Creating Space for Community Representation in Police Reform Litigation

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Input from affected communities is an essential component of the reform process aimed at remedying unconstitutional police practices. Yet, no court has ever granted a community organization’s motion to intervene as a matter of right in police reform, consent decree cases initiated by the Department of Justice. Judicial opinions in those cases have truncated the Federal Civil Rule 24 analysis when evaluating the interests of impacted communities. Thus, the most success achieved by a few community organizations has been permissive intervention or amici status. The models used by the Department of Justice to elicit the community perspective have been frustrating and have failed to incorporate community voice with equal weight and authority in the process. This Article identifies a uniform standard for courts to utilize in public law cases when community organizations seek intervention and proposes an alternative approach to the composition and structure of organizations so that the voices and input of those affected by police brutality are included in a meaningful way. The solution proposed by this Article involves applying an adequate representation analysis more suitable for the dynamic relationship between the federal government and marginalized communities. The right to intervene can be attained by those impacted by police violence while alleviating practical and representative concerns articulated by the judiciary in prior reform cases.

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTRODUCTION</th>
<th>525</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. DOJ-INITIATED POLICE REFORM LITIGATION</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. PASSAGE OF THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY INPUT IN DOJ INVESTIGATIONS AND REFORM EFFORTS</td>
<td>534</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. First Wave—Cursory Community Engagement 535
2. Second Wave—More Detailed Community Engagement 537
3. Third Wave—Community Police Commissions 539

II. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 24 540
A. HISTORY OF FEDERAL RULE 24 541
B. FEDERAL RULE 24 AND STANDING 544
C. FEDERAL RULE 24 AND ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION 544
D. RULE 24 IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES 546

III. EFFORTS BY COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS TO ENGAGE IN POLICE REFORM 548
A. INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS REBUFFED BY FEDERAL COURTS 548
B. COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS’ EFFORTS TO GAIN PARTY STATUS AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994 551
1. Los Angeles 552
2. Detroit 553
3. New Orleans 555
4. Portland 559
5. Albuquerque 560
6. Seattle 563
7. Baltimore 565

IV. HOW COURTS HAVE MISSED THE MARK AND A PATH FORWARD 567
A. CONTROLLING CASE LAW SUPPORTS INTERVENTION 567
B. WHY THE PRESUMPTION SHOULD BE REBUTTED 569
1. Shared General Interest in Consent Decree Is Not Enough—Adequate Representation of Impacted Community Interests Should Require More 569
2. The Federal Government Is Unlikely to Make the Arguments of Impacted Communities 571
INTRODUCTION

Courts overseeing police reform consent decrees have presumed that the federal government adequately represents the interest of communities impacted by police violence. This presumption is derived from judicial interpretations of Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs when a third party can successfully intervene in existing litigation.1 Those interpretations, however, are not rooted in the origins or purpose of that Rule. Courts managing Department of Justice (DOJ)-initiated consent decrees have failed to acknowledge the unique relationship between the federal government and communities impacted by police violence. They have, instead, relied heavily on the traditional legal theory that the government speaks for its citizens. This misapplication not only frustrates the purpose of Rule 24 but also undermines the legitimacy of police reforms.

1. (a) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who:
   (1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
   (2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.

   (b) PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION.
   (1) In General. On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who:
      (A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
      (B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.
   (2) By a Government Officer or Agency. On timely motion, the court may permit a federal or state governmental officer or agency to intervene if a party’s claim or defense is based on:
      (A) a statute or executive order administered by the officer or agency; or
      (B) any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made under the statute or executive order.
      (3) Delay or Prejudice. In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.

FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)–(b).
Impacted communities\(^2\) have attempted to have their insight and lived experience included in various approaches to police reform. One way that those efforts have been seen is in attempts to intervene in consent decrees initiated by the DOJ. Those intervention attempts have been made by community members impacted by police misconduct and the organizations representing their interests. No federal trial court in that context has ever recognized the right of a community organization to intervene as a party. Courts have at most granted permissive intervention, and that was granted only after appeal.\(^3\) The essential nature of impacted community inclusion carries much more weight than permissive intervention connotes. By granting the intervention request permissively, the courts have refused to recognize that the community organization had a right to intervene. The denial of the right to formally participate in DOJ-initiated police reform litigation compounds the pre-existing marginalization of impacted communities.

Disregarding the voices of those harmed by police violence is not new.\(^4\) The presumption by courts that the federal government adequately represents the interests of impacted communities only serves to reinforce that marginalization.

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\(^2\) This Article deliberately focuses on communities impacted by police violence. Marginalized communities—including communities of color, members of LGBTQIA+ communities, and those experiencing mental health crises—have historically been, and are presently being, subjected to disproportionate incidents of violence, searches, and arrests by police officers serving their communities. See Devon W. Carbado, *From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence*, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 127–28 (2017) (describing the disproportionate level of police contact—stop, searches, and arrests—that African Americans have had with law enforcement in Ferguson and in New York City); Emma Pierson, Camelia Simoiu, Jan Overgoor, Sam Corbett-Davies, Daniel Jenson, Amy Shoemaker, Vignesh Ramachandran, Phoebe Barghouty, Cheryl Phillips, Ravi Shroff & Sharad Goel, *A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the United States*, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 736, 736 (2020) (finding that, in a study of nearly 100 million traffic stops conducted by twenty-one state patrol departments and thirty-five municipal police departments, officers demonstrated racial bias when deciding who to stop and whether to conduct a search); CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, UNJUST: HOW THE BROKEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FAILS LGBT PEOPLE 46 (2016), https://www.lgbtmap.org/file/lgbt-criminal-justice.pdf (finding that discriminatory police practices targeting LGBTQIA+ youth led to disproportionate citations and interactions in New York and New Orleans, respectively, and that “LGBTQ youth were at increased risk of police stops compared to their non-LGBTQ peers”); Deidre McPhillips, *Deaths from Police Harm Disproportionately Affect People of Color*, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 3, 2020, 4:07 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2020-06-03/data-show-deaths-from-police-violence-disproportionately-affect-people-of-color [https://perma.cc/R7UK-QGKC].

\(^3\) See United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 404 (9th Cir. 2002).

A great degree of contemporaneous and historical irony exists in that presumption. The Trump Administration disavowed any prior commitment to federal efforts of police reform. The Office of the Attorney General declared unmitigated allegiance to its partnerships with local law enforcement agencies. In doing so, it failed to acknowledge any role in ensuring accountability of local police agencies. The Attorney General’s memorandum concluded with directives to department employees to evaluate “existing or contemplated” consent decrees to ensure conformity with these principles of allegiance. The Trump Administration’s attempt to renege on the pattern or practice reforms in Baltimore that began during the Obama Administration is a salient example of the variable nature of the federal government’s approach to police reform. It also exemplifies the federal judiciary’s rejection of community efforts to intervene.

Prior to the 2016 election, the DOJ launched an investigation of the Baltimore Police Department following the in-custody death of Freddie Gray. On April 12, 2015—just after 8:30 in the morning—Gray was reportedly chased by Baltimore police officers after he glanced at them and then ran. Video of the arrest shows that officers took Gray down with a “leg lace” maneuver and held him in handcuffs while waiting for a police van to arrive on scene. A bystander recording the arrest observed that another officer also had a knee on Gray’s neck. Gray is heard telling officers that he cannot breathe and requesting an inhaler. He is then heard screaming in pain while being dragged to the van.

An investigation by the Baltimore state’s attorney, Marilyn Mosby, revealed that two officers and a lieutenant placed Gray face down on the floor of the back of the police van. His hands, and eventually his feet, were bound, but he was not

the number of chokehold complaints had increased despite a citywide ban); see also G. Flint Taylor, The Chicago Police Torture Scandal: A Legal and Political History, 17 CUNY L. Rev. 329, 330–31, 343 (2014) (discussing the failures of Chicago public defenders to investigate instances of torture recounted by defendants and the refusal of the state’s attorney to investigate and prosecute police officers for reported acts of racially motivated, systemic torture).

5. See Office of the Attorney Gen., DOJ, Memorandum for Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys: Supporting Federal, State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement 1 (2017) (“It is not the responsibility of the federal government to manage non-federal law enforcement agencies.”).

6. Id.

7. See id.

8. Id. at 2.


12. Rentz, supra note 11.

13. Id.

14. Id.

secured in a seatbelt. Departmental policy reportedly required officers to secure
Gray in a seatbelt.

Mosby concluded that Gray “suffered a severe and critical neck injury” while being
transported in the police van. The officer driving the van reportedly stopped several
times to check on Gray’s condition. Police accounts acknowledged that, at least
twice, Gray stated that he needed medical attention. At no point during the estimated
hour that Gray was under arrest did any of the officers seek medical care for him.
Instead, they took Gray to the police station where he was found unconscious and not
breathing. Gray was pronounced dead seven days later on April 19, 2015.

Gray’s killing also prompted the DOJ to begin an investigation into the practices
of the Baltimore Police Department. A Baltimore officer who spoke with the DOJ
characterized the transport process that led to Gray’s death as a “‘load and go’ . . .
with little regard for seatbelts.” The investigation found, among other things, that
Gray and other Black residents were disparately impacted and perhaps intentionally
discriminated against by the Baltimore police at every stage of interaction, from ini-
tial stops to uses of force. The DOJ concluded that racially disparate treatment
“erode[s] the community trust that is critical to effective policing.”

On January 12, 2017, the DOJ and the City of Baltimore filed a proposed settle-
ment agreement. Both parties indicated in the filing that resolving the case via
consent decree was fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the interest of the public.
That proposed consent decree detailed comprehensive reforms for the Baltimore
Police Department.

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16. Eyder Peralta, Timeline: What We Know About the Freddie Gray Arrest, NPR (May 1, 2015, 8:23
PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/05/01/403629104/baltimore-protests-what-we-
know-about-the-freddie-gray-arrest [https://perma.cc/6QCR-DKEB].
17. Id.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Peralta, supra note 16.
22. Id.
23. Erik Ortiz, Freddie Gray: From Baltimore Arrest to Protests, a Timeline of the Case, NBC NEWS
(May 1, 2015, 3:09 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/baltimore-unrest/timeline-freddie-gray-
case-arrest-protests-n351156 [https://perma.cc/RN54-95JD].
25. Id. at 114.
26. Id. at 7.
27. Id.
28. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Decree at 1, 3, United
29. Id. at 3.
30. A consent decree, in this context, is a judicially approved and monitored settlement agreement.
That agreement comes about after the filing of an action and as a result of negotiations related to the
terms. The settlement agreement does not become a consent decree unless and until the judge presiding
over the litigation makes such an order. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “consent decree” as “[a] court
decree that all parties agree to.” Consent Decree, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
31. See Consent Decree at 1–2, Balt. Police Dep’t, 249 F. Supp. 3d 814 (No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB),
ECF No. 2-2.
The Trump Administration, however, disavowed the federal government’s commitment to police reform. The Office of the Attorney General under the Trump Administration expressly left the protection of civil rights to local law enforcement. The DOJ filed a motion to stay the Baltimore consent decree proceedings while the Administration took time to “assess whether and how the provisions of the proposed consent decree interact with the directives of the President and Attorney General.”

With the future of the consent decree in doubt, a lifelong community member and an organization representing a group of local churches filed a motion to intervene. The organization declared a “strong interest in ending unlawful and discriminatory police practices that have harmed [its members] in the past” along with its desire to see the proposed consent decree fully enforced. To support its assertion that the interests of Baltimore residents impacted by police violence would not be adequately represented by the DOJ, the organization cited the “new and different institutional priorities” of the federal government due to the change in administration.

Like each of the other courts that had previously ruled on the right to intervene by community organizations asserting a right to join DOJ-initiated police litigation, the federal court in Baltimore denied community efforts to intervene. The courts have done so even though consent decrees initiated by the DOJ are designed to rectify unconstitutional patterns and practices of local police departments and, thereby, resolve a significant and pressing societal issue. As it currently stands, those public law cases are proceeding through the federal court system with no actual representation of members of the communities impacted by police misconduct.

It is important to recognize that this inquiry goes beyond the politics of changing presidential administrations. Administrations of both political parties have either been slow to intervene or refused to intervene at all. But even federal administrations friendly to police consent decrees have yet to

32. Office of the Attorney Gen., supra note 5 (“Local law enforcement must protect and respect the civil rights of all members of the public. Local control and local accountability are necessary for effective local policing. It is not the responsibility of the federal government to manage non-federal law enforcement agencies.”).
33. Id.
34. Motion for Continuance of Public Fairness Hearing at 4, Balt. Police Dep’t, 249 F. Supp. 3d 814 (No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB), ECF No. 23.
35. See Proposed Intervenors’ Community Churches for Community Development, Inc. & Ralph E. Moore, Jr.’s Motion to Intervene at 1–2, Balt. Police Dep’t, 249 F. Supp. 3d 814 (No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB), ECF No. 30.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id. at 5.
38. See Balt. Police Dep’t, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 815 (addressing two discrete issues in its order: whether the putative interveners are needed to “support[] the approval of the Consent Decree,” and whether they were needed to seek enforcement of the decree against the Baltimore Police Department (quoting Proposed Intervenors’ Community Churches for Community Development, Inc. & Ralph E. Moore, Jr.’s Motion to Intervene, supra note 35, at 7)).
convince many community organizations that they adequately represent impacted communities.39

Existing scholarship has argued that police policies and procedures are created in an undemocratic manner because they fail to go through a legislative process that promotes democratic accountability.40 Other literature has examined how collaborative efforts between community organizations, police departments, and the DOJ have proven useful in reforming police departments.41

Many scholars have also identified the shortcomings of the statute that authorizes the federal government to initiate police reform litigation42 and have proposed a variety of solutions, each of which ultimately suggests that individuals be given a private right of action in structural police reform litigation.43 Others have specifically identified the lack of community inclusion in reform efforts led by the DOJ and the resulting undemocratic nature of these efforts.44 Scholarship has also challenged us to imagine a transformative approach to addressing police violence.45

There remains, therefore, a central question of how best to include the insight, experiences, and needs of impacted communities in structural police reform litigation. That question stands regardless of presidential priorities. This Article seeks to expand the discussion of democratic police reforms through the use of formal intervention.

39. Sunita Patel’s work exploring the undemocratic nature of community engagement models has identified key issues across various consent decrees. Patel’s research found that—even under the consent decree-friendly Obama Administration—DOJ-initiated reform efforts were not ideal in their approach to incorporating impacted communities’ voices. She highlighted three indicators to support her finding: (1) existing tension between community groups in some jurisdictions and the DOJ; (2) shortcomings in the community engagement structures developed under certain DOJ consent decrees; and (3) lack of agreement across jurisdictions that community engagement could correct the power differential between police and the communities they serve. See Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 797 (2016).


