Related Citations
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Antonio F. Perez, A Whole Text Reading of the War Powers Clauses: Why the Constitution’s Text Obviates Esoteric War Powers Debates and Encourages Policy Flexibility and Democratic Accountability, 12 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 861 (2014).
Arguing that the Appropriations Power enables Congress to address the dangers of domestic effects of plenary executive authority.
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Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (2012).
Noting that “[a] navy was a relatively defensive instrument that could not easily be turned upon Englishmen to impose domestic tyranny.”
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Robert J. Delahunty, Structuralism and the War Powers: The Army, Navy and Militia Clauses, 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1021 (2003).
Reviewing the political and geopolitical circumstances at the Founding to argue that Congress’s power to control the Executive’s power in the face of threatened armed conflicts is rooted in the clauses of Article I relating to standing Armies, the Navy, and the Militia.
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Christopher A. Abel, Not Fit for Sea Duty: The Posse Comitatus Act, the United States Navy, and Federal Law Enforcement at Sea, 31 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 445 (1990).
Explaining that the main reason for divergent views of the different branches of the service was that navies could not intervene in domestic politics or threaten personal liberties on land.