Introduction

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is often praised as the crown jewel of the civil rights movement, standing as one of the most powerful examples of American legislation transforming constitutional ideals into lived equality. Louisiana v. Callais now places that promise in peril.[1] What is before the Court is whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act will continue to function as we know it. Will it remain an instrument for identifying and remedying vote dilution, or will it instead resurge as an abstract, hollow ideal that states can evade once again? At its core, this case asks whether the very tools Congress designed to root out racial subordination in the political process can survive in a modern constitutional era that is increasingly skeptical of any consideration to race.

Callais sits at the intersection of two competing mandates. On one side is the Court’s increasingly firm view that the Constitution demands racial neutrality. On the other side is Congress’s command, through Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, that race must sometimes be considered to ensure equality in our political process. The tension between these two principles has long shaped the Court’s voting rights jurisprudence, but never with consequences so far reaching.[2] Undoubtedly, this decision will determine whether our nation’s most enduring safeguard against racial vote dilution remains the living enforcement tool we currently know it as, or whether it recedes into the background as more of a symbolic promise.

This Essay proceeds in five parts. Part I and II situates Callais within its factual and procedural history, tracing how Louisiana’s redistricting battle evolved into its current posture before the Supreme Court. Part III provides the legal background, outlining the Reconstruction Amendments, the statutory framework of the Voting Rights Act and the voting rights case law that has guided courts in balancing race-conscious remedies against equal protection constraints. Part IV analyzes the October 2025 reargument, focusing on the Justices’ competing theories of Section 2 as a diagnostic tool or racial command, temporal limits, institutional boundaries, and partisan considerations. It ends with proposing several plausible outcomes and the trajectories they may set in motion for the future of voting rights enforcement. Part V concludes by reflecting on what Callais ultimately reveals about the constitutional identity of a nation still deciding whether it believes in the full promise of political equality.

I. Factual Background

Following the 2020 Census, the state of Louisiana faced its once-a-decade task of redrawing its six congressional districts to account for population growth and shifts.[3] The Census data showed Black residents now accounted for a growing one-third of the state’s total population,[4] while the white population continued to decline.[5] Yet, as it currently stood, only one of the state’s six congressional districts were majority Black.[6] In response, leaders and community members across the state mobilized to demand a map that took into account the population shift and gave Black Louisianans an equal opportunity to elect their preferred candidates of choice.[7] More specifically, advocates called for a new congressional map with two districts in which Black Louisianans could potentially determine the outcome of elections, while still complying with both the Constitution and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits voting practices that discriminate based on race or color.[8]

Despite these efforts, in early 2022 the Louisiana Legislature adopted HB 1, a congressional map that once again maintained a single majority-Black district.[9] Although HB 1 passed through the Republican-controlled legislature, the map drew significant criticism from voters, local organizers, and civil-rights groups, who viewed it as a continuation of Louisiana’s long pattern of racial underrepresentation. The map preserved the districts of many incumbent powerholders while continuing to pack Black voters into the 2nd Congressional District, which stretches from Baton Rouge to New Orleans.[10]

After the passage of HB 1, John Bel Edwards, Louisiana’s Democrat Governor at the time, vetoed the bill citing his concerns that it violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.[11] The legislature, however, overrode his veto. [12]

II. Procedural History

The litigation roots of Louisiana v. Callais were first planted in Robinson v. Landry (originally Robinson v. Ardoin).[13] A coalition of Black Louisiana voters, including its namesake Press Robinson, and civil-rights organizations filed suit challenging HB 1 under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.[14] The Middle District of Louisiana ultimately agreed, granting a preliminary injunction and concluding that the Robinson plaintiffs had shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits.[15] The state of Louisiana then sought and obtained a stay from the Supreme Court,[16] which held the case in abeyance pending its decision in Allen v. Milligan (formerly Merrill v. Milligan),[17] a parallel redistricting case from Alabama in which Black voters challenged their congressional map under Section 2, arguing that it unlawfully diluted their voting strength by maintaining only one majority-Black district out of seven, despite Black residents compromising nearly 30 percent of the state’s population.[18] After the Supreme Court decided Milligan in June 2023, reaffirming the viability of Section 2 vote dilution claims, the stay was lifted.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit (notably a circuit not known for being progressive in upholding civil liberties)[19] affirmed the district court’s holdings that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed under Section 2 and ultimately gave the Louisiana Legislature until January 2024 to enact a remedial map that better complied with the Voting Rights Act.[20]

In a special session concluding January 19, 2024, the state legislature passed SB 8, which officially established a second majority-Black district but not drawn in the way the Robinson advocates expected.[21] Instead of situating the new district compactly between Baton Rouge and the Mississippi Delta, as the Robinson plaintiffs had proposed,[22] the legislature linked Black communities from Baton Rouge in the south to Shreveport in the north in a sprawling 250-mile configuration.[23] Legislators defended the contours of the district as a compromise between racial and political considerations, as they wanted to protect power-holding incumbents like Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, House Majority Leader Steve Scalise, and Representative Julia Letlow who sat on the Appropriations Committee, and draw out Republican Representative Garrett Graves who was facing internal opposition within his party.[24] Governor Jeff Landry signed the plan into law on January 22, 2024.[25]

Almost immediately after the map’s passage, a group of self-titled “non-African American” voters filed Callais v. Landry in the Western District of Louisiana, alleging that SB 8 was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander under the Equal Protection Clause, as it used race as the “predominant factor” in drawing the new district.[26] The Robinson plaintiffs quickly intervened to defend the map, emphasizing that it was necessary to remedy the Section 2 violation previously recognized by the courts and to ensure fair representation.[27] After a bench trial in April 2024, a three-judge panel ultimately struck down the map in a split 2–1 decision.[28] The majority concluded race had predominated in the design of SB 8 and the legislature failed to show that the map was narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interest of complying with the Voting Rights Act.[29]

The state and Robinson intervenors appealed to the Supreme Court, asking it to stay the district court’s ruling and allow SB 8 to remain in place for the 2024 election cycles. On May 15, 2024, the Court granted the stay.[30] The 2024 elections took place using the new map, and Representative Cleo Fields was elected as the second Black member of Louisiana’s congressional delegation.[31]

The Court later agreed to hear the case, consolidating Louisiana v. Callais and Robinson v. Callais under Louisiana v. Callais, and scheduled oral argument for March 2025.[32] After hearing oral arguments,[33] the Court took a rare turn. Instead of issuing a decision they asked for reargument. The Court invited the parties to submit supplemental briefs on a narrower question: “Whether the State’s intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution.”[34] The Court heard a second round of argument on October 15, 2025.

III. Legal Background

Understanding Louisiana v. Callais first requires understanding the maze of historical, legal, and doctrinal frameworks that make up the case’s bedrock. And, even more so, grasping the balance the Court has long tried to strike among them. This Part will unpack that in three sections: (A) outlining the constitutional foundations in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; (B) tracing Congress’s statutory response in the Voting Rights Act of 1965; and (C) summarizing the Supreme Court’s case law addressing the perceived tension between those provisions and defining how they operate in the redistricting context.

A. Constitutional Foundations

The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments form the constitutional baseline of Callais. Ratified during the Reconstruction era, these two amendments are part of a trio better known as the “Reconstruction Amendments”—the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth.

