Privatizing Criminal Procedure

JOHN D. KING*

As the staggering costs of the criminal justice system continue to rise, states have begun to look for nontraditional ways to pay for criminal prosecutions and to shift these costs onto criminal defendants. Many states now impose a surcharge on defendants who exercise their constitutional rights to counsel, confrontation, and trial by jury. As these “user fees” proliferate, they have the potential to fundamentally change the nature of criminal prosecutions and the way we think of constitutional rights. The shift from government funding of criminal litigation to user funding constitutes a privatization of criminal procedure. This intrusion of market ideology into the world of fundamental constitutional rights has at least two broad problems: it exacerbates structural unfairness in a system that already disadvantages poor people, and it degrades our conception of those rights. This Article proposes solutions to ameliorate the harshest effects of these rights-based user fees but also argues for the importance of resisting the trend of the privatization of constitutional trial rights.

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* Clinical Professor of Law, Director of Experiential Education, and Director of the Criminal Justice Clinic, Washington and Lee University School of Law. LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 2005; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1996; B.A., Brown University, 1992. © 2019, John D. King. I would like to thank Johanna Bond, Randy Hertz, Noelle Lyle, Jenny Roberts, Jonathan Stubbs, and Theresa Zhen for their helpful comments and suggestions, and Ty Alper for his. I am grateful for the extraordinary research assistance of Mary Nerino and Kit Thomas, and for the support of the Frances Lewis Law Center at the Washington and Lee University School of Law.

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INTRODUCTION

Although overall incarceration has decreased slightly since the high-water mark of 2008, the United States still processes a staggering number of people through its various criminal justice systems. The overall size of the criminal justice apparatus shows no sign of decreasing in any significant way, and counties, states, and the federal government struggle to find funding to support this massive project. User fees are the latest effort to provide funding for courts, prosecutors, prisons, and other costly features of the modern American criminal justice system.

As states continue to deal with ever-increasing budget pressures, many have begun to look for nontraditional ways to pay for criminal prosecutions and to shift the costs of the system onto those charged with crimes. As these user fees proliferate, they have the potential to fundamentally change the nature of criminal prosecutions and the way we think about exercising constitutional rights. The shift from government funding of the processes and procedures of criminal litigation to user funding constitutes a privatization of criminal procedure.

The most familiar user fee, which has been adopted by an increasing number of states in the last two decades, is the requirement that indigent defendants repay the state for the costs of their court-appointed lawyers. States have also begun to assess additional costs for defendants in drug cases if the defendant refuses to waive her Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment and requires a drug analyst to appear in court to testify regarding the chemical testing of the substance at issue in the case. Similarly, many states now charge criminal defendants who elect a jury trial the costs of empaneling a jury. In each of these examples, the state fixes a surcharge for those defendants who elect to exercise a constitutional right. Criminal defendants are charged a fee for the exercise of their Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, confrontation, and trial by jury.

Courts long ago squarely rejected as unconstitutional the practice of user fees in the context of voting. Holding that states could not condition a citizen’s right to vote on her ability to pay even a small amount, the Supreme Court in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections struck down Virginia’s poll tax as violating

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1. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2008, at 1, 8 (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf (finding that “federal and state correctional authorities had jurisdiction over” 1.6 million people and the total incarcerated population including jails exceeded 2.4 million at the end of 2008).
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Section I.A.
5. See infra Section I.B.
6. See infra Section I.C.
principles of equal protection. Courts have been far more indulgent, however, in evaluating state requirements that those accused of crime pay for the costs of exercising Sixth Amendment rights within the context of their own criminal prosecution.

These a la carte procedural fees have proliferated over the past quarter-century and this growing phenomenon calls for reexamination. National events over the last few years have made the issue of criminal costs and fees even more timely and urgent than before. The 2015 report from the Department of Justice (DOJ) concerning Ferguson, Missouri, for example, highlighted the city’s practice of using criminal costs and fees to fund municipal operations. In 2016, the DOJ advised state courts that common court practices involving the imposition and collection of costs and fees associated with criminal charges may violate principles of due process and equal protection.

Understanding the current problem requires a reexamination of the evolution of these rights. At least since Gideon v. Wainwright, a clear tension has existed between the expanded understanding of formal trial rights for those accused of crime and the practical costs associated with implementing those rights. The Supreme Court in Gideon recognized a constitutional obligation on states to provide counsel for those unable to afford private counsel, but it did not explain how states are to pay for this requirement. This tension between recognition of a constitutional right and the requirement that government fund the exercise of that right runs through the Court’s recent jurisprudence on the Confrontation Clause, in which the Court acknowledged that a robust and broad understanding of confrontation rights would increase the costs of criminal trials.

The willingness of American criminal justice systems to allow for user fees to be assessed for the exercise of constitutional rights is closely related to the

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8. See id. at 665 ("For it is enough to say that once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").


11. See infra Part I.


13. See id. at 344. At the time Gideon was decided, thirty-five states already provided counsel for indigent defendants accused of crimes, either by state constitution or by statute. See Brief for the State Gov’t as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (No. 62-155) ("Today thirty-five states require counsel in non-capital cases, which is a strong indication of the fundamental nature of that right in the modern view.").

14. See infra Section I.B.
neoliberal market model that has come to dominate American criminal justice. As long as the process is neutrally applied and the rules equally enforced, judges and prosecutors are not seen as responsible for ensuring fair or equitable outcomes. Adversarial (free-market) criminal justice systems care less about accuracy of result and fairness of outcome than about simply ensuring that the existing procedures are applied correctly. As with the free-market economic model, the free-market criminal justice model promises equality of opportunity and process, but not a result that is necessarily fair or just. Putting a price tag on the processes of criminal procedure by way of user fees, however, threatens even the promise of procedural neutrality upon which the adversarial system is built.

Allowing—or even encouraging—the waiver of rights designed to ensure accuracy has a detrimental effect beyond the immediate or individual impact on any given defendant. A broad and robust right to counsel in our adversarial system is justified not only to protect individual defendants but also to safeguard the integrity of the system. The effects of these practices lie beneath the immediately visible surface. There is little current evidence showing that statutes requiring payment by defendants for the costs of their appointed counsel have a chilling effect on the exercise of that right. When considered with the additional and growing variety of user fees, however, it is likely that this phenomenon reduces the actual procedural safeguards that theoretically attend criminal trials. This outcome is especially probable with regard to low-level crimes that constitute the

15. See Darryl K. Brown, Free Market Criminal Justice: How Democracy and Laissez Faire Undermine the Rule of Law 19 (2016) ("Criminal process puts a priority on giving parties procedural opportunities but, as in the economic realm, the state is less committed to ensuring certain kinds of results.").

16. See id. ("The state—especially in the form of the judiciary, but in other respects as well—does less to ‘coordinate’ certain kinds of outcomes, including, ultimately, the accuracy and proportionality of court judgments."); see also Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2004) ("Whereas the adversarial system conceives criminal procedure as governing a dispute between two parties . . . before a passive decision-maker . . . , the inquisitorial system conceives criminal procedure as an official investigation, done by one or more impartial officials of the state, in order to determine the truth.").

17. See, e.g., In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 955 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually’ innocent.").

18. See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, Lessons from Ferguson on Individual Defense Representation as a Tool of Systemic Reform, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1171, 1220 (2017) ("Ferguson is illustrative of how a system grounded on constitutional deficiencies can be used as a tool for revenue generation, and how individual defense counsel can help to reform such systems of governance."); Justin Murray, A Contextual Approach to Harmless Error Review, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1805–07 (2017) (noting that the “total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial” has been viewed as a “structural defect[]” which is not subject to the harmless error doctrine).

vast bulk of the nation’s criminal justice apparatus.  

Beyond the practical effect of these user fees on the exercise of rights by defendants, this Article examines whether encouraging the alienability of these procedural rights changes the way we see them and further diminishes their role in our system of adjudication. Kimberly Krawiec has discussed three categories of forbidden exchange: “(1) illegal ones, (2) inalienable ones, and (3) those that are both legal and alienable, but in which exchange for profit is banned or limited.” Unlike markets in illegal drugs or other kinds of vice, we forbid the sale of civic rights like the right to vote or freedom of speech “not because we consider the items and activities harmful to society, but because they are so closely tied to the individual’s rights and responsibilities as a member of the community that the state does not allow their separation.” We do, however, allow for a defendant to “sell” her right to counsel or to a trial by jury in exchange for a reduction in court costs.  

As we increasingly allow for the segmentation of criminal procedural rights, and for costs to be assessed à la carte for those who exercise these rights, the adversarial adjudication system becomes gradually priced beyond the reach of most criminal defendants. This Article argues that spreading the financial burden of the exercise of such rights across a broader range of social actors would remove the disincentive to actually exercise these rights.

A system that is so reliant on funding from unwilling consumers necessarily ends up treating those who can pay better than those who cannot. Our system of criminal justice has been described as a “two-tiered system . . . where those who can pay their criminal justice debts can escape the system while those who are unable to pay are trapped and face additional charges for late fees, installment plans, and interest. These extra charges have been referred to as ‘poverty penalties’” and constitute a significant increased burden on those who can least afford it.  

Part I of this Article examines the variety of user fees that now accompany criminal trials in state jurisdictions and the trend toward shifting the financial costs of criminal adjudication onto the criminally accused. The three main categories of fees that this Article addresses are those fees assessing defendants the

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22. Id.
23. Of course, plea bargaining is the ultimate “selling” of a fundamental right, although the trade there is one’s right to be presumed innocent in exchange for a shorter prison sentence. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 Yale L.J. 1969, 1975 (1992).
cost of their appointed counsel; those for a defendant demanding the presence of a forensic witness as, for example, in a prosecution involving drug possession or driving while intoxicated; and those charging a defendant the costs of empaneling a jury. Part II analyzes the doctrinal limitations that courts have placed on states seeking to impose a financial burden on defendants who exercise constitutional trial rights. Part III examines the impact of financial costs and fees on those people who are predominantly the subjects of the American criminal justice system: poor people and people of color. This Part addresses not only the criminalization of poverty but also the growing concern that some courts have come to function more as revenue generators than as stabilizing social institutions. Finally, Part III also discusses some of the philosophical challenges in converting public rights into private commodities that can either be exercised or waived for financial reasons. The Article concludes by proposing solutions to ameliorate the effects of these rights-based user fees and argues for the importance of resisting the trend towards privatizing constitutional trial rights. Fee waivers for indigent defendants are a necessary but inadequate reform. The Court should reconsider its decision in Fuller v. Oregon26 in light of the changed landscape of American criminal adjudication in recent decades. The exercise of trial rights should not be subject to a cost-benefit analysis.