45. See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 418–34 (2018) (juxtaposing DOJ reports on Ferguson and Baltimore against the transformative approach embraced by the Movement for Black Lives, including the emphasis on the demand for community control instead of community input).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the procedural mechanism by which community organizations have sought to join the litigation. Rule 24 provides two pathways for a potential litigant to become a party.46 The first pathway under 24(a) requires the movant, or putative intervenor, to establish a legal right to intervene either by federal statute or by satisfying three requirements of the Rule.47 The second pathway under 24(b) requires the movant to have conditional statutory authority or a question of law or fact in common with the main action.48 This Article makes the unique contribution of exploring judicial analyses of motions to intervene using the first pathway. It also fills a gap in the existing literature as it explores the use of Rule 24(a) in police reform litigation to create a more representative and participatory reform process.

Part I summarizes the origins and scope of authority under 34 U.S.C. § 1260149 and explores the evolution of attempts by the DOJ to engage community members in police consent decrees and why those efforts have been less than optimal. Part II discusses the standard set forth for intervention under Rule 24, its purpose, and the equity-driven motivation behind the 1966 amendment to the Rule. This Part also explores the issue of standing and the adequate representation factor in Rule 24(a) and how the courts have typically analyzed the issue. Part III provides a comprehensive analysis of all community organization attempts to intervene in consent decrees between the DOJ and police departments on behalf of impacted community interests.

Part IV discusses the courts’ failure to appropriately consider whether impacted communities are adequately represented in DOJ-initiated police reform litigation and argues that the faulty analysis in this subset of cases ignores controlling case law. This Part then proposes a solution that requires an analysis firmly rooted in the issues of marginalization, autonomy, inclusion, and distrust present in American policing. It uses relevant portions of the prior cases as the foundation for a proposed solution that provides community organizations the right to intervene as parties in DOJ-initiated reform efforts while addressing the practical and representative concerns articulated by the judiciary in prior cases. The solution provides a novel approach to address the unmet needs of structural police reform litigation as well as a means of sustainability. It also provides courts with a model by which invested organizations can organize and collaborate with aggrieved communities to address the current lack of representation.

I. DOJ-INITIATED POLICE REFORM LITIGATION

Congress granted to the U.S. Attorney General the right to investigate and sue municipal and state governments to remedy unconstitutional police practices.50

46. See supra note 1.
47. Supra note 1.
48. Supra note 1.
49. Formerly 42 U.S.C. § 14141.
The following Part proceeds in two Sections. First, it briefly explores the events leading up to the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Second, it details the three iterative processes used by the DOJ in its police reform litigation.

A. PASSAGE OF THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994

The U.S. government has a legitimacy problem with marginalized communities of color. Governmental action purportedly aimed to promote safety and the rule of law has been viewed as social control over marginalized populations. An examination of the entire Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 illustrates this point. The Act simultaneously increased incarceration of inmates through measures expanding death penalty crimes, criminalizing gang membership, and reducing opportunities for parole while empowering the federal government to enjoin unconstitutional police practices. The shift in scope and duration of criminal punishments in America had an indelible and disparate impact on the lives of and communities inhabited by people of color. The conflicting and dual nature of the federal intervention is not limited to just one administration or one act of Congress.

Video footage capturing the barbaric beating of Rodney King on a Los Angeles highway nearly eight years after the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, prompted Congress to hold hearings regarding police brutality. Federal lawmakers sought to “know how widespread . . . police misconduct [was] in Los Angeles and nationwide.” Congress then passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. That statute authorizes

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56. The Supreme Court decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena arguably stands for the proposition that the federal government is in no better place to address matters of racial discrimination than are state governments. The Court applied strict scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of government contract funding essentially based on race and rejected prior decisions that presumed that the federal government should be trusted to appropriately determine what constitutes “benign” racial classifications without being subjected to the highest level of judicial scrutiny. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
57. 461 U.S. 95 (1983). In Lyons, the Supreme Court refused to grant injunctive relief to Adolph Lyons, a Black man, to bar the Los Angeles Police Department’s excessive and routine use of chokeholds during traffic stops. See id. at 99–100.
59. Id.
federal intervention into unconstitutional police practices\(^61\) and limits the DOJ to seeking injunctive and equitable relief from the courts.\(^62\) Section 12601 does not provide to private plaintiffs the authority to seek similar relief.\(^63\) The statutory power to litigate the issue of unconstitutional pattern or practice policing rests solely with the Attorney General as head of the DOJ.\(^64\)

The absence of the private right of action was not merely an oversight. Indeed, Congress rejected an earlier version of the bill, titled the Police Accountability Act, that would have provided a private right of action and detailed measures dedicated to police accountability.\(^65\) Congress initially aimed to give both the Attorney General and injured individuals the right to seek remedies from police departments engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing.\(^66\) The backlash to the proposed right of action for individual plaintiffs was swift.\(^67\) Opponents of the bill, including conservative lawmakers and police advocates, voiced concerns about law enforcement agencies being subjected to frivolous lawsuits from individuals characterized as likely to abuse the newfound authority.\(^68\) At least one article has proposed the notion that objectors were concerned with more than protecting local governments from the cost and annoyance of frivolous lawsuits from community members.\(^69\) Marshall Miller proffers that lawmakers were concerned that rightful claims by injured individuals under the proposed statute would essentially empower federal judges to make decisions

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\(^{62}\) Id.


\(^{64}\) See id.


\(^{66}\) See id.


\(^{68}\) See Gilles, supra note 43, at 1403 (quoting “a letter from Assistant Attorney General W. Lee Rawls to Representative Henry Hyde” addressing the expense and time that local governments and agencies would expend defending against pattern or practice lawsuits if individuals were granted statutory authority to commence such litigation).

\(^{69}\) See Miller, supra note 67, at 175.
about the manner in which police departments are run, a role he seems to believe lawmakers wanted to leave to the elected and appointed officials in charge of local governments. 70 This concern, in many ways, echoed that of the U.S. Supreme Court. 71 The individual right of action was removed from the draft bill in an effort to accommodate the stated objections.

Ultimately, the Police Accountability Act never advanced out of committee. 72 The authority of the Attorney General to pursue pattern or practice litigation against offending police departments was included instead in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 73 It was enacted by Congress without any authority for individuals to pursue injunctive and declaratory relief on their own behalf. There is no mechanism by which aggrieved individuals or organizations could assert an interest and seek to secure a remedy. 74

Research by Myriam Gilles aptly points out that the absence of an individual private right to seek remedies for alleged unconstitutional government conduct is in some ways unique to police misconduct. Her work details how individuals have successfully challenged school segregation, environmental hazards, housing discrimination, legislative reapportionment, and antitrust violations. 75 The federal government has indeed relied on private individuals to be “eyes on the ground” to enforce the law through private actions in these other areas. 76 The DOJ under the Obama Administration looked for a way to include community perspectives in the reform efforts initiated under the authority of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. As Part II discusses, those efforts have taken the form of outreach and engagement, but concerns abound.

B. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY INPUT IN DOJ INVESTIGATIONS AND REFORM EFFORTS

Some may ask whether it is appropriate for communities impacted by police abuses to have a role in pattern or practice litigation initiated by the DOJ. After all, the controlling statute gives sole authority to bring suit to the federal government through the Attorney General. 77 This perspective ignores the integral value

70. Id.
74. See Cover, supra note 43, at 379.
75. Gilles, supra note 43, at 1391 n.25, 1412, 1429–30; see also 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2018) (providing a private right of action for any person injured by an antitrust violation); Hardin v. Ky. Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6 (1968) (“[W]hen the particular statutory provision invoked does reflect a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest, the injured competitor has standing to require compliance with that provision.”).
76. Gilles, supra note 43, at 1413; accord id. at 1386, 1413 (discussing the sweeping structural reforms brought about through private litigants seeking to remedy constitutional violations in, among other things, education, prison conditions, and abortion access). In this way, private litigants have filled the gap when the federal government has failed to act.
of community input and engagement, which is widely recognized by the DOJ (at least during the Obama Administration) and law enforcement.\textsuperscript{78} To that end, the federal government has committed significant resources to the effort of reforming unconstitutional police practices.\textsuperscript{79} Those resources have been devoted to a myriad of activities, including engaging community leaders and others impacted by police violence in response to their requests to investigate the patterns and practices of police departments.\textsuperscript{80} This is a considerable evolution from early consent decree processes that included minimal, if any, community engagement efforts. More recent DOJ-initiated consent decrees demonstrate that progress has been made toward an understanding that community engagement and the establishment of positive community–police relations are essential components to successfully reforming police departments.\textsuperscript{81}

The DOJ has gradually increased outreach to the community and integration of it into federal police reform efforts. Understanding the continuum of those engagement efforts is essential to identifying potential ways to improve. This Section explores the progression of those engagement efforts. First, it details the cursory nature of community engagement provisions within DOJ-initiated consent decrees during the early years. Second, it explores the community engagement model employed by the DOJ during the next phase of consent decrees. It uses the New Orleans consent decree to illustrate the expanded nature of community engagement requirements during that time. Finally, it examines the use of community police commissions as the most recent DOJ approach to engage the community in its police reform efforts.

1. First Wave—Cursory Community Engagement

Settlement agreements initially reached after the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 contained only cursory statements


\textsuperscript{80} See DOJ Civil Rights Div., supra note 78.

\textsuperscript{81} Id. at 40.
requiring the subject police departments to engage with the community.\textsuperscript{82} A review of settlement agreements over the years illustrates a marked change.

The Clinton Administration pursued its first pattern or practice suit to remedy alleged unconstitutional policing in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The 1997 court-ordered reform efforts between the United States and the City of Pittsburgh consisted of eighty-three paragraphs, only two of which addressed “Community Relationships.”\textsuperscript{83} Those references acknowledged that the officer representative attended community meetings within their assigned zones and that the Office of Municipal Investigations, the entity required to investigate complaints against the police, performed outreach to inform the community of its purpose.\textsuperscript{84} The paragraphs simply required the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police to continue its current practices of attending community meetings and producing television broadcasts (as well as using other means of outreach) to inform the public of the function and complaint process employed by the Office of Municipal Investigations.\textsuperscript{85}

The Pittsburgh consent decree required the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police to do nothing more than what it had already been doing. The consent decree did not contain any information on the desired goal to be achieved through these mandates. For example, the decree could have required the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police to analyze the data gathered from civilian complaints to inform its policies or gauge the effectiveness of its community outreach efforts. The decree could have also required the Bureau to incorporate into its policies and training any insight or feedback it may have gained from community meetings.

The Los Angeles consent decree filed four years later took minimal steps toward including issues relevant to that community.\textsuperscript{86} Like the Pittsburgh decree before it, the Los Angeles decree required the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) to meet periodically with community advisory groups.\textsuperscript{87} There was no requirement that the LAPD incorporate community input into the mandated reforms. The Los Angeles decree did include more prescriptive requirements for the LAPD related to community engagement. These requirements included distributing to community groups and centers forms needed to file a complaint;\textsuperscript{88} ensuring that Field Training and Gang Unit officers demonstrate proficiency in “cultural and community sensitivity”;\textsuperscript{89} and providing training to all officers on

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{82} See, e.g., Consent Decree at 19–20, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 2:97-cv-00354-RJC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 1997), No. PN-PA-003-002. By contrast, the Steubenville consent decree ordered the same year had only one reference to community. See Consent Decree at 7, United States v. City of Steubenville, No. 2:97-CV-966 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 1997), No. PN-OH-002-005. That reference was not related to officer engagement or accountability. Id.
\bibitem{83} See Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, supra note 82.
\bibitem{84} See id.
\bibitem{85} See id.
\bibitem{86} See Consent Decree, United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 2:00-cv-11769-GAF-RC), ECF No. 123.
\bibitem{87} See id. at 73.
\bibitem{88} Id. at 30.
\bibitem{89} Id. at 47, 56.
\end{thebibliography}
community policing and cultural diversity.\textsuperscript{90} Perhaps the most significant provision related to community involvement in the Los Angeles consent decree was the creation of a program dedicated to “Community Outreach and Public Information.”\textsuperscript{91} This mandate prescribed the frequency and manner by which the LAPD had to provide the community with details about the consent decree and how community members could file complaints alleging officer misconduct.\textsuperscript{92} The decree, however, failed to include any requirement that the LAPD collaborate or coordinate with community groups while carrying out its mandates.

Detroit was the next city to execute a consent decree to reform its police department with the federal government. If the progressive nature of police-related consent decrees can be measured by the number of ways that departments are required to engage, consult, and inform the communities they serve, the Detroit consent decree took a step backward. Like the Los Angeles and Pittsburgh decrees, it required Detroit to perform outreach to the community to ensure civilians were aware of (and had forms for) the civilian complaint process.\textsuperscript{93} The Detroit Police Department was also required to provide its “proposed policy revisions to the community.”\textsuperscript{94} However, the decree failed to include any requirement that the Detroit Police Department solicit and incorporate recommendations from the community, as appropriate, into those proposed policy revisions. The final reference to community in the Detroit decree required that officers participate annually in training on topics related to the Fourth Amendment such as probable cause, arrests, and custodial detention.\textsuperscript{95}

2. Second Wave—More Detailed Community Engagement

The next iteration of DOJ-initiated police consent decrees—which began in 2011 under the Obama Administration—involved an increased scope and depth of outreach to communities impacted by police misconduct and violence.\textsuperscript{96} This

\textsuperscript{90} Id. at 56–57.
\textsuperscript{91} Id. at 72.
\textsuperscript{92} Id.
\textsuperscript{94} Id. at 21.
\textsuperscript{95} Id. at 35–36.
\textsuperscript{96} The DOJ entered into its first consent decree under the Obama Administration in United States v. Territory of the Virgin Islands. See Consent Decree, United States v. Territory of the Virgin Islands, No. 3:08-cv-00158-CVG-RM (D.V.I. Mar. 24, 2009), ECF No. 3; see also DOJ Civil Rights Div., supra note 78, at 43–44 (detailing the timeline of the investigation and consent decree). The underlying pattern or practice investigation took place prior to former President Obama’s election, and the parties signed the agreement in March 2009. See DOJ Civil Rights Div., supra note 78, at 43–44. It should come as no surprise that the Virgin Islands consent decree mirrors the first wave of consent decrees, particularly in the minimal ways that the provisions of the decree sought to expressly involve community. See Consent Decree, supra, at 8.