The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, extended the liberties and rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to formerly enslaved people.[35] Most relevant to Callais, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from denying “any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” ensuring that all individuals, but especially Black Americans, were afforded equal protection under the law.[36]

The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870, built upon this. After the Fourteenth Amendment’s language proved to be too weak to guarantee Black enfranchisement, the Fifteenth Amendment explicitly confronted the issue by prohibiting the denial or abridgement of the right to vote “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”[37] In many ways, it filled the constitutional gap the Fourteenth left open. Taken together, and against the backdrop of the Civil War, these two amendments captured the broad vision of Reconstruction: a constitutional reboot meant to ensure everyone could claim full and equal citizenship in this country.

B. Statutory Intervention

Yet despite the Reconstruction Amendments’ sweeping guarantees, nearly a century passed before those promises were meaningfully enforced and truly carried out. In the years after Reconstruction, states (particularly former Confederate states in the Deep South) found new ways to suppress Black political participation through the use of literacy tests, poll taxes, intimidation, and physical violence, among other measures. The Supreme Court’s own narrow interpretations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments often legitimized or ignored these practices, leaving the stated constitutional vision of equal political participation largely hollow.[38]

It was not until 1965 that Congress finally stepped in. Using its enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which was designed to give real force to the constitutional guarantees that had long gone unfulfilled.[39] This Act was introduced in direct response to the violence in Selma, Alabama, better known as “Bloody Sunday,” when law enforcement officers brutally attacked peaceful civil rights marchers as they crossed the Edmund Pettus Bridge.[40] The televised brutality shocked the nation and pushed a call for action. As President Lyndon B. Johnson later recalled, “In little more than four months, the Congress, with overwhelming majorities, enacted one of the most monumental laws in the entire history of American freedom.”[41]

The statute’s structure is anchored directly in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment. Section 2 of the Act created a nationwide ban on any voting practice or procedure that “results in a denial or abridgment of the right . . . to vote on account of race or color.”[42] Unlike earlier cases that largely targeted only the most egregious intentional discrimination,[43] Section 2 critically recognized that racial inequality in voting often stemmed from the entrenched systems and practices that produced discriminatory results. In doing so, the statute focused on discriminatory effects rather than discriminatory intent. Section 5 of the Act went a step further and required certain jurisdictions with long histories of voter suppression to obtain federal preclearance from either the Department of Justice or a federal court before changing any of their voting laws or district maps, a safeguard intended to prevent continued discriminatory practices rather than just remedying the violations after the fact.[44]

Together, these provisions gave real teeth to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and marked a turning point in the nation’s commitment to effectuating equal political opportunity. For decades, this Act reshaped the voting and electoral landscape by protecting minority voters, opening more polling places, and expanding representation across every level of government.

C. Case Law

With the text of the Constitution and Voting Rights Act providing the promise, the Court’s case law has historically determined the boundaries of their execution. Over time, those boundaries have shifted, sometimes subtly and sometimes drastically, as the Court has tried to reconcile Congress’s race-conscious remedial scheme in Section 2 with what many interpret as the Constitution’s call for racial neutrality in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment. Notably, the growing popularity of this colorblind interpretation has coincided with a series of decisions that have narrowed the reach of the Voting Rights Act.

1. Pre-Gingles: Development of the Modern Section 2 Framework

Doctrinally, the inflection point came nearly fifteen years after the passage of the Voting Rights Act, in City of Mobile v. Bolden.[45] Although many courts had previously interpreted Section 2 to allow consideration of discriminatory effects, the Court held that both the Constitution and Section 2 of the Act required proof of intentional discrimination rather than merely discriminatory effect.[46] The decision effectively gutted Section 2’s reach, permitting vote dilution practices that perpetuated racial inequality as long as discriminatory intent could not be shown. Congress responded swiftly. In 1982, it amended Section 2 to make clear that liability of a Section 2 violation could rest on discriminatory results, not just intent.[47] That amendment transformed Section 2 into an effects-based provision. As Justice Kagan put it during the Callais reargument, “ . . . Congress put us, this Court, in its place when it said that.”[48]

Four years later, Thornburg v. Gingles operationalized this standard.[49] Justice Brennan’s opinion crafted a three-part preconditions framework that governs violation claims brought under Section 2. To satisfy the preconditions, plaintiffs must first show (1) that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a reasonably configured single-member district; (2) that the group is politically cohesive; and (3) that the white majority votes as a bloc strong enough to usually defeat the minority’s preferred candidates.[50] In practice, these preconditions screen out weaker claims through the use of an exacting test, allowing for only the strongest and the most severely racialized political claims to be heard in court.

Once these preconditions are met and a threshold showing of potential vote dilution is established, the Court then turns to the next stage of the analysis, which can be seen as its most substantive phase. Here, the courts look at the totality-of-the-circumstances to assess the social, historical, and political conditions to determine whether a remedy is needed for the alleged Section 2 violation.[51] Notably though, when Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982, it did not define what constituted discriminatory results. Instead, it provided a set of considerations, now commonly known as the “Senate Factors,” to guide courts in applying the new results test. These factors instruct courts to examine the totality-of-the-circumstances surrounding minority political participation, including the jurisdiction’s history of discrimination, patterns of racially polarized voting, electoral practices that may dilute minority voting strength, and broader social and political conditions that affect minority voters’ ability to participate equally in the political process.[52]

Once plaintiffs satisfy the Gingles preconditions and the totality-of-the-circumstances confirms a violation, courts then order a judicial remedy. Although that remedy can take the form of a majority-minority district, Section 2 does not require proportional representation or any particular map configurations. Courts may order a broad range of remedial options (e.g., crossover districts, coalition districts, ranked-choice voting, cumulative voting) designed to ensure minority voters have an equal opportunity to elect their candidates of choice.

2. Post-Gingles: Retrenchment

In the 1990s, as states drew majority-minority districts to comply with Section 2, white voters challenged those maps as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. In Shaw v. Reno, the Court agreed.[53] They held for the first time that a remedial race-based districting may violate the Equal Protection Clause when race predominates in the drawing of district lines and traditional districting principles, such as compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions, and preservation of communities of interest, are subordinated to racial considerations.[54] In such circumstances, the map is subject to strict scrutiny.[55] Subsequent cases such as Miller v. Johnson and Bush v. Vera clarified that compliance with the Voting Rights Act can constitute a compelling state interest under strict scrutiny, but the means must still be narrowly tailored, respecting those traditional districting principles which are race neutral.[56] In a way, these decisions reframed Section 2 compliance to straddle between requiring states to be race aware enough to remedy vote dilution yet race neutral enough to survive equal protection claims.

The next turn in the maze came in Shelby County v. Holder, which invalidated the Section 4(b) coverage formula that determined which jurisdictions must adhere to preclearance when changing their voting laws and district maps.[57] Ultimately, this nullified the Act’s Section 5 preclearance regime.[58] Although Chief Justice John Roberts assured that Section 2 remained a “permanent, nationwide ban” on racial discrimination in voting, Shelby County marked the beginning of a new era.[59]

In the wake of Shelby County, Section 2 became the sole remaining tool for challenging racially discriminatory maps. This soon proved to be a heavy ask, as it heightened the stakes of Section 2 cases. In fact, in the Court’s 2021 Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee decision, the Court narrowed Section 2’s reach in vote denial cases, introducing extra-textual guideposts that made it harder to challenge restrictive voting laws.[60] While Brnovich was concerned with vote denial claims, like restrictions on ballot access and out of precinct voting, rather than vote dilution claims like those in Callais, still its restrictive reading of Section 2 signaled the Court’s growing skepticism toward expansive interpretations of the Act.

