Related Citations
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Marissa L. Kibler, The Foreign Emoluments Clause: Tracing the Framers’ Fears about Foreign Influence over the President, 74 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 449 (2019).
Examining Founding Era records to conclude that the definition of “emolument” in the Foreign Emoluments Clause is wider in scope than its usage in the other constitutional emoluments provisions, such as the Domestic Emoluments Clause.
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Bianca Spinosa, Interpreting Emoluments Today: The Framers’ Intent and the “Present” Problem, 78 Md. L. Rev. 998 (2019).
Arguing that the Framers’ concerns about potentially corrupting forces of undue influence, both at home and abroad, led them to include the Compensation Clause and the Emoluments Clauses in the Constitution.
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Benjamin Wallace Mendelson, The Nonjusticiable Emoluments Clause, 34 J.L. & Pol. 197 (2019).
Arguing that the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s applicability to the President is not clear since the Framers chose to mention the President in the Domestic Emoluments Clause but not in the Foreign Emoluments Clause.
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John Mikhail, The 2018 Seegers Lecture: Emoluments And President Trump, 53 Val. U. L. Rev. 631 (2019).
Documenting the drafting history of the Emoluments Clauses at the Constitutional Convention.
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Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, From a Mint on a Hotel Pillow to an Emolument, 70 Mercer L. Rev. 705 (2019).
Showcasing Alexander Hamilton’s belief that the cap on the presidential salary would be both a ceiling and floor to prevent the legislature from attempting to control the President through his compensation.
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Karl A. Racine & Elizabeth Wilkins, Enforcing the Anti-Corruption Provisions of the Constitution, 13 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 449 (2019).
Arguing that the history of the Emoluments Clauses and the interpretation of those Clauses over the years support a textual reading of the clause that defines “emoluments” as any profit, gain, or advantage, including those gleaned from market-rate transactions.
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Don Mayer & Adam Sulkowski, The U.S. Constitution’s Emoluments Clauses: How History, Behavioral Psychology, and the Framers’ Understanding of Corruption All Require an End to President Trump’s Conflicts of Interest, 7 Brit. J. Am. Legal Stud. 257 (2018).
Arguing that the Framers hoped for political leaders with civic virtue but drafted the Emoluments Clauses to safeguard public officials from temptation and corruption.
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Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions and President Trump’s “Emoluments” Problem, 40 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 759 (2017).
Looking to President George Washington’s business transactions as proof that business transactions for value are not encompassed by the term “emolument” as used in the Constitution.
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Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of “Emoluments” in the Constitution, 52 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (2017).
Exploring the original meaning of “Emoluments” in the Constitution and identifying four common definitions of the term in Founding Era political discourse.
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Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341 (2009).
Arguing that the Framers drafted the Presidential Emoluments Clause to prevent the President from becoming overly dependent upon Congress or becoming susceptible to corruption by Congress or a particular state.
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Mark R. Brown, Ballot Fees as Impermissible Qualifications for Federal Office, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 1283 (2005).
Arguing that the Framers’ decision to guarantee a fixed executive salary–without state interference–supports the conclusion that states cannot impose property qualifications on presidential candidates.
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Peter J. Henning, Federalism and the Federal Prosecution of State and Local Corruption, 92 Ky. L.J. 75 (2003).
Arguing that the Framers’ concern with corruption led them to adopt several provisions in the Constitution that limit the opportunities for political leaders’ self-enrichment, including the prohibition on increasing a president’s compensation during his time in office.
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John F. O’Connor, The Emoluments Clause: An Anti-Federalist Intruder in A Federalist Constitution, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 89 (1995).
Arguing that the Framers included Article II, Section 1, Clause 7 in the Constitution to shield Congress from presidential intrigue and corruption.