{"id":2764,"date":"2026-06-23T12:38:44","date_gmt":"2026-06-23T16:38:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/?page_id=2764"},"modified":"2026-06-23T12:42:46","modified_gmt":"2026-06-23T16:42:46","slug":"the-fiduciary-constitution-the-separation-of-powers-and-the-legal-landscape-after-sec-v-jarkesy","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/in-print\/volume-23-issue-2-summer-2025\/the-fiduciary-constitution-the-separation-of-powers-and-the-legal-landscape-after-sec-v-jarkesy\/","title":{"rendered":"The Fiduciary Constitution, the Separation of Powers, and the Legal Landscape After SEC v. Jarkesy"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>For decades, the American people\u2019s right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment was severely curtailed by Congress, the executive branch, and the judiciary. To implement \u201cfunctional government,\u201d Congress passed several statutes allowing executive branch agencies to proceed through juryless in-house tribunals, which the Supreme Court blessed through a series of decisions enlarging the so called \u201cpublic rights doctrine\u201d\u2014with the high-water mark coming in <em>Atlas Roofing v. OSHC<\/em>. Yet the civil jury right is once again ascendant. The Supreme Court held in <em>SEC v. Jarkesy<\/em> that administrative agencies cannot seek civil penalties against the American people through juryless in-house proceedings. And the Court made clear that the public rights doctrine is a narrow \u201cexception\u201d to the general constitutional rule that Americans\u2019 right to a jury trial in a civil proceeding must be preserved when they face deprivations of life, liberty, or property.<\/p>\n<p>That ruling perhaps threatens to upend the very structure of agency adjudication that has permeated administrative law for near a century. But in <em>Jarkesy<\/em>\u2019s wake, many have nonetheless proposed new ways to limit the decision\u2019s reach and save this feature of the modern administrative state. For example, some have proposed a defendant sued by an executive agency may well simply agree to have his case heard by that executive agency. Or, others say, most causes of action and remedies pursued in agency proceedings fall outside the Seventh Amendment\u2019s scope, so <em>Jarkesy<\/em> is just a blip. These proposals may well be constitutional under the Supreme Court\u2019s modern precedent. But they raise more fundamental issues about our Constitution\u2019s structure, which the Roberts Court, if slowly, continues to restore by revitalizing the Constitution\u2019s separation of powers.<\/p>\n<p>This article steps back to assess several antecedent questions after <em>Jarkesy<\/em> and suggests that litigants and scholars consider this broader context when exploring how the civil jury right, and other individual rights, should be protected going forward. We advocate for a return to a view of the Constitution that fulfills its original purpose: to protect liberty. Jury rights, like all constitutional issues, fit within a broader framework, and agency adjudication must comply with that framework.<\/p>\n<p>Start at the beginning:\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_1' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_1'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>1<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_1' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #1<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2764_1' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_1' tabindex='-1'>1<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #1 content: <\/span>This paper takes certain positions and its authors hold varying conclusions about protecting the\ncivil jury right. But the more important goal here is for the reader to consider the questions in a broader context before thinking about how we move forward. Constitutional adjudication spans hundreds of years and legal opinions over it run into the millions of pages. And the nature of constitutional adjudication narrows the litigation focus to specific issues in individual cases and controversies. We do not make any claim that many of our views are something courts, other than the Supreme Court, can implement in many instances because of doctrines like stare decisis.\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t what is the nature of the Constitution? The Constitution is fundamentally a fiduciary-like document that establishes a principal-agent relationship between \u201cWe the People\u201d and the federal government.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_2' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_2'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>2<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_2' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #2<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2764_2' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_2' tabindex='-1'>2<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #2 content: <\/span><em>See generally<\/em> GARY LAWSON &amp; GUY I. SEIDMAN, A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t Through the Constitution, the American people delegate certain enumerated and limited powers to specific federal actors who serve as the people\u2019s agents in carrying out defined duties and responsibilities.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_3' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_3'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>3<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_3' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #3<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2764_3' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_3' tabindex='-1'>3<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #3 content: <\/span><em>See id; see also, e.g<\/em>., Robert G. Natelson, <em>The Government as Fiduciary: A Practical<\/em>\n<em>Demonstration from the Reign of Trajan<\/em>, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 191, 193 (2001); Robert G. Natelson, <em>The Constitution and the Public Trust<\/em>, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004) [hereinafter Natelson, <em>The Constitution and the Public Trust<\/em>]; GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 68\u201370 (2010); Gary Lawson et al., <em>The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection<\/em>, 94 B.U. L. REV. 415 (2014); Gary Lawson &amp; Guy I. Seidman, <em>By Any Other Name: Rational Basis Inquiry and the Federal Government\u2019s Fiduciary Duty of Care<\/em>, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1385 (2018).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t The federal government (more specifically certain actors within the federal government) may only wield those powers specifically delegated to it by the people, expressly or implicitly.