Related Citations
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Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 243, 250 (2004).
Reviewing the original meaning of the terms “duties, imposts, and excises” and “taxes” and arguing that the Founders adopted this clause for many reasons, but slavery was not a major reason.
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James R. Campbell, Dispelling the Fog About Direct Taxation, 1 Brit. J. Am. Legal Stud. 109, 112 (2012).
Arguing that capitation taxes embraced a wider range of taxes than traditionally thought, and that apportionment “may have fallen far short of its goal, but it is not just a vestigial trace of the Founders’ long-since repudiated ‘bargain with slavery.’”
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Erik M. Jensen, The Individual Mandate and the Taxing Power, 134 Tax Notes 97 (2012).
Arguing that the penalty associated with the ACA’s individual mandate, if considered a tax, may constitute a direct tax (and is unlikely to be exempt from apportionment under the 16th Amendment as a tax on income).
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Steven J. Willis & Nakku Chung, Oy Yes, the Healthcare Penalty is Unconstitutional, 129 Tax Notes 725 (2010).
Arguing that apportionment retains vitality despite being part of the three-fifths compromise, and that it was not impliedly repealed by the 14th Amendment.
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Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment Under the Constitution?, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 839 (2009).
Arguing that “apportionment is still alive, but (apart from requisitions and capitation taxes) is confined to federal taxes on real estate and tangible personal property.”
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Erik M. Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment (by Way of the Direct-Tax Clauses), 21 Const. Comment. 355 (2004).
Arguing that the Direct Tax Clause was meant to be a significant limitation on federal taxing power and that the phrase “taxes on incomes” in the 16th Amendment should not be interpreted to eviscerate that limitation.
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Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21 Const. Comment. 295, 296 (2004).
Arguing that “nothing in the original meaning of apportionment justifies treating apportionment as a barrier to any federal tax” because “direct taxes” were understood as a proxy for the proposition that Congress must include slave populations in Southern taxes should it choose to apportion a tax.
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Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of “Incomes”, 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 1057, 1091–107 (2001).
Arguing that “a broad interpretation of ‘direct taxes’ is consistent with original understanding” because “if a proposed tax doesn’t have the built-in protections characteristic of taxes on articles of consumption, congressional power to impose the tax should be subject to the apportionment rule. That was the original understanding, consistent with the ‘nature’ of things: cabin the dangerous taxes and leave the safe taxes unconstrained, except for the uniformity rule.”
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Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the Core of the Constitution, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1, 3 (1998).
Arguing that apportionment has “no constitutional weight” because it was imported into the Constitution as a vestige of the Articles of Confederation’s requisition system and to settle a controversy as to the relative power of the slave states.
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Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of “Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2334 (1997).
Arguing that “[d]irect taxes are not duties, imposts, or excises, and they are imposed by the national government on individuals rather than on the states.”