Introduction

Since the founding of Jamestown in 1607, the British monarch had been granting charters to Englishmen providing them land in North America for them to colonize. By 1732, there were thirteen British colonies in North America. For many years, the American colonists lived peacefully under British rule until after the French and Indian War, when Britain began heavily taxing the colonies. Several of these tax acts led to protestation from the colonists who believed that the British Parliament had no right to tax them. The tensions quickly escalated until the first shots were fired on the Lexington green in 1775, beginning the American War of Independence. Since that moment, people have debated whether the American colonists were justified in separating from England in this way.[1] In this essay, I will argue that the American Revolution was a just war under the philosophical doctrine known as “Just War theory.”

Just War Criteria

Thomas Aquinas gave three primary criteria for a just war in the Summa Theologica. The first is “the authority of the sovereign by whose command war is to be waged.”[2] The second requirement is a “just cause.”[3] And third, “the belligerents should have a rightful intention.”[4] Catholic philosophical teaching, building on Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas, lists four criteria for a just war: 1) “the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain;”[5] 2) “all other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective;”[6] 3) “there must be serious prospects of success;”[7] and 4) “the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated.”[8] This essay analyzes the American Revolution under the full range of traditional just war criteria, using the foundational framework laid out by Aquinas and augmented by contemporary Catholic teaching.

Legitimate Authority

A just war must be waged by a legitimate authority. Thomas Aquinas wrote that “it is not the business of a private individual to declare war,” nor is it the “business of a private individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in wartime.”[9] The Continental Congress, made up of representatives elected by the colonial legislatures, certainly constituted a legitimate authority with power to wage war and to make decisions for the country during the war. The Congress established the Continental Army and appointed George Washington as commander-in-chief. Thus, this requirement was easily satisfied.

Just Cause[10]

The colonists rightly believed that the British Parliament did not possess the authority to tax the colonies without first obtaining their consent, as this exercise of parliamentary power directly violated many of their colonial charters. For example, the Virginia charter, granted by King James in 1609, stated that “they and every of them shall be free of all Subsidies and Customs in Virginia . . . and from all Taxes and Impositions for ever, upon any Goods or Merchandizes at any Time or Times hereafter.”[11] Therefore, when Britain began to tax goods such as paper or tea, the colonists justifiably objected to such taxes.

The colonies also objected to the fact that they lacked representation in Parliament. The colonies contained at least a quarter of the entire population of the British empire, yet the “many millions of acres in America . . . [had] no representative.”[12] The colonial charters required that “the colonists and their children should enjoy the same liberties as if they had remained, or were born, within the realm.”[13] One of these “undoubted rights of Englishmen” was to have no taxes imposed upon them without providing consent through representatives in Parliament.[14] Given the difficulty of sending representatives across an ocean, John Adams suggested that the colonies “[go] on as we begun, and fared well for 150 years, by letting parliament regulate trade, and our own assemblies all other matters.”[15]

This policy of Britain to let the colonies govern themselves for most of their existence was known as salutary neglect. For most of the colonies’ existence Britain left them to run themselves, allowing them to create their own legislatures which levied taxes and made laws. Unprofitability, political turmoil in England, and the great distance between London and the colonies all contributed to Parliament’s total lack of interest in governing the American colonies.[16] Regardless of the reason for England’s neglect of her colonies, this salutary neglect set a legal precedent of self-governance in the colonies.

Once Parliament became involved in colonial affairs, its violations of colonial rights threatened to become permanent. When the stamp tax was repealed by the Declaratory Act, this new act insisted that Parliament retained the right to tax the colonies “in all cases whatsoever.”[17] Indeed, the Townshend Acts followed shortly after, imposing new taxes on the colonists. Although Parliament later repealed part of that act as well, they kept the tax on tea as a symbol of Parliament’s power over the colonies.[18] Therefore, the sudden imposition of taxes on the colonies by Parliament, after 150 years of letting them govern themselves and in violation of their rights, spurred the colonists to action.

