This Note seeks to present a unified theory of compliance in international\u00a0economic law. In its first part, it suggests that states and other international\u00a0actors adhere to international rules and norms because of a set of distinct benefits\u00a0they obtain by doing so, grouped under the label of membership value. These\u00a0include, first, the substantive and explicit aims promoted by international\u00a0agreements, rules, and norms, and, second, a set of ancillary benefits inherent to\u00a0the activity of international cooperation itself in the forms of reputation,\u00a0coordination, participation, and global standing. In addition, the Note develops\u00a0the related concept of system value to explain why global or regional hegemons\u00a0may sustain multilateral regimes at great direct cost in order to reap the rewards\u00a0offered by greater international stability and predictability. Furthermore, the Note\u00a0develops the concept of legal regimes, widening the Note\u2019s scope of analysis beyond\u00a0\u00a0the traditional notions of law and legal systems to include highly informal and\u00a0market-based groupings of rules at the international level. In the second part, the\u00a0Note looks at how legal architecture and enforcement can enhance compliance\u00a0with these regimes. The Note identifies four means by which this can be achieved:\u00a0conditionality, risk-weighting, reciprocity, and penalization. The paper then\u00a0concludes by offering some suggestions of how these means can be employed when\u00a0designing future international agreements and organizations within international\u00a0economic law. In particular, it is suggested that financial market access\u00a0can be leveraged to induce compliance, similar to how markets for goods are used\u00a0today, and that, overall, participation gains should be used more readily by\u00a0international organizations to promote compliance.<\/p>\n