Crawl, Walk, Run: Moving the DOD’s Climate Change Policy from Assessment to Action
November 1, 2024 by Robert Elliott
The Department of Defense has made significant progress in advancing climate objectives, going from “assessing” climate impacts to building climate concerns into planning and acquisition processes.
Imagine the world’s second largest employer,[1] one with a global presence and which engages in activities with particularly high-emission equipment, heavy metal pollution, and even radiological problems. Paradoxically, that same organization has also led in the adoption of new energy sources, and by doing so, enhanced its own capabilities. That organization is the Department of Defense (DoD), and the DoD could find new ways to mitigate its climate impact while improving its operational capabilities.
President Obama’s Executive Order 13653[2] from 2014, which instructed all federal agencies to produce a Climate Change Action Plan, was the starting point for the modern DoD climate policy. DoD fulfilled the Executive Order’s requirement by issuing its 2014 Climate Action Plan. This was a relatively limited document primarily mandating further study,[3] but it previewed several of the lines of effort that would carry through subsequent action plans such as training, installation management, and acquisitions.
However, EO 13653 was rescinded by President Trump in the first two months of his administration. Years later, President Biden reissued EO 13653 as part of Executive Order 13990[4] and expanded the demands on federal agencies in EO 14008,[5] which set a government-wide climate policy. EO 14008 set out specific actions like rejoining the Paris Accords[6] and Kigali Amendment[7] and established the Special Envoy on Climate and Office of Domestic Climate Policy, and Section 103 specified how national security agencies should incorporate climate change into their planning documents. Subsections 103(e), (f), and (g) required national security actors to incorporate climate considerations into the production of various required planning and analysis documents, revealing how the Executive Order on its own missed a key lever for government action in military acquisitions.[8] Although Section 101(i)[9] directs the Secretary of Energy to coordinate with the Secretary of State, it ignores the large research and acquisition budgets within the Department of Defense. For example, President Biden requested $145 billion in research, development, testing, and evaluation and $170 billion in acquisition in his FY 2024 DoD request, and Congress actually allocated more funding in several categories. While there are many competing priorities for the DoD dollar, the pot of funds is enormous.
Fortunately, the DoD went further than required in their most recent 2024-2027 Climate Adaptation Plan and made procurement part of the “Lines of Effort” outlined, specifically highlighting acquisition in the second and fourth lines of efforts.[10] The DoD frames these environmental efforts as “ruggedization”[11] and emphasizes the operational impacts of energy requirements.[12] The vulnerabilities of fossil-fuel logistics were made apparent by the recent grounding of the oiler USNS Big Horn in the Red Sea.[13] This grounding was an embodiment of the fears outlined in the CAP and elsewhere, where a single mishap could potentially jeopardizing the operations keeping a vital sea-lane open.[14] The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln may not have required a continuous stream of fossil fuel, but the planes it carried gulped hydrocarbons down. The supply of those fuels was interrupted not by enemy action, but rather by an allision[15] with an underwater object.
From the 2014 CAP to the 2024 CAP, DoD has prioritized making sustainability-focused investments on its bases across the globe.[16] Next, it needs to include the systems operating from those bases. Environmental requirements are an opportunity to modernize rather than an additional politically-motivated requirement. Truly buying in to the environmental requirements rather than checking a bureaucratic box will likely reveal both incremental and paradigm-shifting opportunities. A Cold War-era example of these opportunities to gain military advantage through innovation is the nuclear power revolution in U.S. submarine capabilities. By embracing alternate energy sources in the height of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy was able to build submarines limited by crew endurance rather than fuel stores, and these nuclear submarines achieved significant speed and depth advantages over diesel-electric submarines. Not satisfied with the paradigm-shift, the Navy led the development of natural-circulation reactors[17] for noise signature reduction, a technology showing promise decades later for small modular reactor designs.
One potential technology ready for adoption is the “adaptive cycle” engine proposed for the F-35 and several aircraft still in development. The F-35 version of this technology is the Adaptive Engine Technology Program (AETP). These engines achieve significantly higher performance across all categories, a “generational leap in capability,” rather than squeezing out incremental improvements from existing designs.[18] In a true “paradigm shift,” it would allow US aircraft to haul 20% more payload 30% farther and still mount more-demanding avionics.[19] Although the engine was developed by General Electric, F-35 prime contractor Lockheed Martin endorsed AETP.[20] In the high-dollar world of defense contracts, environmental advocates could push innovative technologies and generate political capital for future acquisition disputes.
Even absent a paradigm-shifting energy breakthrough, there is enormous opportunity for incremental improvements. As outlined above, more fuel-efficient vehicles need less logistical support. The Russian military found that out with the infamous “convoy to Kiev” and the U.S. faces even harder logistical problems when projecting force across oceans rather than into a neighboring country, as exemplified by the USNS Big Horn grounding described above. Every mile-per-gallon improvement the DoD can make advances both operational and environmental objectives.
[1] Martin Armstrong, The World’s Biggest Employers, Statista, Nov. 11, 2022, https://www.statista.com/chart/3585/the-worlds-biggest-employers/.
[2] Exec. Order No. 13,653, 78 FR 66819 (Nov. 1, 2013).
[3] DOD Directive 4715.21, (Jan, 14, 2016), (calling for the DoD to “assess the effects of projected climate change,” (at 6), “several research and survey efforts to more fully identify and characterize vulnerabilities, impacts, and risks posed by climate change,” (at 8), “collaborate” (at 12). These calls were vague, gesturing at categories of non-DoD actors that DoD should collaborate with.
[4] Exec. Order No. 13,990, 86 FR 7037 (Jan. 25, 2021).
[5] Exec. Order No, 14,008, 86 FR 7619 (Jan. 27, 2021).
[6] Id. at § 102.
[7] Id.
[8] Id. at § 103.
[9] Id. at § 101(i).
[10] Department of Defense 2024-2027 Climate Adaptation Plan, National Climate Task Force and Federal Chief Sustainability Officer, Sept. 5, 2024.
[11] Id. at 20.
[12] Id. at 14.
[13] Sam LaGrone, Oiler USNS Big Horn Now in Port in Oman as Congress Raises Questions Over Logistics Fleet, US Naval Inst. News, Sept. 25, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/09/25/oiler-usns-big-horn-now-in-port-in-oman-as-congress-raises-questions-over-logistics-fleet.
[14] The US contracted with a private tanker at double the market rate due to prioritization of US-flagged ships. John Konrad, US Navy Pays Nearly Double to Charter Oil Tankers, gCaptain, Oct. 20, 2024, https://gcaptain.com/us-navy-pays-nearly-double-to-charter-oil-tankers/.
[15] An “allision” is a maritime event where a ship strikes a stationary object, which is distinguished from a “collision” where both ships involved are moving. Allision, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/allision, (last visited Oct. 31, 2024).
[16] Particularly highlighting the efforts to develop “microgrids” and deploy electric vehicles within the DLA Defense Supply Base Columbus, Ohio, DOD 2024-2027 CAP at 11.
[17] Norman Polmar, The American Submarine, 1984-2014, 110 US Naval Inst. Proceedings 975 (May 1984).
[18] Chris Gordon, GE’s AETP Engine Completes Milestone Tests as Air Force Faces Decision on F-35, Air Space Forces Mag., Sep. 14, 2022, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/ges-aetp-engine-completes-milestone-tests-as-air-force-faces-decision-on-f-35-engine/.
[19] Id.
[20] Michael Marrow, Lockheed Backs New AETP Engine for F-35, Breaking Defense, June 21, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/06/lockheed-backs-new-aetp-engine-for-f-35/.