Related Citations
-
Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of “Emoluments” in the Constitution, 52 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (2017).
Identifying four common uses of the term “emoluments” in the Founding era and arguing that the three uses of the term in the Constitution had common meaning, which was “compensation with financial value received by reason of public employment.”
-
Seth Barrett Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause: A Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 180 (2013).
Arguing that the scope of Teachout’s anti-corruption principle cannot extend to state officeholders.
-
Seth Barrett Tillman, Conference Paper: Six Puzzles for Professor Akhil Amar (Loyola University of Chicago Law School, Fourth Annual Constitutional Law Colloquium Conference, Nov. 1, 2013).
Engaging in intratextual comparison of “interpretive default rules” in Incompatibility Clause, Emoluments Clause, and Ineligibility Clause.
-
Seth Barrett Tillman, Either/Or: Professors Zephyr Rain Teachout and Akhil Reed Amar–Contradictions and Suggested Reconciliation, 96 n.170 (January 1, 2012).
Arguing that the Constitution employs different language in the Ineligibility and Incompatibility Clauses the two clauses have different focuses: bias vs. domination.
-
Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 399 (2012).
Criticizing Teachout’s “anti-corruption principle” on the grounds that the limitation of the Ineligibility Clause, Emoluments Clause, and Foreign Gifts Clause to appointed officers likewise limits the interpretive usefulness of such a principle.
-
Note, The Ineligibility Clause’s Lost History: Presidential Patronage and Congress, 1787-1850, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1727 (2010).
Describing the historical significance of the Ineligibility Clause and noting that it served the separation of powers, legislative accountability, and congressional “disinterestedness.”
-
Seth Barrett Tillman, Why Our Next President May Keep His or Her Senate Seat: A Conjecture on the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause, 4 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1 (2008).
Arguing that the Incompatibility Clause does not prevent an individual from sitting as both a senator and the President.
-
David J. Shaw, An Officer and a Congressman: The Unconstitutionality of Congressmen in the Armed Forces, 97 Geo. L.J. 1739 (2009).
Arguing that the Incompatibility Clause, as originally understood, prohibited members of Congress from also serving in the military.
-
Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 359 (2009).
Arguing that the Ineligibility Clause, the Emoluments Clause, and the Foreign Gifts Clause form a core of anti-corruption provisions in the Constitution and that Buckley v. Valeo wrongly emphasized the separation of powers function of the Ineligibility Clause instead.
-
John F. O’Connor, The Emoluments Clause: An Anti-Federalist Intruder in A Federalist Constitution, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 89 (1995).
Conducting a textual, historical, intent-based inquiry into the proper interpretation of the Emoluments Clause and concluding that it served a broader purpose than its anti-corruption function—controlling the expansion of the federal government.
-
Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1045 (1994).
Making an intratextual comparison of Ineligibility Clause and Incompatibility Clause to argue that the Incompatibility Clause has an anti-corruption purpose.