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_4' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_4'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>4<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_4' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #4<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2764_4' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_4' tabindex='-1'>4<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #4 content: <\/span>LAWSON &amp; SEIDMAN, <em>supra<\/em> note 2, at 51\u201354.\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t<\/p>\n<p>This view of the Constitution is supported by the document\u2019s text, which specifically enumerates and then vests different powers in different actors: \u201cthe executive power\u201d and \u201cthe judicial power\u201d are vested, respectively, in the executive and judicial departments, and \u201call legislative powers herein granted\u201d are vested in Congress.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_5' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_5'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>5<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_5' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #5<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2764_5' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_5' tabindex='-1'>5<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #5 content: <\/span><em>Id<\/em>. at 52.\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t It is those powers that those specific actors may wield. Any time the federal government acts, it must be doing so under these delegated powers.<\/p>\n<p>That sounds basic. And it is. But this framework too often is ignored. Overlooked, too, are the next steps in any proper constitutional analysis: what power is being wielded and whether that power is specifically enumerated (or delegated from the people) within the Constitution. If so, one should then ask a second question: who has the power? The Constitution\u2019s enumeration of certain powers to certain actors provides the answer. The Constitution gives separate powers to specific actors\u2014the separation of powers\u2014which proscribes any further subdelegation to other actors. Thus, the Constitution does not authorize agents to give their power away to anyone else. Once these questions are answered, many issues that arise in constitutional litigation, including those that arise in Seventh Amendment cases, can likely be resolved on structural constitutional grounds.<\/p>\n<p>Other constitutional text, of course, plays a role, too. After all, the Seventh Amendment and the Bill of Rights protect individual rights. And \u201cthere is nothing in the Constitution that specifically states &#8230;that Congress may not authorize other actors to exercise legislative power.\u201d\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_6' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_6'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>6<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_6' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #6<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2764_6' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_6' tabindex='-1'>6<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #6 content: <\/span>Gary S. Lawson, <em>Delegation and Original Meaning<\/em>, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 335 (2002).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t So, one might say, only those affirmative limits on the government found in the Bill of Rights preserve the People\u2019s rights. But this gets the order of operations backward, and as Professor Lawson explains, \u201creflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the American Constitution.\u201d\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_7' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_7'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>7<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_7' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #7<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2764_7' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_7' tabindex='-1'>7<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #7 content: <\/span><em>Id.<\/em>\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t The Bill of Rights provides greater protection\u2014like wearing a belt and suspenders\u2014when these structural safeguards against an overreaching federal government fail, and at the same time can serve, in some cases, as a structural check on many of the actors assigned to carryout duties under the Constitution.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_8' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_8'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>8<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_8' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #8<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2764_8' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_8' tabindex='-1'>8<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #8 content: <\/span><em>See generally<\/em> Akhil Reed Amar, <em>The Bill of Rights as a Constitution<\/em>, 100 Yale L.J. 1131 (1991).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t This is not to disparage the Constitution\u2019s individual rights provisions\u2014both enumerated and unenumerated. As history and the modern legal landscape show, the Framers were prescient in placing an exclamation point on the limits of federal power with the Bill of Rights.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_9' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_9'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>9<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_9' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #9<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2764_9' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_9' tabindex='-1'>9<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #9 content: <\/span>Gary Lawson, <em>The Bill of Rights as an Exclamation Point<\/em>, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 513\u201315\n(1999) (arguing that, under the original Constitution, an \u201cextensive Bill of Rights was unnecessary and inappropriate because the national government\u2019s enumerated powers did not include the power to regulate\u201d the rights later included and thus became \u201cexclamation points\u201d for what the federal government may not do); Natelson, <em>The Constitution and the Public Trust<\/em>, <em>supra<\/em> note 3, at 1142 (noting the \u201cfirst ten amendments were added to define the rules of\u201d the enumerated powers limitations.).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t Even so, protecting rights under a Bill of Rights framework can lead to doctrinal confusion susceptible to muddled jurisprudence filled with constitutional \u201cexceptions\u201d and pragmatic approaches at odds with the Constitution\u2019s text and structure.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_10' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_10'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>10<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_10' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #10<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2764_10' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_10' tabindex='-1'>10<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #10 content: <\/span><em>See e.g<\/em>., Evan D. Bernick, <em>Is Judicial Deference to Agency Fact-Finding Unlawful?