Related Citations

  • Dan T. Coenen, The Originalist Case Against Congressional Supermajority Voting Rules, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1091 (2012).

    Arguing that the text and structure of the Constitution, including the Presentment Clause, “establish that a bill is passed if and only if it receives a majority vote.”

  • Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 143 (2012).

    Noting that the veto was intended in part to provide the President with another tool for exercising power in foreign affairs.

  • Jaynie Randall, Sundays Excepted, 59 Ala. L. Rev. 507, 508 (2008).

    Exploring origins of “Sundays excepted” and rejecting the “Christian nation” thesis in favor of deliberation and federalism purposes for enshrining Sunday exception.

  • John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 72-73 (2001).

    Arguing that “[m]any other founding-era writings emphasized that by dividing the legislative power among independent bodies, bicameralism and presentment would make it more difficult for any group actuated by self-interest to capture the legislative process. And, quite apart from any concern with factions, some influential Founders understood bicameralism and presentment as a device to promote caution and deliberation in the lawmaking process—to restrain the momentary passions that sometimes infect the political system.”

  • John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Rights of Legislators and the Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further Defense of the Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Rules, 47 Duke L.J. 327 (1997).

    Arguing that evidence of the original meaning of the clause does not indicate that “passed” is limited to majority votes (i.e., that Congress may impose supermajority voting rules, as long as those rules are themselves repealable by simple majority.

  • Michael B. Rappaport, Veto Burdens and the Line Item Veto Act, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 771 (1997).

    Noting that the Framers included the presidential veto both to guard against legislative encroachment on executive power and to promote circumspect lawmaking, and arguing that Line Item Veto Act both unconstitutionally burdens the veto power and impermissibly delegates power to the President.

  • Michael B. Rappaport, The President’s Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 735 (1993).

    Arguing that “[t]he term ‘adjournment’ here should be understood to refer to all recesses, because both intersession and intrasession recess can interfere with the President’s constitutional right to take ten days to return a bill to Congress.”

  • Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 385 (1992).

    Arguing that it is not clear from Founding era evidence whether or not the Framers would have approved of the line-item veto.

  • L. Gordon Crovitz, The Line-Item Veto: The Best Response When Congress Passes One Spending “Bill” A Year, 18 Pepp. L. Rev. 43, 47 (1990).

    Contending that “[t]here is good historical evidence that the veto power of the Constitution as understood by its Eighteenth Century drafters and ratifiers includes what we now call a line-item veto.”

  • Thomas Stefan Schroeder, Original Understanding and Veto Power: Are the Framers Safe While Congress is in Session, J.L. & Pol. 757 (1990).

    Arguing riders and multi-topic legislation are not embraced by the original understanding of “bill.”

  • Judith A. Best, The Line-Item Veto: Would The Founders Approve?, 14 Pres. Stud. Q. 183 (1984).

    Arguing that, although the Framers did not consider the particular question of line-item vetoes, a broad construction of the Presentment Clause’s intended function supports their constitutionality as a check on legislative overreach.