This Note will argue that the cheerleaders\u2019 run-through banners constitute state action, and\u00a0thus, the superintendent\u2019s ban is necessary to avoid an Establishment Clause violation. The aim\u00a0of this Note is to demonstrate that courts are more eager to find state action when the underlying\u00a0claim involves establishment in public schools. Although courts do not acknowledge that they are applying a lower state action threshold in these cases, they are correct to do so because\u00a0schools have enormous power to regulate the lives of students. Part I discusses how the legal\u00a0scholarship supports the idea of a lower state action threshold for establishment claims in public\u00a0school, although this Note\u2019s specific argument has not been made previously. First, scholars\u00a0have noted that the state action doctrine is malleable because state inaction can always be framed\u00a0as action. Second, courts apply the state action doctrine differently based on the nature of the\u00a0underlying constitutional claim. Finally, the state action doctrine may be unique for\u00a0Establishment Clause claims in general. Part II demonstrates that the lower state action\u00a0threshold for the Establishment Clause in public schools is supported by case law and the\u00a0relationship between the religion clauses. Like the military, public schools are an area of\u00a0pervasive government regulation where a student has fewer free speech and free exercise rights.\u00a0Because the government has greater leeway to direct private actors in these realms, declining to\u00a0regulate can imply state approval. That is, when the power is present but not exercised, inaction\u00a0can become state action. This idea finds support in case law and by analogy to other areas of\u00a0state action law. Part III applies this understanding of state action to the Kountze case. The Note\u00a0ends with a short summary and conclusion.<\/p>\n