It is worth acknowledging that the DOJ likely has a broad view of community in this context. Its engagement efforts sought to include a cross section of representatives from diverse backgrounds and experiences. This is no small effort and deserves recognition. This all-encompassing approach, however, fails to recognize the critical importance of including in the litigation specific segments of the community that have been disproportionately impacted by police violence.
change was demonstrated in two ways. The first was the manner in which the DOJ described the importance of community involvement in its efforts to reform police misconduct in both its stand-alone reports and findings letters. A published report by the DOJ identified restoring public trust as a specific aim of its pattern or practice reform efforts.97 Community engagement became seen as integral to improving police–community relations as well as accountability of officers.98 This recognition of the importance of community can also be gleaned from DOJ findings letters detailing the scope and frequency of DOJ’s efforts to interview community leaders and organizers throughout the process of making departmental findings.99 The second demonstration of increased scope and depth of outreach can be found in the terms of negotiated settlement agreements reached between 2012 and 2015.100

The decree between the City of New Orleans and the federal government101 is illustrative of both the growth in and limitations of efforts to include impacted communities in police reform efforts. The sheer number of references to community in the New Orleans agreement increased more than twentyfold in comparison to the first wave of consent decrees.102 The decree included provisions that the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) would (1) work with community advocates to distribute police policies related to immigration status103 and (2) build relationships with community organizations for the purpose of ensuring that language services would be available to community members who speak Spanish or Vietnamese.104 It also required the NOPD to include community mental health professionals in its crisis intervention work.105

97. See DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 1, 4.
98. Id. at 29.
101. Consent Decree, United States v. City of New Orleans, supra note 100.
102. Compare id., with Consent Decree, United States v. City of Steubenville, supra note 82.
103. Id. at 50.
104. Id. at 52.
105. Id. at 35.
3. Third Wave—Community Police Commissions

As detailed above, community feedback and input have been sought, in some form, through DOJ-initiated consent decrees. The City of Seattle and the DOJ utilized a new model of community engagement in their 2012 agreement to reform the city’s police department.\textsuperscript{106} For the first time, a DOJ-initiated consent decree required a local jurisdiction to create a stakeholder group comprised of community representatives from the many diverse communities within Seattle. Credit allocation for the creation of the Seattle Community Police Commission (CPC) was a point of contention among the parties.\textsuperscript{107} Motivation to create the CPC may have been driven, in part, by questions of sustainability that have dogged federal interventions in local police departments where a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing has been found.\textsuperscript{108} The Seattle consent decree stressed the vital importance of input from the community on proposed changes:

\begin{quote}
The community is a critical resource. Certain aspects of the reform efforts embodied in the Agreements are best developed by dialogue and wide-spread input. Moreover, ongoing community input into the development of reforms, the establishment of police priorities, and mechanisms to promote community confidence in SPD will strengthen SPD and facilitate police/community relationships necessary to promote public safety.\textsuperscript{109}
\end{quote}

The Cleveland consent decree also created a CPC as a “formal” mechanism to “promote public trust and confidence... constitutional and effective policing, officer and public safety, and the sustainability of reforms.”\textsuperscript{110}

As detailed above, the DOJ is on record as being committed to incorporating community input into the fact-gathering phase and during the negotiation of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{107} See Letter from Jenny A. Durkan, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the W. Dist. of Wash. & Jonathan Smith, Chief, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., to Cnty. Police Comm’n (Oct. 21, 2013); Letter from Mike McGinn, Mayor of Seattle, to Cnty. Police Comm’n 1, 3 (Oct. 23, 2013) (detailing Mayor McGinn’s “recollection of the course of negotiations” in which the DOJ credited the Mayor for the idea of the CPC); Jim Brunner, McGinn Seeks to Set Record Straight After DOJ Criticism, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 24, 2013, 9:31 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/mcginn-seeks-to-set-record-straight-after-doj-criticism. In a letter from the DOJ to the CPC, the DOJ provided the federal government’s account of its efforts to engage Seattle community members. The letter detailed moments in the negotiation when the process stalled as it related to a number of topics, including community engagement, and stated that the DOJ proposed that the agreement include a “Community Monitoring Board.” Letter from Jenny A. Durkan, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the W. Dist. of Wash. & Jonathan Smith, Chief, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div., to Cnty. Police Comm’n, supra. The letter goes on to clarify that Seattle had a role in creating what became known as the CPC and asserts that the DOJ never stalled the process out of concern that the community was involved. \textit{Id.} at 2.
\item \textsuperscript{108} DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 18, 23–24.
\item \textsuperscript{109} Settlement Agreement & Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution, supra note 106, at 2.
\item \textsuperscript{110} Settlement Agreement at 4, United States v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:15-cv-01046-SO (N.D. Ohio May 26, 2015), ECF No. 7-1.
\end{itemize}
settlement terms. The importance of community input and engagement, however, appears to wane during the implementation phase of the reform efforts. Specifically, the DOJ has opposed efforts by community organizations and leaders to be included as parties to the underlying litigation driving the reform efforts.\textsuperscript{111} This is true despite acknowledgement by the DOJ that community involvement is essential to the sustainability of reform efforts\textsuperscript{112} and that the failures of prior efforts have generated deep distrust of governmental authority within certain communities.\textsuperscript{113}

This evolution provides context and illustrates how current practices still fall short of meaningful inclusion. Outreach and engagement are distinctly different from the inclusion that party status can provide. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 was created to provide that type of inclusion. Rule 24, however, has been utilized to no avail by impacted individuals and community organizations representing their interests. The next Part discusses the creation, purpose, and other issues relevant to Rule 24.

\section*{II. F\textsc{}ederal Rule of C\textsc{}ivil P\textsc{}rocedure Rule 24}

Intervention attempts to serve as a mechanism to transform societal issues are not new to public law litigation.\textsuperscript{114} The reform cases initiated by the DOJ are currently designed and purportedly used to resolve a significant and pressing societal ill without any actual representation from members of the public thereby impacted. The federal courts have refused to recognize the unique set of interests shared by communities impacted by police abuses. The perspective, insight, and experiences that shape those interests could prove indispensable to the law reform process. Judicial decisions that fail to account for the unique interests of impacted communities can result in the denial of opportunity to meaningfully participate in reform litigation and have done so in a manner that frustrates the intent and purpose of Rule 24(a). This Part discusses the history of Rule 24 and the court decisions that drove its promulgation. It also explores the relevant issues of standing and adequate representation. This Part concludes with a brief description of the interplay between the Rule in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{112} DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 2, 18, 30.
\bibitem{113} Id. at 13. Undoubtedly, there are many more layers of governmental failures that contribute to this distrust. Some of those are explored infra Section IV.B.3.
\end{thebibliography}
affirmative action cases to demonstrate how the Rule has been applied in nonpolice reform cases.

A. HISTORY OF FEDERAL RULE 24

The federal procedural rule that permits an unnamed party to join a lawsuit was originally adopted in 1938. The introduction of the concept was initially viewed as contradictory to traditions that viewed plaintiffs as the “master of the suit.” A derivative of Equity Rule 37, Rule 24 was designed to give to interested individuals the ability to assert a right in the litigation. But unlike its predecessor, the new rule did not require the intervening interest to be subordinate to the original lawsuit.

Rule 24 has undergone only one significant amendment since its original adoption. That revision occurred in 1966. At that time, the Advisory Committee recommended that parties entitled to intervention as a matter of right under subdivision (a) of the Rule be redefined. The amendment resulted in a number of revised provisions aimed at adjusting the manner in which courts applied the Rule. As it relates to the changes in the text, the provision reduced what had been two separate clauses into one clause. It also removed language that indicated the interest in question had to be property related. The two remaining revisions were designed to address concerns about the ways courts placed additional hurdles in the path of movants seeking to intervene.

Under the prior Rule 24(a), successful intervenors were required to demonstrate that their interests were inadequately represented and that they would be legally bound by the outcome as a result of res judicata. The U.S. Supreme

115. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)–(b).
117. Gunter, supra note 114, at 647–48 (quoting FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 626 (5th ed. 2001)).
118. The former Equity Rule 37 provided that “[a]nyone claiming an interest in the litigation may at any time be permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding.” 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 116, § 1903 n.2; see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 912 (1987) (discussing how the events and individuals responsible for the adoption of the Federal Rules were champions of equity as opposed to adherents of the common law).
120. 7C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 116.
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Sutphen Estates, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 19, 21 (1951) (quoting prior Rule 24(a)—“when the representation of the applicant’s interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action” (emphasis added)—in its holding that the
Court’s decision in *Hansberry v. Lee* revealed the insurmountable challenge that those two requirements posed for potential litigants.\(^{127}\) Carl Hansberry and other similarly situated Black landowners appealed a prior decision from the Illinois Supreme Court.\(^{128}\) The land they purchased was purportedly subject to a restrictive covenant barring them from ownership because of their race.\(^{129}\) In affirming the decision of the lower court, the Illinois Supreme Court held that litigation aimed at adjudicating the validity of the restrictive covenants was barred by res judicata, despite Mr. Hansberry not being a party to the prior suit.\(^{130}\)

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the prior decision and held that class action judgments were invalid against a nonparty that was not adequately represented.\(^{131}\) But recall that the prior rule of intervention required a movant to demonstrate that it was both inadequately represented and bound by a prior judgment.\(^{132}\) What *Hansberry v. Lee* resolved for the petitioners in that case created an impossible conundrum for future litigants.\(^{133}\)

Rule 24 was amended to replace the “formal, legalistic restrictions” with “pragmatic solutions that guarantee fairness and orderly procedure.”\(^{134}\) The removal of the res judicata bar from the current version sought to achieve that goal. The Rule, as amended, set forth a more liberal test than its predecessor.\(^{135}\) A movant is now required to show (1) an interest in the subject of the litigation, (2) a lack of adequate representation of that interest by the existing parties, and (3) that the outcome of the case may impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect that interest.\(^{136}\) Despite the amendment to the Rule and recognition that the res judicata requirement created an unreasonable bar to intervention, courts have substituted that requirement with a strict reading of the third factor.

It is important to understand the context and purpose of Rule 24 beyond the Advisory Committee’s notes and relevant scholarship during that time. Scholars view the Supreme Court’s decision in *Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States*\(^{137}\)

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127. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Although *Hansberry* is commonly referred to in the class action context, it would be a mistake not to recognize its impact on the rule of intervention. This is because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on joinder, intervention, and class actions were revised to maintain symmetry across all three. *See* Suzette M. Malveaux, *The Modern Class Action Rule: Its Civil Rights Roots and Relevance Today*, 66 U. Kan. L. Rev. 325, 342–47 (2017) (discussing the deliberations of the Rules Committee as it related to res judicata and *Hansberry*).


129. *Id.*

130. *Id.* at 38.

131. *Id.* at 45–46.

132. See *supra* note 126 and accompanying text.

133. *See* Sam Fox Publ’g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691–92 (1961); *see also* Kennedy, *supra* note 119, at 350 (explaining that *Hansberry* created “a logical impossibility on the face of Rule 24 (a) (2) in that the conjunctive requirements of inadequate representation and binding effect could be considered to be mutually exclusive”).


137. 366 U.S. 683.
as a catalyst for the Rule’s amendment. 138 The underlying case in *Sam Fox* involved a government antitrust action under the Sherman Act against the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP). 139 The proposed intervenor, Sam Fox, was a small-sized publisher concerned that the reforms provided under the ASCAP consent decree were insufficient to protect his interests and that the representation provided was inadequate to serve those interests. 140 The parties agreed to terms in the decree that required the ASCAP board to be elected by membership vote and for revenue distributions to be made on an equitable basis. 141 The government sought to modify the decree twice out of concern for “‘democratic administration of’ [ASCAP’s internal affairs] and for an equitable distribution of . . . revenues.” 142

It was at this point in the twenty-year litigation process that Sam Fox and a small group of publishers sought to intervene. 143 Justice Harlan’s opinion affirming the denial of intervention reportedly drew concern from lower courts and scholars. 144 That concern was rooted in the notion that movant–intervenors were left with no viable recourse. Rule 24(a)(2), as interpreted by the Court, meant that intervention of right was not available if the representation was inadequate because that would render the judgment defective and not binding, thereby not meeting the res judicata requirement necessary for intervention. 145 Satisfactory representation also precluded intervention. 146 It was this dilemma, along with efforts to maintain continuity across rules, that drove the lone substantive amendment to Rule 24. 147

As discussed above, Rule 24 has its historical underpinning in equity. The 1966 amendment to the Rule aimed to solidify Rule 24(a)(2)’s purpose—to provide access to the courts for those who had a broadly conceived legal interest and met the remaining requirements of the Rule. 148 This was done with the goal of promulgating a liberal intervention standard. 149 Satisfying the remaining requirements stated in the Rule can be a significant hurdle for those seeking

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139. *Sam Fox*, 366 U.S. at 685.
140. Kaplan, supra note 138, at 402.
142. Id. at 687 (quoting the modified consent decree).
143. Id.
146. Id. at 402.
147. See id. at 403.
149. Kaplan, supra note 138, at 403.
intervention. As discussed below, existing parties have introduced the issue of standing as a possible bar to intervention in some instances. The following Sections briefly discuss how standing and adequate representation can impact third-party intervention.

B. FEDERAL RULE 24 AND STANDING

In Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., the Supreme Court considered whether a putative intervenor must have standing to intervene as a matter of right. There was disagreement across federal circuit courts on that issue prior to the decision in Laroe Estates. Some circuits held that putative intervenors met the standing requirement provided that standing existed for the original party on the same side of the litigation. Others held that the party seeking intervention must have independent standing to properly seek intervention.

Laroe Estates provided some resolution to the circuit split on the issue of standing. The putative intervenor, Laroe Estates, paid significant money as an investment in plaintiff Sherman’s real estate project. Laroe Estates argued that it was the equitable owner of the property and sought damages in its name. The Court unanimously held that a movant–intervenor is required to satisfy standing requirements if it seeks a remedy different from that of a party with standing. This recent decision leaves open the possibility that a putative intervenor is not required to satisfy standing requirements when it seeks the same relief as an existing party. It is therefore reasonable, in the police reform litigation context, for a movant–intervenor desiring injunctive relief similar to that of the federal government not to be required to satisfy standing requirements under Laroe Estates.

C. FEDERAL RULE 24 AND ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION

Rule 24(a) recognizes the rights of third parties to join existing litigation. To intervene under Rule 24(a), a movant must show (1) an interest in the matter at

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150. This Article focuses on the adequate representation factor of Rule 24(a). The remaining requirements under the Rule are that the motion to intervene be timely and that it assert a significant interest in the litigation that is likely to be impaired or impeded by the litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).

151. See, e.g., Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2003); Proof Brief for the United States as Appellee at 14 & n.2, United States v. City of Detroit, No. 03-2343 (6th Cir. Apr. 7, 2004); Defendant City of Albuquerque’s Response in Opposition to APOA’s Motion to Intervene at 14–15, United States v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV, 2015 WL 13747185 (D.N.M. Feb. 19, 2015).


