Volume 56
Issue
2
Date
2025

Sealing Pandora's Box: The Case for the United States' Observation of Key New Start Treaty Provisions Following its 2026 Expiration

by Matthew Johnson

On February 21, 2023, Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, announced that Russia is suspending participation in New START, the last remaining bilateral treaty limiting Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear arsenals. Over two years have passed since President Putin suspended Russia’s participation in New START, and Russia has declined U.S. initiatives to commence successor treaty negotiations. Even if a successor treaty is negotiated, the U.S. Senate is unlikely to provide its advice and consent. As the Treaty’s February 5, 2026 expiration quickly approaches, and the geopolitical situation centering on Ukraine continues to frustrate negotiations, the United States must adopt a unilateral policy regarding its strategic offensive limits. This Note argues that the United States should continue to observe New START’s strategic offensive limitations and prohibition against interfering with National Technical Means of Verification (NTM), in addition to continuing to publicly release the aggregate numbers of its strategic offensive arms and providing Russia with notifications of intercontinental ballistic missile launches, submarine-launched ballistic missile launches, and significant military exercises. Not only is this approach grounded in successful non-binding precedent on limitations of strategic offensive arms, but this approach would provide national security benefits, such as avoiding the prohibitive costs of a nuclear arms race and laying the groundwork for future piecemeal agreements by instilling good will. Moreover, the United States can continue to deter two nuclear peers— Russia and China—while observing New START’s strategic offensive limitations. Given these advantages, the United States should maintain this policy upon the expiration of New START even if Russia exceeds the strategic numerical limitations or interferes with U.S. NTM, unless Russia obtains a significant military advantage in doing so. By observing New START’s strategic offensive limitations and additional verification measures, the United States can prevent a new nuclear arms race (or the exacerbation thereof) and the opening of Pandora’s Box.

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