Another major grievance of the colonists was the Quartering Act, which required the colonists to house British troops. The English Bill of Rights recognized the right of English subjects not to be burdened with the quartering of soldiers without their consent.[19] The quartering of soldiers in the colonies, therefore, was yet another example of Parliament violating the Constitutional rights of the colonists. Britain claimed that a standing army in the colonies was necessary to defend them, but the soldiers were stationed in major cities, rather than in outposts on the frontier. It certainly did not help that the British soldiers were the “scum of society”, and were “known for their barbarity and brutality, and were rightly feared by the populace.”[20] To have such people quartered in one’s home was justly regarded by the colonists as a violation of their rights. Thus, these “lasting, grave, and certain” violations of the colonist’s rights provided them a just cause for taking up arms in defense of those rights.[21]

Right Intention

A just war must be fought with the right intention. George Washington wrote that “the object is neither glory nor extent of territory, but a defence of all that is dear and valuable in life.”[22] Thomas Jefferson and John Dickinson shared Washington’s view, writing that the colonies “fight not for glory or for conquest,” but “in defence of the freedom that is our birthright, and which we ever enjoyed until the late violation of it.”[23] Their intention was not to bring glory to themselves, nor to conquer new land, but to defend the liberties that were rightfully theirs according to their charters and the English Constitution. Therefore, the colonies had a “rightful intention” in waging the American Revolutionary War.[24]

Exhaust All Other Means

Under Just War theory, the decision to go to war must be a last resort, and the colonies did not go to war until after exhausting all peaceful alternatives. In 1765, a colonial assembly known as the Stamp Act Congress passed a document declaring their rights and grievances, while affirming their allegiance to the king.[25] During the closure of Boston Harbor following the Boston Tea Party, the colony of Massachusetts sent out a letter to the other colonies asking for their support. The people of Pennsylvania responded with a letter saying that while they “sympathized with the people of Boston”, they believed that “all lenient measures should be first tried.”[26] John Dickinson, who helped author this letter, also drafted a petition sent to King George III by the First Continental Congress, which stated that “when the causes of our apprehensions are removed, our future conduct will prove us not unworthy of the regard, we have been accustomed, in our happier days, to enjoy.”[27] By petitioning the king to redress the grievances they had suffered, the colonies hoped to bring about the peace they had enjoyed for so long. The king, however, ignored their petition and this attempt at reconciliation failed.

The Second Continental Congress made one last attempt at reconciliation with the Olive Branch Petition, which stated that

we think ourselves required by indispensable obligations to Almighty God, to your Majesty, to our fellow subjects, and to ourselves, immediately to use all the means in our power not incompatible with our safety, for stopping the further effusion of blood, and for averting the impending calamities that threaten the British Empire.[28]

Even though the first shots had already been fired at Lexington and Concord, Congress still hoped the king would address their grievances and thus bring peace. When George III was presented with the petition, however, he “refused to have anything to do with it.”[29] For years, the colonies had “incessantly and ineffectually besieged the throne as supplicants,”[30] but their constant pleas were ignored by both the king and Parliament, leaving no choice but to take up arms.

Probability of Success

A just war must have a reasonable chance of success, and the colonists had a good chance of victory due to their distance from Britain, their experience, and the likelihood of foreign aid. Geographically, the colonies had many advantages. It took several weeks for Britain to transport troops and supplies to the colonies. Furthermore, the British army was spread out across its imperial holdings around the globe, meaning Britain could not send its entire military might to the American colonies. Additionally, the colonists “had been previously exercised in warlike operation, and possessed of the means of defending [themselves].”[31] Many American colonists, including George Washington, had served under British leadership in the French and Indian War, where they gained valuable military experience. Moreover, the Americans believed that “foreign assistance [was] undoubtedly attainable.”[32] France and Britain had been enemies for centuries, and the French would seize any opportunity to strike a blow to the British empire. All the Americans needed to do was fight a defensive war and keep the Continental army intact until French aid was secured.[33]

All of these factors gave the colonists a probability of success, but what truly made the colonies unconquerable was the “minds and hearts of the people.”[34] As Benjamin Franklin put it, “the seeds of Liberty are universally sown [in the colonies], and nothing can eradicate them.”[35] The result of this mindset was that no matter how many cities British troops took over, they could not win back the hearts of the colonists. The British army managed to capture Boston, New York, and even the capital of Philadelphia, but they could not win the war. Troop presence was necessary to subdue the colonists, and as soon as the troops left, the colonists would continue supporting independence. Since the British army could not occupy the entire country, nor sway the minds and hearts of the people, the colonists’ ultimate success was only a matter of time.

