{"id":24219,"date":"2026-04-07T16:37:39","date_gmt":"2026-04-07T20:37:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/?page_id=24219"},"modified":"2026-04-07T16:37:39","modified_gmt":"2026-04-07T20:37:39","slug":"made-in-the-u-s-a-the-constitutional-crisis-behind-americas-arms-export-regime","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/in-print\/volume-114\/volume-114-issue-2-december-2025\/made-in-the-u-s-a-the-constitutional-crisis-behind-americas-arms-export-regime\/","title":{"rendered":"Made in the U.S.A.: The Constitutional Crisis Behind America\u2019s Arms Export Regime"},"content":{"rendered":"

When weapons stamped <\/i>\u201c<\/span>Made in the U.S.A.<\/i>\u201d <\/span>fall from the sky, it defines <\/i>how ordinary people around the world experience American power. <\/i>Accordingly, the authority to sell U.S.-made weapons has become one of the <\/i>strongest tools of foreign policy. When used strategically, arms exports can <\/i>strengthen our partners, advance national security interests, and even <\/i>dissuade allies from accumulating nuclear weapons, all without risking <\/i>American lives. But today, where administrations routinely authorize <\/i>large-scale weapons sales to address global security challenges, the <\/i>downsides of the U.S. arms export regime have become impossible to <\/i>ignore.<\/i><\/p>\n

Selling weapons to foreign countries risks entangling the U.S. in pro<\/i>tracted conflicts, arming repressive regimes, and fueling human rights <\/i>abuses. Despite robust <\/i>\u201c<\/span>End-Use<\/i>\u201d <\/span>monitoring programs by the Executive <\/i>Branch, once weapons leave U.S. soil, the realities of war make them nearly <\/i>impossible to track, monitor, or rescind, as weapons are frequently retrans<\/i>ferred to third parties without authorization or are captured by unintended <\/i>recipients, <\/i>exposing U.S. technology to reverse-engineering by adversaries. <\/i>Despite these risks, and more, FY2024 marked the highest year of military <\/i>sales in U.S. history.<\/i><\/p>\n

The Constitution largely vests Congress with the authority over arms <\/i>exports <\/i>through its Article I Foreign Commerce Clause power. Out of <\/i>recognition that arms exports implicate questions of foreign policy and <\/i>national security, Congress delegated much of this authority to the <\/i>Executive Branch, creating an arms export regime that balanced the <\/i>strengths of both Branches. In practice, however, this shared authority <\/i>has devolved into a <\/i>\u201c<\/span>tug of war<\/i>\u201d <\/span>for control, with Congressional over- <\/i>sight steadily eroding <\/i>since the 1980s. Today, the Executive Branch is <\/i>generally free to authorize an arms sale unless Congress passes <\/i>legislation prohibiting or modifying it<\/i>\u2014<\/span>a power that Congress has never <\/i>successfully asserted.<\/i><\/p>\n

This Note argues that the expansion of the U.S. arms export regime <\/i>demands <\/i>a <\/i>fresh examination of the balance of power between the <\/i>Legislative and Executive Branches. It proposes Congress re-wire the arms <\/i>export approval process by adopting a <\/i>\u201c<\/span>Joint Resolution of Approval<\/i>\u201d <\/span>(JRA) mechanism, codified in the National Security Powers Act and the <\/i>National Security Reforms and Accountability Act, which restores <\/i>demo<\/i>cratic guardrails <\/i>over <\/i>this <\/i>powerful <\/i>foreign <\/i>policy tool while respecting the <\/i>Executive\u2019s authority to respond decisively to global security threats. This <\/i>Note\u2019s solution does not seek to dismantle the arms export regime. On the <\/i>contrary, it aims to bring greater transparency to the approval process and <\/i>to outline actionable steps Americans can take when demanding account<\/i>ability from their elected officials, thereby restoring Congressional oversight <\/i>over <\/i>the Executive in this <\/i>\u201c<\/span>tug of war.<\/i>\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Drawing parallels from the 1970s antiwar movement and protests of <\/i>the <\/i>2020s against arms exports, this Note contends that the political <\/i>moment is ripe for reform. It further cautions that excluding the public <\/i>from consequential foreign policy decisions altogether erodes trust in po<\/i>litical leadership and deteriorates the quality of a representative democ<\/i>racy; even perceived exclusion is dangerous. <\/i>After all, while the tactics <\/i>of warfare evolve in parallel to the advancements in technology and geo- <\/i>politics of the day, one constant has always remained: Americans want a <\/i>voice <\/i>in shaping the meaning of U.S. leadership. Thus, Congressional <\/i>input, regardless of its ultimate effect on a proposed sale, adds a discrete <\/i>value to the arms export process. Restoring this lever of accountability <\/i>over at least the riskiest weapons sales would realign the arms export re<\/i>gime with democratic principles<\/i>\u2014<\/span>just as the Constitution demands.<\/i><\/p>\n

Continue reading Made in the U.S.A.: The Constitutional Crisis Behind America\u2019s Arms Export Regime<\/strong><\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\nGiroti_Made-in-the-U.S.A<\/a>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

When weapons stamped \u201cMade in the U.S.A.\u201d fall from the sky, it defines how ordinary people around the world experience American power. Accordingly, the authority to sell U.S.-made weapons has […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":13871,"featured_media":0,"parent":24190,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"abstract.php","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_price":"","_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_header":"","_tribe_default_ticket_provider":"","_tribe_ticket_capacity":"0","_ticket_start_date":"","_ticket_end_date":"","_tribe_ticket_show_description":"","_tribe_ticket_show_not_going":false,"_tribe_ticket_use_global_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_global_stock_level":"","_global_stock_mode":"","_global_stock_cap":"","_tribe_rsvp_for_event":"","_tribe_ticket_going_count":"","_tribe_ticket_not_going_count":"","_tribe_tickets_list":"[]","_tribe_ticket_has_attendee_info_fields":false,"footnotes":"","_tec_slr_enabled":"","_tec_slr_layout":""},"class_list":["post-24219","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"ticketed":false,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/24219","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/13871"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=24219"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/24219\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":24221,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/24219\/revisions\/24221"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/24190"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/georgetown-law-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=24219"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}