153. Id. at 1650.

154. E.g., San Juan County v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007).

155. E.g., In re Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Litig., 704 F.3d 972, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

156. Laroe Estates, 137 S. Ct. at 1649.

157. Id.

158. Id. at 1648, 1651.

159. This is not to be confused with the requirements for class action certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). A court, under that rule, must consider whether a named plaintiff is the appropriate representative for a class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)–(4).

hand, (2) that its interest may be impaired by the litigation, and (3) that its interest is not adequately represented by an existing party. 161

The extent to which a putative intervenor must show inadequate representation varies by circuit. Three circuits require only a minimum showing of inadequate representation. The Sixth Circuit has consistently held that an intervenor needs only to point to “a potential for inadequate representation.” 162 The Ninth Circuit uses a three-factor analysis to determine whether existing representation is inadequate. 163 It examines not only whether the existing parties will undoubtedly make all of the proposed intervenor’s arguments but also if they are capable and willing to do so. 164 The Ninth Circuit is expressly concerned about the ability of a proposed intervenor to offer any necessary elements to the proceedings that the existing parties would neglect. 165 The Tenth Circuit goes beyond a minimal showing requirement and affirmatively rejects the presumption that the government adequately represents the interests of its citizens unless the interests are “identical.” 166 Moreover, a presumption of identical interests can be successfully rebutted if the government is obliged to consider interests different from those of the intervenor. 167

The majority of the remaining circuits’ presumption of adequate representation analyses rely heavily on whether interests are aligned. A movant in one of these other circuits must show something akin to its “interest [being] in fact different from that of the [government] and that the interest will not be represented by [the government].” 168 The Fourth Circuit reasons that movants must make a strong

161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Davis v. Lifetime Capital, Inc., 560 F. App’x 477, 495 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1999)); see also id. at 495–96 (“[I]t may be enough to show that the existing party who purports to seek the same outcome will not make all of the prospective intervenor’s arguments.’ ‘If the interest of the absent party is not represented at all, or if all existing parties are adverse to the absent party, then she or he is not adequately represented.’” (first quoting Grutter, 188 F.3d at 400; and then quoting Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1989))).
163. See Citizens for Balanced Use v. Mont. Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2011) (detailing the Ninth Circuit’s three-factor adequacy of representation analysis: “(1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly make all of a proposed intervenor’s arguments; (2) whether the present party is capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether a proposed intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the proceeding that other parties would neglect” (quoting Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003))).
164. Id.
165. See id.
166. Kane County v. United States, 928 F.3d 877, 892 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bottoms v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 869, 872 (10th Cir. 1986)).
167. Id.
168. Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 662 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1005 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)); see Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 888 F.3d 52, 60–61 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that a religious nonprofit made a compelling showing to intervene in a suit between Pennsylvania and the United States over an exemption for religious businesses to pay for contraceptive coverage); FTC v. Johnson, 800 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that there is a greater burden to overcome the presumption of adequate representation when the court finds that interests are shared
showing of governmental inadequacy because it presumes that government agencies are best situated to defend the constitutionality of existing laws. A successful movant in the Seventh Circuit will effectively rebut the presumption of adequate governmental representation only by a showing of “gross negligence or bad faith.”

Part IV below discusses the adequate representation factor and the manner in which courts have analyzed it when deciding motions to intervene filed on behalf of community organizations in police pattern or practice litigation. That Part also explores how those decisions, particularly those that assert the federal government adequately represents the interests of community organizations, have run far afield from the amended purpose of Rule 24.

D. RULE 24 IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES

Decisions in structural reform litigation regarding police practices have often truncated the analysis when evaluating the interest of those asserting the right to party status in the litigation on behalf of affected communities. No trial court decision in a police reform, consent decree case has ever granted a community organization’s motion to intervene as a matter of right. The most success achieved by a small few has been permissive intervention in one case and amici status in others. But input from affected communities is an essential component of the reform process aimed at remediating the effects of unconstitutional policing. The model used by the DOJ to elicit the community perspective through newly created, hybrid commissions has been mostly frustrating and ineffective at developing community voice with equal weight and authority in the process. More importantly, there are other areas within American law and government that demonstrate how community and third-party input have been designed to have more integrated roles.

Individuals who pursue employment discrimination redress through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have intervened in enforcement actions initiated by that federal agency. Though the Supreme Court has referred to the EEOC as “the master of its own case,” individuals allegedly aggrieved by an employer’s actions expressly retain the right to intervene in an action between the movant and a governmental party (citing Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. N. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 378 F.3d 774, 780 (8th Cir. 2004)).

169. See Stuart v. Huff, 706 F.3d 345, 353 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that abortion providers could not intervene to defend a constitutional challenge to abortion laws).

170. See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Kaul, 942 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ligas ex rel. Foster v. Maram, 478 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2007)) (holding that the state legislature could not intervene to defend a challenge to Wisconsin’s new abortion laws because they could not show that the state attorney general would not provide adequate representation).

171. See infra Part IV.

172. See infra Part III.

173. DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 13.


brought by the EEOC. The right of intervention initially created under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been codified by statute in the employment discrimination context. The EEOC itself has recognized that employees may need to intervene in litigation brought by the agency. This need exists because “it is possible the Commission’s objectives and the [employee’s] interests will diverge during the litigation.” The EEOC identifies its overall mission as the pursuit of the public interest in correcting employment discrimination. The agency recognizes that what it deems to be in the best interest of the general public may not be aligned with the specific interests of a singular aggrieved individual. The classification of who qualifies as an aggrieved party under the statute has been broadly defined by some courts.

Intervention attempts in affirmative action cases by putative intervenors impacted by discrimination have been met with mixed judicial results. Black employees, applicants, and contractors were granted the right to intervene in lawsuits that sought to undo affirmative action policies and ordinances. The same has not always held true in higher education affirmative action cases. Circuit courts deciding those motions to intervene have diverged. In Grutter v. Bollinger, a law school affirmative action case, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the right of intervention of community organizations as well as interested, enrolled, and prospective African-American students. That court was persuaded that the movant intervenors met all requirements of Rule 24(a) and expressly rejected the presumption of adequate representation when government

177. See id.
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See, e.g., EEOC v. Albertson’s LLC, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1347 (D. Colo. 2008) (“[A] plaintiff who failed to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, but who asserts she was subject to similar discrimination by the same actors during the same time frame as the charging parties, is an ‘aggrieved person’ within the meaning of section 2000e-(f)(1).”) (quoting EEOC v. Outback Steak House of Fla., Inc., 245 F.R.D. 657, 660 (D. Colo. 2007)).
185. See id. at 266–67 (identifying cases in which students or organizations of color at the Boston Latin Academy, the University of Texas Law School, and the University of Washington were not granted the right to intervene in lawsuits challenging affirmative action policies at those institutions, but identifying successful attempts by students and organizations of color to intervene in affirmative action cases involving the University System of Georgia, the University of Maryland, and the University of Michigan Law School).
186. 188 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 1999).
entities are a party to the action. The First Circuit, in *Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College*, found that the minimal showing requires movant–intervenors to “produce ‘something more than speculation as to the purported inadequacy’ of representation.” Unlike the successful intervenors in *Grutter*, the putative intervenors in *Students for Fair Admissions* were required to demonstrate with some specificity how their interests would not be adequately represented.

As detailed above, federal law provides to aggrieved employees the express right to intervene in litigation commenced by the EEOC against an employer deemed to have engaged in discriminatory practices. Likewise, some marginalized movant–intervenors have found success in utilizing Rule 24 to join affirmative action cases aimed at curtailing the consideration of race in admissions policies by higher education institutions. Despite these mixed results, community organizations seeking to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24 in federal police reform cases have been met with unabashed rejection across all federal circuits. The following Part details the litigation efforts of those community organizations.

III. EFFORTS BY COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS TO ENGAGE IN POLICE REFORM

The presumption that a governmental authority can speak for marginalized communities impacted by police violence promotes paternalistic, hierarchal principles that are antithetical to contemporary notions of democracy. Impacted community members desire to have a voice that is heard and respected and that affords them self-governance in a similar fashion to those who are not marginalized. As discussed in greater detail below, those desires have been the subject of motions to intervene in a number of jurisdictions involved in DOJ-initiated reforms.

A. INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS REBUFFED BY FEDERAL COURTS

Community organizations have attempted to gain party status in police reform consent decrees under Rule 24 since the year 2000. Those attempts by

187. See id. at 400–01 (declining to impose a heightened requirement when a governmental entity is a party, and citing *Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America*, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972), and its holding that only a minimal showing is needed to meet the inadequate representation requirement).

188. 807 F.3d 472, 475 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting *Moosehead Sanitary Dist. v. S. G. Phillips Corp.*, 610 F.2d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 1979)).

189. See id. at 476.

190. See Patel, *supra* note 39, at 805–06 (arguing that a direct correlation exists between “[m]eaningful inclusion of directly impacted voices” and the fundamental democratic “principles of self-determination, anti-subordination, and individual liberty”).

191. See Larry Kramer, *Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties*, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321 (1988), for a discussion and explanation of the distinct meaning of a consent decree—not a contract and not a judgment—as well as an explanation of what typically occurs after a lawsuit is filed that leads to the entering of a consent decree.

192. See, e.g., United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 396–97 (9th Cir. 2002).
interested community organizations have continued in numerous jurisdictions where the DOJ has found a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing.\textsuperscript{193} And although the DOJ has highlighted its efforts to gain input from certain community stakeholders during both the investigative and settlement negotiation stages,\textsuperscript{194} community leaders and organizations have reported feeling left out of the negotiation and implementation phases of the reform process.\textsuperscript{195} Indeed, the DOJ has formally opposed motions to intervene filed on behalf of community organizations.\textsuperscript{196} The absence of formal inclusion and authority is of particular concern considering that one of the central aims of the police structural reform efforts led by the DOJ is to foster trust and improved relations between police departments and the communities they serve.\textsuperscript{197}

Building collaborative working relationships is essential to gaining valuable insight into the experiences and needs of affected communities. This is no small feat. A long history of abuse and distrust between affected communities and police exists in the United States.\textsuperscript{198} This absence of trust undeniably adds to the

\textsuperscript{193} See infra Section III.B.

\textsuperscript{194} See DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 40.


\textsuperscript{196} See, e.g., United States’ Opposition to Motion to Intervene by Disability Rights New Mexico, ACLU of New Mexico, & Native American Voters Alliance Education Project, supra note 111; United States’ Combined Response to the CPC’s Motion to Partially Intervene & to the City & the CPC’s Motions to Extend Certain Deadlines, United States v. City of Seattle, No. 2:12-cv-01282-JLR (W.D. Wash. Nov. 5, 2013), ECF No. 96; Memorandum in Opposition to Proposed Intervenor-Defendant Portland Police Ass’n & Proposed Intervenor-Plaintiff AMA Coalition’s FRCP 24 Motions to Intervene, supra note 111.

\textsuperscript{197} DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 25.

difficulty of structural reform efforts. 199 Fostering trust and positive relationships under such circumstances cannot be achieved overnight or with a perfunctory approach. A critical component of the effort to build better relationships is to create a reform process that the community views as valuable and likely to affect positive, meaningful change. 200 Community leaders and organizations have expressed the importance of being present and heard when policy revisions and community engagement plans are being made. 201

But the desire for community leaders and organizations to be a part of the reform process goes even further than policy revisions and recommendations. Not being heard and seen in the process compounds the marginalization of affected communities 202 who have, in various ways over the years, unsuccessfully sought relief from the judiciary or elected officials. 203

Efforts by individuals to initiate structural reforms within problematic police departments have historically been rebuffed by the federal courts and American legislators. Lawsuits filed both pre- and post-Monell v. Department of Social Services 204 seeking structural improvements in response to police abuses.
committed by officers in Los Angeles and Philadelphia were ultimately rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court held in *Rizzo v. Goode* that federalism and equitable restraint principles precluded the trial court from granting injunctive relief to individuals and community organizations in Philadelphia to address discriminatory police practices within that police department.205

In *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, the Court denied efforts by Adolph Lyons to enjoin officers in Los Angeles from using deadly chokeholds during interactions with individuals who posed no threat to those officers.206 Mr. Lyons had been strangled until he lost consciousness and control over his bladder and bowels during a traffic stop for a burned out taillight.207 After a volley of appeals disrupted a series of short-lived alternating victories by Mr. Lyons and the City of Los Angeles, the Supreme Court ultimately found that the past wrongs of LAPD officers failed to provide standing for Mr. Lyons to enjoin the future conduct of officers on the streets of that city.208 That ruling seemed to deliver a fatal blow to individual efforts aimed at using injunctive relief to structurally change improper police practices in order to improve the manner in which policing is delivered in communities.209

It is with that backdrop that this Part discusses the formal attempts of community organizations to be included in structural litigation efforts to rectify alleged unconstitutional policing and to provide meaningful input. Individuals and community organizations have been engaged in efforts to remedy the abuses suffered disproportionately by Black community members for several decades. These efforts predate the passage of federal legislation aimed at rooting out pattern or practice violations by law enforcement. The following subsection provides the unique contribution of examining each of the seven instances where community organizations have sought to intervene in DOJ-initiated police consent decrees.

### B. COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS' EFFORTS TO GAIN PARTY STATUS AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994

Community organizations have attempted to intervene in seven of the total twenty DOJ-initiated consent decrees210 aimed at reforming alleged pattern or practice violations by law enforcement. Five of those seven sought intervention

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205. See 423 U.S. at 380; Hardaway, supra note 50, at 155.
207. Id. at 114–15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208. See id. at 111 (majority opinion).
209. This is not to ignore the private right of action that still exists for anyone to claim damages against local police departments and individual officers as a result of any alleged unconstitutional policing they may suffer.
210. See An Interactive Guide to the Civil Rights Division’s Police Reforms, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 18, 2017), [https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/922456/download](https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/922456/download) [https://perma.cc/MBY3-GCNF]. Note that the reform agreements counted here do not include all investigations or reform efforts that fell short of official consent decrees. Instead, the twenty cases referenced here included only instances where a suit initiated by the DOJ under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 resulted in a federal consent decree.
as a matter of right. Motions to intervene as a matter of right have been denied and affirmed in all of those instances. The only time that a community organization has been allowed to intervene—albeit only permissively following an appeal—was in United States v. City of Los Angeles,211 as discussed below. This Section details the manner in which courts have analyzed community organizations’ motions to intervene filed in DOJ-initiated police pattern or practice lawsuits.

