Related Citations
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James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon, Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the Early Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, and Transparency, 96 Va. L. Rev. 359 (2010).
Arguing that “the requirement of an established rule of naturalization was understood to foreclose retroactive changes in the terms on which individuals were to be admitted to citizenship.”
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Patrick J. Charles, The Plenary Power Doctrine and the Constitutionality of Ideological Exclusions: An Historical Perspective, 15 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 61 (2010).
Arguing that the Naturalization Clause was understood to codify the international legal principle of plenary authority over immigration in the political branches.
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Iris Bennett, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of “Aggravated Felony” Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1696 (1999).
Arguing that “the Framers drew a direct connection between the exclusivity of Congress’s power over this field–which has been recognized time and again–and the uniformity requirement. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 32, the power over naturalization must ‘necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to prescribe a Distinct Rule there could be no Uniform Rule.’”
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Michael T. Hertz, Limits to the Naturalization Power, 64 Geo. L.J. 1007 (1975).
Discussing the meaning of “uniform” and “rule” in framing context.