Worker protections are on the decline. While this might not be a surprise for those reading the news or for those with knowledge of the current political leanings of the federal executive and legislative branches, the extent, and speed, of which these protections are declining is nothing less than staggering.

Since the start of President Trump’s second term, the United States has seen an increased rollback of many of the already-limited protections for workers. For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is no longer seeking damages on claims based on disparate impact^[1] and has instead shifted to trying to prosecute “illegal DEI initiatives” (referring to company policies that have tried to increase the diversity, equity, and inclusivity of their workplaces for workers of different identities and backgrounds).^[2] Furthermore, the Department of Labor has shied away from seeking liquidated, or “double,” damages in pursuing back pay claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act^[3] and has announced the rollback of enforcement of a variety of labor provisions while establishing more employer-friendly rules.^[4] Also, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has given up its litigation efforts against challenges to its non-compete covenant rules, in which the FTC proposed to starkly limit when and to whom non-compete covenants—terms typically laid out in employee contracts or, less commonly, in severance agreements, that bindingly restrict type and location of jobs former employees can work—could apply.^[5]

The potentially most impactful policy of the second Trump administration’s attack on worker protections has been on the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). On January 27, 2025, President Trump announced the controversial firing of Gwynne Wilcox, a National Labor Relations Board Member, despite Wilcox’s term not expiring until 2028, and Board Members previously only being able to be fired with “cause” per the holding of the Supreme Court case Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S.^[6] The firing was initially held to be illegal with Wilcox to be reinstated in a 7–4 vote by the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.^[7] After the order by the D.C. Circuit Court, an emergency stay was granted by the Supreme Court in a one page order by Chief Justice Roberts which paused Wilcox’s reinstatement; the order was split 6–3 along ideological lines.^[8] With Wilcox fired, the NLRB was without a quorum—the statutory minimum of three Board members required to hear cases, propose rules, and issue authoritative interpretations of labor law.^[9] On December 18, 2025, the U.S. Senate voted to confirm ninety-seven Trump appointees en banc in a 53–43 vote along partisan lines, restoring a quorum to the NLRB with the confirmation of two NLRB members: Scott Mayer, who was previously in-house legal counsel and chief labor counsel at Boeing, and James Murphy, a career attorney at the NLRB.[10]

Meanwhile, in addition to the firing of Wilcox and the quorum crisis, in August 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with arguments presented by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, along with Amazon, Trader Joe’s, and Starbucks who were co-parties in the case, that the NLRB’s structure is likely unconstitutional due to its “for cause” removal provision of board members.^[11] The ruling functionally freezes all NLRA enforcement by the Board in the Fifth Circuit until the Supreme Court agrees to hear the case on appeal.^[12]

While the exact impacts of the Trump Administration and Supreme Court’s attacks on the NLRB and other regulatory bodies remain unclear, what is clear is that violations of preestablished labor and employment laws will inevitably increase without enforcement. These administrative rollbacks in enforcing these laws are particularly troubling as protections under individual employment provisions often do not result in damage awards attractive enough to sway hesitant plaintiffs’ attorneys working on contingency rates, particularly for low-income plaintiffs.^[13] Unions are still facing illegal union busting, though with less legal recourse, and labor organizers are being targeted for their work in unionizing efforts, both politically and economically, often facing unlawful termination.^[14] Simultaneously, the economic power held by workers is dwindling. Union membership is at an all-time low^[15] and wage stagnation is at a landmark high as real wages are unable to keep up with inflation and the consumer price index.^[16]

Amid this examination, it is important to acknowledge that the NLRA isn’t a perfect tool. The Act was negotiated by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and ratified by Congress in 1935 at the height of the New Deal Era as a way to strike a balance between democratic governance of workplaces and corporate independence by giving unions protections to strike, organize, and collectively bargain under the NLRA.^[17] Collective rights under the NLRA fundamentally established modern labor law.^[18] Initially, the NLRA had broad success in encouraging the growth of union membership—by 1945, 34.2% of all workers were in unions and for the next 45 years, the standard of living for union members continued to increase, wages kept up with productivity increases and inflation, and a stable middle class emerged.[19] Yet, as the 20th century progressed, union membership dropped dramatically due in part to increasing economic globalization characterized by rapid outsourcing of manufacturing to foreign workforces, increases in automation technology, and an economic shift to a broadly service-based economy with the rise of major health, technology, and retail sectors.^[20] It is also important to note that many sectors of workers are excluded from the text of the NLRA to begin with.^[21]