1. Los Angeles

In United States v. City of Los Angeles, five community organizations and impacted individuals collectively moved to intervene.212 The court noted that these organizations worked for a number of years with impacted communities and the LAPD on reform efforts.213 The community organizations identified their motivation for intervention as centered around ensuring that the consent decree-related reforms were successful as well as their ability to continue to participate in reform efforts.214 The parties representing both the federal and municipal governments opposed intervention out of concern that allowing others into the litigation would slow down the progress of a complex negotiation process.215 The court considered separately the questions of intervention as a matter of right and permissive intervention.216

Intervention as a matter of right was characterized by the Ninth Circuit as guided by practical and equitable considerations that fall in the favor of the proposed intervenors.217 The purpose of such purported liberal intervention is to ensure four aims: (1) to promote efficiency, (2) to broaden access to courts, (3) to prevent or simplify future cases, and (4) to allow “additional interested part[ies] to express [their] views before the court.”218 Arguably, this liberal standard of guiding principles for determining intervention as a matter of right might lead one to believe that most intervenors would gain party status with relative ease. That has not been the case, and it is not what happened in United States v. City of Los Angeles.

Instead, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision denying the putative community intervenors’ motion for intervention as a matter of right for two reasons. First, the court held that the movants failed to meet the impair or impede requirement because the consent decree litigation did not bar individual plaintiffs

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211. 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002).
212. See id. at 397. The organizations included the ACLU of Southern California, Asian Pacific American Legal Center, Homeboy Industries, Radio Sin Fronteras, and Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Los Angeles. Id. at 397 n.3.
213. See id. at 397.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 404.
216. See id. at 402–03.
217. See id. at 397.
218. Id. at 397–98 (quoting Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1496 n.8 (9th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
from pursing their own action against the LAPD for unconstitutional policing nor did it prevent the community organizations from ceasing efforts to reform the department.\textsuperscript{219} Second, the court held that the movant community organizations failed to successfully rebut the presumption that the federal government provided adequate representation of their interests.\textsuperscript{220} Seeking strict enforcement of the decree alone was not enough to demonstrate inadequate representation for the Ninth Circuit. The opinion indicates that the movants needed to point to some failing or dispute concerning the terms of the consent decree in order to be granted intervention as a matter of right.\textsuperscript{221}

2. Detroit

A motion to intervene filed by the Coalition Against Police Brutality was denied in 2003 by the federal district court in Detroit.\textsuperscript{222} The Coalition consisted mostly individuals impacted by violence during encounters with Detroit police officers.\textsuperscript{223} The Coalition’s efforts to address unconstitutional policing in that city date back to 1998.\textsuperscript{224} At that time, the organization presented a report to the Detroit City Council during a hearing on the need for police reform.\textsuperscript{225} It was reportedly the Coalition’s efforts, in collaboration with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and Amnesty International, which contributed to the city’s decision to request a § 14141 investigation by the DOJ four years later.\textsuperscript{226}

The Coalition’s motion to intervene argued that its significant interests were threefold: (1) representing its members, some of which had filed pending complaints against Detroit officers; (2) ensuring that “true reform” took place through the DOJ process; and (3) making certain that existing community input from citizens and those impacted by police misconduct were not curtailed by the current reform process.\textsuperscript{227}

The Coalition pointed to the broad analysis employed by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits when determining what constitutes a significant, protectable interest.\textsuperscript{228} The Coalition also cited a finding by the Fifth Circuit that the National Organization of Women had a significant interest for purposes of intervention in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{219} See id. at 402.
  \item \textsuperscript{220} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{221} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{222} Order, United States v. City of Detroit, No. 2:03-cv-72258-AC-DRG (E.D. Mich. Aug. 26, 2003), ECF No. 31 (denying motions to intervene).
  \item \textsuperscript{223} Coalition Against Police Brutality’s Motion for Intervention as of Right at 2, City of Detroit, No. 2:03-cv-72258-AC-DRG (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2003), ECF No. 10.
  \item \textsuperscript{224} Coalition Against Police Brutality’s Brief in Support of Their Motion for Intervention as of Right at 5, City of Detroit, No. 2:03-cv-72258-AC-DRG (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2003), ECF No. 10 (citation to internal record omitted).
  \item \textsuperscript{225} Id. at 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{226} Id. at 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{227} See Coalition Against Police Brutality’s Motion for Intervention as of Right, supra note 223, at 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{228} See Coalition Against Police Brutality’s Brief in Support of Their Motion for Intervention as of Right, supra note 224, at 8–9.
\end{itemize}
an action filed by the federal government against steel employers for gender discrimination. The Coalition also pointed to a district court finding that the NAACP in Los Angeles had a sufficient interest to intervene in an action filed by contractors alleging that minority contracts set aside under the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 were unconstitutional.

As to whether the interests of the Coalition would be adequately represented or protected by one of the existing parties, the Coalition argued that neither the City of Detroit nor the DOJ was in a position to do so. The Coalition pointed to two failings on the part of the existing parties. First, the City and the DOJ failed to seek input from the organization regarding the proposed settlement prior to its filing. Second, the parties also failed to hold community meetings to understand the perspective and concerns of community members.

The City’s opposition to intervention asserted that those possible interests were represented by both the federal government and the City of Detroit by way of the elected city council. An upcoming city council meeting was identified as the public’s opportunity for “community input and outreach.” The federal government denied any impropriety in the negotiation of the agreement and asserted the adequacy of its representation by virtue of the DOJ’s goal to “bring about reform in the Detroit Police Department to stem the pattern and practice of constitutional violations.”

The filings by the putative intervenors and the City of Detroit presented issues relevant to judicial consideration. Those issues included whether the government should consult with impacted communities to adequately represent those

229. See id. at 9 (citing United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 845 (5th Cir. 1975)).
231. See id. at 11–13.
232. Id. at 11–12.
233. Id.

In a somewhat perplexing twist, the Detroit City Council had previously filed a motion to intervene approximately three weeks prior to the Coalition’s filing. See Detroit City Council’s Motion to Intervene at 2, 4–6, City of Detroit, No. 2:03-cv-72258-AC-DRG (E.D. Mich. June 18, 2003), ECF No. 6. The Council’s motion to intervene asserted that, contrary to the city charter, the decision by the mayor and Detroit Police Department to enter into the consent decree was made without the approval of Council. See id. at 3. The Council also asserted a conflict of interest between it and the mayor because the mayor stepped outside of his authority by appropriating funds to be spent on the decree. See id. at 5. The Council also complained that it was unaware of the terms of the consent decree and that it had no input on the selection of the monitor. See id. at 6. The motion by the Council called into question its ability to represent the interests of the Coalition.

235. Respondent City of Detroit’s Response to Petitioner Coalition Against Police Brutality’s Motion for Intervention as of Right, supra note 234, at 3.
communities and whether a general interest in a similar result is enough to satisfy the adequate representation factor. The Coalition’s motion for intervention was denied by the district court without written explanation.\textsuperscript{237}

3. New Orleans

In New Orleans, the Community United for Change (CUC) sought to intervene\textsuperscript{238} in litigation related to a proposed consent decree.\textsuperscript{239} Procedurally, the organization’s motion was timely. It was submitted just fourteen days after the complaint and proposed consent decree were filed by the DOJ, and by the court-ordered deadline for such motions.\textsuperscript{240} The CUC was described as “a non-profit association of people in New Orleans who have done admirable work for decades to transform the New Orleans Police Department [NOPD] into a constitutional policing department that respects the rights of all residents.”\textsuperscript{241} The organization reportedly “works with and on behalf of resident victims of the NOPD.”\textsuperscript{242} It was CUC that made the initial request to the DOJ for an investigation into the conduct of the NOPD.\textsuperscript{243} Similar to the efforts of community organizations in other cities, CUC facilitated meetings for community members to detail their experiences and concerns related to the NOPD.\textsuperscript{244} Representatives of the DOJ were reportedly in attendance at some of those meetings.\textsuperscript{245}

The CUC reform efforts did not begin with gaining the attention of the DOJ. More than two years before the federal consent decree was approved by the court, CUC reportedly compiled a “31 page Peoples [sic] Consent Decree” detailing the reforms deemed necessary from the perspective of impacted communities.\textsuperscript{246} According to CUC, its efforts to provide community input through elected officials were rebuffed by the New Orleans City Council.\textsuperscript{247} The CUC sought intervention because, in its view, “the remedies suggested in the proposed consent decree [were] too little and too weak and not at all likely to force the major transformation needed” to ensure constitutional policing in New Orleans.\textsuperscript{248} The CUC’s filing in support of its intervention asserted that none of the existing parties “adequately represent[ed] the interests of the people who are the primary victims

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\textsuperscript{237} See Order, supra note 222.
\textsuperscript{238} Louisiana state law also provides organizations like CUC the right to intervene: “An unincorporated association, in its name, may institute, defend, intervene, or participate in a judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding . . . .” \textsc{La. St. Ann.} § 12:507(A) (2019).
\textsuperscript{240} \textit{City of New Orleans}, 2012 WL 12990388, at *6.
\textsuperscript{241} \textit{Id.} (alteration in original) (quoting Motion to Intervene, supra note 239, at 1).
\textsuperscript{242} Motion to Intervene, supra note 239, at 1.
\textsuperscript{243} Id.
\textsuperscript{244} \textit{See id.} at 2.
\textsuperscript{245} Id.
\textsuperscript{246} \textit{See id.}
\textsuperscript{247} \textit{Id.} The Peoples Consent Decree was submitted to the Department of Justice. \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{248} \textit{Id.} at 5.
\end{flushleft}
of the culture of corruption pointed out by the DOJ.\textsuperscript{249}

The DOJ opposition focused on two points related to adequate representation. First, it argued that CUC failed to rebut the presumption that a government entity adequately represents the interests of “all of its citizens.”\textsuperscript{250} It further argued that CUC was required to demonstrate that its interests were both different and not adequately represented by the government.\textsuperscript{251} Second, the DOJ argued that CUC could not overcome a second presumption of adequate representation recognized by the Fifth Circuit because the federal government and CUC shared the same goal of constitutional policing.\textsuperscript{252}

In denying CUC’s motion to intervene, the district court employed a limited reading of the legally protectable interest required under Rule 24(a). The opinion of the court took issue with CUC’s interest in police reform not being based in a contractual relationship or property right that could be impacted by the remedies instituted through the litigation.\textsuperscript{253} The court’s interpretation of the legally protectable interest not only went beyond that required by Rule 24(a) but also diminished the importance of the interest that CUC asserted. It is difficult to reconcile the notion that a community organization devoted to ensuring the constitutional protections of impacted community members would not have a legally protectable interest in constitutional policing. Moreover, the expectation that CUC would have a legally binding agreement or property right to aid in the protection of those interests is contrary to the articulated equitable purpose of Rule 24 and is misplaced in this context.\textsuperscript{254} To support its position, the court cited an oil and gas pipeline case,\textsuperscript{255} a citation that demonstrates the court’s effort to fit a square peg into a round hole as it relates to its application of the Rule 24(a) standard in the context of police reform litigation.

Finally, the court held that, even if CUC did have a protectable interest, the proposed consent decree process would not impair CUC’s ability to bring a separate action against officers for constitutional violations.\textsuperscript{256} This approach ignores Supreme Court decisions that make it virtually impossible for individuals to successfully file suits to enjoin systemic police misconduct.\textsuperscript{257} The decision in this case also fails to adhere to interests of judicial efficiency and frustrates the


\textsuperscript{250. United States’ Memorandum in Response to Motions to Intervene at 17–18, City of New Orleans, 2012 WL 12990388, ECF No. 27 (citing Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603, 605 (5th Cir. 1994)).}

\textsuperscript{251. Id. at 17.}

\textsuperscript{252. Id. at 18.}

\textsuperscript{253. City New Orleans, 2012 WL 12990388, at *6.}

\textsuperscript{254. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (articulating a desire to remove property interest as a fulcrum to interventions as a matter of right in the adopted 1966 amendment to Rule 24).}

\textsuperscript{255. See City of New Orleans, 2012 WL 12990388, at *6 (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1984)).}

\textsuperscript{256. Id.}

general purpose of the rule of intervention. Moreover, the rationale of the court ignores the unique opportunity that the federally initiated structural reform litigation presents. The court’s opinion did not specifically address whether the interests asserted by CUC were adequately represented by an existing party.

The New Orleans consent decree and those that came after it fail in some key areas. From a practical standpoint, an analysis of the New Orleans decree reveals several ways in which that project could have benefited from robust and inclusive interfacing with CUC. For instance, the decree required the NOPD to ensure that the stops, searches, and arrests it conducted would be “consistent with community priorities for [law] enforcement.” It contains no direction on how any such priorities would be identified and incorporated into the reform process.

The decree also required the NOPD to provide police services that “promote[] broad community engagement and confidence” in the police force. Although this is a positive objective essential to building healthy relationships between the police and the community they serve, the stated goal alone is not enough. Aside from a requirement that the bias-free training include both community and police perspectives on discriminatory policing, the decree provides no guidance or opportunity for the community to provide insight on what type of interactions could lead to greater confidence and engagement.

The absence of collaboration with impacted community organizations is particularly apparent in the Sections of the decree entitled “Community Engagement” and “Community-Based Restorative Justice Project.” In contrast to the portions of the decree focused on victim-centered policing for those who have suffered sexual or domestic violence, the Community Engagement and Restorative Justice Project provisions are light on details. The Community Engagement Section identifies no community organizations with which the department should collaborate. Instead, the decree requires officers to continue to attend department-
sponsored community meetings.\textsuperscript{266} It fails to require the NOPD to collaborate with community organizations that have demonstrated long-standing interest in ending unconstitutional police violence. Instead, the decree narrowly requires the NOPD to collaborate with the community to address issues related to “safety and quality of life.”\textsuperscript{267}

The Restorative Justice Project provision is even more devoid of information and details than the Community Engagement section. The brief paragraph makes the laudable acknowledgment that the parties need to create a project aimed at “remedy[ing] mistrust between NOPD and the . . . community.”\textsuperscript{268} It contains no information on how the project would be implemented, including who would fund and run it.\textsuperscript{269}

Granted, it would be impossible to include every detail on how the NOPD was to go about fulfilling its obligations under the decree. That effort would require a type of mystical foresight not seen in structural reform litigation. In large measure, the information provided fits the general spirit of consent decree settlement agreements and can be viewed as a commitment of the parties to work collaboratively to accomplish the agreed-upon terms. However, the repeated amorphous use of \textit{community} hints at two glaring problems with the current approach to DOJ-initiated police reforms.

The first is that the decree refuses to identify impacted communities as the segment of community with which the police and federal government should be collaborating. If the reform efforts exist to end unconstitutional policing and repair the relationship between police and the affected communities, specifically naming that goal and identifying the organizations working toward the same goal should be required. The second glaring problem is the failure of the decree to specifically require the police to work in concrete, measurable, and verifiable ways with organizations representing impacted communities. Without the community at the table during the formative phases of plans designed to repair police–community relationships and increase officer accountability, the DOJ and federal court simply required the NOPD to have a one-sided conversation.

