{"id":146,"date":"2018-10-18T22:37:06","date_gmt":"2018-10-19T02:37:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/?page_id=146"},"modified":"2025-05-12T11:11:59","modified_gmt":"2025-05-12T15:11:59","slug":"irresistible-force-meets-immovable-object-hadley-arkes-due-process-and-me","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/in-print-2\/volume-16-number-2-summer-2018\/irresistible-force-meets-immovable-object-hadley-arkes-due-process-and-me\/","title":{"rendered":"Irresistible Force Meets Immovable Object: Hadley Arkes, Due Process, and Me"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Recent revisionist scholarship on the due process clause has suggested that a \u201csubstantive\u201d reading of due process predates the <em>Dred Scott<\/em> case, and provides support for a natural-law jurisprudence in which judges invalidate statutes as unreasonable or unjust. Thus, historical scholarship appears to bolster the philosophical arguments of Professor Hadley Arkes, well-known for his view that judges should go \u201cbeyond the Constitution\u201d in their decision-making. The present article, building on a previous reexamination of these purported antebellum precedents for substantive due process, revises the revisionists\u2014including Professor Arkes\u2014arguing that due process requires only conformity with basic rule-of-law principles of generality and prospectivity in the enactment of laws, and procedural regularity in their execution. As for the role properly played by natural-law reasoning, the widely divergent approaches of John Marshall and Stephen Field are contrasted, in order to illustrate how discernment of the Constitution\u2019s meaning differs from going beyond it.  <\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/23\/2018\/10\/16-2-Irresistible-Force.pdf\">Keep Reading Irresistible Force Meets Immovable Object: Hadley Arkes, Due Process, and Me<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Recent revisionist scholarship on the due process clause has suggested that a \u201csubstantive\u201d reading of due process predates the Dred Scott case, and provides support for a natural-law jurisprudence in [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":129,"featured_media":0,"parent":131,"menu_order":1,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"abstract.php","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_price":"","_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_header":"","_tribe_default_ticket_provider":"","_tribe_ticket_capacity":"0","_ticket_start_date":"","_ticket_end_date":"","_tribe_ticket_show_description":"","_tribe_ticket_show_not_going":false,"_tribe_ticket_use_global_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_global_stock_level":"","_global_stock_mode":"","_global_stock_cap":"","_tribe_rsvp_for_event":"","_tribe_ticket_going_count":"","_tribe_ticket_not_going_count":"","_tribe_tickets_list":"[]","_tribe_ticket_has_attendee_info_fields":false,"footnotes":"","_tec_slr_enabled":"","_tec_slr_layout":""},"class_list":["post-146","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"ticketed":false,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/146","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/129"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=146"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/146\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2657,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/146\/revisions\/2657"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/131"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=146"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}