Related Citations

  • David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 71 (2009).

    Tracing the Founder’s vision of the Executive to a “disinterested leadership” model and arguing that the model tracks original intent and is preferable to the current unitary executive theory.

  • Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 Geo. L.J. 1613 (2008).

    Advancing three arguments against the bar of executive discretion in enforcing the law: (1) the Constitution never empowers the President to enforce unconstitutional laws; (2) the President’s duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution requires disregarding unconstitutional laws; and (3) the Faithful Execution Clause requires the President choose the Constitution over unconstitutional laws.

  • Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217 (1994).

    Positing that the President has coequal interpretive authority with Congress and the Court as a function of his duty to take care the laws are faithfully executed and therefore is not literally bound by the legal views of other branches with respect to any of the powers entrusted to him.

  • J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 Duke L.J. 1162 (1989).

    Contending that separation of powers, the fundamental principle animating the Constitution, dictates a unitary Executive that cannot tolerate congressional encroachments that, under the pretext of guarding the public purse, deny the President funds necessary to perform the duties and exercise the prerogatives conferred on him by Article II.