{"id":7722,"date":"2023-02-02T10:51:46","date_gmt":"2023-02-02T15:51:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/iiel\/research\/iiel-blog\/new-directions-for-brazils-foreign-policy-ambitions-2\/"},"modified":"2025-05-12T11:08:25","modified_gmt":"2025-05-12T15:08:25","slug":"new-directions-for-brazils-foreign-policy-ambitions-2","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/iiel\/research\/publication-opportunities\/iiel-blog\/new-directions-for-brazils-foreign-policy-ambitions-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Policy Brief: New Directions for Brazil&#8217;s Foreign Policy Ambitions"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><em>Published November 28, 2022 by <a href=\"https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/in\/mariana-mariano45\/\">Mariana Negreiros Mariano<\/a>, IIEL Program Associate and <a href=\"https:\/\/uwf.edu\/cassh\/departments\/reubin-od-askew-department-of-government\/faculty\/jacob-shively.html\">Jacob Shively<\/a>, Associate Professor in the Department of Government at the University of West Florida.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">In a remarkable turn, Brazil\u2019s former two-term president, Luis In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva\u2014known universally as Lula\u2014won Brazil\u2019s 2022 presidential election. Will he also return his prior ambitions to refashion Brazil as an internationalist rising power? The election itself was razor-thin, with the final votes for each candidate separated by less than two percentage points. Whereas Lula is a leftist who espoused relatively moderate policies in office, his opponent, Jair Bolsonaro, is a classic nationalist who expressly modeled much of his approach after former US president Donald Trump. (At one point, he even <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2020-01-08\/bolsonaro-streams-himself-watching-trump-s-speech-on-iran?#xj4y7vzkg\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">live-streamed himself<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> taking notes on a Trump speech.) In Trump fashion, Bolsonaro approached foreign policy as a set of bilateral relationships in which perceived cultural threats and personal political affinities might carry nearly as much weight as trade concerns. On balance, though, Bolsonaro remained inward-focused and saw key players in, for example, the military as important for preserving domestic order. By contrast, Lula emphasized working with and through international institutions as well as building Brazil\u2019s diplomatic and even military capabilities.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Our research suggests that both presidents\u2019 grand strategy visions were constrained by existing commitments and larger realities. Looking forward, these findings suggest that Lula may once again work to reorient Brazil away from Bolsonaro\u2019s nationalism; however, Lula\u2019s ambitions are likely to be moderated based on lessons learned in prior administrations and the national inertia that channels all grand strategy ambitions.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>I. <\/strong><b>Background<\/b><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.jacobshively.com\/uploads\/4\/7\/2\/9\/4729790\/mariano___shively_-_brazils_changing_fp_ambitions_oct_2022.pdf\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Our study<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> compared three cases of Brazilian foreign policy: two administrations under President Luiz In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva (2003-04 and 2007-08) and the Jair Messias Bolsonaro administration (2019-2022). We focused on each term\u2019s first two years, when precedents are set and major changes more likely, and we applied an emerging analytical framework dubbed \u201cgrand strategy analysis\u201d (GSA). This approach allows observers to evaluate governments\u2019 foreign policies based upon the individuals making decisions, setting agendas, and promulgating rhetoric. This approach not only offers insight into the flow of Brazilian grand strategy but also offers a simple means to study grand strategies consistently across the global north and south. This framework is \u201cagent-centered,\u201d meaning that grand strategy can be observed among individual decision makers and other leaders.<a href=\"#_ftn1\" name=\"_ftnref1\">[1]<\/a><\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> By treating grand strategy as an empirical phenomenon that we can observe as a pattern of thought as policy, we break that phenomenon into three dimensions that we could observe in any administration or time period. These dimensions are\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Scope, <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">referring<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">to the geographic parameters, adversaries, and allies where leaders\u2019 rhetoric and policy overlap;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><i>Substance<\/i>, referring to the strategy\u2019s ideological content, from domestic priorities to national interests to a theory of international politics; and<\/li>\n<li><i>Assertiveness<\/i>, referring to the level of military engagement and the degree to which leaders emphasize diplomacy versus coercion or aggression.