I. USER FEES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Although many aspects of the criminal justice system have become monetized, this Article focuses on the imposition of costs and fees on defendants who elect to exercise certain constitutional trial rights. The rights enshrined in the Sixth Amendment are exercisable or waivable at the election of the accused.27 Notwithstanding their alienability, each of these rights has been seen as fundamental to the adversarial system of criminal justice.28 Other issues relating to the costs and fees of criminal justice are outside of the scope of this Article, although the continued existence of a cash-based pretrial release system, for instance, provides another example of the ways in which poor people are systematically disadvantaged by the current state of criminal procedure in most American states.29

26. 417 U.S. 40, 54 (1974) (upholding Oregon’s recoupment statute which provided that individuals convicted of crimes “who later become[] able to pay for [their] counsel may be required to do so”).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
28. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009) (extending the reach of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”).
29. Other costs and fees that can be described as automatic or nondiscretionary are beyond the scope of this Article. Booking fees and the general court costs that are assessed upon conviction, for example, are, in some jurisdictions, assessed against anyone convicted of a criminal offense. See Wayne A. Logan & Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175, 1186. Such booking fees can range from just a few dollars to several hundred dollars. See id. at 1186 & nn.71–72. Some of these
The Sixth Amendment dictates how American criminal accusations are adjudicated, at least in theory:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . ; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.30

Each of these rights has evolved over the more than two centuries since the ratification of the Bill of Rights,31 and each has been a contested site in which stakeholders have argued the relative merits of efficiency, fairness, accuracy, and justice.32 Nowhere in the Sixth Amendment are these procedural safeguards guaranteed to defendants without cost, and recently states have moved toward charging defendants for the exercise of these rights.

Although states have charged fees for those convicted of crimes since the nineteenth century,33 there is a new trend of charging those facing criminal charges additional fees for the exercise of various constitutionally mandated trial rights.34 What might have been the first user fee in the criminal context was imposed in 1846, when Michigan authorized the recovery of medical costs from prisoners.35 Over a century later in 1965, California introduced a mandatory crime victim fee for those convicted of crimes.36 And Michigan again showed its innovative streak when it became the first state to charge prisoners for a portion of the costs of their fees are imposed regardless of whether the charge results in a conviction. See id. at 1195 (noting that some asset forfeitures, allowing governments to seize money and property from individuals, occur only after criminal conviction whereas others go on “regardless of the outcome in criminal proceedings”). For a detailed taxonomy of the costs and fees associated with all stages of the criminal process, see Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed Into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1492–516 (2016).

30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.


32. See, e.g., TOMKOVICZ, supra note 31, at 20 (discussing the development and contested history of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).

33. See Logan & Wright, supra note 31, at 20 (discussing the extended history of criminal justice payments).

34. See id. at 1184–86 (discussing the “expanding menu” of state-imposed fees on criminal defendants for use of the criminal justice system).


36. See Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor [https://perma.cc/9RGJ-4XWU].
own incarceration. But these fees are imposed without regard to any actions or decisions of the defendant. Fees that are assessed only if the defendant exercises her right to counsel, to confront a witness, or to a jury trial, act as a surcharge on the invocation of those rights.

A. RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Described as the “master key” that guarantees other procedural trial rights for those accused of crime, the right to counsel has a long and contested history. Enshrined in the Sixth Amendment and long held up as fundamental to a fair adversarial system, the contours of the right to counsel have fluctuated and evolved over modern American history. Although Gideon v. Wainwright and its progeny have defined the scope of the right to counsel and its applicability to the states, battles continue over who is entitled to court-appointed counsel, what is expected of court-appointed counsel, and who must ultimately pay for court-appointed counsel. And although the right of an indigent defendant facing a serious charge to court-appointed counsel is now clear, many states have adopted the practice of charging defendants for their exercise of that right.

Gideon and its progeny imposed constitutional requirements on state criminal prosecutions without providing a source of funding. As states struggled to come up with the resources to pay for the vast numbers of appointed counsel required to accommodate the ever-increasing number of criminal adjudications, many states experimented with shifting the costs onto the individual “consumers” of the systems: the accused. The move away from government provision of counsel to a system in which the user is charged was consistent with the neoliberal economic project of the 1980s and 1990s. Before long, some state governments took on the appearance of debt collectors—seeking to recover the funds owed them by defendants through collection techniques that included garnishment of

37. See id. ("Michigan, in 1984, passed the first law to charge inmates for some of the costs of their incarceration.").


39. See generally TOMKOVICZ, supra note 31 (outlining the lengthy history and development of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).

40. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”).


42. See infra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.

43. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (finding the federal right to court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants also applies to states).

44. See Shapiro, supra note 36.

45. See id.; see also Wright & Logan, supra note 19, at 2059 (discussing the emergence of fee proposals tied to budget cuts and “special budgetary stress for indigent criminal defense programs”).

46. See Wright & Logan, supra note 19, at 2051–52 (“In keeping with the privatization strategies increasingly in vogue, many states tried to trim their criminal defense budgets by shifting the costs of such services back to the consumers—indigent criminal defendants.” (footnote omitted)).
wages, seizure of property, impoundment of vehicles, revocation of probation, and the threat of sentence enhancement because of unpaid fees.47

Initially understood as a negative right that only forbade government actors from interfering with a defendant’s ability to choose and retain counsel of her choice,48 the right to counsel evolved in the twentieth century into an affirmative right, obligating the government to provide counsel to those accused of serious crime. *Powell v. Alabama* marked the first time that the United States Supreme Court recognized a defendant’s right to court-appointed counsel.49 Reversing the rape convictions of nine African-American defendants tried in Alabama state court without any meaningful appointment of counsel, the Supreme Court held for the first time that, at least in certain serious cases in which the defendants were incapable of mounting their own defense or retaining counsel, the Fourteenth Amendment required states to appoint counsel for defendants.50 The Court, stressing the serious and extreme nature of the charges and the defendants’ inability either to represent themselves or to secure trial counsel, created an extremely narrow rule limited to the facts of the case before it.51 Nevertheless, *Powell* established the important principle that the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel, through the Fourteenth Amendment, did bind the states in certain circumstances and did endow a positive right to court-appointed counsel, rather than a more limited negative right against state interference.52

Three decades after *Powell*, *Gideon v. Wainwright* made the right to court-appointed counsel categorical, holding in definite terms that defendants facing serious charges in state courtrooms have a federal constitutional right to court-appointed counsel.53 In felony prosecutions, such as the one at issue in *Gideon*, the Court rejected any weighing of factors or balancing tests and instead found a

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47. See id. at 2053–54 (discussing the different fee collection methods used by several states).
48. See Alfredo Garcia, *The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?*, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 42 (1991) (noting “that ‘the right to counsel meant the right to retain counsel of one’s own choice and at one’s expense’” (quoting WILLIAM M. BEANEY, *THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS* 21 (1955))); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 370 (1979) (“There is considerable doubt that the Sixth Amendment itself, as originally drafted by the Framers of the Bill of Rights, contemplated any guarantee other than the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution in a federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his defense.”).
49. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (finding the constitutional right to appointed counsel in specific circumstances of capital cases).
50. See id. The Court noted that:

> [I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.

Id.
51. See id. (concluding that the specific circumstances necessitated counsel).
52. See id. (“[W]e are of the opinion that, under the circumstances just stated, the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
categorical right to court-appointed counsel. The expansive holding of Gideon was subsequently extended to cases that involved actual incarceration (rather than simply the potential for incarceration), even in misdemeanor prosecutions. In Scott v. Illinois, however, the Court limited the scope of the right to appointed counsel, holding that in criminal prosecutions that do not carry the possibility of incarceration, defendants do not enjoy any federal constitutional right to court-appointed counsel.

The specter of increased costs runs throughout the Supreme Court’s right-to-counsel cases, and resource constraints continue to interfere with the vision of Gideon. Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, states struggled to pay for the costs associated with a dramatically expanding criminal justice system. The size of the criminal justice system exploded with the War on Drugs and costs of every aspect of the system rose accordingly. In the three decades between 1980 and 2010, the incarcerated population in the United States grew from approximately 500

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54. Id.; see King, supra note 41, at 10 (“Thus, in Gideon, the Court rejected a balancing-test approach in favor of a categorical requirement of counsel, at least in felony cases.”).

55. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (“[I]n those [misdemeanors] that end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of ‘the guiding hand of counsel’ so necessary when one’s liberty is in jeopardy.”).

56. 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (“[W]e believe that . . . actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment . . . [thus] warrant[ing] adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.”).

57. See King, supra note 41, at 39 (“[C]ost-based arguments have been made against every expansion of the right to counsel.”) (citing Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 431–34 (2011)); see also Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–74 (limiting the scope of the right to appointed counsel to prosecutions that involve actual incarceration); Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 49–50 (Powell, J., concurring) (contending that indigent defendants should not automatically be afforded counsel for “petty offenses”). See generally Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (“[P]rocedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law . . . cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”).

The Supreme Court has an inconsistent record regarding whether and how it should consider the practical costs of recognizing a new constitutional right in the field of criminal procedure. The issue is explicitly addressed in many of the right-to-counsel cases and in Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966) (“[W]e are not unmindful of the burdens which law enforcement officials must bear . . . .”). But some of the Justices have taken the position that consideration of costs is always inappropriate in construing constitutional protections for those accused of crime. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 75 (1970) (Black, J., concurring) (stating that the “value of a jury trial far outweigh[es] all costs to society for ‘all crimes’ and ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions’”). For a contrary opinion, see Justice Breyer’s suggestion that “judges, in applying a text in light of its purpose, should look to consequences, including ‘contemporary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of the community to be affected.’ And since ‘the purpose of construction is the ascertainment of meaning, nothing that is logically relevant should be excluded.’” STEPHEN Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 18 (2005) (footnote omitted).

Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne shows a Justice who is considering the real-world costs of recognizing a new constitutional protection. 557 U.S. 52, 83–84 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the financial implications of post-conviction DNA testing). As support for his position against recognizing a right of defendants to obtain and test DNA after conviction, Alito referred to the “severe backlogs in state crime labs.” Id. at 84.
thousand to more than 2.3 million.\textsuperscript{58} During roughly the same period, total expenditures by states and municipalities on corrections rose from approximately $17 billion to approximately $71 billion.\textsuperscript{59} And among all of the other associated costs, states had to find the money to pay the court-appointed defense lawyers that the system required.

The trend of charging criminal defendants for court-appointed counsel took off in the 1990s, growing from seven jurisdictions in 1994 to twenty-seven in 2006.\textsuperscript{60} By 2017, at least forty-three states had adopted the practice.\textsuperscript{61} The explosion of such fees took place in geographically and politically diverse states from California and Massachusetts to Kansas and Georgia.\textsuperscript{62} Typically, the genesis of these user fees for criminal defendants using appointed counsel arose out of a budgetary shortfall and indigent defense funding crisis, with the leadership of public defender agencies reconciling themselves to support such fees as better than the alternative, in light of budget cuts by the state legislatures.\textsuperscript{63} Coalitions between tough-on-crime legislators and leaders of the criminal defense establishment have led to the proliferation of these fees.\textsuperscript{64}

States vary in the specifics of how they charge defendants for their court-appointed counsel. Some assess application fees at the beginning of a criminal prosecution, while others charge a recoupment fee that is added to other court costs at the conclusion of the prosecution.\textsuperscript{65} Of those that exact after-the-fact recoupment fees, some assess a flat fee for each criminal count, and some require payment from the defendant of all defense costs accrued in the defense of a case,