\textsuperscript{266} See Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department, \textit{supra} note 100, at 61. The consent decree references New Orleans Neighbors and Police Anti-Crime Council (NONPACC) meetings, see id., which are found on the New Orleans Police Department Event Calendar, \textit{see NOPD Event Calendar, City New Orleans, https://www.nola.gov/nopd/calendar/} (click the button with a right arrow until NONPACC meetings appear in the ”Event” column).

\textsuperscript{267} \textit{Id.} at 108.

\textsuperscript{268} \textit{Id.} at 108.

\textsuperscript{269} \textit{See id.}
4. Portland

The Albina Ministerial Alliance Coalition for Justice and Police Reform (AMA) filed a motion to intervene as of right in the DOJ pattern or practice suit in Portland, Oregon in January 2013. The AMA began ten years prior, after the shooting of Kendra James, a Black woman, by Portland police during a traffic stop. The AMA comprised 125 Portland-area religious congregations. Those groups had been working in the area of social justice for more than four decades and were founding members of the AMA.

The AMA made several solicited recommendations regarding the draft terms of a proposed settlement agreement. Those recommendations were not limited solely to aspects of traditional community engagement. The organization raised concerns and declared interests regarding data tracking, the use of intermediary weapons, and the expansion of police accountability through community oversight. The AMA argued that the finalized agreement failed to address the organization’s interests on those issues and others.

The AMA also squarely addressed its assertion that the DOJ would not adequately represent its interests in two ways. First, the organization stated its concern about the failure of the DOJ to address the racially discriminatory practices of the Portland Police Bureau. Community organization leaders provided data analysis on the disparate use of force based on race. The DOJ, despite a purported recognition of the disparity, failed to ensure that the settlement terms were designed to remedy the issue. Second, the organization argued that the DOJ would not adequately represent its interests because the DOJ had rejected recommendations on accountability, use of force, data tracking, and ongoing community input or court oversight of outcomes.

The DOJ argued that it adequately represented any interests thatAMA had in the current litigation. It addressed two presumptions of adequate representation that it argued AMA failed to rebut: the presumption that arises when the intervenor has the same “ultimate objective” of one of the parties, and the presumption that the government adequately represents the interests of its constituency.

271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See id. at 6–7.
275. See id. at 8.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 13–14.
278. Id. at 14.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 15.
281. Memorandum in Opposition to Proposed Intervenor-Defendant Portland Police Ass’n & Proposed Intervenor-Plaintiff AMA Coalition’s FRCP 24 Motions to Intervene, supra note 111, at 19.
The district court agreed with the DOJ. The court determined this after detailing in the opinion how an interest is not protectable if it is “undifferentiated” and “generalized,” or if it is “comparable to a substantial portion of the population.” This analysis failed to address the racially disparate policing present in American cities. People of color, especially Black people, experience disproportionately high rates of interactions with police—from traffic stops to physical violence. The concerns of individuals and communities directly impacted by those disparities are distinctly different from those of the majority. The characterization of AMA’s interests as “undifferentiated” and “generalized” ignored that reality and allowed the court to end its analysis without addressing the issue of adequate representation. Consequently, the finding by the court that AMA had no protectable interest created the space for it to avoid addressing the issue of adequate representation.

Nevertheless, the court provided its analysis of the adequate representation factor. It found that AMA could not overcome the presumption that the government adequately represents its constituents. Embedded in the analysis is the court’s assumption that the federal government was interested inremedying unconstitutional policing and therefore would adequately represent the interests of AMA. For reasons more fully discussed in Part IV, this finding fails on at least two fronts. First, the court failed to acknowledge that a proponent for a general resolution is quite different than an advocate for specified interests. Second, the finding negated the value and insight that those closely connected to the relevant police misconduct could add to inform the reform process.

5. Albuquerque

Formal intervention was sought in the Albuquerque federal consent decree on two separate occasions. The first attempt involved motions of nine unrepresented individuals filed prior to the fairness hearing held by the court to assess the

283. Id. at *5 (quoting S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2002)).
284. See Emma Pierson, Camelia Simoiu, Jan Overgoor, Sam Corbett-Davies, Daniel Jenson, Amy Shoemaker, Vignesh Ramachandran, Phoebe Barghouy, Cheryl Phillips, Ravi Shroff & Sharad Goel, A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the United States, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 736, 739–41 (2020).
285. Id. at 739; see also Sarah DeGue, Katherine A. Fowler & Cynthia Calkins, Deaths Due to Use of Lethal Force by Law Enforcement: Findings from the National Violent Death Reporting System, 17 U.S. States, 2009–2012, 51 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S173, S176 (2016) (finding that members of the Black community were overrepresented relative to the U.S. population as victims of police violence).
287. The court granted to AMA what it referred to as “enhanced amicus curiae” status. Id. at *8. That status certainly provides the appearance that AMA has a literal seat at the table by ordering that it be permitted to: (1) provide briefs on any issues before the court in the same manner as the parties; (2) participate in any oral arguments; (3) have a place at counsel’s table; and (4) be referred to as a party in the litigation, among other concessions. Id. This raises the question of why the court would make these concessions for an entity with no protectable interest that is being adequately represented by an existing party.
288. Id. at *7.
appropriateness of the proposed decree. The court observed that the motions expressed a general interest in remedying "lawlessness" within the Albuquerque Police Department. The court found that the interest was shared and adequately represented by the DOJ. The first attempt at intervention by individuals within the Albuquerque community was consequently denied.

The second attempt at intervention involved three community groups representing the homeless, disabled, and Native American communities within Albuquerque. Their joint motion was filed approximately one month after the court denied the first set of intervention motions. The three organizations had a long-standing history of representing and advocating for the rights and interests of the identified communities. The motion also provided some background on each organization's prior involvement in the reform efforts. Both the federal government and the City of Albuquerque opposed intervention by the organizations.

The procedural mechanism used by the organizations in Albuquerque was different from that used in similar cases. They sought permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) instead of intervention as a matter of right under Rule 24(a). The filing indicates that the parties chose this path to intervention to avoid deficiencies in standing. The motion for permissive intervention identified three ways...
that the DOJ failed to adequately represent the interests of the organizations’ members. First, Native Americans and homeless individuals who had been victimized were too afraid and distrusting of law enforcement to speak directly to law enforcement officers. 301 Second, the U.S. government failed to address the disparate impact that some Sections of the consent decree, which likely would increase interactions between police officers and those with mental, developmental, or other disabilities, would have on those populations. 302 Finally, the DOJ representatives did not have the federally recognized expertise in issues related to mental health that one of the proposed intervenors possessed. 303 The motion identified specific portions of the government’s proposed consent decree that would have a detrimental impact on persons living with disabilities, if adopted. 304

The court decided that the concerns of the community organizations were adequately represented by the parties. 305 It pointed to one of the organizations participating in the Mental Health Response Advisory Committee designed and implemented under the settlement agreement. 306 And it characterized the dispute over the adequacy of representation as an issue of “different policy approaches.” 307 Finally, the court found that the three issues raised by the organizations to support their argument of inadequate representation were new claims that went “beyond the scope” of the existing litigation. 308 The disparate impact argument presented by the community organizations actually led to their undoing. It led the court to express concern that the discovery required to determine the merit of the claims would cause undue delays in the existing case. 309

The concern raised by the court here is not unlike those concerns related to general case management for large, structural-reform litigation. Part IV explores the tensions related to this concern and proposes a viable solution.

301. Corrected Motion to Intervene on Behalf of People Who Have Mental Disabilities, Who Experience Homelessness & Who Are Native American, Who Have Encounters with the Albuquerque Police Department, supra note 295, at 9.
302. Id. at 11.
303. Id. at 10.
304. Id. at 11 (“If implemented, this section would increase the number of encounters between the City’s police officers and people with mental, developmental or other disabilities, likely increasing uses-of-force incidents against them by City police officers and likely increasing the arrests and incarceration of such people.”).
306. See id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See id. at *4. The federal government raised an important issue as to the disparate impact allegation for which there is no simple answer. It argued that a potential delay in the current reform efforts would place other communities at risk of experiencing continued unconstitutional policing while the court and the parties spent time working through the merits of the movant–interveners on behalf of Native Americans and the homeless. Id.
6. Seattle

The Seattle CPC also sought to intervene permissively in that city’s pattern or practice litigation more than one year after the court approved the consent decree.310 Unlike the community organizations that had sought intervention in the prior cases, the CPC was created by the City of Seattle under the terms of the decree. Its membership included ten individuals chosen to represent some of the diverse communities within Seattle as well as three appointed police union members.311 There was no category specifically reserved for those impacted by Seattle Police Department misconduct. The CPC was the first of its kind in DOJ-initiated police reform litigation. The parties agreed that there was “significant community interest” in the litigation and that “[t]he community is a critical resource.”312

The CPC’s and the parties’ filings on the issue reveal the motive of the CPC in seeking intervention as well as the parties’ objections to the intervention sought. The CPC intervention was driven by a desire to seek additional time to provide input and recommendations on policy revisions.313 The organization specifically sought judicial relief from the deadlines established under the first year monitoring plan.314 This process-oriented intervention is unlike the other remedial interventions attempted by community organizations in other jurisdictions. This filing exchange could, in some ways, be explained away as a procedural misunderstanding. The CPC argued that it believed the court required a motion to intervene in order to consider its deadline extension request.315 The opposition articulated by the federal government potentially provides insight into how the DOJ views the role of community organizations in DOJ-initiated litigation.

310. Community Police Commission’s Motion to Intervene for Purpose of Proposing Modifications to Deadlines at 1, United States v. City of Seattle, No. 2:12-cv-01282-JLR, 2013 BL 434209 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2013), ECF No. 90. A pro se litigant and the Seattle Times each also sought to intervene in the case. The pro se filing does not provide much insight into the purpose of the filer’s motion beyond his stated intention to “[i]ntervene as a friend [o]f the [c]ourt on behalf of the City of Seattle.” Motion to Enter the Policy of the Department of Justice & the Question of the Participation of the Washington State Bar Ass’n as an Expert Witness at 1, City of Seattle, 2013 BL 434209, ECF No. 34. The Rule 24(b) motion by the Seattle Times centered around the interest of the press to gain information received by the parties regarding independent monitor applications. See Third Party Seattle Times Co.’s Motion for Relief from Provisional Protective Order & Motion to Intervene at 1–2, City of Seattle, 2013 BL 434209, ECF No. 16. The parties previously sought to limit access to that information. Id. at 1. Both motions are outside the scope of this Article and have not been included in the overall analysis.

311. Settlement Agreement & Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution, supra note 106, at 2 (describing the decree’s focus on creating the CPC to “ensure that [its] membership is representative of the many and diverse communities” based on residential geography, occupation as law enforcement, religious faith, and those designated as “minority” or “ethnic,” with no specific seat on the commission for those individuals impacted by police violence).

312. Id.

313. Community Police Commission’s Motion to Intervene for Purpose of Proposing Modifications to Deadlines, supra note 310, at 2.

314. Id. at 1.

315. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Community Police Commission’s Motion to Intervene for Purpose of Proposing Modifications to Deadlines at 1, City of Seattle, 2013 BL 434209, ECF No. 104.
The DOJ lawyers preemptively argued that the interests of the CPC were “adequately protected” under the current composition of parties and contents of the consent decree. The DOJ conceded that the CPC had a significant protectable interest in the litigation but asserted that this interest was “shared by both current parties.” The DOJ went on to include the federal judge assigned to the litigation as responsible for adequately representing the interests of the community. The identification of the protectable interest and assertion of adequate representation proffered by the federal government were made without any such initial assertion by the CPC. The CPC argued in reply that its independent role as the voice of the community made it distinctly different from being an entity within city government.

This distinction is an important one worth highlighting. The possibility exists that similarly situated, community-based organizations would not agree with city government. For example, if the city and CPC were to take opposing positions on the use of body-worn cameras by officers, there would be no possibility that the city lawyers would advance and represent the interests of the CPC. Concerns have been expressed about the expanding surveillance of marginalized communities.

The CPC also distinguished the engagement required of it under the consent decree from its shared “ultimate objective [of] constitutional and effective policing” with the federal government. The CPC’s motion to intervene was ultimately denied by the court, which instead granted to the commission only amici status.

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316. United States’ Combined Response to the CPC’s Motion to Partially Intervene & to the City & the CPC’s Motions to Extend Certain Deadlines, supra note 196, at 3.
317. Id. at 9.
318. See id. at 10.
319. Reply Memorandum in Support of Community Police Commission’s Motion to Intervene for Purpose of Proposing Modifications to Deadlines, supra note 315, at 4–5.
320. See Melissa Hellmann, Seattle’s Oversight of Surveillance Technology Is Moving Forward Slowly, SEATTLE TIMES (June 5, 2019, 5:11 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/technology/seattles-oversight-of-surveillance-technology-is-moving-forward-slowly/ (detailing the community privacy concerns regarding previously undisclosed governmental use of surveillance technology that led to legislative reforms in Seattle); see also Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 40, at 1829–30 (discussing community privacy concerns related to the use of drones by the government in Compton, California).
321. Reply Memorandum in Support of Community Police Commission’s Motion to Intervene for Purpose of Proposing Modifications to Deadlines, supra note 315, at 5.
322. United States v. City of Seattle, No. 2:12-cv-01282-JLR, 2013 BL 434209, at *6–7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2013). The estate of Charleena Lyles also attempted to intervene after she was killed in an officer-involved shooting in 2017. See The Estate of Charleena Lyles’ Emergency Motion to Intervene for the Purposes of Providing Additional Critical Information to the Court at 1, City of Seattle, 2013 BL 434209, ECF No. 427. Unlike the other intervention attempts discussed in this Article, Ms. Lyles’ estate sought to intervene in its individual capacity. The Lyles intervention was sought approximately four years after the Seattle settlement agreement was adopted by the court as a consent decree. See id. at 1, 5. It was precipitated by the killing of Ms. Lyles during a mental health crisis call for service. See id. at 1–2. The estate sought to provide information to the court regarding concerns about officer training, competence, and decisionmaking after Ms. Lyles was fatally shot by officers. Id. at 2–3, 5.
The Seattle CPC has faced challenges and organizational questions around its authority and impact. Though Seattle’s CPC was granted amici status, it still encountered difficulty establishing “durable collaborative partnerships” with police leadership. Party status would make it harder for law enforcement to disregard community input and needs as mere recommendations. As of now, the success of a community organization’s efforts to be meaningfully engaged in reform litigation is determined by the extent of its political connections. This crucial working relationship should not be left to the chance that police brass will embrace community engagement and input or that the marginalized will find some way to leverage the political capital necessary to gain the attention and support of elected officials. This is especially true considering scholars’ and experts’ identification of a breakdown in community–police relations as a contributing source to patterns and practices of unconstitutional policing.