Yet in Allen v. Milligan, the Court shockingly reversed course. In a 5–4 decision, Chief Justice Roberts reaffirmed Gingles and upheld a lower court ruling requiring Alabama to draw a second majority-Black congressional district.[61] The opinion made clear that Section 2 remained intact as a vital safeguard against vote dilution, even as it acknowledged the constitutional tensions they believe are inherent in race-conscious redistricting. Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s concurrence however contained an alarming warning: race based remedies, as he wrote, “cannot extend indefinitely.”[62] As further explained below, that temporal caveat now hangs in the balance as the Court considers Louisiana v. Callais. Notably, this Louisiana litigation had been stayed pending the Court’s decision in Milligan,[63] underscoring just how closely the cases mirror one another. Although Milligan reaffirmed Gingles as settled law, and the facts of both cases are starkly similar, Callais arrived before the Court bringing decades worth of tension to a head. In Milligan, the question before the Court was simply whether Alabama’s congressional map unlawfully diluted Black voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. This time, however, the Court is squarely asking whether a state’s effort to comply with Section 2 by creating a second majority-Black district crosses the line into unconstitutional racial predominance, in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

IV. Oral Argument Analysis

When the Supreme Court reconvened on October 15, 2025 for reargument, the atmosphere in the courtroom was markedly different from the first round of oral arguments held seven months earlier. Much of the March 2025 argument centered on familiar Section 2 related questions, including how Gingles applies,[64] whether SB 8 properly remedied or overstepped the lower court’s injunction,[65] and how the Fifth Circuit handled the record.[66] By October, however, the discussion shifted from the application of existing law to a far more serious inquiry into the constitutionality of the law itself. The dispute over whether Louisiana’s remedial map complied with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act had now evolved into a deeper question of whether Louisiana’s intentional creation of a second majority-Black district, drawn to cure a vote dilution violation, could itself run afoul of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

The reargument stretched more than two and a half hours, well beyond the one hour it was originally scheduled for, but the extended time felt fitting given the magnitude of what was at stake. However, the imbalance in time allotted to counsel was also notable. The Robinson appellants were given just over fifty minutes to present their argument and rebuttal, while the opposing side—comprised of three attorneys representing the State of Louisiana, private Callais appellees, and the United States—collectively received just shy of one-hundred minutes. While some may attribute this disparity to the presence of multiple parties on the appellees’ side, the extended argument and robust participation by the Justices also suggests that the Court is seriously grappling with the constitutional implications of enforcing Section 2 in the modern redistricting context—an indication that the issues raised may ultimately shape the direction of the Court’s decision.

A. Arguments Presented

Each side arrived with differing proposed solutions to the question presented. Janai Nelson, the President and Director-Counsel of the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund, arguing for the Robinson appellants, urged the Court to hold firm to Milligan’s reaffirmation of Gingles, which was decided just twenty-eight months earlier.[67] She repeatedly affirmed Section 2 operates as a diagnostic tool to identify vote dilution, not as a race-based command.[68] Throughout her argument, she emphasized the broad discretion states hold when remedying Section 2 violations, noting that compliance does not always require race-conscious districting.[69] If the Court believes, as the Callais panel did, that Louisiana’s SB 8 violated the Constitution, the proper course is to remand for a new map, specifically one that cures the Section 2 violation while also satisfying constitutional constraints.[70] The liability finding in Robinson remains undisturbed, she reminded the Court, and it must still be remedied.[71]

Louisiana Solicitor General Benjamin Aguiñaga, by contrast, pressed for a more categorical ruling that would effectively gut Section 2’s application to redistricting. He argued that race-based districting is “fundamentally contrary to our Constitution” because it necessarily requires diminishing the voting strength of one racial group to enhance another’s, embedding “racial stereotypes” about how voters of the same race think and vote.[72] According to Aguiñaga, the way in which the Court has interpreted Section 2 compels unconstitutional racial sorting and stereotyping.[73] Additionally, he argued that the framework lacks any meaningful end point, raising concerns that now forty years after Gingles, race-based remedies could persist indefinitely.[74]      Separately, he maintained that compliance with Section 2 should not qualify as a compelling state interest worthy of justifying racial predominance in districting.[75]

Edward Greim, representing the Callais appellees, advanced a parallel theory. He framed Louisiana’s SB 8 remedial map and Section 2 enforcement as a perpetuation of unconstitutional racial sorting, and he pressed the Court to declare that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act cannot serve as a compelling interest for race-based redistricting under the color blindness of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.[76] Even if such a means was once permissible, it is certainly not permissible indefinitely.[77] Ultimately, Greim urged the Court to rule for his clients “regardless of the grounds on which the Court chooses to rely” and hold that presence of a Section 2 violation alone is not a compelling interest for racial gerrymandering.[78]

Finally, Hashim Mooppan, arguing on behalf of the United States, advanced what some may describe as a middle-of-the-road approach in comparison to Nelson and Aguiñaga/Greim’s proposals. He stated, “. . . the problem is not the mere consideration of race in districting. The problem is when race subordinates traditional neutral principles and is the factor that cannot be compromised.”[79] In both his supplemental briefing and oral argument, Mooppan called for a “clarification” to the Gingles framework so that Section 2 ensures elections are equally open rather than guaranteeing minority voters proportional representation.[80] Justice Elena Kagan highlighted, however, that the Court had recently “rejected” many of these same arguments in Allen v. Milligan, including that Section 2 must be limited to intentional discrimination or that Gingles should be “revise[d] and reformulate[d.]”[81] Using Brnovich as his model, Mooppan nonetheless argued that racial disparities alone in districting should not compel states to create race-based districts.[82]

To achieve this, Mooppan proposed a series of revisions. Under the first Gingles precondition, plaintiffs should be prohibited from drawing illustrative districts that predominate on race.[83] Their proposed district must also be superior than the State’s plan under the State’s own neutral districting principles (i.e., compactness, contiguity, and respect for political boundaries) and must account for political objectives like incumbency protection and partisan balance.[84] Furthermore, the second and third Gingles preconditions should be revised to control for partisanship, since race and political affiliation often overlap.[85] Plaintiffs should be required to show that voting differences stem from race, not politics; otherwise, courts risk mistaking normal partisan behavior for racial discrimination.[86] Finally, Mooppan urged the Court to refocus the “totality of the circumstances” inquiry on what he described as Section 2’s touchstone of “equal openness.” [87] In his view, courts should ask whether the surrounding facts reveal an objective likelihood that a state’s failure to create a majority-minority district reflects intentional discrimination. Although he did not argue that Section 2 requires proof of discriminatory intent (the standard Congress rejected in 1982), Mooppan maintained that the statute should still require evidence of a meaningful risk of purposeful discrimination, rather than invalidating maps based solely on disparate electoral outcomes.[88] In his view, racial imbalances in election outcomes should not by themselves invalidate a districting plan. These proposed modifications would prevent states from prioritizing race over traditional neutral principles, allow Section 2 to survive as an effects-based safeguard against vote dilution, and bring Gingles in line with what he sees as the Constitution’s command.