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\item \textsuperscript{60} Wright & Logan, \textit{supra} note 19, at 2052–54 (noting the uptick in jurisdictions imposing fees on defendants).
\item \textsuperscript{61} See Shapiro, \textit{supra} note 36 (“The NPR survey found, with help from the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, that in at least 43 states and D.C., defendants can be billed for a public defender.”).
\item \textsuperscript{62} See Wright & Logan, \textit{supra} note 19, at 2054. In addition, Wright and Logan document a fascinating political and cultural dynamic within the public defender community around this issue of allocating some of the costs of appointed counsel onto defendants, with the higher-level administrators generally in favor of such mechanisms (if only begrudgingly in the face of inadequate state funding) and the rank-and-file public defenders generally opposed to the assessment of such fees on their clients, for both philosophical and pragmatic reasons. See id. at 2047 (articulating the “counterintuitive” dynamic of those within the public defender system who support user fees and those who resist those fees).
\item \textsuperscript{63} See id. at 2055 ("[The defense leadership's] objectives are to avert immediate budgetary troubles and to establish credibility with legislators and other ‘repeat players’ in the arena of crime politics, such as law enforcement officials.").
\item \textsuperscript{64} See id. at 2069–70 (describing the political coalitions that “have made possible the recent broader private subsidization movement, aptly referred to as ‘pay-as-you-go’ criminal justice”).
\item \textsuperscript{65} See id. at 2046, 2052–54 (discussing the variation in ways that states assess user fees and noting the shift from recoupment fees to up-front application fees to decrease the administrative burden).
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including costs of defense experts and investigators.\textsuperscript{66} States also vary greatly in the extent to which they factor in a defendant’s ability to pay, with some states ignoring that factor altogether.\textsuperscript{67}

B. RIGHT TO CONFRONT

The right to confront adverse witnesses has been one of the most widely discussed areas of criminal procedure in the past decade or so.\textsuperscript{68} The constitutional command that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him”\textsuperscript{69} recently became the basis of yet another fee that can be imposed on criminal defendants. This provision of the Constitution was subjected to a radical reappraisal in \textit{Crawford v. Washington}.\textsuperscript{70} Following \textit{Crawford}, this portion of the Sixth Amendment is now interpreted to provide a broad procedural safeguard for criminal defendants at trial. In the context of forensic testing, for example, this right requires the prosecution to present its lab analysis through live witnesses.\textsuperscript{71} But who should be responsible for the costs associated with the appearance of those witnesses? One response of legislatures worried about the cost of defendants exercising these rights has been to impose the costs of doing so on the defendants themselves.

After receiving little attention for the first century after its adoption, the Confrontation Clause was interpreted in \textit{Mattox v. United States} to be a “general rule[]” that “must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.”\textsuperscript{72} This relaxed approach to the right of confrontation

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\item 66. Beth A. Colgan, \textit{Paying for Gideon}, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1931 n.5 (2014) (“In addition to attorney’s fees, indigent defendants may be charged for the costs of experts, investigators, and other costs related to their defense.”).
\item 67. \textit{See id.} at 1929–30 (“[I]n many jurisdictions, consideration of whether one has the ability to pay for counsel is essentially meaningless, whereas in other jurisdictions, courts are required to impose recoupment without any such consideration at all.”).
\item 69. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
\item 70. 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004) (abandoning the “indicium of reliability” Confrontation Clause framework and holding that out-of-court statements that are “testimonial” will only satisfy the Confrontation Clause if the out-of-court declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a “prior opportunity for cross-examination”).
\item 71. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009) (concluding that admission of lab analysis certificates against a defendant at trial violates his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him).
\item 72. 156 U.S. Const. 237, 242–43 (1895). In \textit{Mattox}, the defendant’s murder conviction had been reversed by the Supreme Court. Two witnesses who had testified at his initial trial had died by the time of his second trial and their testimony was read to the second jury over the defendant’s Confrontation Clause objection. \textit{Id.} at 240. The Supreme Court affirmed Mattox’s second conviction, holding that the dictates
was further endorsed in 1980 in *Ohio v. Roberts*, in which the Supreme Court allowed out-of-court statements to be used against a criminal defendant as long as the declarant was shown to be unavailable and the out-of-court statement possessed “adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”

In 2004, in *Crawford*, the Supreme Court breathed new life into the Confrontation Clause and overturned *Roberts* in no uncertain terms. The Court held that testimonial out-of-court statements could be admitted against a defendant only if the declarant was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to confront the witness about the subject matter of the statement. In *Crawford*, the Supreme Court rejected the *Roberts* test as having departed impermissibly from the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause. The change was dramatic and immediate, and courts struggled to accommodate the new approach to the confrontation right. The Court quickly undertook the task of refining and clarifying its understanding of the confrontation right—seeking first to define “testimonial” in *Davis v. Washington* and *Hammon v. Indiana*, and then to address whether the Confrontation Clause had any regard for nontestimonial hearsay, as well as to clarify whether and how a defendant could forfeit the protections of the Confrontation Clause through her own wrongful conduct.

In 2009 in *Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts*, the Court again considered the scope of the newly redefined confrontation right, addressing whether a criminal defendant had similar confrontation rights when the out-of-court statement in question was a forensic analysis. In *Melendez-Diaz*, the Court considered whether a laboratory analysis from a state-employed lab technician certifying that a substance was cocaine fell within the scope of the Confrontation Clause.

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73. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
74. 541 U.S. at 68–69 (overruling *Roberts*).
75. See id. at 68 (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination.”).
76. See id. at 63 (“The unpardonable vice of the *Roberts* test, however, is not its unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.”).
77. *Davis v. Washington*, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (holding that “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency”). *Davis* and *Hammon* were consolidated and argued together before the Court. See *Hammon v. Indiana*, 546 U.S. 976 (2005).
78. See *Crawford*, 541 U.S. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law . . . .”); see also *Whorton v. Bockting*, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007) (recognizing “*Crawford*’s elimination of Confrontation Clause protection against the admission of [even] unreliable out-of-court nontestimonial statements”).
79. *Giles v. California*, 554 U.S. 353, 355, 367–68, 377 (2008) (holding that criminal defendants forfeit their Sixth Amendment rights to confront adverse witnesses only when a judge determines that the defendant committed a wrongful act with the “particular purpose of making the witness unavailable” at trial).
81. *Id.* at 308–09 (stating the issue before the Court).
The majority concluded that the laboratory certificates were testimonial statements and that the analysts were witnesses against the defendant for purposes of Sixth Amendment protection. Accordingly, because the defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses (and because the witnesses were not shown to have been unavailable at trial), introduction of the laboratory certificates violated the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights. Consequently, the prosecution would be required to present the lab technician for cross-examination if it intended to introduce a laboratory certificate. The Court did not resolve the question of who should bear the costs of presenting such a witness.

Predictions about the effects of Melendez-Diaz on the administration of criminal justice were swift, extreme, and divided. Despite Justice Scalia’s reassurance in the majority opinion that “the sky will not fall,” Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley predicted that misdemeanor drug prosecutions “would grind to a halt” because of the decision. Along with the doctrinal arguments about the meaning and requirements of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and its applicability to the states, the Justices also engaged in a lengthy discussion about the costs of recognizing such a constitutional prohibition against out-of-court statements. The dissent focused on the “heavy societal costs” that the majority opinion imposed, not only in terms of the likelihood that some guilty defendants would go free, but also the increased financial cost of criminal trials.

82. *Id.* at 311 (“In short, under our decision in *Crawford* the analysts’ affidavits were testimonial statements, and the analysts were ‘witnesses’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.”).

83. See *id.* at 311, 329 (stating the conclusion of the Court).

84. See *id.* at 310–11 (requiring the prosecution to present the lab analyst for cross-examination to satisfy the defendant’s Confrontation Clause right).

85. See *id.* at 341–42 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the costs imposed on the administration of justice as a result of the majority’s decision).

86. *Id.* at 325 (majority opinion). In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia claimed that the “dire predictions” of the dissent were exaggerated because “[i]t is unlikely that defense counsel will insist on live testimony whose effect will be merely to highlight rather than cast doubt upon the forensic analysis.” *Id.* at 328.


88. Compare Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326 (“Despite [this rule’s] widespread use among states], there is no evidence that the criminal justice system has ground to a halt in the States that, one way or another, empower a defendant to insist upon the analyst’s appearance at trial.”), and *id.* at 328 (“[T]here is little reason to believe that our decision today will commence the parade of horribles respondent and the dissent predict.”), with *id.* at 341 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“By requiring analysts also to appear in the far greater number of cases where defendants do not dispute the analyst’s result, the Court imposes enormous costs on the administration of justice.”).
now that states would be forced to comply with this understanding of the confrontation right. The majority recognized that “[t]he Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of criminal trials more burdensome.” It reasoned, however, that any potential increase in the cost of prosecution was not a valid consideration in construing constitutional provisions, and also that the economic predictions of the dissent were exaggerated and overblown. This conversation about the economic costs of the newly understood right to confrontation continued in subsequent Confrontation Clause cases, and has not been resolved to the satisfaction of some prosecutors and state legislators, who are troubled by the increased costs of compliance.

Another practical concern expressed after Melendez-Diaz was the prospect of gamesmanship by defendants and their lawyers in refusing to stipulate to certificates of analysis and thereby demanding the presence of the drug analyst without any meaningful intention to confront or cross-examine the witness. A representative from a Virginia Department of Forensic Science laboratory described the problem in vivid terms: “[I]n responding to thirteen subpoenas, analysts ‘spent 74 hours out of the office, traveled 2,600 miles and testified only twice for a total of 10 minutes. They were never questioned by the defense.’”

In response to Melendez-Diaz, states quickly drafted legislation to contain costs and head off the potential for gamesmanship among defendants (or defense attorneys) who might exercise their right to confront scientific witnesses solely in hopes that those witnesses would not appear in court. Kansas, for example, attempted to address this problem by allowing the admission of a certificate of analysis over the defendant’s formal objection “unless it appears from the notice of objection and grounds for that objection that the conclusions of the certificate . . . will be contested at trial.” The Kansas Supreme Court held that

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89. See id. at 342 (“The Court purchases its meddling with the Confrontation Clause at a dear price, a price not measured in taxpayer dollars alone. Guilty defendants will go free, on the most technical grounds, as a direct result of today’s decision, adding nothing to the truth-finding process.”).
90. Id. at 325 (majority opinion).
91. See id. (“The Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause—like those other constitutional provisions—is binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience.”).
92. See id. (“We also doubt the accuracy of respondent’s and the dissent’s dire predictions.”).
93. See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 652 (2011) (“We hold that surrogate testimony of that order does not meet the constitutional requirement. The accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular scientist.”).
94. See Deyrup, supra note 87 (discussing the concern of Melendez-Diaz opponents that defendants would call analysts without intending to contest their conclusions).
this statute violated the Confrontation Clause, as interpreted in Melendez-Diaz.97

Statutes that shifted the burden of production onto criminal defendants seemed clearly unconstitutional after Melendez-Diaz,98 but notice-and-demand statutes seemed to present a way for states to accommodate the newly invigorated right to confront while still containing costs.99 The majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz itself provided guidance to states considering this approach, cautioning that states could not shift the burden of calling witnesses onto the defendant but could require that the defendant object in advance of trial to the state’s use of testimonial hearsay at trial.100

Just four days after deciding Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court agreed to consider the constitutionality of Virginia’s notice-and-demand statute in Briscoe v. Virginia.101 Seeing the writing on the wall, however, Virginia’s General Assembly quickly convened and altered its notice-and-demand statute to conform to the requirements set forth in Melendez-Diaz.102 The Supreme Court remanded Briscoe to the Supreme Court of Virginia,103 which concluded that the old notice-and-demand statute impermissibly shifted the burden of proof onto the defendant.104 Virginia’s revised notice-and-demand statute, passed during a special session in 2009, responded not only to the Melendez-Diaz decision but also to the predicted dramatic rise in subpoenas for drug analysts.105 The notice-and-demand

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97. Laturner, 218 P.3d at 37–38 (striking portions of the Kansas statute as unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment).

98. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009) (“Converting the prosecution’s duty under the Confrontation Clause into the defendant’s privilege under state law or the Compulsory Process Clause shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows from the State to the accused.”).

99. Notice-and-demand statutes require the defendant to take some affirmative step to exercise her confrontation right but also require the government to secure the attendance of the witness in question after having been so notified. See id. at 326 (noting that “notice-and-demand statutes require the prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at trial, after which the defendant is given a period of time in which he may object to the admission of the evidence absent the analyst’s appearance live at trial”).

100. Id. at 324 (“[T]he Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court.”). The Court saw true notice-and-demand statutes as simply accelerating the timing of the defendant’s Confrontation Clause objection and therefore saw no constitutional infirmity with these statutes. See id. at 326–27.


103. Briscoe, 559 U.S. at 33.


105. SB 5007, 2009 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Va. 2009). In the nine months leading up to the Melendez-Diaz decision, “forensic analysts were subpoenaed an average of 528 times per month.” Stephen Wills Murphy & Darryl K. Brown, Essay: The Confrontation Clause and the High Stakes of the Court’s Consideration of Briscoe v. Virginia, 95 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 97, 98 (2010). In July, the month following the Melendez-Diaz decision, forensic analysts were subpoenaed 1,885 times with similar totals for subsequent months. Id.; see also Anne Hampton Andrews, Note, The Melendez-Diaz Dilemma: Virginia’s Response, a Model to Follow, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 419, 440–41 (2010) (describing similar statistics concerning the increase in subpoenas following Melendez-Diaz). The Virginia Department of Forensic Science painted a fairly bleak picture of the financial implications of Melendez-Diaz, noting that, given the number of analysts, vehicles, and budgetary increases required, the
statute passed in Virginia now requires any prosecutor wishing to introduce a certificate of analysis at trial in lieu of live testimony to provide notice to the defendant at least twenty-eight days prior to the trial along with a notice of the defendant’s right to object to such out-of-court testimony. The defendant then has fourteen days within which to object to the admission of the certificate. If the defendant files such a timely objection, the certificate is rendered inadmissible. At no point is the defendant required to state a reason for her objection or to declare an intention to cross-examine any live witness who might appear. The majority of American jurisdictions have now adopted some form of notice-and-demand statute similar to the Virginia statute. Some states go further and also require a certification that the requesting party intends to actually conduct a cross-examination. In those states, when the defendant does not then conduct the cross-examination certified to, she is charged an additional fee. Although such a requirement seems to violate the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights as described in Melendez-Diaz, these statutes remain on the books in some states.

When Virginia’s General Assembly adopted the notice-and-demand procedures, it simultaneously added another provision that imposed a fee on defendants who exercised their rights under Melendez-Diaz. This addition was a change from the previous provision, which had provided that:

The accused in any hearing or trial in which a certificate of analysis is offered into evidence shall have the right to call the person performing such analysis or examination . . . as a witness therein, and examine him in the same manner as if he had been called as an adverse witness. Such witness shall be summoned and appear at the cost of the Commonwealth.

Commonwealth would struggle to assume the new financial burden. See Andrews, supra, at 440 (discussing the realistic implications of the decision on Virginia’s financial state at that time).

107. See id. § 19.2-187.1(B).
108. See id. (noting that if timely objection is made, the certificate is inadmissible unless “(i) the testimony of the person who performed the analysis or examination is admitted into evidence describing the facts and results of the analysis or examination during the [state’s] case-in-chief at the hearing or trial and that person is present and subject to cross-examination”; or “(ii) the objection is waived by the accused or his counsel in writing or before the court”; or “(iii) the parties stipulate before the court to the admissibility of the certificate”).
109. See id.
111. For example, Alabama requires the requesting party to “include a statement of the basis upon which the requesting party intends to challenge the findings contained in the certificate of analysis.” ALA. CODE § 12-21-302(b) (2016).
112. See id. (“If the request for subpoena is granted, and the requesting party subsequently fails to conduct the cross-examination previously certified to, the court shall assess against the requesting party, all necessary and reasonable expenses incurred for the attendance in court of the certifying witness.”).
113. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1(F) (West 2017) (imposing a fee on defendants who demand confrontation and are found guilty).
The new statute amended the final sentence as follows:

Such witness shall be summoned and appear at the cost of the Commonwealth; however, if the accused calls the person performing such analysis or examination as a witness and is found guilty of the charge or charges for which such witness is summoned, $50 for expenses related to that witness’s appearance at hearing or trial shall be charged to the accused as court costs. 115

With one hastily-appended provision, Virginia imposed a tax on the exercise of a defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses. 116

Several states currently impose costs on defendants who choose to exercise their confrontation right as defined in Melendez-Diaz; these states do so either explicitly as Virginia does or generally under a rule that imposes costs on defendants for each witness called. 117 The United States Supreme Court has not addressed in any of its recent Confrontation Clause decisions which party should bear the costs of producing these witnesses, or whether there is any constitutional problem with assessing defendants an extra fee for exercising their right to confront adverse witnesses.

C. RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL

The right to trial by jury is central to American notions of criminal justice, but even this right has become subject to user fees. The Sixth Amendment guarantees: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .” 118 As with the examples above concerning the defendant’s right to counsel and right to confront adverse witnesses, many states charge defendants for the exercise of their right to a jury trial. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, Justice Scalia wrote that the “jury-trial guarantee was one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never been efficient; but it has always been free.” 119 In many states, however, Justice Scalia’s observation is no longer true.

115. Id. § 19.2-187.1(F) (West 2017) (emphasis added).
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-302(b) (assessing “all necessary and reasonable expenses” against a defendant who requests and receives a subpoena and then fails to conduct a cross-examination); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 181.3-701(2) (West 2018) (permitting the imposition of fees on the defendant, including “[t]he actual costs paid to any expert witness,” and “reasonable and necessary” fees for, inter alia, chemical analysis, upon a motion by the prosecutor); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:847(E)(1)(b) (2016) (imposing on the defendant generalized witness subpoena fees); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-304(a)(7)–(9b), (11)–(13) (West 2017) (imposing $600 in fees to be assessed against the defendant upon conviction); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27-27 (2018) (imposing fees on the defendant for the costs of witnesses, blood tests, and other chemical analysis tests); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2187.1(B) (imposing a $50 fee on the defendant for costs related to witnesses who performed laboratory “analysis or examination” if the defendant is later found guilty).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Several states explicitly add a fee for the election of a jury trial. Delaware, for example, imposes an additional $78 per charge if the defendant elects a jury trial instead of a bench trial.\textsuperscript{120} Colorado,\textsuperscript{121} Illinois,\textsuperscript{122} Mississippi,\textsuperscript{123} Missouri,\textsuperscript{124} Montana,\textsuperscript{125} Nevada,\textsuperscript{126} Ohio,\textsuperscript{127} Oklahoma,\textsuperscript{128} Texas,\textsuperscript{129} Virginia,\textsuperscript{130} West Virginia,\textsuperscript{131} and Wisconsin\textsuperscript{132} all provide expressly for an additional charge to be assessed against a defendant who elects a jury and is convicted. Other states have general statutes authorizing assessment of the costs and fees of the prosecution against a defendant, which could be read to include a larger fee if the defendant was tried by a jury. Washington even offers defendants a choice between a six-person and a twelve-person jury, with the larger jury commanding double the price.\textsuperscript{133}

Many states employ a two-tiered criminal adjudication system, within which a misdemeanor is tried initially before a judge but is then subject to a de novo appeal by the defendant to a higher court, at which point the case may be decided

\textsuperscript{120} See Del. Ct. C.P. Crim. R. 58(A) (charging defendants in the Court of Common Pleas $52 per charge in a non-jury case and $130 per charge in a jury case).  
\textsuperscript{121} See Christie v. People, 837 P.2d 1237, 1244 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (finding that Colorado’s rule imposing a $25 jury fee—to be refunded upon acquittal or dismissal—is not “an undue burden on the right to a jury trial”).  
\textsuperscript{122} See People ex rel. Flanagan v. McDonough, 180 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ill. 1962) (discussing the permissibility of a Chicago city law that allows for jury fees with an increase in fee associated with a twelve-person jury).  
\textsuperscript{124} See State v. Wright, 13 Mo. 243, 244 (1850) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the jury tax violated Missouri’s constitutional guarantee “that right and justice ought to be administered without sale, denial or delay”).  
\textsuperscript{125} See State v. Fertterer, 841 P.2d 467, 473 (Mont. 1992) (“[T]he constitutionality of the foregoing statute [allowing the court to assign costs for the jury as part of sentence] has been upheld against claims of a violation of due process rights under the Constitution.”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gatts, 928 P.2d 114 (Mont. 1996).  
\textsuperscript{126} See Korby v. State, 565 P.2d 1006, 1006 (Nev. 1977) (upholding the imposition of costs, including jury fees, on those convicted but not for those acquitted).  
\textsuperscript{127} See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2947.23(A)(2)(a) (West 2014) (imposing costs on a defendant for a jury if the jury has been sworn); see also 2003 Ohio Op. Att’y Gen. 16 (2003).  
\textsuperscript{128} See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 153(A)(8) (West 2016) (authorizing the imposition of a $30 fee on a defendant “for each offense of which [he] is convicted” any time a jury is requested).  
\textsuperscript{129} See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.004(a) (West 2015) (authorizing the imposition of jury fees against a defendant who has been convicted); see also id. art. 102.0045(a) (West 2011) (authorizing an additional fee of $4 to reimburse counties for the cost of jury services).  
\textsuperscript{130} See Kincaid v. Commonwealth, 105 S.E.2d 846, 848 (Va. 1958) (“The costs of a jury are an expense incident to the prosecution, and its collection violates no constitutional right of the accused.”).  
\textsuperscript{131} See State ex rel. Ring v. Boober, 488 S.E.2d 66, 71–72 (W. Va. 1997) (rejecting defendant’s argument that a statement notifying the defendant that he would pay “a jury fee if convicted, imposed an unreasonable burden upon the exercise of [his] constitutional right to a jury trial”).  
\textsuperscript{132} See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 814.51 (West 2017) (authorizing assessment of one day’s jury fees, including all mileage costs, against the defendant if a jury is demanded and demand is later withdrawn within two business days of trial).  
by a jury if state or federal law grants the defendant that right. 134 Most of the
states with such a system assess an additional charge for any defendant who cho-
oses to exercise her right to a jury trial, and in most instances the defendant must
first have the case decided by a judge. Although these systems protect defendants’
rights in that they give the accused two bites at the apple, they also introduce a
surcharge for the defendant who wants the protection of the jury.