There is an inherent tension, despite the DOJ efforts, present in its response to community motions to intervene. As discussed above, the DOJ has engaged the community in real-time, on-the-ground discussions about ways to improve policing in subject jurisdictions. These efforts have included seeking community input during the investigation phase. But that engagement virtually disappears once a decision has been made to move forward with filing suit. In essence, one might observe the DOJ metaphorically saying to interested community leaders and organizations, “Thanks for your help. We’ll take it from here.” This position is evidenced by DOJ opposition to motions to intervene filed by those organizations.

7. Baltimore

The 2016 election and subsequent inauguration of Donald Trump presented unique challenges for the consent decree process in Baltimore. The settlement agreement was filed with the court on January 12, 2017. In April 2017, lawyers for the DOJ informed the court of Attorney General Sessions’s “grave concerns” about the proposed decree. A motion to intervene was filed by community members in Baltimore on that same day.

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325. Graef, supra note 174, at 34.
326. See id. at 35.
328. See Memorandum of Law in Support of AMA Coalition’s Motion to Intervene, supra note 270, at 4–5.
Community Churches for Community Development, Inc. and Ralph Moore, Jr., in his individual capacity, filed a joint motion to intervene in the Baltimore consent decree process.\footnote{Proposed Intervenors’ Community Churches for Community Development, Inc. & Ralph E. Moore, Jr.’s Motion to Intervene, supra note 35.} The putative intervenors requested intervention as a matter of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) or, in the alternative, permissively under subrule (b).\footnote{Id. at 1.} The community group was made up of six churches, five of which were located in Black neighborhoods.\footnote{Id. at 2.} The organization identified their “strong interest in ending unlawful and discriminatory police practices that have harmed them in the past” along with their desire to see the proposed consent decree fully enforced.\footnote{Id.} Mr. Moore was identified as a community leader, social worker, and lifelong Baltimore resident.\footnote{Id.} The filing asserted that he individually, and the communities he serves, would likely be “harmed again” by the Baltimore Police Department if the proposed consent decree was not fully enforced.\footnote{Id.} The complaint in intervention filed by the movants included information about the organization’s long-standing efforts and resources to build and strengthen community–police relationships in Baltimore.\footnote{Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Intervenors Community Churches for Community Development, Inc. & Ralph E. Moore Jr.’s Amended Motion to Intervene as Plaintiffs at 13–14, United States v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 249 F. Supp. 3d 814 (D. Md. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB), ECF No. 31-1.}

The putative intervenors also asserted a “public interest” as a basis for intervention since they lived in Baltimore and would be harmed if reforms were not made.\footnote{Proposed Intervenors’ Community Churches for Community Development, Inc. & Ralph E. Moore, Jr.’s Motion to Intervene, supra note 35, at 4.} Additionally, they highlighted the “recent alarming and recalcitrant behavior” of the federal government.\footnote{Id.} The motion to intervene included a proposed complaint that expounded upon the actions of the federal government under the new Administration.\footnote{Complaint in Intervention of Plaintiff-Intervenors Community Churches for Community Development, Inc. & Ralph E. Moore, Jr. at 5, Balt. Police Dep’t, 249 F. Supp. 3d 814 (No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB), ECF No. 30-2.}

This background framed the putative intervenors’ argument that representation by the federal government would prove inadequate. The motion discussed the Trump Administration’s “new and different institutional priorities and constraints.”\footnote{Proposed Intervenors’ Community Churches for Community Development, Inc. & Ralph E. Moore, Jr.’s Motion to Intervene, supra note 35, at 5.} It went on to discuss how the new Administration’s announced position on the issue was “inconsistent with, and adverse to, the continued federal oversight” needed in Baltimore.\footnote{Id. at 6.} The argument made in support of intervention
failed to explicitly address the presumption of adequate representation when the government is a party.

The court denied the motion to intervene just one day after it was filed. It summarized the purposes of the motion as (1) seeking redress for violations and (2) ensuring enforcement of the decree. The court found that the motion to intervene for the purpose of redressing constitutional violations was moot in light of the consent decree having been ordered by the court earlier that day. The opinion goes on to find concerns about enforcement of the decree to be not yet ripe because the government had yet to do anything to indicate that it would refuse to comply with the decree.

Several takeaways are important to highlight. The majority of organizations seeking intervention are recognized by the courts for their local and long-standing commitment to reform police in their communities. In all instances, the DOJ opposed intervention efforts. The courts recognized the liberal intervention standard set out by Rule 24(a). Nevertheless, the application of the presumption of government adequate representation serves as a virtual bar to intervention for community organizations seeking intervention. The following Part interrogates the judicial authority cited to support the assertion of presumptive adequate representation.

IV. HOW COURTS HAVE MISSED THE MARK AND A PATH FORWARD

The court decisions detailed above create what may be perceived as an impenetrable barrier between the reform process and the communities whose lives and rights the reforms are created to protect. Courts must consider several factors when analyzing motions under Rule 24. It cannot be ignored that courts must also balance practical concerns regarding the scope and size of the litigation under their purview. Although those considerations and responsibilities should not be understated or overlooked, a more complete analysis of the adequate representation factor and its related presumption is in order. The following Part discusses case law relied upon by courts in determining whether impacted communities are adequately represented by the DOJ. It also seeks to illustrate how the denial of intervention to impacted communities misses the mark. The case law that the denials rely on either plainly supports intervention, cites precedential authority misaligned to issues relevant to DOJ-initiated police consent decrees, or ignores the broader applicability of concerns presented by established precedent.

A. CONTROLLING CASE LAW SUPPORTS INTERVENTION

Some courts deciding whether to grant intervention in DOJ-initiated consent decrees cite cases that support finding in favor of the putative intervenors. Two of those cited cases that follow the liberal standard for intervention contemplated by Rule 24(a)’s amendment are discussed below.

343. See Balt. Police Dep’t, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 815.
Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, the seminal Supreme Court case on intervention, is aligned with the standard set out in Rule 24(a). Trbovich involved the efforts of a union member to intervene in a lawsuit brought by the U.S. Secretary of Labor. The Secretary sought the removal of elected union officials for alleged violations under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. Movant–intervenors are required to show only that the representation by the original parties “may be” inadequate to serve their interests. Some of the factors that courts have analyzed when determining if interests are adequately represented include (1) whether the arguments made by an original party to advance their interests would undoubtedly be the same as the movant’s interest arguments, (2) if the original party is both capable and willing to make those same arguments, and (3) if the movant offers a necessary element to the proceedings that the original party will neglect.

This “relatively low” bar encounters enhanced scrutiny when the putative representative party is the government. Several circuits have established a rebuttable presumption of adequate representation when the government is a party. The Third and Fourth Circuits require the movant to make a “compelling” or “strong” showing that the representation is inadequate. In the Seventh Circuit, movants must make a showing of gross negligence or bad faith on the part of the government.

Courts considering whether impacted communities have successfully rebutted the presumption of adequate governmental representation also routinely cite Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Service despite the opinion in that case supporting the opposite conclusion. The Ninth Circuit granted

344. 404 U.S. 528 (1972)
345. Id. at 529–30.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 538 n.10.
349. Gregory R. Manring, It’s Time for an Intervention! Resolving the Conflict Between Rule 24(a) (2) and Article III Standing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2525, 2531 (2017).
350. See, e.g., United States v. Territory of Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d 514, 520 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[W]e presume that the United States adequately represents the interests of those prisoners.”); Ruthardt v. United States, 303 F.3d 375, 386 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Adequacy is presumed, although rebuttably so, where a government agency is the representative party.”); United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 401 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Normally, a presumption of adequate representation generally arises when the representative is a governmental body or officer charged by law with representing the interests of the absentee.”).
351. See Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 888 F.3d 52, 60–62 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that there was a compelling showing for a religious nonprofit to intervene where Pennsylvania was suing the federal government for allowing an exemption for religious business to pay for contraceptive coverage); Stuart v. Huff, 706 F.3d 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that abortion providers could not intervene in defending a constitutional challenge to abortion laws).
352. See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Kaul, 942 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that the state legislature could not intervene to defend a challenge against Wisconsin’s new abortion laws because it could not show that the state attorney general would not provide adequate representation).
353. 66 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
intervention to the State of Arizona and Apache County, Arizona after finding that the federal government did not adequately represent those intervenors. The decision pointed to the federal government’s responsibility to “present the broad public interest.” Moreover, the court reasoned that “[i]nadequate representation is most likely to be found when the applicant asserts a personal interest that does not belong to the general public.” The reasoning asserted by the court here is applicable to police reform cases. The federal government has acknowledged its responsibility to represent the varied and diverse viewpoints of those who live and work in American cities. Moreover, police reform cases considering motions to intervene have failed to acknowledge that the interests of disproportionately impacted communities are different from those of the general public. Instead, they have exacerbated what Sunita Patel calls a formal structure by which the “minority or marginalized voices are . . . silenced in liberal democratic processes.”

B. WHY THE PRESUMPTION SHOULD BE REBUTTED

The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon denied community organization intervention in the Portland consent decree. The court cited Arakaki v. Cayetano, the source of a commonly used test for adequate representation, to support the denial. The following subsection argues that the issues unique to DOJ-initiated police reform efforts deserve closer examination by the courts.

1. Shared General Interest in Consent Decree Is Not Enough—Adequate Representation of Impacted Community Interests Should Require More

The democratic and representational responsibilities owed by the federal government to all Americans expose the fallacy of presumptive adequate representation, especially in police reform litigation initiated by the DOJ. Thus far, the representation analysis employed by courts in the police reform context is limited and fails to consider some key distinctions between the interests and roles of the federal government and community organizations seeking intervention. Lawyers

354. Id. at 1499.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. See DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 78, at 18.
358. See Pierson et al., supra note 284, at 736 (describing the process by which researchers “compiled and analysed a dataset detailing nearly 100 million traffic stops” in dozens of jurisdictions across the country, and concluding that “police stops and search decisions suffer from persistent racial bias”); John Gramlich, From Police to Parole, Black and White Americans Differ Widely in Their Views of Criminal Justice System, Pew Res. Ctr. (May 21, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/21/from-police-to-parole-black-and-white-americans-differ-widely-in-their-views-of-criminal-justice-system/ [https://perma.cc/4RJQ-WM25] (“[Members of the Black community] are also more likely than whites to have specific criticisms about the way officers do their jobs, particularly when it comes to police interactions with their community.”).
359. Patel, supra note 39, at 806.
361. See id. at *6 (citing Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003)).
for both the federal government and subject local jurisdictions highlight the various community interests that they must weigh throughout the implementation phase of a consent decree. The current analysis has been distilled to whether the putative intervenor and the federal government share a specific mutual interest. Courts have employed a simplistic approach to determining this mutual interest: they ask whether both parties desire the remedial efforts of the consent decree to be successful.\(^{362}\) In short, the court simply asks whether they both seek to remedy unconstitutional policing. Allowing a blanket interest in constitutional policing to serve as a factor in the intervention analysis, however, undermines that very inquiry. An analysis that fails to take into account the particularized interest of communities impacted by police violence could benefit from an enhanced understanding of the limited role that the federal government serves in the litigation.

A desire to bring about change is not a magic wand. The process of implementing police consent decrees takes place across a variety of substantive areas in law enforcement. It is unlike traditional litigation in which one party pursues an action against another to recover damages as a result of a single incident or situation. Pattern or practice litigation involves, instead, detailed policy revisions and training on use of force, search and seizure, use of body-worn cameras, community policing plans, and various ways to ensure accountability within departments.\(^{363}\) The intricate nature of the work requires more than the perspectives of law enforcement and local and federal governments. The voice and insight of impacted communities are essential to the implementation phase. Indeed, current consent decree processes have increased their outreach to community members. That outreach, described above, has been a one-sided arrangement with community members being surveyed and informed but never being recognized or respected as essential parties at all stages of the process. Party status for organizations representing the interests of impacted communities would provide space and opportunity for meaningful engagement in every aspect of the reform process, not merely those aspects on which the DOJ seeks input.

The stability and continuity to be gained by granting party status to impacted communities has also been ignored. The implementation of police reform consent decrees takes place over the span of a number of years.\(^{364}\) The consent decree involving reforms within the Pittsburgh Police Department lasted more than eight years.\(^{365}\) The decree in Detroit stretched out for nearly thirteen years.\(^{366}\)


\(^{363}\) See DOJ CIVIL RIGHTS Div., supra note 78, at 10.

\(^{364}\) See id.

\(^{365}\) Order upon Motion Granting Joint Motion to Terminate Consent Decree & Dismiss This Case, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 2:97-cv-00354-RJC (W.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2005).

these implementation periods. Changes have also occurred in the court-appointed independent monitor selected to work with the parties and the court toward implementation. During this time the parties discuss and decide how to carry out the reform mandates to serve the communities impacted by the pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing. The parties may also jointly decide to revise a term or set of terms in the original agreement. Party status for impacted community organizations would provide a role and opportunity for them to formally participate in the implementation decisionmaking.

Party status could also potentially provide a stable source of continuing local expertise, especially in the instance where the putative intervenor has a longstanding history of working to reform police practices. Intervention by impacted community organizations in reform litigation should also address any concerns that private plaintiffs would simply use the process for their own financial gain. The reform processes under § 12601 do not presently allow for monetary damages. In sum, the decisionmaking processes involved require more than a stated commitment to the decree or the ability to strategize.

2. The Federal Government Is Unlikely to Make the Arguments of Impacted Communities

The federal government, as discussed above, has recently demonstrated that there are some arguments that it is unwilling to make on behalf of impacted communities. It is also important to explore how federalism concerns have impacted the depth and breadth of federal intervention. As expounded upon by Burke Marshall, the federal government is constrained by issues of comity and federalism that are unique to the American system of government. Though some scholars have rightfully challenged Marshall’s view of federalism, the federal government has cited it as a reason for making certain litigation choices.

Whether the litigation strategy is rooted in federalism concerns or simply in diverging opinions about how best to achieve lasting reforms, it is illogical to


presume that the federal government will provide adequate representation on behalf of impacted communities. As a practical matter, the role and perspective of the DOJ are distinctly different from those of impacted communities. The federal government plays the crucial roles of initiating an investigation and then pursuing reforms where unconstitutional patterns or practices of policing have been discovered. The importance of that role cannot be overstated. Federal authority to specifically address police brutality had been long overdue. The DOJ must fulfill its primary obligation and responsibility to enforce the laws of the United States. The federal government will have greater insight into law enforcement national trends and best practices. It also has access to experts and resources. The essential arguments made by the federal government will be informed by that insight.