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><strong>II. Lula Administrations: 2003-04 and 2007-08<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Luiz In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva defied expectations. On the one hand, an established leftist, he sought to gain greater independence from Global North governments, foster Global South cooperation, and reorient global power structures. On the other hand, he also advocated increasing Mercosul\u2019s influence, expanding trade with Europe and the United States, and a permanent seat for Brazil in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). His policy proposals were oriented around free-market growth for businesses and government programs for the poor. These included employment programs, tax reform, wider income distribution, and establishing a new relationship between government, workers, and entrepreneurs.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">\u00a0<a href=\"#_ftn2\" name=\"_ftnref2\">[2]<\/a> Lula also\u2014flipping traditional priorities of his Workers party\u2014adopted a neoliberal economic policy encouraging internationalization of Brazilian companies.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> <a href=\"#_ftn3\" name=\"_ftnref3\">[3]<\/a> \u00a0To justify this left-right balance, he explained, \u201cBrazil needs businessmen, and it will provide all the necessary incentives, but this will be the country of production and not speculation\u201d.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> <a href=\"#_ftn4\">[4]<\/a> Hal Brands characterized this approach as \u201csoft balancing, coalition building, and seeking to position Brazil as the leader of a more united South America\u201d.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> <a href=\"#_ftn5\" name=\"_ftnref5\">[5]<\/a>\u00a0Vigevani and Cepaluni simplify the approach as \u201cautonomy through diversification\u201d.<\/span> <a href=\"#_ftn6\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">[6]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Overcoming a corruption scandal and advertising his achievements, Lula started his second term with political capital, consistent political rhetoric, and a mature foreign policy approach.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftn7\"> [7]<\/a> Over the next two years, Lula\u2019s strategic agenda largely carried forward from his prior administration: hunger and poverty, Global South cooperation, multilateral trade negotiations, reform of the United Nations Security Council, and expanding Mercosul.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftn8\"> [8]<\/a> Lula continued pushing for a new world order with greater consideration for developing countries and less power concentrated in Washington, D.C. Rhetorically, Brazil defended regional democracy, integration, and development under its own leadership even as Argentina continued to resist singular Brazilian leadership. Lula also pushed greater military investment, such as greater protection for the \u201cBlue Amazon,\u201d Brazil\u2019s ecologically rich coastal Exclusive Economic Zone.<\/span> <a href=\"#_ftn9\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">[9]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">These ambitions soon reached limitations. In practical terms, Brazil could not sustain these commitments. Failures included a push for presidency of the International Labor Organization, the director general position of the WTO, and a proposal\u2014resisted by Brazil\u2019s South American neighbor\u2014for a free trade agreement between the United States and Mercosul.\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftn10\">[10]<\/a> Despite growing trade relations, the Chinese never backed Brazil\u2019s reform ambitions. Brazil represented and defended human rights, but associations with countries like Cuba and Iran weakened its public image.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">\u00a0<a href=\"#_ftn11\">[11]<\/a> In trade negotiations, Lula sought to combine other rising states in an \u201canti-hegemonic\u201d position; however, China and India, in particular, held incompatible priorities on issues like agriculture protectionism and high subsidies.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> <a href=\"#_ftn12\">[12]<\/a> Meanwhile, many Asian countries were enjoying massive economic benefits from commercial ties to the Global North. Lacking the military and economic resources of a great power, Lula and his team struggled to justify the strategic logic of aligning with weaker and poorer states.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">\u00a0<a href=\"#_ftn13\">[13]<\/a> Further, though Brazil qualifies as a regional leader along many dimensions, it lacks a foundational acceptance as a leader from other lead states like Argentina and Colombia and even risked accusations of \u201cimperialist\u201d behavior.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>III. Bolsonaro Administration, 2019-2020<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">President Jair Messias Bolsonaro represents a stark break with Lula&#8217;s politics. Campaigning after two subsequent presidents, the Workers Party and Lula himself fell into corruptions scandals, Bolsonaro claimed an ambition to protect \u201ctraditional values,\u201d and in office, he broke with Brazil\u2019s existing foreign policy trends by seeking out new partnerships and new positions on international issues. Campaigning, he upended existing foreign policy positions. He declared that &#8220;China does not buy in Brazil. China is buying Brazil\u201d and extended support for Taiwan.