{"id":463,"date":"2020-04-22T20:06:58","date_gmt":"2020-04-23T00:06:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/?page_id=463"},"modified":"2025-05-12T11:11:51","modified_gmt":"2025-05-12T15:11:51","slug":"restoring-the-essential-safeguard-why-the-abbott-test-for-preclusion-of-judicial-review-of-agency-action-is-an-inadequate-method-for-protecting-separation-of-powers","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/in-print-2\/volume-18-number-1-winter-2020\/restoring-the-essential-safeguard-why-the-abbott-test-for-preclusion-of-judicial-review-of-agency-action-is-an-inadequate-method-for-protecting-separation-of-powers\/","title":{"rendered":"Restoring the Essential Safeguard: Why the Abbott Test for Preclusion of Judicial Review of Agency Action Is an Inadequate Method for Protecting Separation of Powers"},"content":{"rendered":"

Judicial review is \u201can essential safeguard\u201d under the Constitution, allowing the judiciary to mitigate injuries on citizens by unjust government action. Throughout the modern era, Congress has passed statutes that allow administrative agencies to entirely avoid judicial review over their actions, frustrating the Constitution\u2019s separation of powers design. That design quarantines governmental powers among three branches for the purpose of protecting individual liberty and ensuring its citizens freedom from arbitrary laws, the right to hold policymakers accountable through elections, and access to an independent judiciary. The modern administrative state already acts outside this design by combining judicial, executive, and legislative powers into one political body. By denying the judiciary its ability to review agency action for constitutional, due process, ultra vires, and arbitrariness violations, Congress further subverts the Constitution\u2019s protections.
\nIn light of these purposes, courts should reconsider the Abbott<\/em> test, which currently governs whether Congress has validly precluded judicial review over agency actions. The Abbott<\/em> test solely considers whether Congress was clear in its desire to preclude review, placing a presumption against preclusion. Nowhere are courts permitted to consider the effects on individual liberty or the threat to separation of powers caused by a Congressional attempt to preclude judicial review. This paper suggests adding another step to the Abbott<\/em> test to rectify the test\u2019s insufficiencies. Rather than stopping at congressional intent, the court should add a final step that weighs the interests of judicial review against the government\u2019s interests in stripping jurisdiction. The new step would require a judge to weigh the interests of separation of powers and liberty against the interests of Congress in precluding review. This test properly focuses the judicial inquiry not onto the bare intention of Congress, but rather the impact on due process, judicial independence, and potential for permitting unlawful agency action.<\/p>\n

Keep Reading Restoring the Essential Safeguard: Why the Abbott<\/em> Test for Preclusion of Judicial Review of Agency Action Is an Inadequate Method for Protecting Separation of Powers<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Judicial review is \u201can essential safeguard\u201d under the Constitution, allowing the judiciary to mitigate injuries on citizens by unjust government action. Throughout the modern era, Congress has passed statutes that […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":129,"featured_media":0,"parent":447,"menu_order":6,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"abstract.php","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_price":"","_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_header":"","_tribe_default_ticket_provider":"","_tribe_ticket_capacity":"0","_ticket_start_date":"","_ticket_end_date":"","_tribe_ticket_show_description":"","_tribe_ticket_show_not_going":false,"_tribe_ticket_use_global_stock":"","_tribe_ticket_global_stock_level":"","_global_stock_mode":"","_global_stock_cap":"","_tribe_rsvp_for_event":"","_tribe_ticket_going_count":"","_tribe_ticket_not_going_count":"","_tribe_tickets_list":"[]","_tribe_ticket_has_attendee_info_fields":false,"footnotes":"","_tec_slr_enabled":"","_tec_slr_layout":""},"class_list":["post-463","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"ticketed":false,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/463","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/129"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=463"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/463\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":464,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/463\/revisions\/464"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/447"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.law.georgetown.edu\/public-policy-journal\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=463"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}