The United States and China are engaged in a hegemonic rivalry for global dominance. Initially manifested in tariffs and a trade war, the geo-economic competition between China and the United States is broadening and will likely impact all areas of the global economic and legal architectures. With respect to international legal governance, extraterritorial jurisdiction may play an important role as both the United States and China seek to use law as part of their overall geo-economic strategies. In the United States, enforcing U.S. laws against Chinese defendants—particularly Chinese state-linked entities—will likely be an important U.S. stratagem. The question of whether to apply a U.S. federal statute to extraterritorial conduct involves determining the application of U.S. law to conduct that occurs at least partially outside the territory of the United States. This Article contributes to the existing literature by exploring extraterritoriality in the context of the U.S.-China rivalry by examining the potential for an expansion in U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction through the lens of government enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”). The FCPA was driven to a substantial extent by geo-political strategy in the context of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry—national security concern over U.S. versus Soviet political-economic influence was a factor in congressional intent in enacting the FCPA. Similarly, in the U.S.-China con-text, U.S. national security concerns over an ambitious China may become an important factor in court rulings on extraterritorial jurisdiction militating strongly in finding adverse domestic effects thereby justifying extraterritorial jurisdiction. Moreover, utilization of the U.S. financial system to further the FCPA violation will likely serve as an additional basis for jurisdiction.

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