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftn14\"> [14]<\/a> He emphasized bilateral relations over multilateralism and also advocated leaving the Paris Agreement, UN Human Rights Council, and the UN Global Compact for Migration. Within Bolsonaro\u2019s coalition, the military, economic liberals, and the \u201cOlavistas\u201d vied for power, but the latter group embodied the new president\u2019s unique ideological influence.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftn15\"> [15]<\/a> Following polemicist Olavo de Carvalho, they held that Judeo-Christian civilization and, in turn, Western institutions like the UN and WTO are contaminated by \u201cglobalism\u201d and \u201ccultural Marxism,\u201d a concept now pitched by Carvalho\u2019s followers as a far-right conspiracy theory. Implicated movements include women\u2019s and LGBTQ rights, gun control, abortion rights, secularism, and environmentalism.<\/span> <a href=\"#_ftn16\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">[16]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">In practice, this approach flipped Lula\u2019s priorities. South American leadership and the Global South lost their previous emphasis and gave way to greater prioritization on right-wing governments, such as Bolivia\u2019s and Uruguay\u2019s, over Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftn17\"> [17]<\/a> In his visit to the United States, Bolsonaro abandoned Brazil\u2019s special treatment in WTO negotiations in exchange for President Trump\u2019s support for Brazil to enter the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">\u00a0<a href=\"#_ftn18\">[18]<\/a> Other arrangements included trade deals, military purchases, and support for Iran that matched Trump\u2019s strategic agenda but lacked clear Brazilian strategic logic.\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftn19\">[19]<\/a> Closer to home, the Amazon rainforest emerged as a global issue when France\u2019s President Emmanuel Macron suggested giving it international status and, later, Germany and Norway withdrew environmental funds based on Brasilia\u2019s relatively <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">laissez faire<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> response to massive wildfires.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftn20\"> [20]<\/a> Bolsonaro emphasized Brazilian sovereignty, accused Europeans of colonial thinking, and argued that the region was available for economic use.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftn21\"> [21]<\/a> Facing stagnant economic growth at home, during his 2019 visit to Beijing, Bolsonaro dropped much of his confrontational talk and signed several trade agreements. He also used talks between Mercosul and the European Union (EU) to push the former from a social to a commercial focus. In the UN Human Rights Council, Brazil\u2019s delegation advocated traditional values and religious freedom over \u201chuman rights.\u201d Still, Bolsonaro reaffirmed Brazil\u2019s willingness to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations and praised economic openness, all framed within Brazil\u2019s sovereign prerogatives.<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftn22\">[22]<\/a>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>IV. 2022 Brazilian Elections<br \/>\n<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The 2022 Brazilian vote revealed a divided Brazil, as Lula won the second round with 50.9% against Bolsonaro\u2019s 49.1%. Still, with more than <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnnbrasil.com.br\/politica\/com-mais-de-60-milhoes-de-votos-lula-e-o-presidente-mais-votado-da-historia\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">sixty million votes<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">,<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> Lula received the largest single vote tally in Brazilian history. In announcing his victory, Lula declared a version of US President\u2019s Biden\u2019s campaign catchphrase: \u201cBrazil is back.\u201d He has said that he will continue his previous <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/portuguese\/brasil-63117592\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">foreign policy plan<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> to make Brazil a protagonist in international politics, work on multilateral relations with developing and Global South states, especially Africa, and reinvigorate protection of the Amazon. In fact, <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.aa.com.tr\/en\/environment\/norway-to-resume-halted-aid-to-brazil-for-amazon-forests-amid-lulas-election-victory\/2725814\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Norway<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> and <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.dw.com\/en\/germany-wants-to-revive-fund-to-save-amazon-rainforest\/a-63626608\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Germany<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> already announced the return of their Amazon contributions. Lula declared his intention to <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www1.folha.uol.com.br\/mundo\/2022\/10\/lula-tera-politica-externa-mais-ativa-e-tentara-dialogar-com-eua-e-europa.shtml\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">travel<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> to