{"id":2709,"date":"2026-06-23T11:03:33","date_gmt":"2026-06-23T15:03:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/?page_id=2709"},"modified":"2026-06-23T11:04:19","modified_gmt":"2026-06-23T15:04:19","slug":"judicial-humility-and-reticence-in-administrative-law","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/in-print\/volume-23-issue-1-winter-2025\/judicial-humility-and-reticence-in-administrative-law\/","title":{"rendered":"Judicial Humility and Reticence in Administrative Law"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Humility has been top of mind for Justice Elena Kagan, a concern surfacing often in her questions and opinions across several terms whenever the case involves a federal agency. The Supreme Court, in her view, lacks humility. And it demonstrates this lack whenever it questions agency priorities.<\/p>\n<p>In January, the Court heard two cases challenging the Chevron doctrine, which requires courts to defer to an agency\u2019s \u201creasonable\u201d interpretation of gaps or ambiguities in statutes.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2709_1' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2709_1'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>1<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2709_1' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #1<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2709_1' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2709_1' tabindex='-1'>1<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #1 content: <\/span>Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024) (No. 22-451); Relentless, Inc. v. Dep\u2019t\nof Com., No. 22-1219.\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t Justice Kagan answered that challenge by calling Chevron a \u201cdoctrine of humility.\u201d\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2709_2' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2709_2'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>2<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2709_2' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #2<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2709_2' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2709_2' tabindex='-1'>2<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #2 content: <\/span>Transcript of Record at 34, Loper Bright Enters. v Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024) (No. 22-\n451).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t \u201cWe know in our heart of hearts,\u201d she explained \u201cthat agencies know things that courts do not. And that\u2019s the basis of Chevron.\u201d\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2709_3' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2709_3'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>3<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2709_3' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #3<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2709_3' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2709_3' tabindex='-1'>3<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #3 content: <\/span><em>Id.<\/em>\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t Justice Kagan, and likeminded thinkers, rely on the agency-specific ability to \u201cknow things\u201d as the primary justification for assuming that Congress prefers agencies, not courts, to resolve ambiguities in statutes. Convinced of the agencies\u2019 epistemic superiority, Justice Kagan reminded her colleagues in West Virginia v. EPA that \u201cthis Court has historically known enough not to get in the way.\u201d\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2709_4' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2709_4'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>4<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2709_4' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #4<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2709_4' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2709_4' tabindex='-1'>4<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #4 content: <\/span>West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 782 (2022).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t Many scholars defend judicial deference in similar terms.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2709_5' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2709_5'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>5<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2709_5' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #5<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2709_5' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2709_5' tabindex='-1'>5<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #5 content: <\/span><em>See, e.g<\/em>., ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW\u2019S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW\u2019S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 8 (2016) (arguing that the judiciary\u2019s surrender of power to the administrative state was done for \u201cvalid lawyerly reasons\u201d and that \u201cgood Dworkinians\u201d should support it); Cass R. Sunstein, <em>Chevron As Law<\/em>, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1666 (2019) (acknowledging the possibility that <em>Chevron<\/em> \u201cunleashes political officials from law\u201d but taking the position nonetheless that it is a doctrine of judicial humility); Gillian E. Metzger, <em>The Roberts Court and Administrative Law<\/em>, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 43\u201344 (2019) (\u201cMoreover, the arguments for deference to agencies on fact and policy matters-such as agencies\u2019 greater political accountability, expertise, or congressional authorization-also push toward deference in law application, which easily spills over into law interpretation.\u201d); Stephen Breyer, <em>The Executive Branch, Administrative Action, and Comparative Expertise<\/em>, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189, 2193 (2011) (\u201cCourts find the notion of comparative expertise useful, indeed necessary, when reviewing administrative decisions.\u201d); Mark Seidenfeld, <em>Chevron\u2019s Foundation<\/em>, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 275 (2011) (arguing that <em>Chevron<\/em> \u201cencourages courts to refrain from dictating outcomes in policy-laden decisions\u201d); David J. Barron &amp; Elena Kagan, <em>Chevron\u2019s Nondelegation Doctrine<\/em>, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 223 (2001) (\u201c[Chevron] stressed more heavily the virtues of placing interpretive decisions in the hands of accountable and knowledgeable administrators.\u201d).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t<\/p>\n<p>The types of determinations for which agencies demand judicial deference vary; the determination may be factual, whether pertaining to the agency\u2019s area of expertise or not; it may be a determination of the law\u2019s application to certain facts; or it may be a pure question of law, a assertion of what a provision in the agency\u2019s organic statute means or what that law\u2019s metes and bounds are. Regardless of the type of decision for which deference is sought, there are good reasons to think that the epistemic gap between agencies and courts is neither so deep nor so wide as to merit deference and that the insistence on deference as a form of humility is premised less on a judicial incapacity to address borderline cases and more about a preference for shifting policymaking towards the executive branch.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2709_6' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2709_6'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>6<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2709_6' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #6<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2709_6' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2709_6' tabindex='-1'>6<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #6 content: <\/span><em>See<\/em> Aditya Bamzai, <em>The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation<\/em>, 126 YALE L.J.\n908, 994 (2017); <em>see id<\/em>. at 994 n.370.\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t This conclusion has implications for other deference rationales.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/23\/2026\/06\/23.1-Fitzhenry-Canaparo.pdf\">Continue reading Judicial Humility and Reticence in Administrative Law<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Humility has been top of mind for Justice Elena Kagan, a concern surfacing often in her questions and opinions across several terms whenever the case involves a federal agency. The [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":28,"featured_media":0,"parent":2686,"menu_order":6,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"abstract.php","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_price":"","_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_header":"","_tribe_default_ticket_provider":"","_tribe_ticket_capacity":"0","_ticket_start_date":"","_ticket_end_date":"","_tribe_ticket_show_description":"","_tribe_ticket_show_not_going":false,"_tribe_ticket_use_global_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_global_stock_level":"","_global_stock_mode":"","_global_stock_cap":"","_tribe_rsvp_for_event":"","_tribe_ticket_going_count":"","_tribe_ticket_not_going_count":"","_tribe_tickets_list":"[]","_tribe_ticket_has_attendee_info_fields":false,"footnotes":"","_tec_slr_enabled":"","_tec_slr_layout":""},"class_list":["post-2709","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"ticketed":false,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2709","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/28"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2709"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2709\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2711,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2709\/revisions\/2711"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2686"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2709"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}