Although a good portion of the decline of preexisting trade unions can be attributed to these economic effects, the lack of emerging unions in new service and information technology industries can be attributed to changes in the political climate around union support and continued corporate union-busting efforts. One of the most notable flips came during the presidency of Ronald Reagan when the administration notoriously fired striking members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) which caused many labor activists to label President Reagan the largest “union-buster” of all time.^[22] The Reagan Administration’s NLRB also rolled back many rules and reversed many of its decision-making precedents, while large parts of federal labor enforcement bodies (such as the Department of Labor, the Occupational Safety and Health Association, and the EEOC) were let go due to administrative hostility, deregulation efforts, and budget cuts.^[23]

Conservative legal scholars, mirroring President Reagan’s fears about government overreach and support of Milton Friedman-esque “trickle-down economics” theories, have let their concern about the NLRA be continually known. Unions, they view, are attacks against worker and corporate autonomy while having disproportionate influence on political structures.^[24] They also view the NLRA as counterintuitively successful by achieving labor peace at the expense of declining union density.^[25] These views are reflected in the notorious “Project 2025” and its promises for the future of union and labor law—a future that seems to be materializing under the second Trump Administration’s attacks on the NLRB and similar administrative bodies.^[26]

While these anti-union policies and economic justifications are obviously attractive for corporations and those currently in charge of the federal government, workers and the working-class will continue to be hurt from the stripping away of rights and protections to organize.^[27] As the federal government backs off, however, individual states, such as California and New York, have taken up the labor protection torch themselves by providing independent workers organizing protections and some level of union governance oversight.^[28] However, these protections are fundamentally limited in scope and create a patchwork of enforcement that cannot address national economic problems as a whole.^[29] More notably, these state policies often are considered in conflict with the NLRA under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause and therefore have been deemed federally preempted by the Supreme Court.^[30]

As such, under the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence, it is clear that most of the abilities to reform labor law rest solely in the hands of Congress.^[31] However, the current political makeup of Congress functionally makes any new laws enforcing labor or employment protections functionally dead on arrival in either chamber. Further, even when the political leanings of Congress change, major questions arise about the political will for many legislators to push forth any labor law reforms. Therefore, as Congress lies dormant, workers organizing together, rather than government involvement, seems to remain the predominant path to building economic power for the working class.^[32] Although unable to provide swift economic or legal change, this front remains the most hopeful. Public support for unions is at an all-time high, and there have been several recent high-profile attempts to create organized labor groups within major service corporations, such as at multiple Amazon warehouses and Starbucks locations.^[33]

Although the futures of the NLRA and NLRB remain to be seen, the power of workers to band together to demand better economic conditions can never be taken away by any governmental body. To that end, we need to support and rely on our workers, our labor organizers, and ourselves to continue to push for a more prosperous and more equal society for all of those who live in it.

^[1] See Jim Paretti, EEOC to Close Investigations of Disparate Impact Discrimination, Litter (Sept. 25, 2025), https://www.littler.com/news-analysis/asap/eeoc-close-investigations-disparate-impact-discrimination [https://perma.cc/3D8P-2DLJ].

^[2] What You Should Know About DEI-Related Discrimination at Work, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-dei-related-discrimination-work [https://perma.cc/D2GG-8CAY] (last visited Nov. 6, 2025).

^[3] Justin R. Barnes & Jeffrey W. Brecher, Employers Won’t Face Double Damages from DOL Wage and Hour Division’s Administrative Proceedings, Jackson Lewis (July 8, 2025), https://www.jacksonlewis.com/insights/employers-wont-face-double-damages-dol-wage-and-hour-divisions-administrative-proceedings [https://perma.cc/X64X-PLY8].

^[4] See Justin R. Barnes & Jeffrey W. Brecher, DOL Regulatory Roundup: What Employers Need to Know, Jackson Lewis (Aug. 26, 2025), https://www.jacksonlewis.com/insights/dol-regulatory-roundup-what-employers-need-know [https://perma.cc/X5YX-EBBC].

^[5] See Tal Marnin et al., Update: FTC abandons Non-Compete Rule and simultaneously initiates targeted FTC noncompete enforcement action, White & Case (Sept. 5, 2025), https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/update-ftc-abandons-non-compete-rule-and-simultaneously-initiates-targeted-ftc [https://perma.cc/3LDB-NDJH].

^[6] See Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S., 295 U.S. 602, 631­–32 (1935); Andrea Hsu, Trump fires EEOC and labor board officials, setting up legal fight, NPR (Jan. 28, 2025, 6:07 PM), https://www.npr.org/2025/01/28/nx-s1-5277103/nlrb-trump-wilcox-abruzzo-democrats-labor [https://perma.cc/75TK-WYFK].