B. Justices’ Line of Questioning

As no surprise, the Justices spent much of their time focused on the constitutional limits that sit around Section 2. The bulk of the bench’s inquiry ran deeper and was quite nuanced, clustering into four recurring themes: 1) whether Section 2 functions as a diagnostic tool or a racial command; 2) whether the Constitution requires temporal limits on race-based remedies; 3) how institutional boundaries and recent crosscutting precedent impact enforcement; and 4) whether partisanship, especially under Rucho v. Common Cause, is the true cause of what is currently being identified as racially discriminatory lines. Taken together, these questions reflect a broader concern about how far the Constitution permits race-conscious remedies in the enforcement of Section 2.

1. Section 2 as a Diagnostic Tool or Racial Command?

One of the foundational exchanges in Callais centered on how the Justices and advocates conceptualized the nature of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Specifically, whether it operates as a diagnostic tool that identifies discriminatory effects or as a racial command that obligates states to redraw race-based districts.

With arguably the most memorable metaphor of the day, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson brought the diagnostic tool argument to life. She analogized Section 2 to a “tape measure” that simply detects when minority voters are denied an equal opportunity to elect their candidates of choice.[89] Section 2, she explained, “is the mechanism by which the law determines whether a remedy is necessary.”[90] Once a court identifies inequality under Section 2, then the remedial question arises. This metaphor emphasized the statute’s function is evaluative, not prescriptive, as it simply tells courts when intervention is warranted but not how to draw the lines. Counsel for the Robinson appellants, Janai Nelson, readily adopted Justice Jackson’s framing, stressing that as racially polarized voting and residential segregation wane, Section 2’s reach contracts because the Gingles preconditions will no longer be met.[91] Under this reading, Section 2 is seen as self-limiting and simply just a race-conscious identifying tool.

Conversely, Louisiana Solicitor General J. Benjamin Aguiñaga argued that Section 2 has evolved into a de facto racial command. When Justice Amy Coney Barrett sought to clarify what exactly counts as the “remedy” under Section 2, Aguiñaga stated the Court’s precedents presume that proving the Gingles preconditions automatically triggers the remedy of a majority-minority district.[92] As Justice Jackson pushed back, he stated that as parties and courts currently understand the statute, it automatically requires creation of majority–minority districts once plaintiffs satisfy the Gingles preconditions, making race the predominant factor.[93] Justice Jackson once again noted that Section 2 itself does not mandate a second minority district as it is solely a diagnostic mechanism to identify unequal electoral opportunities.[94] In her belief, the remedy should remain a separate, flexible inquiry.

Deputy Solicitor General Hashim Mooppan advanced a slightly different position. While agreeing with Justice Jackson that Section 2 itself does not mandate a particular result but just identifies a problem, Mooppan explained that his objection lies in how Gingles and Milligan have construed the statute. In his view, those decisions define a “problem” whenever there exists an alternative map that would favor Black voters, even where there is no basis to believe the State acted with intentional discrimination or even a significant risk of it.[95] In other words, while his position appeared to accept Justice Jackson’s descriptive account of Section 2 as a “tape-measure” used to diagnose unequal political opportunity, he disagreed normatively as to whether this is how the tool should operate in practice.

Ultimately, this debate over whether Section 2 operates as a diagnostic tool or a racial command goes to the very heart of how the Justices understand the statute; and, by extension, what they believe the Constitution allows. It is hard not to think that this fault line will likely have a predominant role in shaping how the Court resolves this case and the scope of Section 2’s reach moving forward.

2. Temporal Limits and Permanence

Another recurring point of questioning was whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act can constitutionally function without an explicit temporal limit, or as stated by Justice Kavanaugh, an “end point.”[96] Resurrecting concerns he alluded to in his Milligan concurrence,[97] Kavanaugh asked throughout the argument whether race-based measures could “extend forever” without violating equal protection.[98] Though Section 2’s text notably contains no sunset clause, members of the Court pressed the advocates to explain whether its enforcement authority must run out. Said another way, can Congress authorize an indefinite remedy that sometimes requires attention to race, or must even the most remedial uses of race still eventually expire?

The issue first presented itself about halfway through Nelson’s argument. She explained that Section 2 protects a permanent right, the equal opportunity to participate in the political process.[99] Its remedies, however, are temporary and self-limiting even without a sunset clause.[100] First, not all Section 2 remedies center around the use of race.[101] Second, a race-based remedial map lasts only as long as it continues to correct a real-world identified issue; when racialized politics and residential segregation wane, so will the ability to satisfy Gingles.[102] Third, since redistricting happens every ten years, any race-conscious remedial map is inherently provisional as almost every redistricting map is replaced decennially.[103] Finally, if Congress wanted Section 2 to have an explicit end point, it would have said so, as it wrote a durational limit into Section 5 and created a reauthorization mechanism. [104] It chose not to do the same for Section 2.[105]

Justice Kavanaugh pushed back, arguing courts are not supposed to defer to Congress when applying the Equal Protection Clause or when evaluating legislation passed under the Fifteenth Amendment’s enforcement power, which must satisfy the Court’s “congruence and proportionality     ” test requiring Congress’s remedies to be appropriately tailored to constitutional violations.[106] Additionally, he suggested that strict scrutiny itself requires a temporal limit.[107] While Nelson maintained a durational limit is not necessary, she stated if the Court so insisted on one, she recommended giving advance notice similar to what Justice O’Connor wrote in Grutter v. Bollinger.[108] There, Justice O’Connor put on notice that affirmative action may only be needed for another generation, as it did not need to endure beyond 25 more years.[109]

The issue surfaced even more clearly when Aguiñaga invoked language from Allen v. Milligan. He reminded the Court that Milligan had “left open the question of whether a logical end point is identifiable in the race-based redistricting context.”[110]  To Aguiñaga, the statute’s current interpretation lacked any self-limiting principle. Once a state drew a majority–minority district in response to Section 2, he argued the logic of Gingles compelled the continual preservation of that district, or its racial replacement, in perpetuity.[111] For that reason, he urged the Court to “answer that question and answer no, because there is no logical end point to race-based redistricting under Section 2 as the Court has construed it.”[112]

The exchange grew sharper as Justice Sonia Sotomayor questioned Greim, who argued race-based remedies must be tied to proof of intentional discrimination. With visible skepticism, she asked, “So I’m assuming that the ban on . . . literacy tests . . . will sunset too?”[113] When Greim replied that those statutes “don’t require racial stereotyping,” she countered that such laws “affect the races” and that the Gingles inquiry simply measures whether people’s votes are being taken away merely because they’re Black.[114] Sotomayor’s point seemed to be rooted in the text, as she moved to highlighting that the words of the Fifteenth Amendment do not require Congress to only act in cases of intentional discrimination. She suggested as long as racialized vote dilution persists, the Constitution permits Congress to keep the statute alive.

When Deputy Solicitor General Hashim Mooppan rose for the United States, he struck a less extreme tone though still quite alarming for voting rights advocates. He conceded that Congress may, in some contexts, adopt enduring statutes without an endpoint. “[W]e don’t actually think you necessarily need to have a temporal limit in the statute itself” he said.[115] He cited literacy tests as examples.[116] As Mooppan explained it, properly tailored effects tests      without a sunset clause remained valid because they were “well-known, highly likely to be intentionally discriminatory laws even if they’re not always.”[117] He clarified that the modern Gingles framework had swung too far to fall in that category, as it was not the type of tailored enforcement that gets at a significant risk of intentionally discriminatory behavior.[118] In his proposal, Section 2 could survive without an end date only if its reach was more closely tethered to clear, ongoing risks of intentional discrimination.