Arkansas, for example, has a two-tiered criminal trial system, in which misde-
meanors are initially triable either in district court or circuit court, entirely at the
discretion of the prosecutor. 135 Because anyone accused of any criminal violation
has a right to be tried by a jury according to state law, 136 those initially convicted
in district court have the right to a de novo appeal to circuit court, in which that
person may elect to be tried by a jury. 137 To exercise that right to a jury trial, how-
ever, the accused must pay an extra $150 fee, which is nonrefundable regardless
of whether the charge results in conviction, acquittal, or dismissal. 138 Neither the
Arkansas Code nor the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure appear to allow
such fees to be waived in the case of indigent defendants attempting to exercise
their right to a jury trial. 139

In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that the right to a jury trial
was fundamental to the American system of criminal justice and so bound the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 140 The Court explained the impor-
tance of the jury as “an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.” 141 Duncan held

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134. See generally David A. Harris, Justice Rationed in the Pursuit of Efficiency: De Novo Trials in
the Criminal Courts, 24 CONN. L. REV. 381 (1992) (describing de novo trial systems employed by
several states for the adjudication of misdemeanors).
136. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 10.
137. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-703 (2013) (stating that “the right of trial by jury [is] inviolate,
[and] all appeals from judgment in district court shall be de novo to circuit court”); State v. Roberts, 900
S.W.2d 175, 176 (Ark. 1995) (“[T]here is . . . no entitlement to a jury trial in a municipal court, but
the right remains inviolate when an appeal is pursued to a circuit court where the case is tried de novo”).
138. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-6-403 (West 2013).
139. See Brief for Ark. Pub. Law Ctr. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner’s Writ of Certiorari to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at 7 n.3, Carrick v. Hutchinson, 136 S. Ct. 269 (2015)
(mem.) (No. 15-204), 2015 WL 5466138 (noting that although “ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-6-403(c)
(2013)] contains an indigency exception for the $150 filing fee, it appears to refer only to civil litigants
who ‘prosecute a cause of action’” (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-6-403(c) (West 2013)) (emphasis
added)).
140. See 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). The Supreme Court noted in Duncan that:

Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in
all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.

Id.

141. Id. at 156. During the Founding, Patrick Henry defended the importance of the jury as a local
community protection against government overreach and intrusion, stating “[t]his gives me comfort—
that, as long as I have existence, my neighbors will protect me.” THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
that states were required to provide a jury trial for any defendant facing a “serious offense,” defined in that case as one carrying a potential sentence of at least a two-year period of incarceration.142 Two years after Duncan, the Court extended its definition of “serious offense” to include any crime for which the authorized imprisonment was more than six months.143 A crime for which the maximum authorized punishment is incarceration for six months or less is presumed to be a petty offense, and therefore outside of the scope of the federal constitutional right to a trial by jury.144 The Supreme Court has allowed, however, that this presumption of pettiness is rebuttable if the defendant can show other indicia that demonstrate seriousness.145

Whether specific or general, waivable or not on the basis of indigency, and explained to the defendant in advance or added on to her bill after trial, each of these additional fees acts as a tax on the exercise of the jury trial right. States differ in their application of jury trial fees and the amount that defendants are charged. And many states have resisted the temptation to impose additional fees for defendants who exercise their right to a jury trial.146 But in many jurisdictions across the country, criminal defendants now must decide between keeping their costs down and exercising the right to a trial by jury.

II. DOCTRINAL LIMITATIONS OF USER FEES

Although the presumption in American courts is that the government bears the costs of prosecuting criminal cases, legislatures may impose specific costs on the defendant by statute.147 When such specific statutory authorization exists, courts tend to defer to the legislative prerogative to impose such costs and reject challenges to the constitutionality of those fees.148 Courts have placed limits on a

143. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (“[N]o offense can be deemed ‘petty’ for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized.”); see also Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989) (“The possibility of a sentence exceeding six months, we determined, is ‘sufficiently severe by itself’ to require the opportunity for a jury trial.” (quoting Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69 n.6)).
144. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543 (stating that for society’s purposes, a crime carrying a maximum prison term of six months or less can be understood as petty).
145. See id. (discussing the rebuttable presumption that a crime carrying a sentence of six months or less is not entitled to a jury trial). For a fascinating opinion holding that the threat of deportation may entitle a defendant facing an otherwise petty conviction to a trial by jury, see Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243, 1251–52 (D.C. 2018).
146. Alaska, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, and South Carolina are a few states in which either the legislature or the courts have rejected fees for jury trials.
147. See United States v. Bevilacqua, 447 F.3d 124, 127 (1st Cir. 2006) (“The American legal tradition does not, absent specific statutory authority, require defendants to reimburse the government for the costs of their criminal investigations or their criminal prosecutions.”).
148. See Logan & Wright, supra note 29, at 1207 (“On the whole, challengers lose more often than they win because courts defer to legislative judgments in enacting statutes that require the payment of specific costs or fees.” (first citing State v. Myers, 602 S.E.2d 796, 800–08 (W. Va. 2004), then citing State v. VanWinkle, 186 P.3d 1258, 1262 (Mont. 2008)).
legislature’s power to impose these costs and fees, however, where they are seen as having the potential to chill the exercise of the right in question.149

One of the earliest attempts to challenge the imposition of fees on indigent defendants who had been appointed counsel at trial was the 1972 case of James v. Strange.150 David Strange was charged with first-degree robbery.151 With the assistance of court-appointed counsel, Mr. Strange entered a plea of guilty to the reduced charge of pocket picking and was given a suspended sentence.152 When Mr. Strange was subsequently assessed a $500 fee for the recoupment of payment made by the state to his attorney, he argued that the assessment of the fee violated his constitutional right to equal protection.153 Although the Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Strange that the Kansas recoupment fee was unconstitutional, Justice Powell wrote a narrow opinion that focused on the specifics of the Kansas statute.154 The Kansas recoupment statute provided that an indigent defendant who does not repay the amount assessed within sixty days of being notified of the obligation would have a judgment docketed against her and allowed for a lien to be executed on the defendant’s real estate.155 The state was also permitted to garnish the defendant’s wages, and the defendant was not entitled to exemptions that Kansas law allowed for other debtors.156 The Supreme Court found that the relatively unfavorable treatment shown to debtors under the recoupment statute when compared to other types of debtors violated principles of equal protection.157 The Court found it especially troubling that even acquitted defendants were not only charged the recoupment fee, but were also subject to the unfavorable recovery terms and denied basic debtor exemptions.158

The Court in Strange went to great lengths to avoid the broader issue of whether recoupment statutes violated the Sixth Amendment by chilling or deterring the exercise of the right to counsel. Although the court below had ruled that the Kansas statute was unconstitutional because it “needlessly encourages indigents to do without counsel and consequently infringes on the right to

149. See id. at 1208–09 & n.264 (citing Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16–19 (1956); State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 617 (Iowa 2009); State v. Tennin, 674 N. W.2d 403, 410–11 (Minn. 2004); and State v. Webb, 591 S.E.2d 505, 509–10 (N.C. 2004) as examples in which courts “limited or wholly invalidated the use of such fees . . . [when they] conclude that the fees unduly restrict the constitutional right to counsel of indigent defendants”).
150. 407 U.S. 128, 128 (1972) (“This case presents a constitutional challenge to a Kansas recoupment statute, whereby the State may recover in subsequent civil proceedings counsel and other legal defense fees expended for the benefit of indigent defendants.”).
151. Id. at 129.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 135–36.
155. Id. at 129–31, 129 n.3.
156. Id. at 131.
157. See id. at 140–41 (‘‘[T]o impose these harsh conditions on a class of debtors who were provided counsel as required by the Constitution is to practice . . . a discrimination which the Equal Protection Clause proscribes.’’).
158. Id. at 139.
counsel,” the Supreme Court decided the case on the much narrower equal protection ground shown by the different treatment of debtors under Kansas law. There is evidence that the Court did not want to discourage states from experimenting in their attempts to fund the growing need for indigent defense counsel. The Court declined Mr. Strange’s invitation to provide a sweeping ruling that would eliminate or discourage recoupment fees: “Given the wide differences in the features of these statutes [among the various states that allow for recoupment of fees for court-appointed counsel], any broadside pronouncement on their general validity would be inappropriate.”

The Supreme Court addressed the more general issue of the constitutionality of recoupment fees just two years later in 1974 in Fuller v. Oregon. In Fuller, the Court considered a challenge to Oregon’s recoupment statute, by which criminal defendants were required to repay costs of their own defense to the state after conviction. Charged with, inter alia, third-degree sodomy, Mr. Fuller was appointed counsel by the trial court after it concluded that he was indigent and therefore unable to hire his own lawyer. His court-appointed lawyer hired an investigator to work on his case. After pleading guilty to the charge of third-degree sodomy, Fuller was sentenced to a five-year period of probation, conditioned upon him reimbursing the state for the costs of his defense—including both his lawyer’s and investigator’s fees and costs.

Fuller appealed his sentence, arguing that the state violated the Constitution in conditioning his successful completion of probation on his repayment of the fees for his court-appointed defense. The Court disagreed, however, finding no equal protection violation and no direct violation of the Sixth Amendment as

159. Id. at 134 (quoting Strange v. James, 323 F. Supp. 1230, 1233 (D. Kan. 1971)).
160. See id. at 140–41 (concluding that the Kansas statute violated the Equal Protection Clause).
162. Strange, 407 U.S. at 133.
164. Id. In a separate but related line of cases, the Supreme Court placed strict limits on when a judicial officer could personally benefit from the outcome of a case. In Tumey v. Ohio, for example, the Court invalidated a system in which the judge was paid a flat rate per conviction (but not for acquittals or dismissals), holding that the pecuniary interest of the judge cast doubt on the impartiality of the system. 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927). Half a century later, the Court similarly held that a system whereby judges were paid per warrant issued, but not for warrant applications that were denied, was unconstitutional. See Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 251 (1977) (per curiam). Instances in which the revenues generated went to the general fund (out of which the judge is paid) rather than to the judge personally, however, have been upheld. See Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61, 65 (1928) (finding the judge’s relationship to the city’s general fund was too remote to trigger constitutional concern). This, thus, line of cases suggests that although direct personal profit by a judicial officer from prosecution and conviction generally violates due process, no such general prohibition exists when a municipality or state profits in this manner.
165. Fuller, 417 U.S. at 41.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 41–42.
168. Id. at 42.
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Regarding Fuller’s equal protection claim, the Court held that differentiating between convicted defendants and those who were either acquitted or had their charges dismissed was constitutionally permissible, and that the distinction between those two classes of criminal defendants was not invidious. The Court put great weight on the fact that Oregon’s recoupment statute contained a number of exemptions for those unable to repay the state. These exemptions, the Court held, distinguished Fuller’s case from the statute at issue in James v. Strange.

The Court also rejected Fuller’s argument that Oregon’s recoupment statute violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fuller argued that Oregon’s statute could chill the exercise of a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel by making the exercise costly. Rejecting this claim, the Court reasoned that the potential burden of repaying the costs of court-appointed counsel did not interfere with the right to counsel guaranteed in Gideon v. Wainwright:

We live in a society where the distribution of legal assistance, like the distribution of all goods and services, is generally regulated by the dynamics of private enterprise. A defendant in a criminal case who is just above the line separating the indigent from the nonindigent must borrow money, sell off his meager assets, or call upon his family or friends in order to hire a lawyer. We cannot say that the Constitution requires that those only slightly poorer must remain forever immune from any obligation to shoulder the expenses of their legal defense, even when they are able to pay without hardship.

