Related Citations
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Andrew Kent, Ethan Leib & Jed Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2111 (2019).
Arguing that Article II incorporates fiduciary obligations, including the duties of loyalty and good-faith, that constrain the exercise of the pardon power.
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Noah A. Messing, A New Power?: Civil Offenses and Presidential Clemency, 64 Buff. L. Rev. 661 (2016).
Suggesting that the Constitution’s text, structure, and history support the idea that the President may pardon civil offenses.
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Paul Rosenzweig, Reflections on the Atrophying Pardon Power, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 593 (2012).
Proposing that the Founders intended the President to have a robust pardon power and that the President’s pardon power was broadly accepted in the early days of the Republic.
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Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 521 (2005).
Arguing that, in light of the Constitution’s text, structure, and history, the President is the constitutional prosecutor of all federal offenses.
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Brian C. Kalt, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 Yale L.J. 779 (1996).
Arguing that the intent of the Framers and the words and themes of the Constitution do not support the idea that the President can pardon himself.
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James N. Jorgensen, Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President’s Prerogative to Escape Accountability, 27 U. Rich. L. Rev. 345 (1993).
Examining the historical evolution of the President’s pardoning power, from medieval English practice through modern American use, and arguing that the clemency powers of the President should be limited for executive branch officials.
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Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 569 (1991).
Tracing the use of the clemency power from its historical origins to the modern day and proposing procedures to divest clemency decisions from the individual discretion of the President.
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Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 Yale L.J. 1069 (1990).
Analyzing the Framers’ writings and debates, along with colonial and early federal criminal prosecution practices, to determine that the Framers did not intend prosecution to be a core executive function.