^[7] See Matthew Netti et al., Full D.C. Circuit Court Reinstates Wilcox to the NLRB, Sheppard Mullin: Lab. & Emp. L. Blog (Apr. 7, 2025), https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2025/04/articles/labor-and-employment/full-d-c-circuit-court-reinstates-wilcox-to-the-nlrb/ [https://perma.cc/G7YF-VQKH].

^[8] See Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415, 1415–17 (2025) (granting stay of a permanent injunction); Matthew Netti et al., Supreme Court Decides Against Reinstating Wilcox to NLRB as They Rule on Her Termination – NLRB Remains Without a Quorum, Sheppard Mullin: Lab. & Emp. L. Blog (May 23, 2025), https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2025/05/articles/labor-and-employment/supreme-court-decides-against-reinstating-wilcox-to-nlrb-as-they-rule-on-her-termination-nlrb-remains-without-a-quorum/ [https://perma.cc/PW5K-B8ZY].

^[9] See Rebecca Davis O’Brien, Trump’s Cuts to U.S. Labor Board Leave Festering Disputes and a Power Struggle, N.Y. Times (Dec 15, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/15/business/labor-law-nlrb-trump.html [https://perma.cc/YJ5F-ZX9A]; Netti et al., supra note 8; Robert G. Brody & Matthew Chiota, The NLRB’s Quorum Crisis and the Growing Constitutional Battle with the States, Rockland Cnty. Bus. J. (Nov. 6, 2025), https://rcbizjournal.com/2025/11/06/the-nlrbs-quorum-crisis-and-the-growing-constitutional-battle-with-the-states/ [https://perma.cc/W226-SN5X].

[10] S. Res. 532, 119th Cong. (2025); Chase Clark, NLRB Regains Its Quorum, Paving the Way for Renewed Board Action (US), Squire Patton Boggs: Emp. L. Worldview Blog (Dec. 19, 2025), https://www.employmentlawworldview.com/nlrb-regains-its-quorum-paving-the-way-for-renewed-board-action-us/ [https://perma.cc/LCZ4-QQW2].

^[11] See Space Expl. Tech. Corp. v. NLRB, 151 F.4th 761, 771–72 (5th Cir. 2025); but see Spring Creek Rehab. & Nursing Ctr. LLC v. NLRB, No. 24-3043, 2025 WL 3467537, at *6 (3d Cir. Dec. 3, 2025) (disagreeing with the Fifth Circuits’s holding on the NLRB’s constitutionality in Space Expl., 151 F.4th at 770).

^[12] See Chris S. Edwards & Avery J. Locklear, Federal Appellate Court Enjoins NLRB Proceedings, Concluding the NLRB’s Structure Is Likely Unconstitutional, Nat’l L. Rev. (Aug. 23, 2025), https://natlawreview.com/article/federal-appellate-court-enjoins-nlrb-proceedings-concluding-nlrbs-structure-likely [https://perma.cc/7CS5-KLRP].

^[13] See Celine McNicholas et al., Civil monetary penalties for labor violations are woefully insufficient to protect workers, Econ. Pol’y Inst.: Working Econ. Blog (July 15, 2021, 12:56 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/civil-monetary-penalties-for-labor-violations-are-woefully-insufficient-to-protect-workers/ [https://perma.cc/HP4T-Z6YC].

^[14] See Lynn Rhinehart & Celine McNicholas, What’s behind the corporate effort to kneecap the National Labor Relations Board?: SpaceX, Amazon, Trader Joe’s, and Starbucks are trying to have the NLRB declared unconstitutional—after collectively being charged with hundreds of violations of workers’ organizing rights, Econ. Pol’y Inst.: Working Econ. Blog (Mar. 7, 2024, 9:43 AM), https://www.epi.org/blog/whats-behind-the-corporate-effort-to-kneecap-the-national-labor-relations-board-spacex-amazon-trader-joes-and-starbucks-are-trying-to-have-the-nlrb-declared-unconstitutional/ [https://perma.cc/FT5A-GZ4M].

^[15] See Michael S. Derby, US labor union membership slips in 2024 to record low, Reuters (Jan. 28, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-labor-union-membership-little-changed-2024-government-says-2025-01-28/ [https://perma.cc/MR77-ETYA].

^[16] See Bryan Robinson, The Wage Crisis of 2025: 73% of Workers Struggling Financially, Forbes (Jan. 24, 2025), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bryanrobinson/2025/01/24/the-wage-crisis-of-2025-73-of-workers-struggling/ [https://perma.cc/4Q9G-SMQ6].