Proportionate Evil

Finally, the evils of war cannot outweigh the good sought. The horrors of war were well known to the colonists, many of whom had recently fought in the French and Indian War. George Washington, for example, witnessed the slaughter of General Braddock’s army at Monongahela. Nevertheless, when the time came to fight for their rights, the colonists were willing to go through all the horror again because they believed their cause was worth the costs of war. George Washington wrote in a letter to one of his generals that the colonists “are ready to spill their blood in vindication of [their] rights.”[36] The legacy of the American Revolution has left no doubt that the liberties the colonists fought to attain were well worth the price.

Conclusion

In summary, the Continental Congress was a legitimate authority. The many grave injustices of Britain, including the overruling of colonial charters and the quartering of British soldiers, provided a just cause for the colonists to take up arms during the American Revolution. The colonies did not go to war with the intention of glory or conquest, but to defend their rights. The colonists only resorted to violence after years of petitioning the king for a redress of their grievances and having these pleas ignored. Their experience in previous wars, Britain’s difficulty with waging war across the ocean, the likelihood of French aid, and the inability of Britain to conquer the hearts and minds of the people in the American colonies gave the colonists a high probability of success. Finally, the fact that the colonists were willing to go to war, despite having experienced the horrors of war, demonstrates that the goods they would obtain through independence outweighed the evil caused by war. Thus, under the criteria of Just War theory, the American Revolution was a just war.

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[1] E.g., Marc LiVecche, Was the American Revolutionary War Just?, Providence (July 4, 2017), https://providencemag.com/2017/07/american-revolution-july-4th-just-war-american-revolutionary-war/ [https://perma.cc/6JHK-3RSS].

[2] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II-II, Q. 40 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Burns Oates & Washbourne 1920).

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Catechism of the Catholic Church: Revised in Accordance with the Official Latin Text Promulgated by Pope John Paul II 2309 (2000).

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Aquinas, supra note 2.

[10] Aquinas’s “just cause” requirement and the Catechism’s “lasting, grave, and certain” damage criteria are effectively two sides of the same coin, so this Post analyzes them together here.

[11] Va. Const. of 1609; see also, e.g., Md. Const. of 1632 (“We, our Heirs, and Successors, at no Time hereafter, will impose, or make or cause to be imposed, any Impositions, Customs, or other Taxations, Quotas, or Contributions whatsoever, in or upon the Residents or Inhabitants of the Province aforesaid for their Goods, Lands, or Tenements within the same Province”).

[12] John Adams, Novanglus; Or, A History of the Dispute with America, From Its Origin, in 1754, to the Present Time, No. VII (1775).

[13] David Ramsay, The History of the American Revolution 79 (Liberty Fund 1990) (1789).

[14] Stamp Act Congress, Declaration of Rights (1765).

[15] Adams, supra note 12.

[16] Russell Kirk, The Roots of American Order 303 (2003) (“Barbados or Jamaica alone … seemed worth more to London than all the thirteen mainland colonies put together.”).

[17] Declaratory Act 1766, 6 Geo. 3. c. 12 (Brit. Am. & Brit. W. Indies).

[18] Tea Act, History.com (Nov. 9, 2009), https://www.history.com/articles/tea-act [https://perma.cc/7ZCK-28RY].

[19] Bill of Rights 1689, 1 W. & M. 2 c. 2 (Eng. & Wales) (criticizing King James II for “quartering soldiers contrary to law” and stating “That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of Parliament, is against law”).

[20] Dave Williams, How Loudoun County Got Its Name, Loudon History, https://mason.gmu.edu/~drwillia/loudoun.html [https://perma.cc/TL74-3TAF].

[21] See Catechism of the Catholic Church, supra note 5.

[22] Letter from George Washington to Brig. Gen. John Thomas (July 23, 1775).

[23] Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms (July 6, 1775).

[24] See Catechism of the Catholic Church, supra note 5.

[25] Stamp Act Congress, supra note 14.

[26] Ramsay, supra note 13, at 107.

[27] Petition from the Continental Congress to King George III (Oct. 1774).

[28] Petition from the Second Continental Congress to King George III (“Olive Branch Petition”) (July 8, 1775).

[29] David G. McCullough, 1776 at 10 (2005).

[30] Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms, supra note 23.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Letter from George Washington to John Hancock (Sep. 8, 1776) (recognizing that “on our side the War should be defensive”).

[34] Letter from John Adams to Hezekiah Niles (Feb. 13, 1818).

[35] Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Lord Henry Kames (Feb. 25, 1767).

[36] Letter from George Washington to Brig. Gen. John Thomas, supra note 22.