This Article provides an account of the object of legal interpretation. It examines various potential objects: text, lawmaking choice, practice, and order. The Article argues for a pluralist conception of the object of interpretation, according to which all of these alternatives are possible objects. In making this argument, the Article puts forth an account of the nature of the object of interpretation. The object of legal interpretation is, in essence, what is treated as a source of law—a fact that is recognized as generating law. As such, which alternative is exactly the object of interpretation in a given context depends partly on descriptive considerations regarding what the law treats as a legal source and how it does so, and partly on normative ones regarding which object of interpretation officials should choose.

This account has several consequences. No object of interpretation is self-evident, not even the text. Further, there is no single “correct” object of interpretation. Pluralism is inevitable, as it is always possible for legal practice and practitioners to treat different things as the object of interpretation. Legal systems and individual interpreters need, in a very real sense, to choose an object of interpretation. Since all interpretation depends on its object, any proposal for a method of interpretation must first define what is being interpreted.

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