^[17] See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69.

^[18] See The History of the National Labor Relations Act and the Future of Worker Power, Aspen Inst.: Blog Posts (Mar. 28, 2022), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/the-history-of-the-national-labor-relations-act-and-the-future-of-worker-power/ [https://perma.cc/4R46-RRXS].

[19] Paul D. Romero & Julie M. Whittaker, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R47596, A Brief Examination of Union Membership Data (2023), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47596 [https://perma.cc/H5YN-N6E2].

^[20] Id.

^[21] See CLJE: Lab, Building Worker Power in Cities & States: Workers Excluded from the NLRA, Ctr. for Lab. & a Just Econ. (Sept. 1, 2024), https://clje.law.harvard.edu/publication/building-worker-power-in-cities-states/workers-excluded-from-the-nlra/ [https://perma.cc/BV7V-C2EN].

^[22]  See The 1981 PATCO Strike, Univ. Tex. Arlington Librs. (Sept. 2, 2021), https://libraries.uta.edu/news/1981-patco-strike [https://perma.cc/DK2F-TUCF].

^[23] See Andrew Strom, Ronald Reagan Has Shaped U.S. Labor Law for Decades, OnLabor (Jan. 4, 2024), https://onlabor.org/ronald-reagan-has-shaped-u-s-labor-law-for-decades/ [https://perma.cc/8SZY-Q9A5].

^[24] See G. Roger King, The Biden Administration “All of Government” Approach to Increasing Union Density in the Country and the NLRB’s Cemex Decision, Federalist Soc’y: Blog (Nov. 21, 2023), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/the-biden-administration-all-of-government-approach-to-increasing-union-density-in-the-country-and-the-nlrb-s-cemex-decision.

^[25] See Michael Wachter, The Striking Success of the NLRA, Regulation, Spring 2014, at 20, https://www.cato.org/regulation/spring-2014/striking-success-nlra [https://perma.cc/93Q5-DE7D]; Alexander T. MacDonald, The Accidental Success of the NLRA: How a Law about Unions Achieved Its Goals by Giving Us Fewer Unions, Federalist Soc’y: Blog (Aug. 28, 2024), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/the-accidental-success-of-the-nlra-how-a-law-about-unions-achieved-its-goals-by-giving-us-fewer-unions.

^[26] See Heritage Found., Project 2025 599­–604 (2023), https://static.heritage.org/project2025/2025_MandateForLeadership_FULL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4777-98EE]; Project 2025 and Unions, It’s Better in a Union, https://betterinaunion.org/project-2025 [https://perma.cc/4UG2-5ZKX] (last visited Nov. 8, 2025).

^[27] See Margaret Poydock & Celine McNicholas, Under the government shutdown, NLRB cases are on hold and the future of the agency remains uncertain, Econ. Pol’y Inst.: Working Econ. Blog (Oct. 24, 2025, 9:18 AM), https://www.epi.org/blog/under-the-government-shutdown-nlrb-cases-are-on-hold-and-the-future-of-the-agency-remains-uncertain/.

^[28] Lauren Herz, States Move To Address NLRB’s Inability To Act, But Legal Challenges Are To Come (US), Squire Patton Boggs: Emp. L. Worldview Blog (Sept. 15, 2025 4:00 PM), https://www.employmentlawworldview.com/states-move-to-address-nlrbs-inability-to-act-but-legal-challenges-are-to-come-us/ [https://perma.cc/2YWX-WKXU].

^[29] See Id.; see generally Best States to Work in the US 2025, Oxfam Am. (Aug. 28, 2025), https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/issues/economic-justice/workers-rights/best-states-to-work/ [https://perma.cc/AZK4-2ZW3].

^[30] See CLJE: Lab, supra note 21; Herz, supra note 28.

^[31] See Samuel Estreicher, Towards Sustainable Labor Law Reform, 38 A.B.A. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 327, 334–35 (2025), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/labor_law/resources/journal/38-3/towards-sustainable-labor-reform/.

^[32] See Jimmy Williams, To Build a Stronger Labor Movement, Go to the Members, Am. Prospect (Oct. 30, 2025), https://prospect.org/2025/10/30/to-build-stronger-labor-movement-go-to-members/ [https://perma.cc/85K3-U9KM].

^[33] See John Logan, Corporate union busting in plain sight: How Amazon, Starbucks, and Trader Joe’s crushed dynamic grassroots worker organizing campaigns, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (Jan. 28, 2025), https://www.epi.org/publication/corporate-union-busting/ [https://perma.cc/3FRS-8D38].