Although recognizing that recoupment statutes could be found unconstitutional if they constituted a penalty on the exercise of the right to appointed counsel, the

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169. See id. at 50–52.
170. Id. at 50 (“This legislative decision reflects no more than an effort to achieve elemental fairness and is a far cry from the kind of invidious discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause condemns.”).
171. Id. at 47.
172. See id. at 47–48 (“The legislation before us, therefore, is wholly free of the kind of discrimination that was held in James v. Strange to violate the Equal Protection Clause.” (footnote omitted)).
173. See id. at 51–52.
174. See id. at 51. Although Fuller did not argue that his counsel was ineffective or that the fees assessed for those purposes constituted unreasonable compensation for his counsel, he “assert[ed] that a defendant’s knowledge that he may remain under an obligation to repay the expenses incurred in providing him legal representation might impel him to decline the services of an appointed attorney and thus ‘chill’ his constitutional right to counsel.” Id.
175. Id. at 53–54.
Court found that Oregon’s statute was not such a penalty because it burdened only those who foreseeably had the ability to pay without hardship.176

State and lower federal courts have occasionally ruled state recoupment statutes unconstitutional when they have strayed from what the Supreme Court authorized in Fuller. For example, such statutes have been held unconstitutional if they do not inquire into a defendant’s ability to pay,177 if they do not afford the defendant the same exemptions and procedural protections given to other debtors under state law,178 and if the state seeks to treat defendants who have been acquitted more harshly than defendants who have been convicted.179 In this way, Fuller has provided a roadmap to the states on how to require reimbursement of the costs of a defendant’s court-appointed lawyer without violating constitutional principles of due process, equal protection, or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Challenges to the imposition of fees for the exercise of other constitutional rights are less frequent than those involving recoupment statutes in the right-to-counsel context. Courts have considered, both before and after Melendez-Diaz,180 the extent to which states can constitutionally impose a burden, either financial or procedural, on a criminal defendant who wishes to confront a scientific witness at trial.181 Although simple notice-and-demand statutes have been held constitutional, courts have struck down statutes that require a defendant to assert a specific objection to the out-of-court statement and grounds for that objection.182 In State v. Campbell, the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the state’s notice-and-demand statute as a reasonable requirement, noting that although the statute required defendants who were able to pay to be assessed the costs of the

176. Id. at 54.
177. See, e.g., Olson v. James, 603 F.2d 150, 155 (10th Cir. 1979) (concluding that “a court should not order a convicted person to pay these expenses unless he is able to pay them or will be able to pay them in the future considering his financial resources and the nature of the burden that payment will impose” and noting that “[i]f a person is unlikely to be able to pay, no requirement to pay is to be imposed”); Fitch v. Belshaw, 581 F. Supp. 273, 277 (D. Or. 1984) (holding a state statute that imposed repayment obligations without any determination of the defendant’s ability to pay “unconstitutionally chill[ed] an indigent defendant’s exercise of [the] Sixth Amendment right to counsel”); State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 623 (Iowa 2009) (“[I]mposing mandatory reimbursement without regard to ability to pay infringes an indigent defendant’s right to counsel.”); State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 410–11 (Minn. 2004) (holding the state’s mandatory recoupment statute violated defendant’s federal and state right to counsel).
178. See, e.g., Dudley, 766 N.W.2d at 616–17 (discussing the invalidity of an Iowa statute based on its denial of exemptions to the criminal defendant and noting that “the different treatment of acquitted defendants such as Dudley as compared to ordinary civil judgment debtors violates the Equal Protection Clause”).
179. See, e.g., id. at 621–22 (holding an Iowa statute violated the acquitted defendant’s equal protection right because “there is no rational basis to deny acquitted defendants the benefit of the fee limitations afforded convicted defendants represented by the public defender”).
181. See Sokoler, supra note 110, at 188 & n.145, 189–90.
182. See, e.g., State v. Laturner, 218 P.3d 23, 37–38 (Kan. 2009) (concluding that the demands of Kansas’s statute exceeded those authorized in Melendez-Diaz and violated the defendant’s confrontation right).
laboratory witness’s appearance, the statute exempted indigent defendants from this financial burden. 183 Similarly, in upholding Virginia’s notice-and-demand statute in a case that preceded Melendez-Diaz, the Virginia Court of Appeals noted that the Commonwealth bore costs associated with the scientific witness’s appearance at trial and upheld the statute as a “reasonable procedure” that “encourage[d] judicial and governmental economy.” 184 Shortly after the Virginia Court of Appeals’ decision in Brooks, the Virginia General Assembly amended the statute at issue in significant ways, including by shifting the costs associated with calling a scientific witness onto the defendant who has been convicted “of the charge or charges for which such witness” was summoned. 185

Many states have looked unfavorably upon the practice of charging criminal defendants for the exercise of their right to be tried by a jury. 186 Striking down the state’s jury trial fee in 1979, the New Hampshire Supreme Court declared that “a criminal defendant cannot be required to purchase a jury trial—even for so nominal a sum as eight dollars.” 187 In concluding that such a fee violated the state Constitution, the court compared a jury trial fee to the voting poll tax that was struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections. 188 In Harper, the Supreme Court declared that conditioning a person’s vote on payment of a fee violated principles of equal protection, “whether the citizen, otherwise qualified to vote, has $1.50 in his pocket or nothing at all, pays the fee or fails to pay it. . . . To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter’s qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.” 189 Other states have flatly prohibited the practice of charging criminal defendants an additional fee for empaneling a jury, although often pursuant to principles of state law rather than federal law. 190

183. 719 N.W.2d 374, 378 (N.D. 2006) (“The statute . . . authorizes an indigent defendant to subpoena the director or employee of the state crime laboratory to testify at the preliminary hearing and trial at no cost to the defendant, making that witness available for confrontation.”).
185. See SB 5007, 2009 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Va. 2009); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1(F) (West 2017); see also supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text.
186. Although not involving a financial surcharge, the United States Supreme Court struck down the capital sentencing provision of the federal kidnapping statute as unconstitutional because it allowed for a capital sentence only after a jury trial. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). The Court said that this provision placed too high a price on the exercise of one’s right to a jury trial. See id. at 581 (“The inevitable effect of any such provision is, of course, to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial.”).
188. See id. (comparing the “purchase [of] a jury trial” to the poll tax struck down in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966)).
190. See, e.g., People v. Hope, 297 N.W. 206, 208 (Mich. 1941) (“[A]ssessing costs against a defendant for a jury in a criminal case is not permissible under the laws of this State. Every person charged with a criminal offense has a constitutional right to a trial by jury.” (citation omitted)); People v. Kennedy, 25 N.W. 318, 320 (Mich. 1885) (“[I]t would be monstrous to establish a practice of punishing persons convicted of misdemeanors for demanding what the constitution of the state gives them[]—a trial by jury.”); see also T. Ward Frampton, The Uneven Bulwark: How (and Why) Criminal Jury Trial
III. THE PROBLEM WITH PRIVATIZING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

The proliferation of user fees in criminal procedure turns fundamental rights into commodities. Those charged with a crime can either buy enhanced procedural protections or forego those safeguards to save money. The commodification of trial rights not only risks creating a secondary class of criminal justice for poor people, but also risks changing our conception of fundamental rights. Markets affect the way that society views goods, and a market in procedural protections for those accused of crime threatens to undermine the way society views the purposes and objectives of the criminal justice system.

A. PRINCIPLED PROBLEMS

Many have acknowledged that the criminal adjudication system could not function if everyone charged with crime exercised the full panoply of trial rights afforded them by the Constitution. The American adversarial system has come to depend on most criminal defendants waiving their procedural rights and, therefore, the system makes the exercise of those rights costly. The most vivid and widespread example of this reality is our system of plea bargaining, in which a defendant who turns down a plea offer and forces the state to prove its case at trial is subject to the well-known “trial tax” and will likely spend more time behind bars.

*Rates Vary by State*, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 183, 211 & n.161 (2012) (citing *Kennedy* and *Hope*). Several states have, however, expressly considered and rejected this argument. See id. at 212 & n.165 (citing state court decisions considering but rejecting constitutional challenges to the imposition of jury fees).

191. Of course, a strong argument can be made that the American system of criminal justice has already developed into a two-tiered system, with overwhelmed public defenders handling the bulk of the criminal cases, while those few criminal defendants with money are able to hire private counsel and fully exercise their trial rights. See generally Phil McCausland, *Public Defenders Nationwide Say They’re Overworked and Underfunded*, NBC (Dec. 11, 2017, 5:55 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/public-defenders-nationwide-say-they-re-overworked-underfunded-n828111 [https://perma.cc/S4NU-7M6W] (noting that the public defender system “has been understaffed, underfunded and overwhelmed with cases for more than 30 years” and “shows no indication of getting better”).


193. See Alexander, supra note 192. Alexander notes that:

The Bill of Rights guarantees the accused basic safeguards, including the right to be informed of charges against them, to an impartial, fair and speedy jury trial, to cross-examine witnesses and to the assistance of counsel.

But in this era of mass incarceration – when our nation’s prison population has quintupled in a few decades partly as a result of the war on drugs and the “get tough” movement – these rights are, for the overwhelming majority of people hauled into courtrooms across America, theoretical. More than 90 percent of criminal cases are never tried before a jury. Most people charged with crimes forfeit their constitutional rights and plead guilty.

*Id.*

194. See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (acknowledging that “criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials”).
bars if convicted. In his examination of the rhetoric of citizenship in Supreme Court cases, Bennett Capers concludes that the law’s vision of the “good citizen” as one who cooperates with law enforcement and freely waives her rights is troubling and at odds with the idea of a free and equal society. Capers critiques the Court’s repeated invocations of “good citizens” as those who will freely speak with law enforcement, notwithstanding their right to be left alone: “[T]here is something deeply problematic about a model of good citizenship that relies on citizens foregoing their citizenship rights. Just as there is something problematic with a model of good citizenship that, in effect if not by design, chills democratic dissent.”

Capers goes on to argue that the problems with imposing cultural expectations of citizenship as a price to be paid for the exercise of rights do not fall equally on all citizens. The unequal distribution of power across social groups leads to a disproportionate burden on people of color in the actual exercise of their rights. “We should be troubled by citizenship talk that implicitly requires minorities to prove or ‘work’ their citizenship, and to perform as passive, nonquestioning, and, indeed, as second-class citizens.” These critiques are as true in the context of trial rights as they are in the Fourth Amendment context with which Capers is primarily concerned. We should be troubled by a criminal justice system that systematically discourages the exercise of trial rights by defendants, especially if that burden falls most heavily on already marginalized groups. The impact of à la carte procedural fees disproportionately affects poor people and people of color, leading to functionally different criminal adjudication systems based on access to money.

Applying Capers’s formulation in the context of trial rights implicates citizenship in two ways: financial and philosophical. The privatization or commodification of trial rights requires a criminal defendant to purchase rights that should simply flow from citizenship, and that have previously been thought to be incident to citizenship. Moreover, the expectations of citizenship differ for marginalized subjects of the criminal adjudication system. Poor people and people of color—the disproportionate subjects of American systems of criminal justice—

195. See J. Vincent Aprile II, Judicial Imposition of the Trial Tax, 29 CRIM. JUST. 30, 31 (2014) (discussing the imposition of a trial tax on criminal defendants asserting their constitutional right to a trial); see also John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204, 213 (1979) (characterizing the trial tax as “that terrible attribute that defines our plea bargaining and makes it coercive and unjust: the sentencing differential by which the accused is threatened with an increased sanction for conviction after trial by comparison with that which is offered for confession and waiver of trial”).
197. Id. at 700.
198. See id. at 694–95 (discussing the racial inequality implications of “citizenship talk”).
199. See id. at 694–96 (discussing the “extra work racial minorities . . . must do in order to enjoy a simulacrum of full citizenship status in their interactions with the police”).
200. Id. at 700.
are expected to passively acquiesce in the restriction of their trial rights and to accept the limited form of citizenship that is offered to them.