South American countries, the US, the EU, and China before assuming the presidency again in 2023. He wishes to restore Brazil\u2019s relationships on equal respect and aims to be part of a multilateral international organizations and work to end the war in Ukraine. Still, Lula raised concerns among Ukraine\u2019s supporters in May when <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/americas\/brazils-lula-says-zelenskiy-as-responsible-putin-ukraine-war-2022-05-04\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">he insisted<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> that Ukraine\u2019s President Zelensky and even President Biden bore equal responsibility with Russian president Vladimir Putin for the war. Moving forward, Lula will face many challenges to accomplish his foreign policy strategy. Brazil, as before, does may lack necessary resources to sustain Lula\u2019s ambitions. Besides international challenges, Lula will also face challenges with a divided Brazil. Half of the population is unhappy to see the presidency held by an ex-convict who was part of one of the country\u2019s biggest <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.cfr.org\/in-brief\/lava-jato-see-how-far-brazils-corruption-probe-reached\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">corruption schemes<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> that not only hurt the multinational petroleum company Petrobras but shook Brazil\u2019s entire political establishment. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>V. <b>Findings and Conclusions<\/b><\/strong><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The GSA framework helps organize and evaluate these cases. In terms of <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">scope<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, President Lula sought to expand Brazil\u2019s geographic extent to a wider variety of countries and country types, from rich Europe to developing Africa. Regarding allies, he focused on South-South cooperation with special attention to Cuba, Bolivia, and Argentina as well as other middle-income states like China, India, and Russia. Still, despite Lula\u2019s conciliatory, inclusive rhetoric, Brazil still found itself\u2014especially during Lula\u2019s second term\u2014grappling with conflicts across its region. Bolsonaro, by contrast, shrank Brazil\u2019s good neighbor approach and reoriented foreign policy around bilateral economic interests and right-wing governments. Drawing inspiration from Donald Trump\u2019s style of nationalism, Bolsonaro\u2019s rhetoric and policies provoked adversarial responses from governments in Europe and elsewhere. Further, he considered anyone with \u201cglobalist\u201d and \u201csocialist\u201d beliefs to be a Brazilian adversary.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Regarding <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">substance<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, Lula\u2019s terms remained remarkably consistent; however, their intensity differed. In 2003-2004, Lula concentrated on social causes and development, whereas in 2007-2008, the administration emphasized Brazilian power and interests. For instance, during both, Brazil sought a position in the UNSC. Lula sought multilateral relations with developing and Global South states, but his rhetoric and assertive diplomatic engagement also welcomed greater accord between the Global North and South. In his formulation, hunger and poverty were directly tied to Brazil\u2019s and the world\u2019s security. He pushed for South American leadership but key neighbors such as Argentina resisted. By contrast, Bolsonaro\u2019s nationalist approach often reversed these sensibilities. In South America and beyond, he emphasized sovereignty and bilateral relations rather than leadership and multilateralism. He appealed to \u201ctraditional values\u201d and conspiracy theories in order to place Brazil as an agent defending Western civilization.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Despite these differences, both administrations displayed a low force level on <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">assertiveness <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">because neither perceived direct nor distant security threats; however, in his first term, Lula did take some initial, ultimately isolated efforts to expand Brazil\u2019s military capability in order to improve the country\u2019s case for a permanent UNSC seat. Rather, diplomacy and dialogue were Lula\u2019s security strategy when, for instance, he insisted that the Palestine conflict could be resolved with serious engagement from both sides. Interestingly, despite his strong talk and military connections, Bolsonaro saw little need to build Brazilian military capabilities. Rather, his strategy for the military was inward-focused: he sought to build domestic political support with higher salaries and greater access to senior government offices.