By the argument’s end, the divide was clearer. Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Samuel Alito appeared most receptive to the call for an explicit temporal limit, while the Court’s liberal wing defended Section 2’s durability as a permissible, adaptive enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment.

3. Institutional Boundaries and Relevant Crosscurrents

Throughout the morning, Justice Barrett’s questions regarding congressional authority kickstarted broader curiosity into the matter by others on the bench. Mentioning the framework outlined in City of Boerne v. Flores, she asked whether Section 2’s results-based framework remains congruent and proportional to the Fifteenth Amendment, and whether Congress overstepped by targeting disparate impact rather than intentional discrimination.[119] That, she suggested, might also affect whether a temporal limit is required.[120]

Nelson responded that Section 2 goes to the heart of what the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits: abridging the vote on account of race. As such, Congress may use effects-based tools to uncover and correct entrenched racial discrimination. While Nelson said Boerne shouldn’t apply in this context, she noted if it did, the Court previously held the Voting Rights Act as a paradigmatic example of congruent and proportional legislation.[121] Moreover, just because a statute may result in race-conscious remedies does not mean Congress cannot act.[122] Under Ex parte Virginia and its progeny, Congress can address conduct that is beyond what the Fifteenth Amendment addresses.[123] It can target conduct that is technically constitutional to make sure race discrimination in voting does not go “undetected, uncorrected, or undeterred.”[124]

Justice Alito picked a similar thread, first stating the Fifteenth Amendment pretty clearly requires a showing of intentional discrimination and the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act walked away from that.[125] Then, for clarity he confirmed his understanding of Mooppan’s view that Congress’s enforcement power may reach beyond regulating intentional discrimination, but only to the extent it helps identify situations that strongly suggest intent.[126] Proving discriminatory purpose is notoriously hard since it forces courts to sift through legislative statements and serious accusations against the state.[127] On that view, Section 2 could be justified if it targets effects so extreme that they likely signal intentional discrimination.[128] He then said if that’s the case, Section 2 might still be congruent and proportional to the Fifteenth Amendment.[129]

Mooppan agreed in part. Mooppan stated Congress can go beyond intent, but only if the statute is narrow and directed at a real risk of discrimination. Section 2, as interpreted through Gingles, fails that test.[130] It no longer captures likely bad actors but instead compels states to engage in race-based districting. That kind of blanket race sorting, he argued, is not tailored to a current problem. If it ever was, it was only because the record of discrimination in 1965 was so overwhelming.[131]

Aguiñaga pressed a similar point, insisting that Congress in 1982 wrongfully made no record showing intentional discrimination in redistricting.[132] Without such evidence, there is no constitutional backing to require race-conscious line drawing.[133] He pointed to Northwest Austin to argue that modern patterns of racial polarization or residential segregation cannot substitute for proof of intent.[134] Justice Kagan pushed back, reminding everyone that Section 2 was rewritten precisely to reject the intent standard.[135] Instead, it targets discriminatory effects because Congress recognized that structural inequality can exist without overt intent.[136] That, she suggested, is what gives the statute its constitutional legitimacy.

Aguiñaga further argued that the Senate Factors framework itself encourages courts to rely on racial generalizations rather than evidence of present discrimination. To him, states would be forever held captive to long past discrimination, without a showing of current, specified intent.[137] To support his argument, he invoked Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) v. Harvard to allude that Section 2 perpetuates the same racial stereotyping condemned in the university admissions context.[138]

Nelson resisted that analogy. She emphasized that SFFA addressed voluntary diversity programs, not remedial enforcement of proven discrimination.[139] Despite this, she believes SFFA is ultimately supportive of her argument, as it reaffirmed that race can be used in a limited way to remedy specified discrimination, which is precisely what Section 2 requires after a finding of vote dilution.[140] Given that the Court issued both Milligan and SFFA within the same three-week span, she argued it would be implausible to read the latter as completely undermining the former.[141] Nelson held the belief that Section 2 does not “require[] neither confession nor accusation of racism.”[142] It asks only whether electoral structures yield unequal outcomes.[143] In doing so, it remains constitutionally within bounds.

4. Rucho and Partisanship

Finally, several Justices explored whether Rucho v. Common Cause, which treats partisan advantage and incumbent protection as legitimate districting objectives, must also inform how courts apply the first Gingles precondition.[144] Justice Alito emphasized that the first precondition requires a “reasonably configured” district that comports with traditional districting criteria.[145] He questioned whether partisan advantage like incumbency should count among those criteria, especially in light of Rucho.[146] Mooppan agreed with Alito’s framing and argued that the plaintiffs’ maps failed under this Gingles analysis. Specifically, he criticized the lower court’s finding that simply allowing Representative Julia Letlow, who sits on the Appropriations Committee, to continue to live in her district constituted incumbency protection when she was stripped of her voter base.[147] “[T]hat’s not incumbency protection.”[148]

Turning to a separate but slightly related question, Justice Kavanaugh raised a point from the Solicitor General’s brief which said the Court should hold that Section 2 plaintiffs cannot ignore the state’s political goals, like maintaining partisan advantage, when proposing their illustrative maps.[149] Nelson rejected this framing, warning that allowing political motives to override the antidiscrimination aspect of Section 2 would “swallow Section 2 whole.”[150] She reiterated that courts must consider the totality-of-the-circumstances to determine whether race, not party, is driving electoral outcomes.[151] Nelson argued that racially polarized voting, not partisan advantage, is the relevant constitutional and statutory concern, and pointed out the historical inability of Black candidates to win statewide positions in Louisiana as further indication of race based vote dilution.[152] In her view, allowing such partisan motives to encroach in the process will only gut Section 2’s protections.[153]

Justice Kavanaugh transparently acknowledged that before Rucho, states rarely articulated partisan motives explicitly, which makes this an “open question.”[154] As a spectator watching and listening, it was clear that the Court is particularly intrigued by this new question and seriously considering the ways in which Rucho should reshape Section 2 analysis going forward.

C. Potential Outcomes

Admittedly, to predict the outcome of Louisiana v. Callais would be to attempt the impossible. While the reargument offers more clues about the Justices’ leanings, it would be overconfident to assume that the bench’s questions clearly forecast the eventual configuration of votes. As always, alliances and thought processes shift, and this Court has surprised observers before, even recently in Milligan. The more significant signal lies in the Court’s decision to rehear the case and reformulate the question presented. That move makes clear  the Justices are giving serious weight to the broader constitutional foundations of Section 2 itself. With that possibility in mind, several plausible trajectories emerge.