The federal government’s insight, however, does not negate the essential role and perspective that impacted communities could bring to the litigation process. Just as the ability of the federal government to make arguments from the national perspective is invaluable to the process, so too should the local perspective of impacted communities not be overlooked. Arguments related to the impact and effectiveness of local police practices are best made by the communities affected by those practices. Many community organizations that previously sought intervention in DOJ pattern or practice suits have demonstrated long-standing engagement in police reform efforts. The historical knowledge and experience that comes from that engagement could enable the organizations to make specific arguments for how best to design and implement key policy revisions. Arguments made on behalf of local communities could add a necessary layer to newly developed policies related to civilian oversight, accountability, and community policing.

More specifically, there is no indication that the DOJ has previously engaged impacted communities on what arguments should be made on their behalf. Instead, the details from prior intervention attempts highlight instances when the DOJ has refused to do just that. As discussed above, the community intervention efforts in Portland were made because the federal government backed away from race-based reform efforts. Separate and apart from previous interventions, community organizations have historically made concerted efforts to establish or expand the effectiveness of civilian oversight as well as additional mechanisms to increase police accountability. Arguments made by impacted

373. See Hardaway, supra note 50 (discussing the persistent problem of police violence in America).
374. See supra Sections III.B.1–4.
communities, but not espoused by the DOJ, can also be found in amici filings.376

3. History Demonstrates the Federal Government’s Neglect of Impacted Communities and Their Experiences

During the first 150 years of American history—what legal scholar Stephen Rushin refers to as the “Hands-Off Era”—the federal government made the deliberate choice to ignore police misconduct on the state level.377 This hands-off approach was not due to ignorance. The Wickersham Commission’s report on lawlessness in law enforcement released in the early 1930s provided official notice to the federal government that local police departments across the country were employing brutality to extract coerced confessions.378 Nevertheless, the federal government remained essentially silent for nearly six more decades.

Rushin categorizes this timeframe as the “Buildup Era,” and he generously gives the federal government and judiciary credit for taking some steps to make the cost of police misconduct too great for departments, whether that be financially or legally, through the loss of improperly obtained evidence.379 This position fails to acknowledge the minuscule impact those efforts had on police departments. The heightened burden of proving misconduct on a civil or criminal level was often too great for already marginalized and presumed guilty individuals to overcome. Local governments won far more cases than they lost.380 And the losses they incurred rarely prompted them to incorporate the concerns of impacted communities into the way localities policed those communities.

During the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson’s Law Enforcement Assistance Act was an explicit declaration of the federal government’s position on police brutality.381 It came about after uprisings in Harlem after fifteen-year-old James

376. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Summary at 1, United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 2:00-cv-11769-GAF-RC), ECF No. 403 (noting that the intervenors include the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Los Angeles, ACLU of Southern California, Homeboy Industries, Asian Pacific American Legal Center, and Radio Sin Fronteras).


379. RUSHIN, supra note 377, at 10–12.

380. Harmon, supra note 369, at 9 (describing the inadequate and ineffective nature of criminal and civil remedies available to redress and deter police abuses).

Powell was shot in the street by a police officer. Prior to that time, the federal government had enacted legislation aimed at addressing purported civilian terrorism against members of the Black community. Johnson and Congress viewed the anger of the impacted communities of color with disdain. The legislation left no doubt that the interests of the federal government and local law enforcement authorities (and likely the municipalities themselves) were aligned. Johnson was of the position, as he stated in a speech following the uprisings in Detroit, that federal intervention in local police matters was appropriate when state and local police could not “end disorder.” For Johnson, intervention was necessary on behalf of law enforcement to maintain “law and order,” not to protect those in impacted communities.

The passage of the law signaled a wholesale rejection of any argument that the federal government was interested in protecting the constitutional rights of impacted communities of color in the context of policing. Johnson’s Act did not just send troops into cities to restore order. It also gave financial support to enlarge local police agencies. Johnson also illegally authorized surveillance of Black liberationist and civil rights organizations. These legislative actions were designed to snuff out civil unrest without addressing or acknowledging the injustices, specifically police brutality, that prompted the uprisings.

The Johnson Administration is highlighted here to illustrate how the federal government has aligned itself with local government and law enforcement. Reticence of certain political officials and parties to intervene in local police matters tells a story of unreliable and sporadic efforts by the federal government, at best. In fact, most of history shows that the federal government has failed to successfully intervene to defend the constitutional rights of local citizens.

C. THE FRAMEWORK FOR A PATH FORWARD

Courts’ analysis of the adequate representation factor under Rule 24 has failed to fully assess the interests of impacted communities. Moreover, the analysis has


384. Id.

385. Statement by the President Following the Signing of Law Enforcement Assistance Bills., supra note 381.

386. ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 87 (2016) (discussing the Johnson Administration’s provision of money to municipal law enforcement agencies for the hiring of more officers, to “professionalize” the agencies, as well as the provision of military-grade equipment).


388. RUSHIN, supra note 377, at 3–8 (discussing how for 150 years of American history the federal government has, on the whole, failed to consistently intervene to enforce the rights of local community members while deliberately choosing to ignore police abuses).
failed to give full consideration to the ways in which the interests of the federal
government are not fully aligned with those impacted by police violence. The
DOJ model of community engagement and consultation does not enable the fed-
eral government to adequately represent the interests of communities impacted
by police violence. Federal courts that presume the federal government
adequately represents those interests have sorely missed the mark of remedying
unconstitutional police practices. Expanding the analysis beyond the limited
focus of whether the federal government has an interest in a successfully imple-
mented consent decree is worth consideration.

*Texas v. United States* provides an intervention framework useful in the con-
text of marginalized communities and the federal government. The Fifth
Circuit in that case held that the presumption of adequate representation is suc-
cessfully rebutted when a movant identifies an adversity of interests between
itself and the government representative. An adversity of interests can be dem-
onstrated by showing that the government has interests connected to its rela-
tionship with the other existing party *and* the courts with jurisdiction. The
court stated that “the lack of unity in all objectives, combined with real and legitimate
additional or contrary arguments, is sufficient to demonstrate that the representa-
tion may be inadequate.” Movants are required to make a connection between
the claimed divergent interests and how they affect the litigation.

As they were in *Texas v. United States*, the federal government’s interests in
DOJ-initiated police consent decrees are distinctly different from the interests of
impacted communities. The Attorney General made the Trump Administration’s
desire to have a good working relationship with local law enforcement widely
known. Considerable financial resources were provided from the federal
government to municipalities and their police departments. These resources included
grants from Homeland Security and the DOJ, as well as military surplus equip-
ment. The DOJ has also failed to include community interests and perspectives
beyond the investigation phase of its police reform efforts. Court filings indicate that
the DOJ has desired to have sole control over the implementation of the reform
mandates. Finally, the DOJ readily admitted that it has a responsibility to

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389. 805 F.3d 653 (5th Cir. 2015). In *Texas*, noncitizens were permitted to intervene in an action
regarding Homeland Security’s deferred action program after successfully rebutting the presumption of
adequate representation by the federal government. Id. at 663. Intervenors pointed to the governmental
interests in an expansive interpretation of government authority, enforcing immigration laws, and
maintaining a working relationship with the states to demonstrate divergent interests. Id.
390. Id. at 661–62.
391. See id. at 662.
392. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brumfield v. Dodd, 749 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2014)).
393. See id.
394. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 5.
396. Id.
397. See supra note 111.
represent the interests of all citizens.\textsuperscript{398}

This lack of unity in objectives between the DOJ and impacted communities has manifested itself in ways that undoubtedly have concrete effects on the litigation. The DOJ has emphasized the importance of strong relationships with law enforcement over the importance of consent decrees.\textsuperscript{399} That prioritization led to the DOJ’s failure to honor its agreement in principle with the City of Chicago.\textsuperscript{400} In Baltimore, the DOJ officially attempted to delay, and perhaps attempted to abandon, reform efforts.\textsuperscript{401} This, coupled with the federal government’s supply of military grade weapons and other technologies to local law enforcement efforts, indicates that its diverging interests impact the litigation.

The current top-down model that excludes community insight from the consent decree process prioritizes efficiency over the need to enable impacted communities to build positive working relationships with their local law enforcement agencies. As it currently stands, litigation reform efforts serve only to reinforce the authoritative and hierarchical frameworks that divide community and law enforcement by relegating impacted communities to nonparty status. Courts inclined to recognize that the federal government does not adequately represent the significant interests of impacted communities will have legitimate, practical concerns over the size and scope of the litigation. It is the courts’ responsibility to ensure that reform efforts do not become unduly burdened by divergent viewpoints and agendas that may prevent the court from maintaining order. There is a balance to be struck between those practical concerns and the courts’ responsibility to ensure that interested parties are not excluded from litigation.

The following discussion outlines the framework for establishing the outer edges for evaluating motions filed by community organizations under Rule 24.

1. Significant Interest Demonstrated by Community Engagement and Efforts to Reform Questionable Police Practices

Some will undoubtedly be concerned that favorable rulings for community organizations seeking intervention may open the floodgates for intervenors with varying perspectives and motives to unduly burden the reform process. Insight and guidance from those impacted by police misconduct are integral components to a healthy and accountable law enforcement agency. They are also essential to the implementation of successful reform processes. Courts seeking to ensure that the insight and expertise of impacted communities are being utilized in a meaningful way should examine the historical engagement efforts of the putative intervenor. As seen in previous motions to intervene, community organizations in certain jurisdictions have worked for many years to bring policing concerns to the attention of local elected and selected officials. This community perspective

\textsuperscript{398} See DOJ Civil Rights Div., supra note 78, at 13–14.
\textsuperscript{399} See Office of the Attorney Gen., supra note 5.
\textsuperscript{401} See Motion for Continuance of Public Fairness Hearing, supra note 34, at 1.
should be buttressed by the organization’s knowledge of both current and historical community–police relations, local police department practices and policies, and community concerns about the police services received. Although several of the organizations highlighted in this research had long tenures within their respective communities, length of engagement around reform efforts should not be dispositive. It could, however, be used as a factor to demonstrate how a comparatively short DOJ investigation should not be presumed to usurp the need for direct community representation in police structural reform litigation.

2. Specious Intervention Attempts by Anti-reformists Do Not Meet the Intervention Standard

The legislative intent and purpose of § 12601 is to provide injunctive relief to those impacted by unconstitutional policing. Structural police reform litigation under § 12601 is not the appropriate vehicle or mechanism for anti-reform sentiment or advocacy. Rule 24, although liberal, does contain essential requirements.

Of most relevance here is the requirement that a movant possess an interest that is likely to be impaired by the litigation. By the time that the parties have entered into a consent decree, the DOJ has determined—and the local government has agreed—that the federal government has enough evidence to support a finding of pervasive unconstitutional policing. An outside party asserting an interest against the decree would essentially be advocating for the continuation of unconstitutional practices by law enforcement for which there can be no cognizable interest. Accordingly, intervention by organizations should be limited to community organizations that represent the interests of marginalized communities impacted by the pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing. To date, the only conceivable intervention attempts against reform efforts have come from police unions.402

Impacted community organizations granted intervention during the remedial phase of reform litigation can serve to benefit the implementation process. As discussed above, the historical perspective and on-the-ground insight to be gleaned from marginalized communities are essential components to the reform process. Giving equal party status to impacted communities and local law enforcement also serves to provide a foundation for positive community–police relations beyond the reform process. To that end, providing a seat at the table to impacted communities is aligned with the statutory aims of § 12601. The same cannot be said of community and civic organizations whose primary interest lies in supporting local law enforcement from federal reforms. Any such specious claims are tangential to reform litigation and do not meet the requirements of Rule 24(a). It would be appropriate to rebuff attempts to intervene by those with the purpose of thwarting reform efforts or not impacted by police violence.

402. Hardaway, supra note 50, at 193–98 (arguing that police union assertions of collective bargaining interests in police reform litigation should not satisfy Rule 24(a) because those rights—limited to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment—are outside the scope of the managerial policy revisions covered by law enforcement consent decrees).
3. Collaboration and Joint Legal Representation of Community Organizations

Limiting the number of attorneys of record is another way to prevent structural reform litigation from becoming unnecessarily unwieldy. In many instances, there have been several community organizations working to support those impacted by police violence and misconduct. As discussed above, some of these organizations have worked to remedy police misconduct in a number of different ways over the course of several years. Many of those efforts began before the DOJ initiated its investigations. Indeed, many community organizations have been instrumental in gaining the attention of the DOJ and assisting in its investigations.

Although those efforts are invaluable, it is important to avoid situations where there are a number of lawyers representing each distinct and marginalized community. For instance, it is conceivable that the LGBTQIA+, homeless, and Black communities impacted by police violence would be supported by different community organizations. It is impractical to expect, however, that each of those organizations be represented by separate and distinct legal counsel. Instead, it should be required that the community organizations representing impacted communities agree on the selection of a trial counsel team to represent the collective interests of each marginalized community. To streamline that representation, the organizations should be expected to independently reach a formalized agreement on their objectives, priorities, and means for resolving differences. The court should not be required to address or manage those issues.

CONCLUSION

Organizations seeking intervention in other contexts have successfully rebutted the presumption of adequate representation.403 However, federal courts presiding over DOJ-initiated police reform cases have without exception found that community organizations have failed to rebut the presumption of adequate representation.404 The decision in United States v. City of Los Angeles is often cited to support the denial of motions to intervene as a matter of right filed on behalf of community organizations.405 But the court’s analysis of community efforts to intervene is inherently deficient in identifying and addressing the interests of impacted communities. The current top-down model being used to reform local departments has historically excluded impacted communities despite recognition that input and engagement from those stakeholders are key components.

Not only is asserting that the federal government adequately represents the interests of communities impacted by police violence factually inaccurate, but also court decisions denying community organizations the right to intervene in police reform litigation run counter to the purpose and intent of Rule 24. The

403. E.g., Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1499 (9th Cir. 1995); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1983); Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886, 887 (9th Cir. 1980).
404. See, e.g., United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 402–04 (9th Cir. 2002).
405. Id.
language and comments of the amended Rule fail to support the current judicial findings that intervention hinges on adequate or satisfactory representation of interests.406 Thus, a cursory or perfunctory analysis of the adequacy of representation by courts in a manner that stifles the options of putative intervenors circumvents or ignores the purpose and intent of the drafters’ amended Rule.

Party status for community organizations representative of those impacted by police violence could be beneficial in a number of ways. The aims of this Article are to recognize the invaluable and irreplaceable insight to be gained by impacted communities and to provide a framework in the reform process for community organizations to have a long-sought place at the litigation table. The willingness of a court to formally recognize the importance of impacted communities to the process also has reparative benefits. It could address concerns of distrust and misgivings by granting to marginalized communities full access to aspects of the process from which they have long been excluded. Of equal importance, it would provide the opportunity to ensure that needed conversations and understanding occur between community and police regarding challenges of policing in contemporary American cities as the parties brainstorm solutions and policies.

406. See Kaplan, supra note 138, at 401–02.