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">We argue that Lula was an internationalist and Bolsonaro a nationalist, yet both were constrained by Brazil\u2019s commitments and capabilities as they assumed office, and neither fundamentally reordered Brazil\u2019s position in the world. Each president\u2019s tone, ambition, and content dramatically diverged, but that alone proved insufficient to fundamentally change Brazilian grand strategy. Despite expectations among supporters and adversaries that he would prove a strictly ideological leftist, Lula fostered relatively moderate liberal\u2014sometimes characterized as \u201cneoliberal\u201d\u2014administrations. In foreign policy, Lula reached for economic and political approaches that included working with international organizations and private sector trade. By contrast, Bolsonaro\u2019s grand strategy assumed state sovereignty and civilizational\/cultural values should guide Brazil\u2019s domestic and foreign priorities. Pragmatic but rarely focused on trade, Bolsonaro saw the \u201cglobalist\u201d environment as a threat and pursued foreign affairs as an appendage of his domestic political fights. Lula brought and consistently applied a consistent strategic agenda that sometimes fell awkwardly between left and right and sometimes exceeded Brazil\u2019s capabilities. By contrast, Bolsonaro\u2019s approach limited Brazil\u2019s ambitions. Ideologically, rather than cooperation and mutual benefit, it espoused defending Western Civilization as a set of cultural priorities and aligning with Trump\u2019s United States.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">For Brazil, neither leader dramatically reworked the country\u2019s global status. Perhaps if applied consistently over multiple administrations, one or both strategies might create the outcomes leaders hoped to achieve; yet, in practice, both Lula and Bolsonaro shifted Brazil\u2019s grand strategy at its margins rather than its core. Brazil\u2019s basic status among peers as well as its economic, political, and security interests remained relatively stable in a broader historical context. Now, we wait to see the next chapters in Brazilian history with Lula as president again. If the analysis above holds, we are likely to see Lula\u2019s internationalism once again guide Brazil\u2019s high-profile priorities, but in this new term, that ambition will be limited not just by the familiar constraints of national capabilities and international politics but also a tightly balanced domestic politics now transformed by Bolsonaro\u2019s nationalism.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong>Sources:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref1\">[1]<\/a> Shively, Jacob. 2020. <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Make America First Again\u202f: Grand Strategy Analysis and the Trump Administration.<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> Rapid Communications in Conflict and Security Series. Amherst, New York: Cambria Press.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref2\">[2]<\/a> \u201c<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Hor\u00e1rio Eleitoral: Presidente Brasil.\u201d 2002. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=HU45_nQD-H8\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=HU45_nQD-H8<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref3\">[3]<\/a> Vidigal, Carlos Eduardo. 2020. \u201cInterview conducted by Mariana Negreiros Mariano.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref4\">[4]<\/a> Vidigal, Carlos Eduardo. 2020. \u201cInterview conducted by Mariana Negreiros Mariano.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref5\">[5]<\/a> \u00a0Brands, Hal. 2011. \u201cEvaluating Brazilian Grand Strategy under Lula.\u201d <i>Comparative Strategy<\/i> 30 (1): 28\u201349. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/01495933.2011.545686\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/01495933.2011.545686<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref6\">[6]<\/a>\u00a0Vigevani, Tullo, and Gabriel Cepaluni. 2007. \u201cA Pol\u00edtica Externa de Lula Da Silva: A Estrat\u00e9gia Da Autonomia Pela Diversifica\u00e7\u00e3o.\u201d <i>Contexto Internacional<\/i> 29 (2): 273\u2013335. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1590\/S0102-85292007000200002\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1590\/S0102-85292007000200002<\/a>. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref7\">[7]<\/a>\u00a0Casar\u00f5es, Guilherme. 2020. \u201cInterview conducted by Mariana Negreiros Mariano.\u201d <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref8\">[8]<\/a>\u00a0L\u00eddia Domingues Peixoto Prado. 2007. \u201cA politica externa do primeiro governo Lula (2003-2006).\u201d Mestre em Rela\u00e7\u00f5es Internacionais, S\u00e3o Paulo, Brazil: Universidade Estadual de Campinas. <a href=\"https:\/\/core.ac.uk\/download\/pdf\/296843997.pdf\">https:\/\/core.ac.uk\/download\/pdf\/296843997.pdf<\/a>. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref9\">[9]<\/a>\u00a0Saraiva, Miriam Gomes. 2020a. \u201cThe Democratic Regime and the Changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy towards South America.\u201d <i>Brazilian Political Science Review<\/i> 14 (3): e0001. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1590\/1981-3821202000030001\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1590\/1981-3821202000030001<\/a>. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref10\">[10]<\/a>\u00a0L\u00eddia Domingues Peixoto Prado. 2007. \u201cA politica externa do primeiro governo Lula (2003-2006).