First, it is highly likely the Court could adopt Deputy Solicitor General Mooppan’s refinements, or at least some version of it. Such an adoption would narrow Section 2 by creating a “predominance” and “superiority” filter in the Gingles analysis, requiring plaintiffs to show both: (1) that their illustrative district does not itself make race the predominant line-drawing factor and (2) that it is meaningfully better than the State’s enacted map under the State’s own traditional districting principles. Justice Kavanaugh referred to Mooppan’s proposal as the “real innovation” and showed an open posture to the new framing.[155] Justice Sotomayor, unsurprisingly, showed much more reluctance. At one point she outright said: “We didn’t grant cert on redoing Gingles. We granted cert on a totally different question. And we have said over and over again that statutory precedents are entitled to far greater stare decisis protection.”[156]

However, what some may find most intriguing is Justice Neil Gorsuch, who voiced unease with the line-drawing problems Mooppan’s approach may create in practice. Pressing Mooppan on how courts are supposed to control for a state’s political objectives, including whether courts can second-guess their stated objectives, he warned the gray zones regarding cohesion and racial and partisan affiliation could lead the courts into the “business . . . of stereotyping.”[157] After walking through Mooppan’s proposed refinements to the second and third Gingles preconditions, particularly around how much racial group cohesiveness and crossover voting is necessary, to some surprise Gorsuch cautioned: “This will be the next problem if we go your way.”[158] When Mooppan speculated that Gorsuch might be implying the whole Section 2 framework should be scrapped instead, Gorsuch quickly said, “No, I’m not asking that. That isn’t my question.”[159]

Second, it is also quite likely that the Court may fracture on rationale by producing a plurality opinion that garners enough votes to gut Section 2 as we currently know it but does not find consensus on the underlying reasoning. This possibility feels especially real given the range of questions aired during reargument. Justice Kavanaugh seemed most focused on temporal limits and whether race-based redistricting can constitutionally continue without a logical end point. Justice Barrett appeared concerned with whether Section 2’s results framework remains congruent and proportional to Congress’s enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Alito repeatedly returned to whether Section 2 has drifted too far from intentional discrimination and whether partisanship, rather than race, is the better explanation for the challenged district. Justice Gorsuch, by contrast, seemed less interested in sweeping constitutional invalidation than in the administrability and line-drawing problems that new refinements to Gingles would create. In short, the Court may be able to agree on an outcome without agreeing on a single path to get there, making a fractured decision along multiple lines increasingly likely and further blurring the boundary between race-conscious remedial enforcement and constitutional limits.

Yet a more radical outcome is also on the table: the Court could extend Students for Fair Admissions’ colorblind logic to redistricting, holding that any race-based map is presumptively unconstitutional. Alternatively, the Court might sidestep the constitutional collision entirely and remand for lower courts to make a decision, or dispose of Callais on narrow procedural grounds.

Finally, the Court could reaffirm Section 2 and Gingles in full. While many might say this is the least likely path forward, it is not outside the realm of possibility. The Court surprised many observers just two terms ago in Allen v. Milligan, where it rejected similar arguments and reaffirmed the continued viability of the Gingles framework. A similar outcome here could again emphasize Congress’s enduring authority to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments and uphold race-conscious remedies as valid tools for combating structural, proven instances of discrimination in voting while also legitimizing the Court’s posture regarding longstanding precedent and stare decisis.

Regardless of which path the Court chooses, there is no doubt the implications will be sweeping. Callais will almost certainly redefine how the Constitution mediates the long-running tension between race-conscious protection and formal equality for generations to come.

V. Conclusion

Louisiana v. Callais will say something defining about who we are as a people, as a nation, and where we intend to head. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted to make the promises of the Reconstruction Amendments real, not rhetorical, and to translate that promise into practice and lived experience. That promise was felt outside the Supreme Court itself on reargument day, where demonstrators from across the country—including the vast majority of whom came from the Deep South thanks to mobilization efforts like Black Voters Matter—gathered starting in the early hours before reargument to make their presence known and voices heard. Demonstrators voiced cautious optimism that the Court would protect their interests, but they also made their message abundantly clear: if Section 2 is gutted, our voices will be diluted, diminished, and the possibility of electing candidates of choice will become even more remote.

From a judicial legitimacy perspective, the hope is also that Section 2 will remain intact, especially given that Allen v. Milligan was decided just twenty-eight months before Callais rearguments. Milligan was a detailed reaffirmation of Section 2’s constitutionality and purpose. There, the Court rejected Alabama’s claims, many of which were nearly identical to those Louisiana now raises.[160] The Milligan Court made clear that Section 2 was deliberately designed by Congress to confront racial discrimination in voting and that race is part of the statute’s consideration process;[161] however, drawing a comparison between Milligan and Callais also invites an uncomfortable déjà vu that recalls the path from Northwest Austin[162] to Shelby County[163] which came only four years apart. In Shelby, where the Court struck down Section 4 and nullified Section 5, Chief Justice Roberts stated:

Striking down an Act of Congress ‘is the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.’ . . . That is why, in 2009, we took care to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act when asked to do so, and instead resolved the case then before us on statutory grounds. But in issuing that decision, we expressed our broader concerns about the constitutionality of the Act. Congress could have updated the coverage formula at that time, but did not do so. Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare § 4(b) unconstitutional.[164]

In a strikingly similar sequence, this Court in Milligan opted to resolve the case on the statutory grounds and reaffirm precedent to avoid a constitutional rehaul, while still expressing some constitutional concerns over the Act itself (i.e., temporal limits raised in Kavanaugh’s concurrence). Yet two years later, in Callais, the Justices are circling back and openly exploring whether remedial effects under Section 2 have become constitutionally infirm. Just as Shelby County followed the statutory restraint of Northwest Austin with a swift dismantling, Callais may follow Milligan down a similar path.

If Section 2 falls, the consequences will be immediate and far-reaching. Analysts warn that nearly a third of the Congressional Black Caucus and more than one in ten members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus could lose their seats.[165] That kind of retrenchment would erase decades of progress and remove one of the few remaining barriers against maps drawn to dilute minority voting strength. Already, partisan gerrymandering is surging as federal oversight has declined and the Court’s decision in Rucho has further enabled the practice. Several Republican-controlled legislatures have launched mid-decade redistricting campaigns to consolidate power before the 2026 elections. In Texas and Missouri, newly enacted maps shaped under political pressure from President Trump and his Justice Department have splintered communities of color, weakening their collective influence at the ballot box.[166] In contrast, California moved in the opposite direction, passing Proposition 50 in a November 2025 special election aimed at redrawing several of the state’s congressional districts to counterbalance the five Republican seats created by Texas.[167]

All in all, it is difficult to imagine how this Court could retreat from such a forceful and recent affirmation without undermining the moral arc of justice that has shaped this nation’s voting rights landscape for the past six decades. The outcome in Callais will reveal whether this Court still believes that the right to vote—the right that protects all other rights—deserves the Constitution’s full protection in our multiracial democracy. If the Court falters, few alternatives remain.

One avenue that holds some promise is renewed, modernized congressional action. Congress can, and must, act to restore robust voting rights protections through its constitutional powers. Key among these efforts is the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, repeatedly introduced in recent years by Representative Terri Sewell,[168] Alabama’s first Black woman elected to Congress.[169] Her very presence in the House is owed, in part, to a Section 2 challenge in 1992 and government action that led to the reconfiguration of Alabama’s congressional map to create a district where Black voters could control the outcome of the elections after a long subjection to vote dilution.[170] That history reminds us legislative remedies remain possible, and they may be the last safeguard for a democracy still struggling to deliver good on its promise.

[1] See Louisiana v. Callais (consolidated with Robinson v. Callais), Nos. 24-109 & 24-110 (2025).

[2] See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1 (2023).

[3] Redistricting in Louisiana, Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Redistricting_in_Louisiana [https://perma.cc/9QM4-AEYW] (last visited Mar. 20, 2026).

[4] Louisiana: 2020 Census, U.S. Census Bureau (Aug. 25, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/state-by-state/louisiana.html#race-ethnicity [https://perma.cc/L6RV-ADM3].

