{"id":1766,"date":"2026-04-14T07:19:55","date_gmt":"2026-04-14T11:19:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/legal-ethics-journal\/?page_id=1766"},"modified":"2026-04-14T07:30:01","modified_gmt":"2026-04-14T11:30:01","slug":"addiction-as-a-mitigating-factor-in-lawyer-sanctions-toward-a-more-medicalized-approach","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/legal-ethics-journal\/in-print\/volume-38-issue-4-fall-2025\/addiction-as-a-mitigating-factor-in-lawyer-sanctions-toward-a-more-medicalized-approach\/","title":{"rendered":"Addiction as a Mitigating Factor in Lawyer Sanctions: Toward a More Medicalized Approach"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">In 2022, an audit revealed that a real estate lawyer in Vancouver, Canada had misappropriated over 8 million dollars of client funds.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> However, in 2024 the bar sanctioned the lawyer with only a seven-year ban on legal practice\u2014rather than permanent disbarment\u2014because the association reasoned that the lawyer\u2019s gambling addiction had contributed to his illicit behavior.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> This scandal and its outcome place a spotlight once again on a decades-long debate regarding the degree to which lawyers suffering from an addictive disorder should receive leniency when sanctioned for professional misconduct.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">When determining sanctions for an attorney suffering from addiction, two competing considerations must be balanced. On the one hand, addiction should be appreciated as an illness that often consumes the lawyer and their behavior. Too harsh an approach, the thinking goes, deprives the public of a talented attorney who could thrive when healthy, and punishes that same attorney for an illness that is largely out of their control. On the other hand, the self-regulating legal field must safeguard both legal clients and the legal profession itself from lawyers whose illnesses result in ineffective legal representation, illegal conduct, or unjust outcomes. Excessive leniency, in particular a lawyer\u2019s continued ability to practice, contravenes this protective duty of the legal field by permitting an afflicted attorney to continue causing harm.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">The American Bar Association\u2019s (ABA)<\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">(<\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">SILS<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">) explicitly acknowledge both of these interests and the need to balance them. Nevertheless, courts and commentators, even when utilizing this shared <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">SILS<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> framework, disagree on the relative weight that should be given to each of these considerations and how that weight should differ based on the specific context of a given disciplinary case. The lack of a decided-upon \u201cbest\u201d approach generally threatens the likelihood that justice is done, and the uncertainty it creates jeopardizes the legitimacy of the legal field and the faith it engenders in the public. It is true that some degree of variation in the application of the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">SILS<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> is inevitable under the current regulatory structure of the legal practice in the United States. Decisions regarding the regulation of lawyers have generally been left up to state supreme courts and state bar associations,<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> and while these state guidelines must comport with the Supremacy Clause,<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> both the federal government and (at least implicitly) the ABA have ceded this authority to the states.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> While it could be argued that a national system of binding legal regulation would be preferable, that argument goes beyond the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, the ability for state supreme courts to unilaterally reassess the application of state legal regulation makes greater uniformity a realistic possibility.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">This Note argues the failure to adequately acknowledge and interact with the medical and psychological roots of addiction are a shared, critical failing of all current approaches to lawyer discipline cases involving addiction.<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> In other words, judicial balancing would be much more informed, and thus tend towards greater justice, if it more greatly emphasized medical evidence, testimony from medical or psychological professionals, and the scientific literature on addiction. Based on that assumption, this Note proposes that the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">SILS<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> should be amended to explicitly direct courts, when faced with a lawyer discipline case in which the lawyer suffers from an addiction, to adopt a three-part framework to determine a fair penalty. First, the court should rely on medical records and expert testimony from a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist to establish that a lawyer suffers from an addiction recognized by the <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">(DSM-5).<\/span><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> Second, in order to determine whether an attorney\u2019s addiction had a mitigative impact on their misconduct, the court should rely on medical evidence and testimony to identify which criteria of addiction a given attorney met under the DSM-5 as well as any literature demonstrating an addiction-behavior link not acknowledged in the DSM-5. Third, a court should determine if the misconduct was so severe that it outweighs any mitigative impact that the attorney\u2019s addiction had on the misconduct.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Section I provides an overview of the realities of substance use and addiction in the legal field, then introduces the ABA\u2019s <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">SILS<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> and <\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Model Rules of Professional Conduct <\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">(<\/span><i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Model Rules<\/span><\/i><span style=\"font-weight: 400\">).<\/span> <span style=\"font-weight: 400\">Section II presents the various approaches that state courts have taken when considering the mitigative impact of addiction in lawyer discipline cases. This section also discusses the rationales and inconsistencies found in these approaches. Section III outlines the criteria under which various addictions can be established under the DSM-5 and the types of behavior that the DSM-5 explicitly connects to these types of addiction. Section IV articulates this Note\u2019s recommendation of a three-step process for considering lawyer discipline cases involving a lawyer suffering from addiction, a process that would include a much greater reliance on medical evidence and testimony than has been demonstrated in previous lawyer discipline cases.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/legal-ethics-journal\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/24\/2026\/04\/GT-GJLE250049.pdf\">Keep Reading<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In 2022, an audit revealed that a real estate lawyer in Vancouver, Canada had misappropriated over 8 million dollars of client funds. However, in 2024 the bar sanctioned the lawyer [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14207,"featured_media":0,"parent":1755,"menu_order":3,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"abstract.php","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_price":"","_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_header":"","_tribe_default_ticket_provider":"","_tribe_ticket_capacity":"0","_ticket_start_date":"","_ticket_end_date":"","_tribe_ticket_show_description":"","_tribe_ticket_show_not_going":false,"_tribe_ticket_use_global_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_global_stock_level":"","_global_stock_mode":"","_global_stock_cap":"","_tribe_rsvp_for_event":"","_tribe_ticket_going_count":"","_tribe_ticket_not_going_count":"","_tribe_tickets_list":"[]","_tribe_ticket_has_attendee_info_fields":false,"footnotes":"","_tec_slr_enabled":"","_tec_slr_layout":""},"class_list":["post-1766","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"ticketed":false,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/legal-ethics-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1766","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/legal-ethics-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/legal-ethics-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/legal-ethics-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14207"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/legal-ethics-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1766"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/legal-ethics-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1766\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1776,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/legal-ethics-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1766\/revisions\/1776"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/legal-ethics-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/1755"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/legal-ethics-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1766"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}