\u201d Mestre em Rela\u00e7\u00f5es Internacionais, S\u00e3o Paulo, Brazil: Universidade Estadual de Campinas. <a href=\"https:\/\/core.ac.uk\/download\/pdf\/296843997.pdf\">https:\/\/core.ac.uk\/download\/pdf\/296843997.pdf<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref11\">[11]<\/a>\u00a0Almeida, Paulo Roberto de. 2010. \u201cNever before Seen in Brazil: Luis In\u00e1cio Lula Da Silva\u2019s Grand Diplomacy.\u201d <i>Revista Brasileira de Pol\u00edtica Internacional<\/i> 53 (2): 160\u201377. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1590\/S0034-73292010000200009\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1590\/S0034-73292010000200009<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref12\">[12]<\/a>\u00a0Almeida, Paulo Roberto de. 2010. \u201cNever before Seen in Brazil: Luis In\u00e1cio Lula Da Silva\u2019s Grand Diplomacy.\u201d <i>Revista Brasileira de Pol\u00edtica Internacional<\/i> 53 (2): 160\u201377. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1590\/S0034-73292010000200009\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1590\/S0034-73292010000200009<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref13\">[13]<\/a>\u00a0Vidigal, Carlos Eduardo. 2020. \u201cInterview conducted by Mariana Negreiros Mariano.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref14\">[14]<\/a>\u00a0Casar\u00f5es, Guilherme. 2020. \u201cInterview conducted by Mariana Negreiros Mariano.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref15\">[15]<\/a> Lopes, Dawisson Bel\u00e9m. 2020. \u201cDe-Westernization, Democratization, Disconnection: The Emergence of Brazil\u2019s Post-Diplomatic Foreign Policy.\u201d <i>Global Affairs<\/i> 6 (2): 167\u201384. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/23340460.2020.1769494\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/23340460.2020.1769494<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref16\">[16]<\/a> Saraiva, Miriam Gomes. 2020a. \u201cThe Democratic Regime and the Changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy towards South America.\u201d <i>Brazilian Political Science Review<\/i> 14 (3): e0001. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1590\/1981-3821202000030001\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1590\/1981-3821202000030001<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref17\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">[17] <\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Carolina Furquim. 2019. \u201cPol\u00edtica Externa Na Am\u00e9rica Latina e as Rupturas Com Velhos Modelos.\u201d <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Latin American Business Stories<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/labsnews.com\/pt-br\/artigos\/america-latina\/politica-externa-america-latina\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/labsnews.com\/pt-br\/artigos\/america-latina\/politica-externa-america-latina\/<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">; Desideri, Leonardo. 2020. \u201cO Que Bolsonaro Fez Na Pol\u00edtica Externa Em 2019.\u201d <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Gazeta Do Povo<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.gazetadopovo.com.br\/republica\/o-que-bolsonaro-fez-na-politica-externa-2019\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.gazetadopovo.com.br\/republica\/o-que-bolsonaro-fez-na-politica-externa-2019\/<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">; Nolte, Detlef, and Luis L. Schenoni. 2021. \u201cTo Lead or Not to Lead: Regional Powers and Regional Leadership.\u201d <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">International Politics<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">, October. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1057\/s41311-021-00355-8\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1057\/s41311-021-00355-8<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref18\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">[18] <\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Casar\u00f5es, Guilherme. 2020. \u201cInterview conducted by Mariana Negreiros Mariano\u201d; Reich, Simon. 2019. \u201cTrade Outcomes from the Trump-Bolsonaro Meeting: More Than Meets the Eye?\u201d <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Center for Strategic and International Studies<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/trade-outcomes-trump-bolsonaro-meeting-more-meets-eye\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.csis.org\/analysis\/trade-outcomes-trump-bolsonaro-meeting-more-meets-eye<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"><a href=\"#_ftnref19\">[19]<\/a> Desideri, Leonardo. 2020. \u201cO Que Bolsonaro Fez Na Pol\u00edtica Externa Em 2019.\u201d <i>Gazeta Do Povo<\/i>. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gazetadopovo.com.br\/republica\/o-que-bolsonaro-fez-na-politica-externa-2019\/\">https:\/\/www.gazetadopovo.com.br\/republica\/o-que-bolsonaro-fez-na-politica-externa-2019\/<\/a>; Saraiva, Miriam Gomes. 2020a. \u201cThe Democratic Regime and the Changes in Brazilian Foreign Policy towards South America.\u201d <i>Brazilian Political Science Review<\/i> 14 (3): e0001. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1590\/1981-3821202000030001\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1590\/1981-3821202000030001<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref20\">[20]<\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">\u00a0Saraiva, Miriam Gomes, and \u00c1lvaro Vicente Costa Silva. 2019. \u201cIdeologia e Pragmatismo Na Pol\u00edtica Externa De Jair Bolsonaro.