The history of states’ attempts to impose poll taxes on those wishing to exercise their right to vote is instructive. Defended by states as simply attempts to fund the electoral process, these surcharges on the right to vote also discouraged participation in elections.201 After initially finding no constitutional infirmity in state poll taxes,202 the Supreme Court later reversed itself, concluding that such taxes were an unconstitutional infringement on the right to equal protection.203

In 1937, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a challenge to the practice of poll taxes in state elections, holding that Georgia’s imposition of a one dollar per year poll tax on men between the ages of twenty-one and sixty was constitutional.204 Georgia’s law prohibited anyone from voting who could not show that they had paid the poll tax, exempting men over sixty as well as all women from the requirement.205 The Court rejected arguments that this voting restriction violated either the Equal Protection Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause.206

Less than three decades later, however, the Court changed course. In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, the Court held that Virginia’s poll tax “not exceeding $1.50” violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.207 The Court made clear that “a State violates the Equal Protection Clause . . . whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.”208 The Court criticized Virginia’s poll tax, stating that “the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights.”209 Finally, the Court concluded that the introduction of wealth or payment as a factor in the exercise of the right to vote constituted invidious discrimination on the basis of wealth that could not be tolerated, and that the relatively modest amount of the required fee did not affect the unconstitutional nature of the poll tax.210 Because of the fundamental nature of

201. See David Schultz & Sarah Clark, Wealth v. Democracy: The Unfulfilled Promise of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 375, 391 (2011) (describing the poll tax’s varied history, most notably its adoption in the South after the Civil War with the intention of disenfranchising African Americans and poor whites).
204. See Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 283–84.
205. See id. at 280–82.
206. See id. at 281–84.
207. Harper, 383 U.S. at 664 n.1, 670 (holding that “‘the opportunity for equal participation by all voters’ . . . is required” and thus striking the state’s poll tax (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964))).
208. Id. at 666.
209. Id. at 667. The Court expressed no disapproval, however, of the use of literacy tests as a prerequisite to allowing a citizen to vote, believing that the ability to read and write “has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the ballot.” Id. at 666 (quoting Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959)).
210. Id. at 668 (“The degree of the discrimination is irrelevant.”).
the right to vote, “any alleged infringement . . . must be carefully and meticu-
ously scrutinized.”211 Subsequent cases have upheld other types of voting regula-
tions, such as requirements that a person seeking to vote produce identification,212
but have not retreated from Harper’s prohibition against any fee for voting.213

Just as the right to vote is “preservative,” the right to counsel is fundamental to
the exercise of all other procedural rights and safeguards that attend a criminal
trial in the United States. And the rights to confront witnesses and to have one’s
case decided by a jury are similarly fundamental to our notions of a fair criminal
justice system. The arguments advanced by the Court in Harper should apply
with equal force in the context of constitutional trial rights designed to ensure
fairness and accuracy.

Over the past several decades, we have created various markets in the realm of
criminal procedure. The most well-recognized and studied has been the defendant’s
right to trial, which can be waived in exchange for various types of consideration.214
Indeed, criminal defendants now waive their right to trial in over ninety-five percent
of cases, trading in that commodity for either a reduction in charges, a shorter sen-
tence, or both.215 In his book, Free Market Criminal Justice: How Democracy and
Laissez Faire Undermine the Rule of Law, Darryl Brown describes plea bargaining
as a deregulated free-market system, which is defined by

the private market’s moral indifference to effects of unequal resources among
contracting parties, its exceedingly thin concept of coercion, and its minimal
regulation of outcomes according to criteria of fairness rather than party con-
sent. In these respects and many others, democratic and market norms in crimi-
nal justice simultaneously supplant legal rules and facilitate expansive state
enforcement authority.216

We seem to have entered what could be described as the Lochner era217 of crim-
nal adjudication, as the ideology of private party control has occupied the field

211. Id. at 667 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561–62).
of the statute [requiring citizens to present identification when voting] to the vast majority of Indiana
voters is amply justified by” legitimate state interests).
213. See id. at 198 (“The fact that most voters already possess a valid driver’s license, or some other
form of acceptable identification, would not save the statute under our reasoning in Harper, if the State
required voters to pay a tax or a fee to obtain a new photo identification.”).
214. See Ric Simmons, Private Plea Bargains, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1125, 1173–74 (2011) (discussing
the tradeoff of waiving one’s constitutional right to trial to receive lower levels of punishment or other
benefits and noting that “[u]nder this model, giving the defendant[] more procedural rights—a more
robust Miranda right, for example, or more extensive discovery rights—is in reality simply giving the
defendant more to bargain away”).
215. See Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22,
html?smid=pl-share [https://nyti.ms/2k2RLBD] (stating that “97 percent of federal cases and 94 percent
of state cases end in plea bargains, with defendants pleading guilty in exchange for a lesser sentence”).
217. See id. at 63 (describing how the “Supreme Court leveraged [the Lochner principle of liberty of
contract] in service of a strongly laissez-faire conception of capitalism, to strike down a range of
without a corresponding focus on disparate bargaining power.\textsuperscript{218} As market-based norms and rhetoric have come to dominate how we think of criminal adjudication, it becomes more difficult to maintain norms and rhetoric that are centered on dignity, justice, and fairness.\textsuperscript{219} 

Many states have procedures that allow defendants to pay money to avoid either jail time or, in some cases, criminal prosecution altogether.\textsuperscript{220} Deferred prosecution agreements allow someone suspected of criminal activity to agree to pay a victim or the state, or to engage in other activities in exchange for an agreement by the state not to prosecute.\textsuperscript{221} Such agreements have been widely used (and criticized) in prosecutions of corporations suspected of violating financial and other laws.\textsuperscript{222} Similarly, many states condition entry into a pretrial diversion program on the defendant’s payment of a diversion fee; those unable to pay the fee are ineligible for the program.\textsuperscript{223} Even beyond the pretrial context, such preferential treatment for those with the ability to pay extra costs and fees continues after judgment, with some states charging convicted defendants for the costs of their own incarceration and supervision.\textsuperscript{224} And some states now also allow prison cell upgrades for prisoners able to pay extra.\textsuperscript{225}

Ironically, the constitutionality of recoupment statutes seems to depend upon a widespread ignorance of their existence. As the Supreme Court of California expressed in invalidating that state’s recoupment statute prior to Fuller:

\begin{quote}
[As] knowledge of [the recoupment] practice has grown and continues to grow many indigent defendants will come to realize that the judge’s offer to supply
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item 218. See Brown, supra note 15, at 13 (“[T]he modern trend has been to expand parties’ control over the adjudication process, and American justice systems have in some important respects gone further down this road, giving one or both parties the ability to waive nearly all rights and procedures.”).
\item 219. See id. at 63 (“One reason for this relative paucity of attention [paid to how free-market ideology influences American criminal justice] is that market rationality in American criminal procedure law is almost too obvious to warrant notice.”).
\item 220. See Logan & Wright, supra note 29, at 1188 (detailing the practice of pretrial abatement, in which “local law or practice allows defendants in minor cases to pay an amount to the police or the courts that stops the prosecution from going forward”).
\item 221. See id. at 1187 (discussing the use of deferred prosecution agreements).
\item 222. See Brandon L. Garrett, Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations 68–70 (2014) (detailing fines paid in corporate “deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements” and noting that the “fines sound significant” but are, on average, only 0.04% of the respective corporation’s market capitalization).
\item 223. See Logan & Wright, supra note 29, at 1187–88 (discussing the charges associated with pretrial diversion programs).
\item 224. See id. at 1192–93 (detailing probation and parole fees).
\item 225. See Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets 3 (2012) (noting that today “almost everything is up for sale,” for example: “A prison cell upgrade: $82 per night. In Santa Ana, California, and some other cities, nonviolent offenders can pay for better accommodations—a clean, quiet jail cell, away from the cells for nonpaying prisoners” (footnote omitted)).
\end{footnotes}
counsel is not the gratuitous offer of assistance that it might appear to be; that,
in the event the case results in a grant of probation, one of the conditions might
well be the reimbursement . . . for the expense involved. This knowledge is
quite likely to deter or discourage many defendants from accepting the offer of
counsel despite the gravity of the need for such representation as emphasized
by the [Supreme] Court in Gideon . . . .

The constitutionality of post-Fuller recoupment statutes—or any elective trial
right—rests on a belief that they do not chill the exercise of the right to counsel
because so few people know about the surcharges involved. As they become a
more routine feature of criminal adjudication, however, this argument falls apart,
and the user fees will deter the invocation of fundamental rights just as the
California Supreme Court predicted in In re Allen.

Although we talk of defense lawyers, juries, and confrontation as being essen-
tial to the American system of criminal justice, practices increasingly discourage
the actual use of these features of adversarialism, especially in misdemeanor
courtrooms. A system that is serious about actually using these procedural safe-
guards could easily implement practices to encourage their use, the simplest of
which would be eliminating the costs and fees associated with invoking them.

B. PRAGMATIC PROBLEMS

Increased costs and fees interfere with key criminal justice goals, such as reha-
bilitation and successful reentry, making it more difficult for those with convic-
tions to obtain housing and employment, and to succeed on probation, parole, or
supervised release. In addition to making it objectively more difficult for those

226. In re Allen, 455 P.2d 143, 144 (Cal. 1969) (en banc); see also Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 51
(1974) (quoting this language from In re Allen).

227. Justice Powell’s opinion in James v. Strange found that recoupment statute unconstitutional on
very narrow grounds but did not address whether the statute impermissibly chilled the exercise of the
right to counsel. 407 U.S. 128, 139–42 (1972). In a cover note to a draft of the opinion, law clerk J.
Harvie Wilkinson III discouraged Powell from finding it unconstitutional because it chilled the exercise
of the right to counsel: “Once we get into the business of saying a particular statute chills the right to
counsel, there will be no end to the chilling, no rational way to save these statutes.” Memorandum from
Wilkinson, supra note 161. Wilkinson further counsels against using a due process rationale that the
defendants are not given notice of the requirement to repay the state at the time of the exercise of their
right to counsel:

[O]nce we get to the point of requiring notice, then we are slowly falling into what I think
would be the liberAL’s [sic] desires to have all of these statutes invalidated under the right to
counsel thesis. If you have to notify a guy of the debt right before you assign him counsel,
then it obviously is going to “chill” him a little bit, and all these recoupment statutes are in
trouble.

Id.

