This Article focuses on the institutional design of American competi<\/i>tion policy. It argues that any long-term effective revival of U.S. antitrust <\/i>policy requires a better acknowledgement of the key and irreplaceable <\/i>role played by private litigation and proposes a rethink of private anti-<\/i>trust enforcement policy.<\/i><\/p>\n
To unpack the nuanced interconnection between public and private <\/i>competition <\/i>enforcement, the Article begins by tracing the rise and fall of <\/i>private antitrust. It builds on a novel, hand-coded, and comprehensive <\/i>analysis of the entire Supreme Court antitrust track record<\/i>\u2014<\/span>all 474 <\/i>decisions over 130 years<\/i>\u2014<\/span>to outline how an ideologically mixed coali<\/i>tion of anti-enforcement Justices seized on private cases to, in effect, <\/i>reform U.S. <\/i>competition policy at large. Indeed, almost all Supreme <\/i>Court decisions that significantly changed U.S. antitrust laws after the <\/i>mid-1970s were private litigation cases. Over time, a weakened competi<\/i>tion policy led to more unchecked abuses of market power in the U.S. <\/i>economy. <\/i>A growing recognition of these abuses motivates current calls <\/i>for an antitrust revival.<\/i><\/p>\n Relying on insights <\/i>from political economy, this Article then explores <\/i>the root political causes of these changes at the Supreme Court level and <\/i>the key role played by private plaintiffs in the enforcement ecosystem. <\/i>Reformers face a challenge: Too little private litigation exposes competi<\/i>tion policy to the risks of long-term political gaming<\/i>\u2014<\/span>private parties <\/i>exploiting the <\/i>political system to their own advantage<\/i>\u2014<\/span>while too much <\/i>private litigation risks triggering the type of judicial antagonism that <\/i>helped undermine the system over the past decades.<\/i><\/p>\n The Article proposes the creation of <\/i>\u201c<\/span>antitrust super-complainants<\/i>\u201d <\/span>and the expansion of standing rights, combined with stricter motion <\/i>practice rules and maintaining treble damages and fee shifting rules, <\/i>as ways to strike such a balance and help reinvigorate private antitrust <\/i>enforcement.<\/i><\/p>\n Continue reading Rethinking the Key Role of Private Antitrust Enforcemen<\/strong>t<\/strong><\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\nLancieri_Rethinking-the-Key-Role-of-Private-Antitrust-Enforcement<\/a>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" This Article focuses on the institutional design of American competition policy. It argues that any long-term effective revival of U.S. antitrust policy requires a better acknowledgement of the key and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":13871,"featured_media":0,"parent":24190,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"abstract.php","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_price":"","_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_header":"","_tribe_default_ticket_provider":"","_tribe_ticket_capacity":"0","_ticket_start_date":"","_ticket_end_date":"","_tribe_ticket_show_description":"","_tribe_ticket_show_not_going":false,"_tribe_ticket_use_global_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_global_stock_level":"","_global_stock_mode":"","_global_stock_cap":"","_tribe_rsvp_for_event":"","_tribe_ticket_going_count":"","_tribe_ticket_not_going_count":"","_tribe_tickets_list":"[]","_tribe_ticket_has_attendee_info_fields":false,"footnotes":"","_tec_slr_enabled":"","_tec_slr_layout":""},"class_list":["post-24202","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"ticketed":false,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/24202","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/13871"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=24202"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/24202\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":24204,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/24202\/revisions\/24204"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/24190"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=24202"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}