\u201d <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Rela\u00e7\u00f5es Internacionais<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> 64: 117-137. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.23906\/ri2019.66a08\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.23906\/ri2019.66a08<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref21\">[21]<\/a> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">\u201cSpeech by Brazil\u2019s President Jair Bolsonaro at the Opening of the 74th United Nations General Assembly \u2013 New York, September 24, 2019.\u201d 2019. <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Minist\u00e9rio Das Rela\u00e7\u00f5es Exteriores<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.gov.br\/mre\/en\/content-centers\/speeches-articles-and-interviews\/president-of-the-federative-republic-of-brazil\/speeches\/speech-by-brazil-s-president-jair-bolsonaro-at-the-opening-of-the-74th-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-september-24-2019-photo-alan-santos-pr\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.gov.br\/mre\/en\/content-centers\/speeches-articles-and-interviews\/president-of-the-federative-republic-of-brazil\/speeches\/speech-by-brazil-s-president-jair-bolsonaro-at-the-opening-of-the-74th-united-nations-general-assembly-new-york-september-24-2019-photo-alan-santos-pr<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">; Saraiva, Miriam Gomes, and \u00c1lvaro Vicente Costa Silva. 2019. \u201cIdeologia e Pragmatismo Na Pol\u00edtica Externa De Jair Bolsonaro.\u201d <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Rela\u00e7\u00f5es Internacionais<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> 64: 117-137. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.23906\/ri2019.66a08\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.23906\/ri2019.66a08<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">; \u201cBrazilian President Speaks out against \u2018Media Lies\u2019 Surrounding Amazon Fires.\u201d 2019. <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">UN News<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/news.un.org\/en\/story\/2019\/09\/1047192\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/news.un.org\/en\/story\/2019\/09\/1047192<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">; Desideri, Leonardo. 2020. \u201cO Que Bolsonaro Fez Na Pol\u00edtica Externa Em 2019.\u201d <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Gazeta Do Povo<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.gazetadopovo.com.br\/republica\/o-que-bolsonaro-fez-na-politica-externa-2019\/\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/www.gazetadopovo.com.br\/republica\/o-que-bolsonaro-fez-na-politica-externa-2019\/<\/span><\/a><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref22\">[22]<\/a> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">\u201cNa ONU, Presidente Jair Bolsonaro Apresenta \u2018Um Novo Brasil.\u2019\u201d 2019. <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">OUN News<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">. <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/news.un.org\/pt\/story\/2019\/09\/1688192\"><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">https:\/\/news.un.org\/pt\/story\/2019\/09\/1688192<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Published November 28, 2022 by Mariana Negreiros Mariano, IIEL Program Associate and Jacob Shively, Associate Professor in the Department of Government at the University of West Florida. In a remarkable [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11247,"featured_media":0,"parent":3728,"menu_order":9,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_price":"","_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_header":"","_tribe_default_ticket_provider":"","_tribe_ticket_capacity":"0","_ticket_start_date":"","_ticket_end_date":"","_tribe_ticket_show_description":"","_tribe_ticket_show_not_going":false,"_tribe_ticket_use_global_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_global_stock_level":"","_global_stock_mode":"","_global_stock_cap":"","_tribe_rsvp_for_event":"","_tribe_ticket_going_count":"","_tribe_ticket_not_going_count":"","_tribe_tickets_list":"[]","_tribe_ticket_has_attendee_info_fields":false,"footnotes":"","_tec_slr_enabled":"","_tec_slr_layout":""},"class_list":["post-7722","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"ticketed":false,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/iiel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/7722","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/iiel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/iiel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/iiel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/11247"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/iiel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7722"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/iiel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/7722\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9245,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/iiel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/7722\/revisions\/9245"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/iiel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/3728"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/iiel\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7722"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}