<\/em>, 16 GEO.\nJ.L. &amp; PUB. POL\u2019Y 27 (2018). We also note that the Bill of Rights plays a very different role under the Fourteenth Amendment, which makes many of the Bill of Rights provisions the primary protection for liberty with respect to the states.\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t<\/p>\n<p>Once one grapples with the Constitution\u2019s structural elements, the Seventh Amendment rarely provides an independent protection; the very nature of the Constitution guards against encroachments on the jury right. The questions of what power and who may wield the power the Constitution assigns may often be dispositive in protecting people\u2019s right to a civil jury trial.<\/p>\n<p>One specific provision is especially apt when it comes to the civil jury right. We the People delegate, under Article III, \u201cthe judicial Power of the United States\u201d\u2014to judicial branch actors who are exclusively vested with that power. There is no enumerated power allowing Congress (or anyone) to give away, arrogate, or allow the executive branch to exercise the judicial power\u2014including, but not limited to, federal agencies. In turn, nothing in the Constitution authorizes the executive branch to wield that power. So whether an agency may hear and ultimately decide a matter turns on whether the Constitution has affirmatively allowed them to wield that power.<\/p>\n<p>If true, many of the proposed functional limits on the Supreme Court\u2019s <em>Jarkesy<\/em> decision are nonstarters. Indeed, it does not matter whether a party \u201cconsents\u201d to have the executive branch wield power against them, or \u201cwaives\u201d the right to have his or her case heard in an Article III court\u2014where the jury right would attach in certain cases. Under our government of enumerated and separated powers, an executive agency may not exercise the judicial power of the United States\u2014no matter how efficient the practice may be. Like all other parts of government, executive agencies act at the direction of the People.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_11' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_11'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>11<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2764_11' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #11<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2764_11' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2764_11' tabindex='-1'>11<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #11 content: <\/span>We acknowledge that certain adjudications within the executive branch may constitute the\nexercise of \u201cexecutive\u201d as opposed to \u201cjudicial\u201d powers. We also do not contend that <em>any<\/em> adjudication is judicial simply because it has judicial-like elements. We instead say merely that <em>whether<\/em> a power is judicial or executive cannot turn on an individual\u2019s \u201cwaiver,\u201d \u201cconsent,\u201d or any other extraconstitutional consideration. We also take seriously Chief Justice Roberts\u2019s observation that \u201cThe rise of the modern administrative state has not changed th[e] duty\u201d of Article III <em>courts<\/em> to \u201csay what the law is.\u201d City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 316 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t<\/p>\n<p>At bottom, the federal government\u2019s powers cannot be divorced from the Constitution\u2019s broader structure and context. Instead, the Founders created a government assigning certain actors limited and enumerated powers to ensure ordered liberty. The Constitution\u2014its text, its history, its <em>meaning<\/em>\u2014tell us what Congress, the executive, and judiciary may do as our agents. Any attempt to circumvent those authorizations undermines the fiduciary nature of the document. And no one may, in the face of convenience, waive or alter these principles.<\/p>\n<p>With this background in mind, this article proceeds in three parts: Part I explores the nature of the Constitution\u2019s structure and text reflecting a fiduciary relationship between the people and the government, with the people as principals delegating limited powers to their government agents. Part II shows how this fiduciary understanding supports the enumerated powers doctrine, which in turn informs the separation of powers and subdelegation doctrines. Part III applies these principles and reexamines the constitutional debate over the Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial and Article III\u2019s grant of \u201cjudicial Power\u201d to the federal courts. It argues that, properly understood, the enumerated powers and separation of powers doctrines largely obviate the need to define the scope of these Article III and Seventh Amendment guarantees in the context of agency adjudication of \u201cpublic rights\u201d cases.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/23\/2026\/06\/23.2-Garrison-Kerkhoff-Slattery.pdf\">Continue reading The Fiduciary Constitution, the Separation of Powers, and the Legal Landscape After <em>SEC v. Jarkesy<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>For decades, the American people\u2019s right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment was severely curtailed by Congress, the executive branch, and the judiciary. To implement \u201cfunctional government,\u201d Congress [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":28,"featured_media":0,"parent":2728,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"abstract.php","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_price":"","_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_header":"","_tribe_default_ticket_provider":"","_tribe_ticket_capacity":"0","_ticket_start_date":"","_ticket_end_date":"","_tribe_ticket_show_description":"","_tribe_ticket_show_not_going":false,"_tribe_ticket_use_global_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_global_stock_level":"","_global_stock_mode":"","_global_stock_cap":"","_tribe_rsvp_for_event":"","_tribe_ticket_going_count":"","_tribe_ticket_not_going_count":"","_tribe_tickets_list":"[]","_tribe_ticket_has_attendee_info_fields":false,"footnotes":"","_tec_slr_enabled":"","_tec_slr_layout":""},"class_list":["post-2764","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"ticketed":false,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2764","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/28"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2764"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2764\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2786,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2764\/revisions\/2786"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2728"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2764"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}