Related Citations

  • David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 71 (2009).

    Contending the Removal Clause demonstrates the President cannot fire civil officers for disobedience, therefore implying a “duty-based” theory of executive power where officers act out of honor, not patronage or fear.

  • John V. Orth, Presidential Impeachment: The Original Misunderstanding, 17 Const. Comment. 587 (2000).

    Reasoning that the framers did not view impeachment as a rejection of the “people’s choice” since they misunderstood the role the House of Representatives would play in the Electoral College.

  • Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 291 (1999).

    Compiling contemporaneous essays written during President Clinton’s impeachment regarding the definition of “high crimes and misdemeanors,” its application to presidents as opposed to other officers, and the Independent Counsel’s meshing with, or gumming up, the framers’ impeachment machinery.

  • Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, 49 Duke L.J. 1 (1999).

    Concluding that, properly utilized, the Senate’s trial of impeachment can be used as a Madison device to regulate fractional pressures as the public can consider the individual’s entire account, through the cipher of the Senate, and determine his legitimacy for continuing to hold office.

  • Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process, 18 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 53 (1999).

    Rejecting views that trials in court more properly hold a President accountable than impeachment because the original meanings of presidential immunity and impeachment frame a sounder regime for regulating presidential misconduct.

  • Richard M. Pious, Impeaching the President: The Intersection of Constitutional and Popular Law, 43 St. Louis U. L.J. 859 (1999).

    Analyzing public responses to three possible impeachments — Nixon in 1974, Reagan in 1987, and Clinton in 1998 — and arguing the American public is rational and often separates private from public life in viewing the President.

  • Mark R. Slusar, The Confusion Defined: Questions and Problems of Process in the Aftermath of the Clinton Impeachment, 49 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 869 (1999).

    Discussing the danger inherent in leaving some aspects of the impeachment process open to widely varying interpretation, but also describing some areas where such open texture is better and allows individual senators’ discretion.

  • Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 279 (1998).

    Advancing originalist and post-ratification evidence to illuminate how the Constitution sharply circumscribes the impeachment power it grants to the House of Representatives.

  • Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1989).

    Explaining that impeachment as a political process defies systematic analysis and that legal scholarship may only illuminate the contours of various political questions the Constitution entrusts to Congress.