Related Citations
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Bethany R. Pickett, Will the Real Lawmakers Please Stand Up: Congressional Standing in Instances of Presidential Nonenforcement, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 439 (2016).
Concluding that the Framers gave the President multiple duties (rather than prerogatives) in Section 3 and that these duties, denoted by the word “shall,” include the duties to report on the state of the union, receive ambassadors, and take care that the law be faithfully executed.
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Sudha Setty, The President’s Question Time: Power, Information, and the Executive Credibility Gap, 17 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 247 (2008).
Documenting how the State of the Union address was modeled after the British monarch’s speech opening Parliament and suggesting that the creation of the State of the Union address was uncontroversial to the Framers.
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Marci A. Hamilton & Clemens G. Kohnen, The Jurisprudence of Information Flow: How the Constitution Constructs the Pathways of Information, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 267 (2003).
Arguing that the Framers’ prioritization of information flow from the Administration to the Legislature prompted the drafting of the State of the Union Clause.
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Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 (2002).
Engaging in an extensive analysis of the text and history of the State of the Union Clause and the Recommendations Clause and arguing that the Framers intended the clauses to cast the president into the role of “Legislator in Chief.”
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Mark J. Rozell, Restoring Balance to the Debate over Executive Privilege: A Response to Berger, 8 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 541 (2000).
Presenting the history of the drafting of the State of the Union Clause and arguing that the Framers intended the Clause to give the President the prerogative to reveal information to Congress at his discretion, not give Congress the authority to compel the President to present any information Congress demanded.
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Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 104 Yale L.J. 51 (1994).
Arguing that the State of the Union Clause and the Recommendations Clause indicate that the Framers assumed that the President would have better access to information than the legislature had.
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J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 Geo. L.J. 2079 (1989).
Documenting the historical circumstances of the early American legislature which made the State of the Union address especially valuable to Congress.