228. See Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: Monetary Sanctions as
Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 509–10 (2011); Traci R. Burch, Essay, Fixing
the Broken System of Financial Sanctions, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 539, 542–43 (2011); Kirsten
D. Levingston & Vicki Turetsky, Debtors’ Prison—Prisoners’ Accumulation of Debt as a Barrier to
Reentry, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 187, 191–92 (2007); Travis Stearns, Legal
Financial Obligations: Fulfilling the Promise of Gideon by Reducing the Burden, 11 SEATTLE J. SOC.
involved in the criminal justice system to reestablish themselves as productive citizens, an overreliance on court costs and fees to fund the criminal justice system affects the perceived procedural fairness of the system. In this way, and perhaps unsurprisingly, poor people who have difficulty paying the costs of their own involvement in the criminal justice system perceive the system as less fair and more biased against them.229

The Supreme Court in *Strange* also expressed a general critique of recoupment statutes as contrary to the public policy of successful reentry into society of those convicted of crimes:

> A criminal conviction usually limits employment opportunities. This is especially true where a prison sentence has been served. It is in the interest of society and the State that such a defendant, upon satisfaction of the criminal penalties imposed, be afforded a reasonable opportunity of employment, rehabilitation and return to useful citizenship. There is limited incentive to seek legitimate employment when, after serving a sentence during which interest has accumulated on the indebtedness for legal services, the indigent knows that his wages will be garnished without the benefit of any of the customary exemptions.230

All of these costs seem to come in exchange for little revenue. The futility of recoupment systems was recognized as early as 1972 by the Supreme Court in *Strange*:

> We do not inquire whether this statute is wise or desirable . . . . Misguided laws may nonetheless be constitutional. It has been noted both in the briefs and at argument that only $17,000 has been recovered under the statute in its almost two years of operation, and that this amount is negligible compared to the total expended.231

More recent examinations of recoupment systems have shown a similarly poor return on investment.232 Of course, even if the fees imposed generate little revenue, the statutes could still operate to keep costs down by discouraging the robust exercise of rights to which criminal defendants are entitled.

Recently, the practice of using low-level courts as revenue generators has come under criticism. The Ferguson Report took a comprehensive look at the practice and condemned it, finding that the focus on revenue eclipsed any focus on

231. *Id.* at 133.
community safety or well-being.\footnote{233} Court fees and costs act as a regressive tax that affects entire communities instead of just those accused of crime. But using court fees to pay not only for court expenses but also for other municipal services is an easy political sell, and the practice shows no sign of disappearing. And even in the face of data showing lackluster results in actually collecting money from those accused of crime, the imposition of such fees is a politically popular move.\footnote{234}

As a result, the use and popularity of court costs and fees has greatly increased in recent years.\footnote{235} Criminal defendants have increasingly been seen as the answer to the funding problems that have befallen states and municipalities as cash-strapped legislatures have reduced funding without meaningfully addressing hyper-incarceration or shrinking the size of the criminal justice apparatus. Some municipalities have even used their criminal justice systems as profit centers, funding other governmental functions through criminal costs and fees.\footnote{236}

The wide variety of costs and fees has increased over time and has now come to serve as a fiscal crutch for cash-strapped governments.\footnote{237} This phenomenon has skewed the priorities of criminal justice systems, encouraged aggressive prosecution of even minor crimes, and exacerbated the problem of mass incarceration.\footnote{238} And the possibility of requiring poor defendants themselves to fund the

\footnote{233. See \textit{The Ferguson Report}, \textit{supra} note 9, at 2 (describing police appearing to view some African American residents "less as constituents to be protected than as potential offenders and sources of revenue").}

\footnote{234. See Wright & Logan, \textit{supra} note 19, at 2070 ("Collecting such fees from defendants remains politically popular despite the disappointing monetary results that typically accrue." (footnote omitted)).}


\footnote{236. See Logan & Wright, \textit{supra} note 29, at 1190; see also \textit{The Ferguson Report}, \textit{supra} note 9, at 14 (detailing the importance of court costs and fees to the Ferguson revenue fund).}


\footnote{238. See Logan & Wright, \textit{supra} note 29, at 1190; see also \textit{The Ferguson Report}, \textit{supra} note 9, at 14 (detailing the importance of court costs and fees to the Ferguson revenue fund).}
vast machinery of criminal justice systems “creates perverse incentives that pressure both courts and counsel to ignore the consequences of recoupment.”

The increasing practice of imposing user fees on criminal defendants coincides with an ever-expanding web of collateral consequences that make it difficult for those convicted of crimes to obtain employment. Since the Court decided Fuller, these surcharges have multiplied and defendants have become more aware of surcharges as a routine aspect of criminal procedure. The practice of imposing user fees is at once more routine and also more damaging to defendants now than it was, and the burdens of a commodified criminal procedure system fall more heavily on disadvantaged groups. Because of this changed historical context, we can see more clearly the dangers of using costs and fees either as a revenue generator or as a disincentive to the exercise of trial rights. Fuller, therefore, should be reexamined in light of this changed context. As the seriousness of even a minor conviction continues to rise, as measured in both direct and collateral consequences, the effect of a tax on trial rights becomes more pernicious.

CONCLUSION

Tom Barrett was charged in 2012 with stealing a can of beer worth less than two dollars. He was offered a court-appointed lawyer but decided to represent himself to avoid being charged the additional $50 fee that Georgia charges defendants who are appointed a lawyer. “Now he says that [representing himself] was a mistake.” Barrett, who was homeless at the time of his charge, was sentenced to probation but could not afford the over $400 monthly payment to the private probation company that oversaw his probation. When he fell behind on his payments, his probation was revoked and he was sent to jail. The effects of this kind of economic calculus are predictable and preventable, and courts

239. Colgan, supra note 66, at 1932.
241. See Sobol, supra note 24, at 516 (“The adverse impact of this two-tiered system on the poor and minorities is reflected in disproportionate assessment of fees, additional monetary sanctions, barriers to re-entry, and stress on families.”).
242. See King, supra note 41, at 20–36 (discussing how misdemeanor convictions affect criminal defendants and specifically detailing several categories of potential collateral consequences).
244. Shapiro, supra note 243.
245. Shapiro, supra note 36.
246. Shapiro, supra note 243.
247. Id.
and legislatures should take steps to avoid putting poor defendants like Mr. Barrett in this situation.

One preliminary measure to address the problem of privatization of trial rights is to ensure that all state systems are conducting indigency inquiries and waiving costs and fees for those unable to pay. The available evidence suggests that many states are simply not conducting such inquiries and many of the statutes imposing fees on the exercise of trial rights do not even provide for such waivers.\textsuperscript{249} States that do not allow for waivers of these fees based on indigency, however, are vulnerable to due process and equal protection attack.\textsuperscript{250} A robust commitment to imposing such user fees only on those with the ability to pay would ameliorate the most pernicious effects of these rights-based user fees. Even so, indigency determinations have historically been ineffective and inconsistently applied. Since 1983, \textit{Bearden v. Georgia} has prohibited incarceration for failure to pay absent a finding of willfulness,\textsuperscript{251} but these protections have proven largely illusory in practice.\textsuperscript{252}

Even if the truly indigent were relieved from the financial requirements of rights-based user fees, those criminal defendants who do not qualify as indigent are subject to deciding whether to pay for their constitutional rights. It is hard to imagine that the result will be anything other than a chilling effect on the exercise of these rights, especially as they become a more common and well-known aspect of our criminal justice system. As more people become aware of the piecemeal imposition of fees for each right invoked, defendants will become more selective about which ones they use, and the exercise of these rights will be chilled by the potential costs.\textsuperscript{253}

Beyond either of these rationales, charging defendants for the exercise of trial rights is offensive to our historical understanding of the nature of these constitutional rights. By turning rights into commodities, we degrade the rights. The only way to address this phenomenon is to eliminate rights-based user fees altogether. Just as the Supreme Court reclaimed the nature of the right to vote as something beyond commerce and the market in \textit{Harper v. Virginia}\textsuperscript{254}
Board of Elections,254 the Court should reexamine its precedent allowing states to impose surcharges on defendants for exercising their rights at trial. Like the right to vote, trial rights should not be subject to a cost-benefit analysis. And, as in the election context, the costs of administering the criminal justice system should be borne by society as a whole rather than by those charged with crimes.

Increased reliance on user fees to fund governmental functions disproportionately harms those who are least able to pay.255 The majority of those caught up in the criminal justice system are poor,256 and a disproportionate number are people of color.257 Over eighty percent of criminal defendants qualify for court-appointed counsel, even under the narrow definitions employed by some states.258 Those unable to post bail, perversely, can end up not only being detained prior to trial but also being charged for the costs of that pretrial detention. Defendants of color have been shown to be more likely to be detained pretrial due to an inability to post bail.259 And, finally, because most court costs and fees are imposed as flat fees, without regard to a defendant’s ability to pay, the burdens of paying for the system fall disproportionately on poor defendants.260

Anecdotal evidence shows how difficult it can be for a poor person to pay off the bare minimum court costs and fees, and that burden can get significantly heavier if the person chooses to exercise her right to counsel or other elective trial rights. “According to Federal Reserve surveys, fully one third of Americans say they are ‘just getting by.’ Thirty-eight percent could not pay for a $400 emergency without selling an asset or borrowing; 14 percent couldn’t pay at all.”261 These costs and fees have dramatically increased in recent years, as has the total

255. See Sobol, supra note 24, at 516 (explaining that the adverse impact of the two-tiered system falls disproportionately on the poor and minorities, and citing examples).
256. See Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-Incarceration Incomes of the Imprisoned, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 9, 2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html [https://perma.cc/53E5-MLAT] (finding that “in 2014 dollars, incarcerated people had a median annual income of $19,185 prior to their incarceration, which is 41% less than non-incarcerated people of similar ages” (emphasis omitted)).
259. See Ram Subramanian et al., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 15 (2015) (“Black men are also disproportionately held pretrial as a result of an inability to post monetary bail.”).
260. See Sobol, supra note 24, at 518 & nn.273–75 (“Financial sanctions . . . disproportionately impact those at lower income levels. Typically, fines and fees in the United States system are imposed without consideration of the income of defendants.” (footnotes omitted)).
amount of personal debt attributable to criminal justice costs and fees. The growth of financial penalties, whether classified as fines, restitution, or fees, has tracked the phenomenon of hyper-incarceration over the past four decades.

By charging additional fees for the exercise of trial rights, states transform those fundamental rights into commodities. No state has yet begun to charge defendants for each peremptory strike used, or for each hour of court time taken up by their trials, but the logic of these hypothetical absurdities is not different from the examples of states charging defendants for other procedural rights.

This intrusion of market ideology into an area that had previously been seen in a different light has at least two broad problems: it exacerbates structural unfairness in a system that already disadvantages poor people, and it degrades our conception of fundamental rights. With regard to the first, placing a price tag on a fundamental right may well have the effect of making it available to one group of defendants but practically unavailable to another. “In a society where everything is for sale, life is harder for those of modest means. The more money can buy, the more affluence (or the lack of it) matters.”

A deeper critique of the commodification of trial rights, however, has to do with the way we conceive of those rights and their place in our constitutional structure. Even if we accept the idea that poor people have reduced access to procedural safeguards in criminal trials, we may object to positioning these rights as just one more good to be bought or sold. Discussing the intrusion of market norms and practices into what had been more sacred realms, Michael Sandel writes:

> [I]n order to decide where [the market] belongs, and where it doesn’t, it is not enough to argue about property rights on the one hand and fairness on the other. We also have to argue about the meaning of social practices and the goods they embody. And we have to ask, in each case, whether commercializing the practice would degrade it.

Once we see the right to a trial by jury as something that might cost us $125 (as a six-person jury would in the state of Washington) or $250 (as a twelve-person jury would in the state of Washington), and a bench trial as something that would cost us nothing, we have entered the world of market values. And we have
profundely changed how trial rights are considered. Reconceiving of these rights as something to be bought and sold not only corrupts the idea of fundamental rights, it also acts as a de facto tax on the adversarial system.

268. See SANDEL, supra note 225, at 34 (“To corrupt a good or a social practice is to degrade it, to treat it according to a lower mode of valuation than is appropriate to it.”).