claims.\u00a0 Part IV addresses discrimination based on sexual orientation under both the\u00a0 Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. This section begins with an overview of Romer v. Evans<\/i>, which established the applicability of rational basis review for sexual orientation-based classifications. The section then covers\u00a0 Lawrence v. Texas<\/i>\u2014a landmark case in which the Supreme Court determined that homosexual people\u2019s right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the right to engage in sexual conduct without interference from the government.\u00a0Next, the section looks at how district and circuit courts have used the\u00a0 Romer <\/i>standard10 to limit the rights granted in that decision\u00a0and summarizes the pre-Obergefell <\/i>circuit split on same-sex marriage and the resulting Supreme\u00a0 Court decisions expanding the right to marry to all same-sex couples in the 2013\u00a0 Windsor <\/i>decision12 and the 2015 Obergefell <\/i>decision. Finally, Part IV explores state constitutions\u2019 varying levels of scrutiny of sexual orientation classifications.<\/span><\/p>\nEqual Protection<\/a>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reads,\u00a0 \u201c[N]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,\u201d\u00a0is an […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8524,"featured_media":0,"parent":739,"menu_order":7,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"abstract.php","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_price":"","_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_header":"","_tribe_default_ticket_provider":"","_tribe_ticket_capacity":"0","_ticket_start_date":"","_ticket_end_date":"","_tribe_ticket_show_description":"","_tribe_ticket_show_not_going":false,"_tribe_ticket_use_global_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_global_stock_level":"","_global_stock_mode":"","_global_stock_cap":"","_tribe_rsvp_for_event":"","_tribe_ticket_going_count":"","_tribe_ticket_not_going_count":"","_tribe_tickets_list":"[]","_tribe_ticket_has_attendee_info_fields":false,"footnotes":"","_tec_slr_enabled":"","_tec_slr_layout":""},"class_list":["post-814","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"ticketed":false,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/gender-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/814","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/gender-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/gender-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/gender-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/8524"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/gender-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=814"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/gender-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/814\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":827,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/gender-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/814\/revisions\/827"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/gender-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/739"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/gender-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=814"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}