Related Citations
-
James I. Wallner, The Foundations of Advice & Consent: Original Intent & the Judicial Filibuster, 31 J. L. & Pol. 297 (2016).
-
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending Formalism and Functionalism in Separation-of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments Power After Noel Canning, 64 Duke L.J. 1513 (2015).
-
Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?, 122 Yale L.J. 940 (2013).
-
David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 71 (2009).
-
Congressional Restrictions on the President’s Appointment Power and the Role of Longstanding Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1914 (2007).
-
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231 (2001).
-
Bret Boyce, The Constitutionality of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act Under Article II, 24 False Claims Act and Qui Tam Quarterly Review 10 (2001).
-
John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 Const. Comment. 87 (1998).
-
Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal Appointments Process, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 467 (1998).
-
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the President’s Administrative Powers, 102 Yale L.J. 991 (1993).
-
John O. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 633 (1993).
-
David A. Strauss and Cass R. Sustein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 Yale L.J. 1491 (1992).
-
Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 443 (1987).