Georgetown Center for the Constitution

Arguing that the authority to determine what the Constitution means has always been shared rather than exercised solely by the Supreme Court.

Proposing a new framework for analyzing the legality of jurisdiction-stripping legislation.

Making a constitutional case against the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, including an analysis of what the suspension clause says about the proper interpretation of Congress’s power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.

Argues that the exceptions clause language is properly read to permit Congress to shift cases from the Court’s appellate to its original jurisdiction. Thus, Congress can’t make any exceptions to appellate jurisdiction without giving SCOTUS concurrent original jurisdiction over these cases. Looks to the original public meaning of the clause to conclude that the federal judiciary must be allowed to exercise all of the judicial power of the United States, and the Supreme Court has the final jurisdictional word in all cases that raise federal issues.

Exploring a justification for the Supreme Court’s assertions of supervisory power by which it prescribes rules of procedure and evidence on inferior courts: the notion that the Court possesses supervisory power by virtue of its constitutional supremacy.

Exploring the attribute of hierarchical “finality” on which all the political power of the Supreme Court now depends.

Exploring the history and workings of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and its amendments.