[5] Dan Gooding, Census Data Shows Where US White Population Is in Decline, Newsweek (June 26, 2025, at 4:00 EDT), https://www.newsweek.com/us-census-data-white-population-declining-2090809.

[6] LA 2020 Congressional, DRA 2020, https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::ce81ca33-09da-40a2-8803-35e9cf0a6469 (last visited Mar. 20, 2026).

[7] See Wesley Muller, GOP Lawmakers Reluctant to Add Majority-Minority Districts in Louisiana, LA Illuminator (Jan. 21, 2022, at 9:11 EDT), https://lailluminator.com/2022/01/21/gop-lawmakers-reluctant-to-add-majority-minority-districts-in-louisiana/.

[8] Id.

[9] See H.B. 1, 2022 First Extraordinary Sess. (La. 2022) (enacting La. Rev. Stat. § 18:1276 and establishing Louisiana’s six congressional districts) (enrolled as Act No. 5, 2022 First Extraordinary Sess.).

[10] Complaint at 3, Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022) (No. 3:22-cv-211) (arguing the map “packs” Black voters into Congressional District 2).

[11] WAFB Staff, Gov. Edwards Vetoes Proposed Congressional Redistricting Map, WAFB (Mar. 9, 2022 at 7:51 EST), https://www.wafb.com/2022/03/10/gov-edwards-vetoes-proposed-redistricting-maps/.

[12] Wesley Muller, Louisiana Legislature Overrides Gov. Edwards’ Veto of Congressional Map, LA Illuminator, (Mar. 30, 2022, at 18:18 EST), https://lailluminator.com/2022/03/30/louisiana-legislature-overrides-gov-edwards-veto-of-congressional-map/.

[13] See Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 772.

[14] Id. at 766.

[15] Id. at 766–67.

[16] Emergency Application for Administrative Stay Pending Appeal at 5–6, Ardoin v. Robinson, 142 S. Ct. 2892 (2022) (No. 21A814).

[17] Ardoin, 142 S. Ct. at 2892 (granting the application for stay and holding the case in abeyance pending Merrill v. Milligan).

[18] Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 16, 102 (2023).

[19] See, e.g., Harness v. Watson, 47 F.4th 296 (5th Cir. 2022) (affirming the lower court’s decision to uphold a Mississippi Constitution provision that disenfranchises those with prior felony convictions); United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443 (5th Cir. 2023), rev’d, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) (holding the federal domestic violence gun-ban statute unconstitutional based on historical tradition, but later overturned by Supreme Court where Chief Justice Roberts notably said they were “slaying a straw man”); All. for Hippocratic Med. v. FDA, 78 F.4th 210 (5th Cir. 2023), rev’d, 602 U.S. 367 (2024) (affirming the lower court’s decision that reinstated older, more restrictive regulation of the abortion pill mifepristone, but was later vacated and remanded by Supreme Court).

[20] Robinson v. Ardoin, 86 F.4th 574, 584 (5th Cir. 2023).

[21] See S.B. 8, La. State Legislature, https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/BillInfo.aspx?i=245512 [https://perma.cc/UA88-MBC6] (last visited Mar. 23, 2026); S.B. 8, 2024 La. Acts First Extraordinary Sess.; Louisiana Legislature Passes Congressional Map With Two Majority-Black Districts, Democracy Docket (Jan. 19, 2024), https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/new-louisiana-congressional-map-with-two-majority-black-districts-heads-to-governor [https://perma.cc/B9YA-XVKX].

[22] Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759, 771–72 (M.D. La. 2022) (describing plaintiffs’ desire for a second district that connected “the Baton Rouge area and St. Landry Parish with the delta parishes along the Mississippi border”).

[23] Louisiana Legislature Passes Congressional Map With Two Majority-Black Districts, supra note 21.

[24] Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 8–9, Louisiana v. Callais (consolidated with Robinson v. Callais), Nos. 24-109 & 24-110 (U.S. Dec. 23, 2024) (describing political goals); Megan Lebowitz & Sahil Kapur, Louisiana Republican Garret Graves Says He Won’t Seek Re-Election After Supreme Court Ruling on Redistricting, NBC News (June 14, 2024, at 19:22 EDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/louisiana-republican-garret-graves-wont-seek-re-election-supreme-court-rcna157293 [https://perma.cc/Y2TB-TVVC].

[25] See S.B. 8, supra note 20.

[26] Callais v. Landry, 732 F. Supp. 3d 574, 581–82, 599 (W.D. La. 2024).

[27] See Motion to Intervene as Defendants at 1, Callais v. Landry, 732 F. Supp. 3d 574 (W.D. La. 2024), Dkt. No. 10.

[28] 732 F. Supp. 3d at 614 (W.D. La. 2024).

[29] Id.

[30] Robinson v. Callais, 144 S. Ct. 1171 (2024).

[31] Democrat Cleo Fields Wins Re-drawn Louisiana Congressional District, Flipping Red Seat Blue, Associated Press (Nov. 11, 2024, at 17:31 EST), https://apnews.com/article/democrat-cleo-fields-louisiana-congressional-district-01cbab22601bef1cd8f4463a1ad395ef [https://perma.cc/UQ9E-BWQS].

[32] Louisiana v. Callais (consolidated with Robinson v. Callais), Nos. 24-109 & 24-110 (2025).

[33] The original questions presented were: (1) Whether the majority of the three-judge district court erred in concluding that race predominated in the Louisiana Legislature’s enactment of S.B. 8; (2) whether the majority erred in finding that S.B. 8 fails strict scrutiny; (3) whether the majority erred in subjecting S.B. 8 to the preconditions of Thornburg v. Gingles; and (4) whether the action is non-justiciable. Question Presented Report at 1, Louisiana v. Callais, No. 24-109 (U.S. Nov. 4, 2024).

[34] Louisiana v. Callais, SCOTUSblog, https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/louisiana-v-callais/ [https://perma.cc/86EC-9Q2G] (last visited Mar. 23, 2026). Justice Clarence Thomas dissented from the reargument order. Id.

[35] 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Civil Rights (1868), Nat’l Archives, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/14th-amendment [https://perma.cc/YUX7-Q379] (last visited Mar. 22, 2026).

[36] U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

[37] U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1; 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: Voting Rights (1870), Nat’l Archives, https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/15th-amendment [https://perma.cc/JMV2-Q8LB] (last visited Mar. 22, 2026).

[38] Chief Justice Roberts stated in Allen v. Milligan:

Shortly after the Civil War, Congress passed and the States ratified the Fifteenth Amendment, providing that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” . . . In the century that followed, however, the Amendment proved little more than a parchment promise. . . . Congress stood up to little of it; “[t]he first century of congressional enforcement of the [Fifteenth] Amendment . . . can only be regarded as a failure.”

Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 10 (2023) (quoting Northwest Austin Municipal Utilities District No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009)) (internal citations omitted).

[39] Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment grants Congress the enforcement power to pass “appropriate legislation” to prevent racial discrimination in voting: “The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 2.

[40] The Senate Passes the Voting Rights Act, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Senate_Passes_Voting_Rights_Act.htm [https://perma.cc/ZHL9-C3J9] (last visited Mar. 26, 2026).

