{"id":2798,"date":"2026-06-23T14:13:01","date_gmt":"2026-06-23T18:13:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/?page_id=2798"},"modified":"2026-06-23T14:13:35","modified_gmt":"2026-06-23T18:13:35","slug":"breaking-the-black-box-reexamining-judicial-deference-in-national-security-issues-post-loper-bright","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/in-print\/volume-23-issue-2-summer-2025\/breaking-the-black-box-reexamining-judicial-deference-in-national-security-issues-post-loper-bright\/","title":{"rendered":"Breaking the Black Box: Reexamining Judicial Deference in National Security Issues Post-Loper Bright"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In the landscape of U.S. administrative law, few topics command as much intrigue and controversy as judicial deference to national security agencies. The Supreme Court\u2019s decision in <em>Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo<\/em> was a critical inflection point in the judiciary\u2019s oversight of executive power. Traditionally, the <em>Chevron<\/em> deference framework has enabled courts to lean toward executive agencies\u2019 interpretations in ambiguous statutory matters.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2798_1' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2798_1'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>1<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2798_1' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #1<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2798_1' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2798_1' tabindex='-1'>1<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #1 content: <\/span>Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842\u201344 (1984).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t This leniency has been particularly pronounced where national security is claimed, based on the premise that the executive branch is both constitutionally and functionally better equipped to address the unique demands of the immediacy and security issue.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2798_2' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2798_2'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>2<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2798_2' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #2<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2798_2' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2798_2' tabindex='-1'>2<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #2 content: <\/span><em>See<\/em> United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320\u201321 (1936) (recognizing the\nexecutive\u2019s distinctive role in foreign affairs).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t In the realm of national security, executive agencies like the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) often wield substantial authority, operating under broad interpretations of statutory language with limited judicial interference.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2798_3' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2798_3'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>3<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2798_3' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #3<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2798_3' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2798_3' tabindex='-1'>3<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #3 content: <\/span><em>See<\/em> 50 U.S.C. 1701\u201307.\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t This deference, cemented in doctrines like <em>Chevron v. National Resource Defense Council<\/em> and <em>Kisor v. Wilkie<\/em>, has long afforded agencies expansive latitude in their interpretations, particularly when constantly cloaked under the veil of national security.\n\t\t<span class='js-footnote footnote'>\n\t\t\t<button type='button' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2798_4' class='footnote_inline_btn js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-describedby='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2798_4'>\n\t\t\t\t<sup class='footnote_inline_btn_number'>4<\/sup>\n\t\t\t\t<span id='footnote_btn_text_abstract_footnote_2798_4' class='visually_hide'>Open footnote #4<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t<cite id='abstract_footnote_2798_4' class='footnote_content_cite js-footnote-content'>\n\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_content_number js-footnote-toggle-btn' aria-controls='abstract_footnote_2798_4' tabindex='-1'>4<\/button>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content_wrap_inner'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_content'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='visually_hide'>Footnote #4 content: <\/span><em>See<\/em> Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 573\u201374 (2019).\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class='footnote_close_btn_wrap'>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type='button' class='footnote_close_btn js-footnote-close-btn' aria-label='Back to content'>close<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t<\/cite>\n\t\t<\/span>\n\t<\/p>\n<p>Yet, recent shifts in judicial doctrine, highlighted by the <em>Loper Bright<\/em> decision, raise compelling questions about the limits of this deference: Should this recalibration apply uniformly across all agencies that claim to exercise a core Article II function? <em>Loper Bright<\/em> signals a pivotal moment in administrative law, challenging the judiciary to reconsider how and to what extent agencies should be granted interpretive autonomy, especially in fields where agency actions heavily impact economic activities and individual liberties under the banner of security.<\/p>\n<p>This paper embarks on a reassessment of judicial deference in the context of national security, using OFAC\u2019s expanded regulatory reach as a case study. The analysis pivots on the implications of <em>Loper Bright<\/em> and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence that increasingly favors statutory precision over agency autonomy. While the judiciary has traditionally exercised restraint in matters of national security, citing the executive\u2019s superior expertise and access to classified information, such deference is not without its limits. Indeed, the judiciary\u2019s constitutional duty \u201cto say what the law is\u201d necessitates a rigorous examination of agency actions that extend beyond immediate military needs, particularly when regulatory actions risk encroaching upon individual rights.<\/p>\n<p>This paper further contends that while some measure of deference may still be appropriate in contexts of imminent threats or military actions, OFAC\u2019s evolution into a comprehensive regulatory body demands a recalibrated approach to oversight. The agency\u2019s reliance on interpretative guidance and informal rulemaking, often manifested in Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and non-binding advisories, reflects an opaque decision-making process that raises transparency concerns. Without explicit statutory backing or proven expertise in financial regulation, OFAC\u2019s interpretations have, at times, strained the limits of congressional intent, highlighting the dangers of unchecked administrative power. Ultimately, this paper argues for a reassertion of judicial independence in an era where the stakes of agency deference are at an all-time high, calling for courts to reaffirm their role as co-equal arbiters in the complex interplay of national security and administrative power.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/23\/2026\/06\/23.2-Huang.pdf\">Continue reading Breaking the Black Box: Reexamining Judicial Deference in National Security Issues Post-Loper Bright\u00a0<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the landscape of U.S. administrative law, few topics command as much intrigue and controversy as judicial deference to national security agencies. The Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":28,"featured_media":0,"parent":2728,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"abstract.php","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_price":"","_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_header":"","_tribe_default_ticket_provider":"","_tribe_ticket_capacity":"0","_ticket_start_date":"","_ticket_end_date":"","_tribe_ticket_show_description":"","_tribe_ticket_show_not_going":false,"_tribe_ticket_use_global_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_global_stock_level":"","_global_stock_mode":"","_global_stock_cap":"","_tribe_rsvp_for_event":"","_tribe_ticket_going_count":"","_tribe_ticket_not_going_count":"","_tribe_tickets_list":"[]","_tribe_ticket_has_attendee_info_fields":false,"footnotes":"","_tec_slr_enabled":"","_tec_slr_layout":""},"class_list":["post-2798","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"ticketed":false,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2798","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/28"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2798"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2798\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2800,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2798\/revisions\/2800"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2728"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2798"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}