[41] Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. President, Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the Signing of the Voting Rights Act (Aug. 6, 1965), in The Am. Presidency Project UC Santa Barbara, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-capitol-rotunda-the-signing-the-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/F7CT-HMHV] (last visited Mar. 22, 2026).

[42] Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301).

[43] See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), overruled by Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (collectively addressing Texas’s white primary system, in which private political parties effectively excluded Black voters from meaningful participation in one-party elections); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (striking down a redistricting plan that excluded almost all Black voters from Tuskegee’s limits).

[44] See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5 (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10304).

[45] City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).

[46] Id. at 72–74.

[47] The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982).

[48] Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Louisiana. v. Callais, Nos. 24-109 & 24-110 [hereinafter Oral Arg. Tr.].

[49] See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35, 50–51 (1986).

[50] Id. at 50–51.

[51] See S. Rep. No. 97-417 at 28–29 (1982).

[52] Id.

[53] See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).

[54] Id. at 647.

[55] Id. at 657.

[56] See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 919–21 (1995); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 982 (1996).

[57] Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).

[58] Id.

[59] Id. (“Our decision in no way affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in voting found in § 2. . . . Our country has changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.”).

[60] Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, 594 U.S. 647, 669–72 (2021).

[61] Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 19 (2023).

[62] Id. at 45 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

[63] See supra notes 15–17 & accompanying text.

[64] Oral Arg. Tr., supra note 48 at 12, 30–31.

[65] Id. at 39–41, 42–43, 20–21.

[66]Id. at 32–33, 52–53.

[67] Oral Arg. Tr., supra note 48, at 4–6.

[68] Id. at 23–24.

[69] Id. at 7–8, 35.

[70] Id. at 5.

[71] Id. at 27.

[72] Id. at 48.

[73] Id.

[74] Id. at 49.

[75] Id. at 50, 66.

[76] Id. at 82.

[77] Id.

[78] Id. at 82–83.

[79] Id. at 102.

[80] Id. at 103, 149–50; Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 18, 21, Louisiana v. Callais (consolidated with Robinson v. Callais), Nos. 24-109 & 24-110 (U.S. Sept. 24, 2025).

[81] Oral Arg. Tr., supra note 48, 65–66.

[82] Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, supra note 80, at 21–22.

[83] Id. at 22.

[84] Id. at 23; see also Oral Arg. Tr., supra note 48, at 104.

[85] See Oral Arg. Tr., supra note 48, at 130–35; Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, supra note 80, at 27.

[86] See Oral Arg. Tr., supra note 48, at 103–04, 128–29; Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, supra note 80, at 27–28.

[87] Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, supra note 80, at 28–29.

[88] Id. at 29.

[89] See Oral Arg. Tr., supra note 48, at 23–24.

[90] Id. at 23.

[91] Id. at 5.

[92] Id. at 74–76.

[93] Id. at 77–78, 80.

[94] Id. at 80.

[95] Id. at 112–13.

[96] Id. at 19–20.

[97] Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 45 (2023) (stating in concurrence voting to affirm the majority’s decision, “Justice Thomas notes, however, that even if Congress in 1982 could constitutionally authorize race-based redistricting under § 2 for some period of time, the authority to conduct race-based redistricting cannot extend indefinitely into the future. But Alabama did not raise that temporal argument in this Court, and I therefore would not consider it at this time”) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

[98] Oral Arg. Tr., supra note 48, at 39–40.

[99] Id. at 19.

[100] Id. at 18.

[101] Id. at 19.

[102] Id.

[103] Id. at 5.

[104] Id. at 19.

[105] Id.

[106] Id. at 39.

[107] Id.

[108] Id. at 40.

[109] Id.

[110] Id. at 67.

[111] See Oral Arg. Tr., supra note 48, at 49 (stating “And this stereotyping system has no logical end point. We are 40 years removed  from Gingles, and yet, according to my friends on the other side, nothing has changed in the voting and housing patterns in Louisiana that  require race-based redistricting”).

[112] Id. at 67.

[113] Id. at 92.

[114] See id. at 92–93.

[115] Id. at 121–22.

[116] Id. at 122.

[117] Id.

[118] Id.

[119] Id. at 21–22.

[120] Id. at 22.

[121] Id. at 22–23; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530, 533 (contrasting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to the Voting Rights Act (VRA), noting RFRA’s lack of evidence showing modern laws backed by bigotry and emphasizing that the VRA built in safeguards against overbreadth, including Section 4’s coverage ending when substantial voting discrimination has not occurred for five years).

[122] Oral Arg. Tr., supra note 48, at 23–24.

[123] Id. at 23; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1880).

[124] Oral Arg. Tr., supra note 48, at 23.

[125] Id. at 120.

[126] Id. at 121.

[127] Id. at 120–21.

[128] Id. at 121.

[129] Id.

[130] Id. at 121–22.

[131] Id. at 122.

[132] Id. at 54.

[133] Id.

[134] Id. at 52–53.

[135] Id. at 53.

[136] Id.

[137] Id. at 59–60.

[138] Id. at 59–60, 73.

[139] Id. at 31.

[140] Id.

[141] Id. at 32.

[142] Id. at 33.

[143] Id.

[144] Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684 (2019).

[145] See Oral Arg. Tr., supra note 48, at 11.

[146] Id. at 12.

[147] Id. at 108, 118.

[148] Id. at 108.

[149] Id. at 16; Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, supra note 80, at 25.

[150] Oral Arg. Tr., supra note 48, at 16.

[151] See id. at 16–17.

[152] Id.

[153] Id. at 17.

[154] Id. at 71.

[155] Id. at 143.

[156] Id. at 105.

[157] Id. at 133.

[158] Id. at 132–35.

[159] Id. at 135.

[160] Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 30, 41 (2023).

[161] Id. at 10–12.

[162] Nw. Aus. Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).

[163] Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).

[164] Id. at 556–57.

[165] Fair Fight Action & Black Voters Matter, What Happens in the South Doesn’t Stay in the South: Louisiana v. Callais: The Supreme Court Case That Could Enable Republicans to Rig Congress, Politico, https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000199-c097-dae2-ab9d-ded7d6fb0000 (last visited Mar. 23, 2026).

[166] Oren Oppenheim, Mid-Decade Redistricting and the Midterms: How Redrawn Maps Impacts the Battle for the US House, ABC News (Nov. 3, 2025, at 5:05 EDT), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/mid-decade-redistricting-midterms-redrawn-maps-impacts-battle/story?id=126909158 [https://perma.cc/Y6HG-QD39].

[167] See Ashley Lopez, Democratic Voters Say California’s Prop 50 Gives them a Way to Counteract Trump, NPR (Nov. 3, 2025, at 5:00 EDT), https://www.npr.org/2025/11/03/g-s1-96207/california-redistricting-prop-50-trump [https://perma.cc/B56A-DDY7].

[168] John R. Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2025, H.R. 14, 119th Cong. (2025), https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/14; Rep. Sewell Introduces the John R. Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act Ahead of the 60th Anniversary of Bloody Sunday (Feb. 29, 2025), Committee on House Administration, https://democrats-cha.house.gov/media/press-releases/rep-sewell-introduces-john-r-lewis-voting-rights-advancement-act-ahead-60th [https://perma.cc/XW8K-KXCF].

[169] Biography, Sewell House, https://sewell.house.gov/biography [https://perma.cc/3FYM-5MJE] (last visited Mar. 23. 2026).

[170] See Wesch v. Hunt, 785 F. Supp. 1491 (S.D. Ala. 1992).